/"jT5^ Oircctor of
IAjCentral ^vGELv intelligence
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN9
Outlook For Eastern Europe in
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
-Soorot-
Director of
Contra.
Intelligence
Nl1
Outlook For Eastern Europe in
asusedheprcpamwn of ibis Memorandum.
The
a
'his Memorandum: The Central Intelligenceo Defense Intelligence Agency The National Security Agency Thef Intelhgence and Research Depanmertr of State
Outlook for Eastern Europe0
0 wiltear of transition from revolt to reform in Eastern Europe, but for the most part it will not be the year for implementing tough reforms.
Despite de-Communization throughout the region. Communists will retain sufficient power in some places to remain serious potential obstacles to reforms, particularly in Romania and Bulgaria.
' Hungary and Czechoslovakia will force the removal of Soviet troopsoland and East Germany wilt probably put Moscow under increasing pressureubstantial drawdown by the end ofthe year.
The transition to democratic polities and market economies will be most steady in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany; Poland, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria will have rough sledding; and Romania and Albania could welt be in for still more violence.
Key Judgments
ill be lhc year of transition from rcvolleform in Eastern Europe, but for the most part it will not be the year for tough reforms. Poland,has taken thc plunge, and its experiment willellwetheroughminderj reform in Eastern Europe.
Thc year will also sec substantial but uneven dc-CommunizationEastern Europe. Elections will remove Communists from office, reform programs will dismantle the institutional vestiges of old regimes, and Communist Parly memberships will evaporate through confiscation of party property, abolition of mandatory dues, and co-opting of persoanel into new civil bureaucracies and private enterprises. Still, Communists will retain substantialin Romania andcould create serious obstacles to far-reaching reforms.
There will be growing demands for removal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary. Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Soviet forces in East Germany will also come under more serious public pressure.
Implementation of economic reforms in Poland will beget still more rapidly rising prices, layoffs, and factory closings. At thc same time, it is highly
unlikelyufficient social net will be in place and operating during
most of thc year. Workers caught in thc squeeze will take to the streets.
precipitating labor unrest, some violence, and (he Solidarity government's
most crucial test (oda(c.
The opposition in Hungary will dominate the National Assembly that will be elected in March; the Socialists (former Communis(s) will at.bestunior partneroalition.
Chances arc better in Czechoslovakia than in any other East European couniry that measured progresstable democratic society can be sustainedlthough reform-minded Communists remain inood chance of participatingoalition afterbalance will shift decisively in favor of independents. Socialists, and representatives ofthe People's Party.
East Germany will remain adrift between discredited Communists and fractious opposition groups until after (he March elections, and lhcera will feature substantial and rapid movemeni loward merger with West Gcirnany.
1
Polilics in Romania will be increasingly polarized over muchiih lhe governing Nalional Salvation Frontorsening crisis of legitimacy and ihc nation livingontinuing threat of intimidation by Ccausceau-era secret police who have been absorbed into the new Interior and Defense ministries Surfacing economic problems,harp downturn in industrial production, will force theegin serious economic reform late in ihc year.
The transitionon-Communisi rule in Bulgaria will be fixed in the May legislative elect ions, bul follow-on reforms of ihc military, security services, and economy will boost the potential for widespread unrest and violence.
Yugoslavia coniinucs to sail perilously dose lo national disintegration, with Iong-build;ng ethnic tensions and economic problems reaching catastrophic proportions. However, there is reason for optimism. Much hinges on implementation of the parliament's newly enacted economic reforms, especially on the government's resolve0 to restrain subsidies and control monetary policy, on lhc emergenceultiparty political system, and on efforts to hammerew con^tiiutional relationship among the country's ethnic groups.
Contents
Pant>
Judgments
Arc the Key Ouestions and Issues?
Themes for the Nexl Year
Everyone's Test Case
Dynamics of Political Reform0 Progress Toward Economic Reform
Military and Security Services
A
c,
for Relations With Moscow and Anii^rwUrjrm
and Milestones0
Everyone's Best Bet
Dynamics of Political Reform0
Toward Economic Reform
2
Military and Security Services
for Relations With Moscow and Anii-Sovietism
and Milestones0
* ,
13
Can the "Velvet Revolution" Continue?
Dynamics of Political Reform0
Toward Economic Reform
Military and Security Services
for Relations With Moscow and Anii-Sovieiism
and Milestones0
Germany: Crashing Westward
Dynamics of Political Reform0
Toward Economic Reform
1
Military and Security Services
-Secret-
De-Communication
for Relations With Moscow and Ami-Sovictism
and Milestones0
Will Reform Continue To Come From Above?
Dynamics of Political Reform0
Toward Economic Reform
Military and Security Services
for Relations With Moscow and Anti-Sovietism
and Milestones0
Sorting Out thc Christmas Revolution
1 'i.i n At" T> 1 Tl. * 1
uynamics ot raittcal Reform0 Progress Toward Economic Reform
28
Military and Security Services
for Relations With Moscow and Anti-Sovietism
and Milestones0
Can tt Hold Together Long Enough To Reform?
Dynamics of Polilical Reform0
Toward Economic Reform
Military and Security Services
De-Communization
.
for Relations With Moscow and Ami-Soviciism
and Milestones0
On SialmKm Sn-vsv^ Outlook foi IISn iQ'lft
East European Political Parties and Pressure
39
Secret-
Communism hat collapsed in Eastern Europe, and in ils wake the political and economic fabric of the region isew generation of reform-minded leaders arc snuggling toegional landscape Ihat ii littered wiih lhe wreckage ofplanned economics. At thc personal level, old loyalties are meaningless; formerly safe assumptions about tbc future are nowfelong habits of obedience arc suddenly invalid, patterns ofobedience have been disrupted. Surviving rumps of Communist regimes nre beleaguered bysymptoms of systemic collapse; Iheir supporters frenzied by fear of irrepressible change The salient fact aboul Central and Eastern Europe, as one pundit recently put it, is that now "nothing isothing fundamental or lasting lias been changed by four decades of Soviet domination, and every aspect of Eastern Europe's future is open.
What Are (be Kay QacMiorts and Issues?
The rapid pace of evems in Eastern Europe during the past year have underscored lhc need to examine lhe prospects for orderly change in ihe countries of theibe nexl year. In addition to identifying overarching (hemes Ihat will be reference points for analyzing developments, such an assessment should alsoountry-by-country discussion around tbe following issues and questions:
How far have key players and groups come in efforts to make democracy work; how far will they gel? What are lhc chances that progress toward democracy and pluralism might be undermined by factionalism, resurgent nationalism, and/orcollapse'1
What factors or forcescasonable/ measured evolution ol reform? WhjiCommunist parties, secret police,discredited leaders -will retard ptoireW
How will the army and security services--at least parity discreditedover the next year? Will there be purges, major organizations! changes, significant reductions in forces among thc old security apparatuses? How trustworthy arc they now; how capable of counterrevolution?
