Created: 2/1/1990

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Situation HrpnirM


Broadening the Antidrug Oflcniiv

The Cocaine Industry: Challenge*

Coca CuhJrmUoQ Comiaaiaa


TkU Situation Rerori is prepared by tht DO Cemniermawemict Center.from oiher offices. Il assesses narcotics-relatedTV report leadshort Perspectiverup relate* issuethat wef special Importance. Thentended toand to teneratt discussion. The Perspective It followed byand the remainder af tht report examined various dimensions of iheby region^ Questions and comments are welcome and ihouldtoCouniernarcorlci Center.




Narcotics Situattion RrportBB

rebruary IWO

Colombia: Breaching the AnlHnzj Often*!

calk by Colombian political and religious leadenialogue with the trafficker* may intensify if Medellin drag kingpin Pabloaptured or killed by the government or. indeed, by bis rivals from Call or elsewhere. Those takingoahkm would aotc that Escobar's removal, following the death of Rodriguez Gacbt in December, rida the country of the two moat violent drug traffickers and fulfills Bogota's avowed goal to bring (hern to Justice. This tack would garner strong public backing and intensify the already significant pressure oa President Barco to draw down operations. To do ao. however, would largelythe achievements ofthe past sisrawdown would not only pave the way for the MeoetUa organisations to rebound but wonM abo remove any government chaDenge lo the lessmore insidious and extremelyfront Call and the north coast, which continue to account for much ofocaine I

Support for tbe government has so far generallyroad understanding that the violent tactics of the Medellin traffickershreat to Colombia's security. The death of Rodrigwea Oacharc&gai with security forces and the government's nbscqoeot pledge to pursue las equally dangerous cohort. Pablo Escobar, wonhigh marks at home and abroad for iu commitment lo confront Ihe kingpins. Nevertheless. Escobar'* passing from tbe scene is not likely to achieve one of Bogota's key ioals: to quell drug-related violence in Medellinscene of0 murders during theelsewhere. Many of Escobar'sand rivals reportedly arc pari military specialists who have beaded rural defense groups and assassinationcower vacuum would generate additional violence and intlmidaliou at would-bo soooessors line up associates and authorities to further their individual i

Traffickers from Cab. the north coast, sad elsewhere sacanwbile have been spared the same level of government pressure devoted to the Mcddbn ora^aizaisoa* largely, wc believe, because they historically have used less confrontational tactics in blunting countcroarcotica operations. Nevertheless, these orgaolratioos, which generally rely on bribery rather than intimidation aad stay out of the direct political limelight, represent aa equally dangerous threat to Colombia'* democratic matitatioos, particularly dtSOBraama1 Uatoogh their penetration of economic, poliii-*l. and security interests.




I In aarticle wriltea by Gilberlo Rodriguez Urejuila, US UW tangpcn reminded ihe public thai attempts to seek hit extradition were Invalid because be has already been tried aod acquittedolombian court of tbe charges pending against him In the United;

thai the recent

release ot two weu-estaotisneo norm coast uamcaers shortly after top local National Police Commanders were replaced further underscores the light grip narcotics interests In this area have on the security force*!

The Cocaine Induslry: Challenges

Latin American cocaine trade is facing iu most serious challenge yet from counlcrnarcocica forces, but iu enormous power, flexibility, and built-inwillo remain the preeminent drug threat to tbe United Stales and other Western court-trie* well into. The ability of the Colombian Oovemmeot to sustain the offensive initially launched In9 against the kingpins who manage and finance much of the industry has put them on the defensive, even thougbH that overall cocaine flowstotbeUrirtednchecked. The ability of the trade to rebound after voluntarily drawing down some operations during tbe first six weeks of the crackdown reinforces our belief tost Colombia's efforts alone will not be enough to cripple the industry and prevent cocaine production and marketing from expanding to new areas. In this regard, tbe central roles played by traffickers in all the Andean countries, as well as support from drug interests in other nations, facilitate continued industry adjustments to anlutarcotics pressure. Moreover, theby broad-based corruption and the region's traditional economicweU-posiUdncd to resist anything short of aninternationally coordinated effort to dismantle its traduction, trafficking, and financial networks.