1 What arc thc prospects for significant anti-Soviei and anti-Warsaw Pact agitation in any of lhc reforming countries of Eastern Europe?
Major Themes for (lie Nexl Year
Thc es'olution of Eastern Europe will occur in thc contex( of larger processes ofeconomic and poliiical integration of Western Europe, (he dramatic shift in thc (exture of NATO relationships, changes in Soriet-Easl European relations, and the unification of lhe two Germanics. Change in the East will interact to an extent with these externalshaping tbem and being shaped by them.although Ihe pace and particulars of reform will vary from country to couniry. certain transnational themes will unify thc experience of the region over the nexl year. These include the following.
The edifying pan is over; the lough decisions and actions are ahead. As thc heady speciadc of (opplcd Communist dictatorships gives way0 to (he grim responsibilities ofew future, some ii/crin regimes will delay, and others mighi falter.
The0 Mil bf one of transition from revolt to reform in Eastern Europe, but for the most part it will not be the year in which tough reforms areew East European proverb says (hat "it's easier to make democracy thanhe nex( six loonths willeriod of political
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foe Economic Performance
Economic performance in Eastern Europe during the next six months will strongly affect political stability and the need for Western assistance.
The following countries are in the approximate order of their likely success:
Czechoslovakia has Inflation under control,debt of manageable site,redit rating second only to East Germany among the East European countries. It needs to loosen economic linkt to the Soviet Union.
Hungary has severe inflation problems. Rapid reform and attendant austerity could causeBut the economy already has alarge private-sector with substantial ties to the West, which can be budi upon.
conomy is deep in the doldrums, and its international creditors are worried. Reform is moving slowly; commitment toby leadership or theyet to be tested.
Yugoslavia has rampant inflation, althoughpolicies show signs of slowing it. Ethnic and
regional disputes hamper meaningful economic reforms. Debt relief it possible, but large-scale Western aid is not likely.
Romanies economyisarray, with no clear plans for revamping It. Stores of food and goods previously slated for export provide only acushion. Romania hasood start on land and small enierprite reform. The ouster of Ceausescu provides welcome relief from the draconlan debt repayment.
Poland's economy is In terrible-shape and will remain so during the next six months at least, despite ambitious reform efforts. Polanduge debt and the worst credit rating in Eastern Europe. Labor unrest It likely when reforms beginite harder
East Germany is in desperate trouble, with con tinuing emigration, workforce demoralisation, and likely delays in ERG assistance driving the economy toward collapse. Officialsercent annualited decline in nationalin the first quarter.
and democracysorting out, jockeying, coalition building, intriguing,stabilizing,ertain amount of score settling. It willbe an era of substantial preparations for eventual implementation of reform programs. But. except in Poland, most emerging regimes will delay the wrenching and politically dangerous economic restructuring until late in the year or
Poland is the pioneer, and us experiment milellwether of tough-mindedn in Poland the political srwwoown over austerity and increased joblessness willcome late0 Nowhere cite in the region b
ihe ausicrity challenge so great as in Poland. To an extent, other countries of lhe region are waitingee whether Solidarity sticks to iu decision and what political price it pays for its courage.
-Vo population in Eastern Europe has yet voted for economicit. for autierity^but most will face this test0
Substantial de-Commumiation of Eastern Europe will take place0 Elections will remove Communists from office, reform programs willthe insiituiional vestige* of old regimes, and Communm Pany memberships wJI evaporate
through confiscation of puny property, abolition of mandatory dues, and co-op*inj of personnel into (be new civil bureaucracies and private enterprises.Communisis and Communist hardliners will, however, do their best to retain influentialhea serious obstacle to implementing reforms, particularly in Romania and Bulgaria
Poland
2 mil/Ion
Major ethnic divisions:7 percent Govern mem
ybrid governmeni headed by non-Commumsis but guaranteeing continuingconirol over the security and defense establishments.
Leading political figures
Head of stale: President Wojclech Jaruselski.
Head of government: Premier Tadeusj Matowiecki
Others: Lech Walesa. Chairman of Solidarity
Status of Communist Parly: At lhe Communist Party Congress Inhe party transformed itself into Ihe Social Democracy of the Polishmall group of reformers broke away andeparate party named lhe Social Democratic Union.
Economy
) (US dollars)
illion (calculated from purchasing power parity ratio)
erercent of US GNP per
capita)
7ercent
Hard currency trade and) (mil-lions of US dollars)
Current
Gross
Major Reform*
Accomplished or well under way;
Freedom of the press, political affiliation, religion, and assembly.
Rapid and broad-based economicaimed atull-fledged mar-ket economyapitalist financial system
Abolition of secret police and factory and paramilliary militias.
Initialed.
Reductions in military spending
Poland: Eteryonc's Test Case
The Dynamics of Polilical Reform0 Promised polilical reforms are well under way In Poland, with basic freedoms of press, religion,and polilical association either already enshrined in law or under draft for parliamentary approval laier this year. Dismantling of lhc instruments of former Communist social control ts well advanced, andde-Communizaiion of Polish society ispast the midway point.olish leaders will lead the way in Eastern Europe towardmarkctization of Poland'sthe last characteristics of Stalinist stateconstitutional changes, andew civilbased on traditional Polish values of family, nationality, and church.
The strains of thisas Ihc governmeni moves forward with implementation of its already passed economic restructuring program byprobably accelerate the formation of distinct polilical interests or parties from within the politically diverse Solidarity movement. One of the most significant of these will be Solidarity's trade union wing, which, at lhe factory level, may eveniual-ly oppose government policies and could ally in some instances with ihe remnants of ihe official unions, the OPZZ. Over lhe longer term, this mayealiny evolution toward democracy, and. even in lhc near term, these groups/panics will be able to work together on important issues. Bul. initially, it could ilow and complicate the implementation of reforms.
mplemcniation of the government's economic reform rrogram within thc first six months0 will, at east initially, result in rapidly rising prices and mayfollowed soon thereafter by massive layoffs and ome factory closings.arked downturn in illation by the end of spring, workers caught in lhc runch of austerity will probably resort to strikes esigncd lo stop living standards from falling further, hese will pose the years most serious challenge to ic Mazowiecki governmeni.
'idespread tabor unrest and the breakdown of lis irrenl legislative consensus on reform wouldatowiccki government io back away from full
implementation of economic reforms, delaying some moves1 and beyond. Il could also lead to lhe formationew Solidarity governmeni andfor new national elections. One majorof this would be lo dampen tbe already slow-to-materialize enthusiasm of foreign investors, althoutfh it is also true thai massive unresi would disoouraue investments even more.
A Polish facc-orTover austerity would set lhe Mage for desperate feats of political gymnasticsa bold effort by Afaiowlecki to wring alarger infusion af foreign assistance from Western backers, largeied at coping withand shortages of consumer goods.
Progress Toward Kconomic Reform The Polish Government has chosen rapid reform over gradualism, believing thai the incremental policy changes of the past have been wholly inadequate to the task of transforming PolandodemThe public's complaints about rising prices will continue to increase. Polish leaders arc well aware of lhe political dangers they will face as ihe economy lurches fitfully oui of ils protracted coma, bul no one can predict very precisely just how long this transition period will last or how wrenching lhc transformation will be. There is corrwponding uncertainly about thc amount of Western aid thai will be needed Bui. since the development plan is premised on receiving billions of dollars' worth of grants, loans, technical assistance, and debl relief, this amount is large and will probably increase0 substantially above the amounts already offered.
Inflation willonstant barometer of theperformance. Should inflation still be high after midyear, ii would indicate serious trouble for the future of reform.
Thc Miliiary and Securily Services Over theonthsear, auttertty and popular hostility will cut ihe Polish internal security forceshe bone The same forces of austerity will also force additional cuts in defense spending, and. as
politics becomes more fractious, (hc military budget willore popular target of politicians eagerhow thai thc budget ax spares no sacred cows. Warsaw has moved to disband (be factory andmilitias; whilelements of (he former secret police and militias may try topublic unrcsl. tbey probably do no(hreal of counierrevolulion to (he Solidariiy
otninunija(ion
Public pressure* will cause Maeowiccki to conlinuc to repliicc Communists in (he stale bureaucracy, and local election! scheduled for April will removeof Communliti from local centers of power. By yearend, Communist influence in Ihc Polishand lhe party's ability to disrupt operations will be sharply reduced.
Outlook for Retalions With. Moscow and Anti-Sovierism
Despite fairly good relations between the Solidarity government and Moscow, ties willarsaw will move lo separate the Polish snd Soviel militaries. Polish cftKi.il. have already abolished ihe position of poliiical officer in ibeand will move0 to reinforce the depolitici-zaiion of ihe armed forces.
If Moscow continues lo sioaewall Polish demands for increased economic anotably delays in debt icpayment and credit on cncigyPolish officials willire under iheir rhetoric of Soviet responsibility for Poland's economic mess and the issue of thc Katyn murders. Poles also resent the fact (ha( Sovieis occupy scarce housing and low-level flighu by Soviel aircraft As the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians force the Soviets out. pressure onwill increase. Nonetheless, Warsaw is unlikely to
let relations deteriorateangerous level, because it will continueec valueovic( security guarantee in (be faceniling Germany.thc Polish public's preoccupation with domestic economic troubles willignificant atiack on relations with Moscow.
Crunchpoiab and Milestones0
The Solidarity government will face two crucial dead-lints inagreement date with the IMF in February (letter of intent has already been signed) and local elections, now set for late April. The first will be relatively easy. Having passed the bulk of economic reform legislation late last year andhaving apparently succeeded, Marowiecki is well positioned io come to terms wiih the Fund in February oo the particularstandby loan
Local elections willore ciucial lest for lhe government.will replaceommunist hacks wiih Solidarity loyalists andoccur ai about the (imc (hai votcis begineci lhe hardest blows of economic reforms. Depending on how Solidarity factions play them, lhc elections couldationalon austerity and (hc performance ofational outcry againsi the pace of reform. The legislative runup to thc elections will also test ihc Solidarity consensus, because il willultitude of important decisions on how to revamp and reviulire regional and local government in Pel.'id i ih; vital interest of every fledgling parly, notably Rural Solidariiy.
rat.
More important, perhaps, thc ipccuclc of localwill merge with other factorsidyear political dynamic thai will piobabty cause thcto move general election! (now setp to late this year or very earlyhc following reasons would figure in this move:
Local elections will excite political appetites to white-hot intensity, sellingising chorus of demands for carrying the cleansing process back to the national level.
The collapse of thc Communist Party hasthe legitimacy and durability of (be Round-table Agreement on which (he complexion of lhe current legislalure rests. Besides, some early indica-tions notwithstanding. President Jarutclski has failed to build bis credibility or prestige; tbc recent specter of their pccsident singing The Internationale apparently was more than moil Poles could stomach and revived memories ofthew regime.
Moreover. Poland will notbehind" (be other countries of Eastern Europe, all of which will hold general electionsoles will demand to maintain their coveted stature as the vanguard of political reform in the region.
Hungary
illion
Major ethnic divisions:ercent.ercent
Government
System: Former Communist stale well along in transition lo Western-style liberal democracy.
leading polilical figures
Head ofresident to be elected In0
Head of government. Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth
Others Reno Hyers. Chairman of theSocialist Party (HSPp Imre Potsgay. member of the Pretldium and likely HSP candidate for president: Joxef Antall.of ihe Hungarian Democratic Forum.
Status of Communist Parly; After reformers in ihr Hungarian Socialist Workers'Party (HSWP) reorganised the party, renamed it the Hungarian Socialist PartyndIhe pany monopoly of polilical power, those in the original party who objected io alt thiseparate new party called, again, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The original HSWP numbered moreembers: the HSP can muster0 members. ,he new HSWP
Economy
SdotlariI
illion (calculated from purchasing power partly ratio)
erercent of US GNP per capita)
GNP annual0ercent
Hard currency trade andf US dollars)
SHi7
SJ22
Current accouni balance: $
Major Reforms Welt under way-Abolition of party organizations in factories, avil service, and the armed forces.
Initialed:
Free elections and the creation ofasystem.
Abolition of securily police spying oncitizens.
Promised;
Attempt io secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungarian territory
hat real cflbrts in thc direction of reform will only come laic in thc year or. perhaps, earlyonetheless, the legislative groundwork for radical economic restructuring and further political liberalization of Hungarian society has been laid, thanks to the headstrong Hungarian Nationaldefections from Communist tanks, and thc brinksmanship of Premier Nemeth.
Progress Toward Economic Reform Budapest's current economicby Europe's highest per capita debt, high interest payments, inflation, and general businesswill endure well into. The government has let past IMF financial targets slip, and it has yet to tackle many of lhe underlying structural problems inherent in its heavily subsidized economy.
Thus far.inancial situation has become increasingly precarious because of backsliding on the government9 economic reform and austerity programs and heavier-then-expeeltd Hungarian spending abroad. Hungary and ihe IMF recently reached agreementraft letter of intentew standby loan, bui Hungary has lost so much credibility in commercial credit markets that approval of lhe loan may not unleash enough commercial credit to finance Hungary's annual debt serviceSi billion.