Al this point, tbe wild card in tbe Latin American cocaine situation la the Colombian crackdown. In our judgment, this effort has been especially notable because, for tbe firstatin Americanhasomprehensive strategy tothe leading Colombianresponsible for managing much of the expanding international cocaineapprehending tbe kingpins and their lieutenants, as well as seizing their records and communications centers. The eflort hasumber of successes, including the death of one of tbe world's roost notorious kingpins, tbeof several of the industry's top lieutenants to the United States, and the confiscation of millions of

dollars worth of trafficker assets. Moreover, virtually all of the kingpins have bad to lower their profiles, and some have been forced underground to avoid extradition or death. The pressure has increased traffickersource and market areas well beyondmounting threats against heretofore smoothly functioning drug operations.

Encouraging though these developments may be, the trade's capabilities remain largely intact. Tbestrength is especially apparent in the vast areas of territory effectively under its dominion. These include the Upper Huallaga Valley and other areas of Peru; tbe Beni, Chaparc. and Santa Crui regions of Bolivia; and parts of central and southeasternGWen tbe hardiness of the coca bush and the vast profits its exploitation generates, we believe that cultivation could spill over Into other areas of Latin America, thereby further insulating tbe trade from concerted unilateral antinarcodes Initiatives. There are already small areas of coca coltirstioo insuch as Ecuador. Venezuela, and Braril^

Even without such expansion, however, the industry produced moreetric tons of coca leaff all were converted, this would amount toons of cocaine, well aboveons many estimate Is required to satisfy tbe annual US market About half of this coca leaf comes from Peru, which Is the world's largest coca producer. The other two Andean players, Colombia and Colivia. perform equally important and complementary roles. Tbe Colombian industry, which grows less coca than tbe Bolivian and Peruvian industries, generates huge revenues from the more lucrative processing and marketing operations. Bolivia, the world's second-largest coca grower,rug infrastructure that in both cocaine processing and marketing.

Dl IN/


Industry'* complementary operations areevident in the throe-step proccw by which coca leaves become cocaine hydrochlorider pore cocaine. After the leaves are hejresied, growers In Peru and Bolivia extract coca paste from them In crude laboratories that are little more than pus dug in the around and lined with sheets of

i are mo

laboratories in Bolivia, located almost exclusively in the Chapare region- The number of faculties in Peru is significantly higher because of its greaterMost Peruvian coca products are transshipped to Colombia for refining into cocaine. In Bolivia's case, however, large amounts of the paste are processed into cocaine base at conversion sites usually outside culti-vallon areas. Some Bolivian cocaine base isDown to the Llanos region of southeastern Colombia for final processing, although increasing amounts are refined in Bolivia as local traffickersarger profits. Colombian processing operations are meanwhile entrenched throughout the country, in urban as well as In rural areas!

We believe the growth that bas catapulted cocaineuUibulion-dollar business that currently may involve upillion Latin Americans will continue during the neat few years. In our Judgment, the United States will remain tbe key target for cocaine traffickers, but we also expect tbe industry to focus on Western Europe, whoseillion iahabitapt* already are gaining greater access to

i as drug organizations arc the prime movers in bringing tbe cocaine HC1 to market,accounting for someercent of the cocaine that la trafficked throughout the United States. At this /The Bahamasey transshipment

Coca CuiliraIloo: Continuing Expansi

Coca cultivation increased byercent In tbe Andean ration9 according to our estimate, and tbe potential exists for labatantiat expansion tn thein the Andes and in other tropical and subtropical regions around tbe world. Leasercent of the land ba South America that caa egroeoewcaliy snpport coca cultivation is underand most of ihi^^BgggggggglgMmmnmwgft yielding more thanO0 nsetrie lou of coca leaf-is ieolivia, aad Coiorabia. If afl of this leaf were processed, it could yield aa asucfaetric tons of-

For centuries, coca had been grown primarily along the eastern slopes of the Andes Mountains ofEcuador. Peru, and Bolivia to support Indigenous demand for chewing coca, it Is now grown largely In Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, anduch ameller scale in Brazil, Vtoezuela. and 1

the largest coca producer in the Andean Ridge

Increases in coca cultivationolivia iaill depend in part oo tbe abibty of tbe new BoWr, Governmentbuild oo (be recent success of Its voiantary crop crarficatjcn aegtrnro Each roootb

combination offforts have apparcnilj cBu-ecl the price ol It'flHk ]lo faU somewhat below the profit margin.ore coca fanners have applied for funds through the Bolivian voluntary eradication program. We believe that future changes In levels of coca cultivation will depend heavily on whether prices remain depressed. If the price of coca leaf rlseSjSve^ would expect to sec further cultivationINew cultivation would continue to follow