If government and public-sector reforms arcthey will entail tbc closure of more thannsolvcol siaieoubling oflo. and substantially higher inflation. Social unrest could result. Ifesitates furlher in attacking the underlyingcauses of its economic malaise, ihe costs will be even higher, among ihem. increased inflationaryeventually more jolting reductions ofsubsidies, escalating government deficits,relations with the IMF and potential Western financial backers, and rescheduling.
Reforms themselves will cause exiremc discontent and, in the short term, lower living standards and increased threat of public protests Poverty is
Hungary: Everyone's Beit Bel
Thr Dynamics of Political Reform0 The "apparat coup"8 against Janet Kadarortuous process of self-transformation in his Hungarian Socialisl Workers' Party. But. far from finding strength and legiiimacy in renewal, the badly fiactured Communists have lost ground lo anof reform parties and pressure groups.Socialist Party and Socialist Worker Party (formerly Communist) membership now stands at no more. and thc Communist's vote-getting potential is reduced to coruaderably less than tbe parliamentary majority they confidently expected to command al thc outset of reform. Legalizedgroups now includeull-Hedged politicalby thc Democratic Forum coalition and lhe Freedozen well-defined interest groups, and hundreds of smaller, mostly single-issue pressure groupsesult:
opposition "ill dominate the Nationalthat will be elected in March, and lhc best the Socialistlegal successor to lhc former Communis!hope for is tounior partneroalition governmcni. This will further jeopardize ihe presidential prospects ofreform leader Itmcis fading fastavorite to win the forthcoming (March-April) presidential balloting.
thc opposilion is in disarray. The Democratic Forum, expected to win the most sealsc pailiament, is beset by differences among its disparate groups and is only slowlyoncrete program. It is now highly vulnerable to awill develop during the firstofthe Free Democrats.
Electoralmostly the maneuvering ofdominate the first halfroad consensus exists thai Hungary must movearket economy and musl impose significant restraints on government spending, there will be no speedup of economic reslruct urine, and budget austerity uniil late spring at lhe earliest. In fact, lhe poliiical mix will probably be so volatile ocn after electionsshaky coalitions learn lo live
t*t.
widespread inif mosi observers fail lo lake note ofpart, the result of several years of morepcrceni inflation. To dale, Hungarians have used (heir newfound freedoms to stay out of politics and work at two and even three jobs. As both internal and external pressures force the country toward the grim prospect of further bell-tightening* Hungarians of every political stripe will come off the sidelines and into an increasingly contentious polilical arena.
Tbe Military and Security Services An inter ministerial group has apparently completed its task of considering ways to pare down the security functions of the Interior Ministry, to make police organizations more subordinate to regional and local authorities, and to reduce the foreign intelligence apparatus. The first months0 will probably show slow but steady progress toward implementing many of these reforms.
Hungarian reformers have moved vigorously lothe old levers of social repression, mostlo disband the "Workersoncihelcss. members of the old secret police were caught recently eavesdropping on opposition parties, underscoring thc resilience of security organizations.
i zat ion
ew Hungarian government will be able to build on legislation that has abolished polilical party organizations from factories, the cMI service, and the armed forces. These laws have set the stageore profound elimination of Communist influence
throughout Hungarian institutions ihan in any other former Sovicl Bloc country, notably (he gradualof Communist loyalists wiih apolitical and opposition personnel in both key and rank-and-file positions. The pace of this process will be slow, but it will certainly pick up after spring elections. The electoral performance of Communisi and Socialist candidates in both the parliamentary and presideniial balloting will set the tone for thc campaign.
Outlook for Relations With Moscow and Anti-Sorietism
Opposition victory in forthcoming elections will quicken the rhetoric of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and will energize demands for Hungary to join West European institutions. There will be anpotential for anti-Sovietamong theMoscow proveson thc withdrawal of its troops.
Crunchpoints and Milestones0 The important milestones0 will beparliamentary contests set for March and presidential balloting that willin April or May. These contests will shape upudgment on ihc future role of lhc Communist Pany in Hungarian politics and as referendum^ on the pace of economic reform.
t-
Czeckoilorakia
illion
Major ethnic divisions:3 percent.5 percent.ercent
Government
System: In early transition from Communist state to promised Western-style democracy.
leading political figures
Head of state; President Vaclav Havel
Head of government: Premier Marian Calfa
Others: Alexander Oubcek. Chairman ofthe Federal Assembly
Status of Communist Party: In disrepute and disarray since the Jakes regime was overthrown in the "Velvet Revolution"In
Economy
} IUS dollars]
illion {calculated from purchasing power parity ratio)
erercent of US GUP per capital
GNP annual7erceni
Hard currency trade andf US dollars/
Current account
Gross
Major Reform.
Accomplished or well under way:
Abolition of spying by security police on Czechoslovak citizens.
The paramilitary militias to be controlled by the government.
Freedom of the press, assembly, politicaland religion.
Initiated:
Free elections in Juneultipartysystem
Negotiations intended lo lead'to withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovak territory.
Ciechosioiakia: Can lite "Vebcl Revolution" Continue?
The Dynamics of Political Reform0 Chances are better in Czechoslovakia than in any other East European country lhal measured progresstable democratic society can be sustainedonetheless, accomplishing this will depend heavily on improvement in themost of which will probably await the sorting out of political relationship io forthcoming elections.to other East European countries, economicin Czechoslovakia arc not acute; growthluggish bul regionallyercent, and thc nation's external debt is ihe lowest in Eastern Europe, except for Romania. This means the new government will have some breathing space lo prepare for an all-oul assaull on
Thc collapse of thc Jakes regime and dramatic advent of reform government under Civic Forum have set the stageear of political consolidation andimplosionhirty-eight polilical parlies have already emerged and will challenge thefor dominance in parliamentary elections setune. Civic Forum has announced thai il will conlesi thc electionsparent" of numerous groups, but minor factionalism will probablyultiparty system in Czechoslovakia, even before the balloting.
Although reform-minded Communists remain in lhe government- -andood chanceoalition afierbalance has shifted in favor of independents. Socialists, andof the People's Party. Communistin lhe Cabinet include Ihree avowed "marketa self-styledon-Communisls have replaced Communisis in most keythe Ministry ofIhree Communist ministers have quit Ihe party,Prime Minister Calfa.ivic Forum-dominated government- which has pledged no Corn-munisi "witchnonetheless gradually root out Communists from sensitive bureaucratic posts Many Communists Have ulrcudy been dumped from the two provincial governments and will probably haveinority role, if any. in government after thc elections In June.