Dt is

only eradicated when found cotocatcd with alab. Therefore, coca growers for the most part can operate In Colombia without fear of government interference, and coca cultivation will continue to expand In. We expect that tbe largest increases in cultivation will occur in the Puturnayo and Bolivar areas

in ibstramatic expansion in[u>0ubstantial Increases in all coca growing regions ui Colombia. Bolivar badarijuana growing area before the Colombianoperation8 canaed many farmers in that area to switch to cocaM

Colombia's eoun terns root ics campaign is urge tedagainst traffickers and their assets and.esser extent, processing labs and cultivation. Coca b

Potential Coca CaJtrmrjoa Areas


Tbe potential worldwide coca growing area for both the upland and lowland coca varieties is enormous compared with the area now under cultivation. In South America alone, lessercent of ibe land thai could support upland or lowland coca is under cultivation. Although cultivation of coca for tbetrade has not been confirmed outside South America, there are large areas agronomically suitable for growing both varieties. These coca growing areas arc In the tropical and subtropical areas of Mexico and Centraloutheast Asia, and io the islands of Indonc

The Coca riant

Although theft ore morepeciri of coca belonging lo Iht tropical plant gratis Erylhroxylum. only two dottly relatedcocaultivated for tht Illicit cocaine trade or for chewing. Erylhroxylum coca It lha primary source of cocaine for iht drug trade bttaiuti'ad ion of cocaine from E. movogranatenit It difficult when field extraction methods art used-

Th* cultlratton ofperenniallo regions of lhe world that areoercent average retail*rail free,ean annual temperature between It amiegrees Celsius, ami with average annual rainfallillimeim Erylhroxylum coca, the coca ipettt mart Important lo iht cocaine trade, coniiiti of two varieties lhal art even more rtttrtcted lly:

Although Ibeagrorioeilcally cults.bto tor growing coo Is vast, (scion other ikaa agronomics place limits oatraffickers can expand or relocate their operations- The traffickers' cbcacc la constrained br the cutting transportation infrastructure, theof governrncnl control and (be potitacal will of lhe government to exercise tbla control, and theof labor needed lo farm and harvest the coca


Coca products must be readily moved out of Use growing legion, and precursor chemicals for initial processing of coca leaves Into paste and base must be moved Into tbe region in large quantities. Because small-scale traffickers and coca fanners depend on existing labor and transportation systems, many of tbe projected coca cultivationarticularly in Ibe jungle regions of South America, could be developed only by Urge trafficking groups with sufficientio offset initial infrastructure development

coca raritly coca, aa "upland"that Is propagated from ittd that grows only la elevationsnd 2JXJO mettrt and Is favored by porous, well-drained soils. TV highest cocaine yields In upland coca are producede ten. The upland coca plant can bt harvested three to fourear, beginningonths after planting and continuing for as long asears; tht yield and alkaloid content of lhe leaves, however, diminish afteroean.

Erylhroxylum coca varietylowland" variety that can only bt propagated from cuttings, growl bert In poorly drained soils at elevations listeters. Lowland coca can bt harvtsltd three to sixear, beginning six months after planting and continuing fee three lofcmr yean. Potential cocaine yields foe lowland coca arehalf those for upland eoca^^

Grcrtrwaaiat Caetrol

Extensive coca cultivation and traffic king are possible cot/ where tbe government does act have the desire or the ability to exercise in control. However, corruption or intimidation from traffickers often co-opt those government force* stationed ia coca-producing re-gions^^h

f labor

Tbe cultivation of coca and tbe productioa of cocaine arc labor intensive, and tbe accessibility oflarge labor pooley factor in the selection of future productioneparseajor barrier to Ibe development of new cultivation areas in the jungle regions of South