Progressoftoniic Reform Having undergone during lhe laslears lheeconomic decline of any developed nation.is nowrogram of far-reaching economic reform, albeit not asransformation as Poland and not right away. With inflation underairly manageable foreignelatively skilled labor force, and credit rating second only to East Germany. Prague has some of the makings of successful economic reform. It will eventually need to accelerate growth, abolish the waste and inefficiencies that come wiih its outmoded command economy, and restructure its obsolete heavy industries. It would be wise io take significant steps in this directionnd some basic reforms will be implemented in the first half of the year. But Premier Calfa has implied thai substantial reforms would have io awaii the electionewearlier than tbe spring.
The Military and Security Services President Havel's handpicked Interior Minister.Sacher, has already embarkedeform of ihe security organizations, but government officialspublicly that the secret police are burrowed so deeply into government and society lhal they will be difficult to ferret out. The People'sCommunis Party's paramilitary securitydisbanded in December. Civic Forum has pledged thai the secret police will no longer spy on Czechoslovak citizens and has disbanded the Interior Ministry office in charge of domestic investigation.ebruary lhe governmeni dissolved lhe Security Service. Dcspiic some probable resistance, lhe residue of the security services arc no longer capable ofounterrevolution.
The Czechoslovakpercent conscripi. professionalized, and reportedly widely sympathetic to Civicgenda hasow profile in thc transition lo non-Communist government, and it will do so in Die fuiure. The former Communist government decided early9 to reduce the manpower of thc Army subslaniially by November of tins year; they plan to reduce Iheir troop sirenglh00 in the next year and lo scrap several hundred tanks The Calfa government will probably
-eiaatoa-
ihese chances, and it will cm even more from tbc defense budget. The government has already reduced the length of service for conscripts from (wo years toonths.
ommum/ation
The Calfa government has not yet moved toCommunist Party property, nor has it blocked the collection of party dues. However, thc pany itself ii dissolving into its splinter tendencies, with radical reformers disgruntled with thc pace of reform leaving to form othet left-of-center parties. The Communist trade union is also collapsing and will be replaced soon by an independent trade union structure, possibly based on strike committees thai have sprung up throughout the country. In other spheres, ideological education has ended in thc miliury and schools. Onanuary, Communists lost their majority in partin-meni.
Outlook, foi Relations With Moscow and Anti-Sovleiism
Civic Forum now accepts that Czechoslovakia must remain in the Warsaw Pact, but this commitment will probably be erodederhaps in thc direction of Hungarian-style quasi-neutralism. New Foreign Minister Die nit bier has virtually declared theof Soviet lioops illegal on lhc basisreaty exacted under thc duress of the Warsaw Pact invasion
0 Soviet troops in Crccboslovakia will eventuallynot completely in(he second, decisive round of negotiations io accomplish this began in February.
Thus far, Cicchoslovaks have not vented much anger ai the continued Sovietsmall demon-siraironsoviel barracks and in areas of iioopconceniraiions. If second-round negoiiations on lhe removal of the Central Group of Forces appear to lag, however, the Soviel troop presence couldote important eleclion issue, and Soviet forces would become the targets of greater and more volatile public hostility
Crunchpoints and Milestones0 The new Czechoslovak Government has set for itself an end-of-Fehruary deadline far wrapping upguaranteeing freedoms of press, assembly,affiliation, and religion. Czechoslovaks will lake meeiing this deadline as evidence ihat lhe progress achieved in the elevation of Havd and Dubcek is being consolidated in lhe further dismantling of thc Communist regime's controls over society.all-important parliamentary elections, which will ratify (he transfer of powerson-Communui panics, arc sei for early June.
ejei-j
- Social,
East Germany
illion
Major ethnic divisions:7 percent
Government
System- Former Communist state being run by reform Communists who hare set free elections for
Leading political figures
Head of state: Office of president to be established
Heed of government: Premier Hans Modrow
Others: Gregor Gysi. Chairman, PDS Lothar de Maiiiere, Chairman. CDU Ibrahim Hoehme. Chairman, SPD-OST Wolfgang Schnur. Chairman. Democratic Awakening
Status of Communist Party: The Socialist Unity Party has formally renounced lis constitutional monopoly of political power; renamed itself lhe Socialist Unityof
Economy
} (US dollars)
illion (calculated from purchasing power parity ratio}
ererceni of US GNP pee capita)
GNP annual8erceni
Hard currencyions of US dollars)
Exports:
Imports
') (mil-
S
Current account balance:
Major Reforms Accomplished or well under way-Termination of Ideological education In schools and military units.
Freedom of travel. Abolition of press censorship. Initialed:
Significant steps toward "marketncluding reduced subsidies for Inefficient State enterprises, substantial access of foreign investors, and some privatization of property.
Disarming and abolition of the secret police and factory milllia.
Promised:
Prosecution and punishmeM of corruptfrom the Honecker regime.
So arm.
East Germany: Crashing Westward
The Dynamics of Polilical Reform0 The GDR is adrift between the discreditedregime and fractious opposition leaders. Even ihc formation of an unstable coalition betweenand opposition leaders will not prevent thc government from slowingrawl. Communist efforts to whip up public fears of resurgent nco-Nazism have failed to produce much concern.despite greatly increasing assistance from West German counterparts, leaders of the opposition groups arc proving incapable ofoordinated election campaign and ofrogram lhat fully reflects the clear agenda of East German voiers.
Tbe weak position of the Communist-led government and parliament and ihe strong focus on ctectora! politics mean that economic and social reforms will Continue to lurch forward uncertainlytable government takes hold later0 or de facto unification with lhe FRG occurs. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Modrow, who had arguedo-slow approach, now appears resigned to fundamentalincluding massive transfers of state firms io private ownership, decentralization, and reliance on markei forces. So far. Communists have backiracked on existing central plan production quotas and have initiated an "experiment" that gives selected slate enterprises substantial operating freedom andautonomy. As of mid-January, the governmeni committed itself to breaking up the large industrial combines and lo allow mosi forms of joiniemocratically elected government in March will accelcraie (his approach. Efforts to keep lhe economy functioning on an even keel will be battered, however,teady rate of continued emigration (now ater day) among skilled workers and technicians.
Thc election campaigns, which should come under full steam in February, will fcaiurc tlltee issues: internal democratization (including lhe future ofconomic reform, and unification of Ihe two Germanics. In addition lo the Communisis. who will be marginalized in ihc elections, ihc parliamerila-ry contests wtil pit candidates of Ihe former fellow
travelingChristian Democrats, and Nationalrepresentatives of the various groups within the New Forum andAwakening, including the revived SocialPany. Among the opposition groups, Iheof substantial aid from West German Socialpoised to emerge from the balloting with lhe largest group in the legislature, possiblyajority.
Thc situation at ground level in East Berlin and other major centers of opposition will remain volatile, at least until summer. Opposition groups and non-Communisi parties can exclude ihe Communistsostelection government, especially if they can reduce iheir fragmentation and form even moderately stable electoral coalitions and establish sympathetic coniacis with thc large numbers of disaffected voters in East Germany. At this point, thererowing likelihood thai thc parliament and government thai emerges after March will be fractious and incapable of taking decisive action. It will represent views ihai arc at leasi partly at odds wiih the rapidly evolving aspiration of the East German masses, and thus will face almost immediate public pressure to movetoward merger wiih thc FRG. In this scenario:
The spring will see accelerating public demandsnity referendum and continued government drift.
West German leaders would emerge as political leaders of East Germans as well, and revolving-door minisirics would underscore ihc divisions in the Coalition.
Such an unstable coalition would be even more dependent on West German government and party support and more likely to view unification as'he only way lo stabilize the economy.
Thc polilical landscape is marked by absence of leadership and of lhe ability io face lhe current problems effectively. The issue is now whether the elections willDR capable ofew treaty relationship IVenragsgemeinschaft} with the Federal Republic or leadituation in which emigration continues, government remains ineffective, and ike only solution is Quick unification under the administration of West German authorities.
Pr ogress Toward Economic Reform Thc0 wit) also feature an acceleration of the process, already substantially underway, of forging an intricate web of economic relationshipsst Germany and West Germany, leading to economic unification. The GDR already standsosition of dependency to the FRG, and this dependency will grow. At the public-sector level. Bonn and East Berlin will continue to integrate their economies, particularly the telecommunication, railroad, highway, and energy transmission links that will be tbe substance of de facto unification, well in advance of formal political confederation.
Berlin will workrogram forsocial" market economy in the first quarterut it will face tough slogging in sticking to an
austerity budget and ia moving against insolvent slate
enterprises.
While Easi Berlin struggleseform one of the more centralized economies in Europe, it has one large advantage over its neighbors -ihc West German con-rteciton. West Germany will furnish upward of SIO billion in aid over tbe nest several yean, and il ii already providing much technical assistance. Into lhc clear benefits of FRG financial help, there arc powerful incentives lhat accompany that aid. Chancellor Kohl continually emphasizes the necessity of market reformsondition of continued help. In thc longer term, the prospect ofari of Europe's sirongcilimproved access to the ECs integrated markei aflcrspur nnd reinforce the GDR's resolve to persevere wiihreform, even when inevitable problems arise.
The Military and Securily Services The political atmosphere in the GDR is volatile, bul il now appears that all sides are committed to an orderly transfer of power to ihe parliament and governmeni thai will emerge in March. Still, potential reactionarylhe securitymay conspire io stage provocations or to thwart reform. Nevertheless, Ihe enlirc Naiiunal Defensethe supreme command of lhe miliiary and securilyresigned, and the MainCommunist Party's instiiu-lional control of (hebeen removed and
will not be replaced For iu own reasons, tbeSED continues to stress the threatighlwingnd the crpposition remains anxiousecret police counterrevolution
The armed forces are facing serious deterioration:Virtually no young East German wants lo serve in
the Army: upward ofercent of conscripts may
fail to report for duty in March.
Thereatlern of desertion to lhe West.
Echoing the recent Swiss referendum, there arc some popular calls for abolition of Ihe Army.
More seriously, there is growing pressure of ihe lype familiar in the West on issues of noise pollution, maneuver damage, and military training, including lhc notion of alternate service.
Despite these pressures, the Army leadership has kept lhc military out of politics. Thc Army cannot be used for population conirol; conscripts will not shooi at civilians.
Dc-Co inn ionization
The process of transferring the civil service ond miliiary leadership to non-Communist control has hardly begun.ew elected government will probably move deliberately in this direction, replacing Communists could lead to serious clashes and sabotage of lhc administration.
After the March elections, any new government will come under relentless public pressure to put former high officials of thc Communist regime on trial for corruption and abuse of power. New andrcvelaiions will revive public anger and easily provoke outbursts of violence
Outlook for Relations Wiih Moscow and Anti-Soiictitm
Wiih minoi exceptions. Gorbachev may remain fairly popular among opposition leaderships and groups, andoviet iroops stationed in Easi Germany have noiarget of massive public bosiiliiy. Nonetheless, opposition leaders have said iltnt no GDR government would agree to accept lhc residual Soviet forceonventional Forces in Europe
agreement. Provocateurs may try to precipitateand (he forthcoming election campaigns willfeature some anti-Warsaw Pact rhetoric and vocal demandspeedy withdrawal of Soviel forces. Under mounting public pressure, the new government will probably urge Gorbachev to begin immediatelaIhe limelable for Soviet withdrawal.
Crunchpomt* and Milestones0
Parliamentary elections, now set forarch, will mark the important political transition forollow-on local elections, still set for May. willurther and equally significant erosion of Communist power. Ininappears increasingly likely ihat Ihere willeferendum on German unity
Bulgaria
illion
Major ethnic divisions: Bulgariansercent,erceni.ercent
Governmcni
System: Communist state In transition toward promised socialist democracy.
Leading political figures
Head of stale: Petur Mlodenov, President of lhe Slate Council
Head of government: Andrey Lukanov, Premier and Chairman of the Council af Ministers
Others: Head of Bulgarian Communist Party: Aleksandur Ulov. Chairman ofthe Supreme Party Council Presidency
Stains of Communist Party: LongtimeTodor Zhivkov and his close supporters were removed from office in9loodiest coup by party moderates and liberals trying lo remain in control by volunteering to make the sorts of political and economic changes being forced on Communist parties In other East European countries.
Economy
) (OS dollars)
illion (calculated from purchasing power parity ratio)
S7.SI0 perercent of US GNP per capita)
GNP annualen28 percent
Hard currency trade andf US dollars)
Current account balance: S
Gross
Relorms
Initiated:
Guarantee of constitutional rights af ethnic mi non ties
Short-term economic reforms, includingprivatization of property.
Promised:
Abolition of the constitutional guarantee of the Communist Party's leading political role.
Free elections (in. Nationalloec ted.
A new constitution lo be drafted by that legislature.
Dissolution of the secret police and tighter controls over security operations of lheMinistry.
Gradual transitionree market economy.
23
Sacral
Will Reform Continue To Come From Above*
TVe Dynamics of Political Reform0
The Bulgarian polilical terrain has shiftedsince former Foreign Minister Mladenov led his "top down" coupdor ZhWkov. and it will shift still further toward democratizationladcnov's early itraiegy of containing dissent byrocess of gradual change on the Soviet model has failed to keep pace with the unci-pectedly rapid growth of opposition forces, including an independent trade union. Opposition groupsissidenl element within the Communist Party were energized by Zhlvkov's down/all. and they have seised thethe Communiston the defensive and stampeding Mladenov Into quick concessions.