Outlook aari ImpUcatlceri

We have no indications that coca growersajor relocation of their efforts outside Ihe traditional growing areas, but weteady. If gradual, expansion of Ibe area devoted lo this crop can be

wherejhe st


expected. The roll impact of any espanUon will not be felt for tocos time Inasmuch ai (he highest yields do not occur for five to eight years after planting. We believe that trafficker! are not likely loajor ihift unless pushed to do to by successful, prolonied narcotics crop control programs or interdiction efforts in the traditional areas.ajor shift is made, we believe traffickers la South America would initially relocate to other areas la the region. In the absenceomprchcaarve oowaieroa rooties program, the most likelyone having the greatest potential impact on cocaine production would be to the high-yield upland coca growing area along Ihe eastern slopes of the Andes Mountain* That area, which represents about one-third of South America 1coca growing area. It men favorable to expanded coca cultivation thai the lowland growing areaof the availability of transportation systemsubstantial labor pool. However, If tbe Andean rations are successful In implementing comprehensive control efforts in Ihe upland growing area, traffickers are likely to move more of their ^rations lo Ihe lowland area wherejhe spread of cultivationto control]

A major thlfl in coca cultivation outsldo SouthIt least likely but wouldove with potentially the greatest impact on cocaineercent of Ibe potential coca growing areas outside South America can tgroeotnkally support the cultivation of tha higher yielding upland coca variety. These areas also favor rapid expatuuon. since the local governments, particularly in Africa, have nowith narcotic crop control ctTcets needed to hall the spread of coca cultivation. In addition, these areas altoufficient labor pool and tbe substantial transportation Infrastructure needed to support acoca i


The Narco-IasurRertt Connection In i" Andean Region I

reUtionihlp bctweea nnrcotsca traffickers and insurgents In Ibe Andes bat evolved largely because Uachckcrs and gvernllti la both Colombia and Pent inhabit remote geofrspbic regions thai traditionally have been outside government control At this point, insurgents ia both as boos profit financially from their participation la the btdastry. sltbougb iheir invocve-mcat hat hadarginal impact on the size and overall strength of the drag trade Itself. We believe, however, that trafficker-inauigent friction willhiteosify in both Colombia and Pent, atbecome increasingly concerned over the guerrillas' efforts lo expand Iheir participation and wiih It. their share of PJtcit drug revenues. In Bolivia, where links between small subversive organizalions and interests may exist, conflict could alto de-el

Tbe strongest insurgent drug ilea

I all subversive orgaaUauoot naverade ai one time or another. Currently,an Rrvolo tiooary Armed Forces of(FARC) it the moat deeply tn vetted, at initial efforts in extracting war taxes from coca growers andcicbangc for providing security narcoticsbeen augmentedncluding

rarely have defended drug site* against government raids, thus reneging on Iheir part of the bargain with traffickers. Some traffickers have reportedly refused lo pay protection feet in insurgent-dominated regions and hare formed paramilitary groups to offsetinfluence la tome

The Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgency inwhich we estimate numbers fewerbegan iu association with the narcoticsia much the same way as the FARC, but iu involvement hi coca processing and transportsUoo remain more limited than that of the

guerrillas. Wt believe Semoero

[ia order to profit from aa rooties

upport base among peasant coca growers unhappy with exploitation by traffickers about government couoUrnarcoilcs


relationihlp between the trafficker! and tbe FARC haa grown increasingly contentious, however, as the guerrillas have expanded their narcoticsand challenged the trafficker! in other ways. Tbe Ccsombtan military, which haa long viewedUvotvrmcet In dragsustification for more aggressive countcruourgeut operations, claims that expanded FARC Uvorvement ia coca cultivation and refining has Increasingly put the FARC In direct Ition with ioms traffickers

licatea that Ihe Iniurgenu

Sendero's mote recent efforts to set higher pricesmeanwhile provoked

conflicts witharticularly Colomt bo have traditionally dominated coca i

rices for coca: JlMummetcdearly weeks after the antF" irug crackdown in Colombia but have been climbing


In our Judgment, insurgents in both Peru andwill try to exercise in creasing control over ihe narcotics industry In areas where they are also socking some form of political domination. Wee-fixing in Peru and expanding uuurgent-maintalnod coca fields In Colombia are developments that will almostamly Intensify tbe insurgent-trafficker conflict!

An additionalon may occuresult ofsituation in Bolivia. The ZaraleArmedmall terroristresponsible Jot attacks on US citizens andin

gggHsBBwaaBafl Lwaaaiwlw armed group, the Alejo Calalayud Commando

group promotes tbe idea that tbe coca leaf

is sacred and an Important part of the peasanta' religious beliefs, la7 the CAC advocated tbe ouster from Bolivia of US drug enforcement personnel and fomented enough unrest among peasants lo cause the temporary removal of US officials from Ibe area. Zsratc Wilika and other subversive groups la their formative stages may take advantage of the financial and recruiting opportunities inherent la the coca growing regions to gather strength, as their Peruvian and Colombian counterparts have done. If these groups eventually become Involved in naicotic* iraf-Scking they may encounter resistance frontseeking lo protect their opera lion* from insurgent cncroacrtrnesjgj

Wrat European nation* have Hatted to confront the increasing threat posed by cocaine, although the uoeraneaa of Individual nalioaal reiporues willto provide the cocaine induitry withto eanlott. Until recently, hereon was the major narcotics challenge facing ibe region, with mostantidrug strategics origins ling io Ihe health ministries aad dedicatedehabilitatingDaring the past decade, however, Colombian drugby Western Europe's Large and relatively affluent snartrsi. weak border security, and sophisticated transportationsome air and maritime esport operations on Iberia aad Italy. Tbe success of these initial opera-lions led to intensified efforts to move larger maritimeIn containerizedsouthern and northern

Tbe European Community (EC) countries that have become key entry points and those thai havemarkets appear lo be responding most vigorously through increasing efforts against export and dfe lion operationsat cm

abinet-level official to increase ihe effec-tlreneaa of Ita aQlinarcotks program, and Italy and the United Kingdom are augmenting security al key airports and seaporu. In addition, most Wastoat iota have enacted legislationncreasefor drug trafficking, to seize trafficker profits, and to enhance resources for enforcement In our judgment, recently enacted asset seizure legislation In Ilary, tbe United Kingdom,efendant lo show thai his assets are notbeen especially effective In heir authorities confiscate large narcotics profll

Expanded intelligence sharing is meanwhile enabling Weal European police forces to Increase Interdiction and arrests. In Spain alone, for Instance, authorities haveumber of multibandrrd-kilogramn is after receiving tips fp

Signaling their mounting concern over cocaine exports to Western Lutope, some of the governments harden hit by the trade are stepping up antidrug assistance to the source nations Most Weal European assistance to drug-prodocmg countries is currently channeled through tbe United Nations Fund for Drug Abase Control (UN fDAO and committed lodeveloameni programs. Forabatanlial part of0 million rnultiyear antinarcoocs budget Isearmarked for Holms and Colombia, aad some Nordic countries im pre tied with Ibe Colombian crackdown and hoping to confront their own domestic problem In lisecently made contributions through UNFDAC to Bogota|

At the same time, however J

s some (rustration In Europe over perceived inefficienciei In UN programs, which require Utile commitment from the drug-producing countries aad limit enforcement aid toercent of UNFDACs annual budget, curre-tl>aiillion Accordingly, aof West European govern menu are beginning to offer direct assistance lo Andean nations. The United Kingdom, for example, recently committed more than S2 million to Colombia In enforcement and training assistance, and Italy is providing Bogota with ar-mored vehicle* and training to enhance protection of Colombia'savorite trafficker target.

Such responsiveness to tbe oocairuuhreatisnot^^

Population* in moit European countries have stabilized, France Portugal, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium coot tec that dreg as the rrutjctfuthorities i

Netherlands and PortugaTdo not view cocaine as an addicting substance, nor do health officials collect statistics on cocainefurthering national myopia. These difficulties are compounded byand manpower constraints in countries such as


limit security and interdiction effa

Atdespite current unilateral aodefforts by some Weal European governments to respond to the cocainebelieve tbe cocaine industry can easily exploit tbe vulnerabilities of Individual European countries. Furthermore, what isegional problem for Western Europe is likely to intensifyis currentlyborder controls throughout the EC are relaxed or eliminated.!


Hi Inruttl.auoa Down Sharply b> NN of inetric boat of marijuana inpercent from that8 -thtrop in productionleets tbe .

of tbe US-sponsored aerial andJcaiioo program, the US Coast Guard intension program, and the Colombian Nationalnterdiction effort!esult of these programs, the Colombian riurijuana industry appears to betate of decline. Colombia now falls well behind Mexicoource of maryuana for the United StatcaP

Panama Pledge* Antidrug Cooperationt)

To underscore iu commilmeot to cooperate fully on antidrug matters, tbe new Panamanian Gown meat has signedjoint agreement with Washington on narcotics Tbe bilateral measure calls for reducing demand, preventing illegal drugaad drug production aad uaOckiag. Most of ihc antidrug burden is likely io faD initially on tbe Public Force--reconsilluted from tbe Panama Defense Forces. Antidromic* investigations willdlcd by the Independent Technical Judicial Police under the direction of Ihe Attorney General. Offidal commitment to Ibe fight appears sincere, but drug interest! arej Panama that i

iMyait-and-see altitude concerning Panama's viabilityrug-money-laundering havenesult of the seizure of bank records dnring tbe recent USaf Nceeiga'solombian i

| Stringent bank secrecy regulation* meanwhile remain intact for the nearactor that, in our judgment, maymore traffickers to launder substantial profits through bunks in Panama as tbe investigations comeose.