In thc campaign for spring elections, increasingly well-organized and bold opposition groups willthe Communist government to make good on promises of polilical reform, including passageultiparty democratic election law and equal access to media. Nonetheless, ihe Communist Party will probablyubstantial role in ihc postelection government. The opposition will coniinue lo resist pressure from lhc regime looalitionfor fear of being implicated in the country's worsening economy and of damaging their popularity before elections They will push for quickerof the former regime's irutrumcnts of sociallhe securily police.
Progress Toward Economic Reform Bulgarian governments, both before and after the elections, will move to stabilize ibe country's faltering economy, but Ihey arebefore theundertake fundamental reforms. The principal objective of government0 wilt be to ensure supplies of consumer goods andresulting in more foreign debt Beyond ihis. however, the Mladenov governmeni is reportedlyto lay the groundwork for sweeping changes byand reform law permuting catensive privatization ofiberalized foreignmem law. and budget cuts lhat would reduce subsidies to some state enterprises
Thc Military anal Securily Services The Bulgarian mdilary and security arebut public pressures for elimination of the secret police will build in lhe first monthshe Lukanov governmeni has already moved toward reconstructing Ibe role of Ihe secret policef the criminalof the main statutes defining and outlawing antislale acts. Still, it is noi clear whether thc announced disbanding of the dreaded SUthmonitors andhas been carried our This is likely lout ling-edge issue of the government's relations with ihe opposition on the currenttalks, as the ejection approaches. Moreover,indications are that the Bulgarian military lead-ciship at leasl sides wiih lhe concept of Communist Parly self-reform, and, since mid-January, laws have been enacted to "depolinci/e" the armed forces.
De-Com munn
Change in the Bulgarian Communist Party isthc now familiar East European pattern of self-reform. Pany reform is proceeding slowly, as Ihc moderate leadership tries to introduce changes in the face of opposition from hardliners and demands for more sweeping reforms from the rank and hie. Mladenov has already purged the party leadership of Zhivkov stalwarts and replaced city and regional officials with presumably reform-minded incumbents. There were funher. wide-scale purges of Central Committee members at (he extraordinary congress in early February. Thc regime will come underpressure from radical Communists io denude the pany of everything from ihe past lhat threatens its survivalore open polity, including its*name, ideology, practices associated with democraticand the present leadership. Failure by the pany leadership to sponsor more radical changes could leadplit and to the formationeparate Socialist party
Opposiuon parlies will press during lhe firstIhc year for significant gestures toward endingmonopoly of ihe polilical system.demanding lhcof Ibe Communist Party could escalate, adding
morc Incentives for Communist reformers io dump ihc baggage of Ihc past. After thc May elections, radical de-Cotnmunizaiion willontinuingey laigctli-Communist reformers tn boih Ihe prcdeciion and postelection periods will be control of tbe Interior Ministry.
Outlook for Relations With Moscow and Anti-Soiiftism
Bulgarian reformers appear determined to maintain good relations with Moscow, and the non-Communist Opposition has so far refrained from oven anti-Sovietism, only going so far as to support relations on an equal footing.
Crunchpoints and Milestones for IWO Continuing roundtabte talks with the or*osiiion and increasing political activism will set lhc stage for elections in May. Mladenov's efforts toorba-chevton shine to the Communist image eould pay
dividends in the legislative elections, when balloting will nonetheless probablyovernmentajority of non-Communists. But lhe Communists
(especially certain Communist leaders) will retain a
significant amount ot* popular support and may get 10
toerceni of ihe vote.
Romania
2 million
Major ethnic divisions:1 percent,ercent,ercent
Governmcni
System: Early in transition from Stalinism. The new interim government /pending promised free elections) is run by the National Salvation Frontelf-appointed coalition ofpolitical activists and former Commu-nttt officials who had fallen out with Ceausescu
Leading political figures
Head of state: Ion Iliescu. president of the Council of the National Salvation Fronl
Head of government: Prime Minister Pet re Roman
Others: Duminu Maiilu. Vice President ol the Council of the National Salvation Front
Status of Communist Party; The rigidlyregime long headed by Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrownloody rebellion that peaked on Christmastill dominate the government apparatus although many ofthe old regimes most reprei-sive regulations nave been abolished; NSFcontinue io say soothing things aboutdemocratic reforms after the remnants of the security forces loyal to the Ceausescuhaw been neutralized.
EconomyS dollars)
illion (calculated from purchasing power parity ratio)
ererceni of US GNP per capita)
GNP annualIerceni
Hard currency trade and) {mil-lions of US dollars)
Current account balance: 0
Gross
Major Reforms
Accomplished or well under way;
Freedom of religion and association
legalisation of political parties and eitabtish-mentultiparty political system.
Abolition of secret police.
Initiated;
Freedom of the press; public access to state-owned media.
Markei-onemed economic reforms, including pnvaiiiaiion of some property.
Sorting Out tut Christmas Resolution
The Dynamics of Political Reform0
Romania't governing National Salvation front fFSN)orsening crisis of legitimacy. It has been unable lo consolidaie popular and intellectual support or curb thc rising tide of anli-Cocnrounist sentiment and anxiety about its political ambitions. Although Ibe FSN bowed to popular pressure and agreed to share power with the opposition panics before thc Mayt retains conirol. If thc FSN and ihe opposition are increasingly polarized, it will be dim-cult to form an effective preelection coalitiondemanded in street protests.
The FSN's position will continue to be especially undermined by indications it has absorbed elements of the hated Ceausescu-era secretthe Defense and Interior Ministries and is using them to promote its Interests:
There is mounting evidence that sections of thethe infamous Troopstheir staff-level officers have beenintact.
Orchestrated proregime rallies in late January sue-gested some Sccuriialc involvement.
Thc small number of arrests of Securiiate suggests the former repressive apparatus is being protected by officials at the highest levels of lhe military and government
The FSN will also use ils control of lhc media lo promole its chances ofajority inparliamentary elections, but heavy handed practices wouldassive backlash. Thc watchdog Group for Social Dialogue will keepon the FSN io share power and resist lhe temptation io rig election* thai have nowonth.
Progress Towaid Economic Reform
Despite considerable natural resources and negligible debt, moslbelieve Romania facet years, if not decades, of struggle to overcome the systemicresulting from previous decades ofand corruption Romania's sudden revolution, moreover, has not set broughtoncrete plan for economic reform.