Cctisoing Antidrug Efforts

forccdowns peeled drug smuggling aitcrafl onanuary by the Cuban Air Force mark*first successful use of this uctic since President Castroougher countejnarcotict stance last June. Cuban fighters fired warning shots at Use US-registered aircraft, forcing it to land at Havana'sairport. Tbe incident follows augmented antidrug training by tbe Air Force and the Cuban military's dedication of additional manpower and equipment to interdiction. Meanwhile, drug trafficking through Cuba has dimini&hedj

incident probably reflects the dividends of extensive countemarcolies training, which has helped offset constraints posed by equipment problems and the difficulty of intercepting slow, low-flying smuggling aircraft. The shrinking role of Cuban territory in drug operations probably results from these more aggressive measures but is also, in part, the result of broaderhe trade, such as the coontcrnarcotics offensive launched by tbe Colombian Government last August flHB

Jaasalca: Marijuana dill ration Reduced Again

Jamaica's harvest of anetric tons of marijuana infromjhat inthe third decJincJa marijuana production invectares

were wltivatec^ndMrvesud. The continuing declinTln production Is attributable to the success of tbe "Buccaneer" eradication/interdiction program run by the Government of Jamaica and backed by the US Department of State. As long as the "Buccaneer" program continues to be actively pursued by the Jamaican Government, ihe level of marijuana production is likely to remain low.

Middle- East

artre Shilts Emphasis!

Iran began lu Val 'Adiyat coun teroa rco tks operationoterug amugglen have been executed, low of drugi and numeroua weapon* have been aciied. and thoiuands of addicu arrested, according io Iranian prsas. A* law eafoeceeneel officials atari ibe next phase of Ihe operation, icbcdulcd lo begin la laic January. Ibe focus of tbe initiative haa apparently tbifled from punishment lo rchabiUuUon. The latest long-term plans crnpbaiiic ptaciog more of the addicts in rehabilitation comer* rather than in work casops, which differ little from pritou camps. According to press reports, there areehabiliia lion center* throughout Iran that are eapected to accept the addicts- The shift toward rcawbtUutton was probably prompted in part by tbe failure of past policies to item the rapid increase in heroin addiction Despite the draconian measures of the past year, including mass executions of drug traffickers, the number of opium addicts In Iranillion, according to official government figures. Tbe emphaii* oo rehabiliia lion will not. In our view, yield immediate results because Iran lacks sufficient trained medical personnel and medical fact!

Enhancing Cotmttrnareotks Capability^

^Pakistan's Maritime Securitymproved and expanded its counteruarcotics capabilities.^imilsr to the US Coast Guard, the MSA is responsible for narcotics int

Ihe political trouble* of last fall wane. Prime Minister Bhutto seems to be reeaipha*iring her commitment to the war oo drugs Military participation la counter narcotic* operation* was part of her six-point proposal to com bit drug trafficking announced last year. So far, though, military participation bas been'f mnmililinu hi eviction aod law .

I We

r. that tbe moat beneficial program would"stress drag asset leinsre aad property forfeiture, as well as detection aod interdiction. This policy would serve the twin goals of law enforcement and revenue enhancement for Ibe government. At this point, however, Islamabad lacks the eophiiikaicd conspiracy

Worldwide seizures ofrown marijuana9 indicatethe trade through Urge shipments and various routes. Press reports reveal thatwere seat to Los Angelesargo ship inounds reached Guam in :

Tiytcadurmg^StoDer and November. Fjtriter in tbe yeagjiuthorities at Manilas international airport had seizedounds.

B press reports last fall detailed the discovery in Rigailograms

ontainer from tbe Philippines bound for the Netherlands via Belgium by ship. We believe that competing priorities aod lack of resources will continue to hamper i'g efforts to eradicate marijuana and lo convict arrested traffickers.

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