Sorting out thc polilical implications of thc revolt in December will dominate thc Romanian polilical scene for at least thc first halfut surfacing economica sharp downturn In industrialmeansew Romanian leadership will be forced lo begin serious economic and financial reform late in the year. Among its first acts, the FSN lifted the ban on foreign borrowing and diverted to domesticthe consumer goods that Ccausescu hadfor export. These two measures and the release of energy from industrial to consumer use should permit Bucharestmprove the lot of ordinary Romanians marginallyew months and help forestall serious public unrest until after lhe elections. Eventually, however, when stocks run low, industry stagnates, and export earnings needed to purchase energy and new capital equipment dry up, the government willhave to reimpose restrictions and borrow heavily from the West. Romanians would see this ason the gains of the resolution, and unrest would be increasingly likely.
Thc Military and Security Senices
The Romanian military is well positioned to assume power if thereollapse of public order or if Romanians attempt to overthrow the FSN before elections. Rank-and-file opposition opposes military intervention, bul some of the oppositioniliiary takeover to the present political arrangement. Although it is now reluctant lo stepignificant deterioration of the economy and growing social unrest could cause the Army to interveneelf-styled agent of nalional reconciliation.boih ihc Army leadership and the public-will continue to mistrust the FSN for having integrated Sccuriialc personnel inlo the Interior and Defense Ministries, and opponents of the FSN will assess thc military's zeal in hunting down lhc Securiiateey indicator of its support for continued reform
ommunication
Opposition suspicions and anxieties continue to focus especially on the FSNrypto-Communist group
Although the FSN hairoperty of the now defunct Communist Party, it has refined to share such asset* with other parties.
Outlook for Relations With Moscow and Anil-Sovietbra
The absence of Soviet iroops and lhc relativelyrole that Moscow played in thc events of last December probably obviate the development of strong ami-Sovietism in the nexl year. Moreover, the new government hasesire to reverse Ceaiiseseu's legacy of international isolation,improved relations wiih Moscow and Budapest. Still. Romanian nationalist feeling runs high, and this could eventually lead to strong public demands for lhc return of Bessarabia and ami-Hungarian incidents.
Ounchpoirtts and Milestones0
Public and leadership aiieniion It focused onelections set foray, the only fixed point0 that presently matters in Romania. Tlie FSN, despite public qualms aboul its domination by Com-munbis and ex-Communist officials, is well positioned toajority or near majority in balloting for legislative seats. Oppositionof ihem throwback* to the prc-Ceauscscudemanded thc FSN's resignation aflcr its announccmeni onanuary lhal tl will run in the upcoming election and have called for the formationew. broad-based provisional government. Among other issues, critics will attack the FSN's slow start at democratizing Romanianit* anti-Communblweak record on dismantling ibe Communist Party, ils ominous control of lhe media, and its lethargic attitude toward bunting down the
29
Yugoslavia
7 million
Majortsions: Srrbterceni. Croatsercent.ercent.percent.ercent.ercent.ercent
Go'crnmcm
ederation of six Communist(and two technically autonomous provinces) thai exercise considerable independenceeak central government whose leaders serve short, rotational terms. The system wasto cope wiih ihe historical animosity among the various Yugoslav ethnic groups and. in particular, to constrain the national power of the Serbs, the largest group. The prosperous northern republics Slovenia and Croatia are politically more liberal than the rest of the couniry.
Leading political figures
Head af state: Janez Drnovsek is the current President of the Collective Stale Presidency; his one-year term expires in0
Head of government: Anto Ma'kov.e. Presi dent of lhe Federal Executive Council
Others; Slobodan Milosevic^ President ofa charismatic, nationalistic populist who champions policies promoting Serbianover Yugoslavia
Status of Communist Party The regional branches of ihe League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) control the governments of the six republics and two autonomousbut the LCY branches in Slovenia and Croatia are supporting local government plans lo hold free elections in which other parties -ill participate
Fionociy
VS dollars)
illion (calculated from purchasing power parity ratio)
ererceni of US GNP per capita)
GNP annual6JOJ1 percent
Hard currency trade andf US dollars)
Current account balance. 0
Grots
Major Reforms
Initiaied:
Markel-ortenled economic reforms, including curbs on spending, tighter controls onpolicy, siabilizaiioa of exchange rates, and reduced subsidies lo some enterprises.
Abolition of the Communist Party monopoly and the formationulti-party political system
Promised. Direct elections with secret balloting.
Can If Hold Together Loot Enough lo Reform?
The Dynamics of Political Reforn0
Yugoslavia continues lo sail perilously close lodisintegration, with growing strains belwttn republics and long-building economic problems reaching catastrophic proportions. The country's chronic problems have grown more acute recently, in lhe wake of strengthening reform movements in other East European countries. In thc past year, the cfTorts of Serbian strongman Milosevic to increase hispower have driven Communist parties in thc olher Yugoslav republics toward reform, in an effort to lap popular support for Ibeir opposition to Serbian machinations. Thc League of Communists of(LCY) calledultiparty system and the elimination of theoUtical monopoly at its January congress, before breaking up in disarray. Even conservative Serbian leaders neededolster their position by backing multiparty elections, and thc clear trend in Yugoslavia, including(he proliferation of dissident groups determined tofor democratic reforms analogous to thosein Poland and Hungary. Croatia and Slovenia aie planning free elections for lhc spring
The outcome of Slovenian and Croatian elections, Ihe evolution toward substantial democratic reforms in Bosnia, Montenegio, and Macedonia, and Ihe spread of opposilion political parties, even in Serbia, pointear of increasing ferment in Yugoslavia and increased strums between its rival ethnic groups. Serbian leader Milosevic's influence wdl probably wane because heardliner and will noi be able to adjust to the multiparty system that will emerge. Moreover, adoptionultiparty system could further damage already strained ethnic relations by allowing more parochial leaders to be voted into office
Progress Toward Economic Reform During ihe last weekhc Yugoslav Federal
Assembly passed an economic reform packageto slay lhc country'saboutercentewstabilizing (he exchange rate, reducing generous subsidies io moneylosiiig state enterprises, and tight-cmng up on Belgrade's notorious loose monetary
policy. Record hard currency reserves suggest the government can stabilize the exchange rate for some lime and probably temporarily dampen inflation, but its long-term prospects for success will depend on the government's ability0 to restrain subsidies, control monetary policy, and maintain the wage freeze.
Flies in the new economic ointment will include ill-disciplined officials who refuse to hold the line on wageentral bank with almost nodiscipline, unions that have no intention of swallowing the government's austerity program, and largely autonomous regional governments thatreforms agreed to in thc Federal Assembly.
Passage of the economic reform program does,open thc wayew round of negotiations with the IMFtandby loan probably with anin the first monthshe IMF has demanded aciion to implement thc reformsrecondition for ihc loan, and Ihis couldpring clash between the government and unions. As with everything thai happens in Yugoslavia, such confrontation will take on unmistakable colors of iniercihnic hatreds, predictably bclween Serbs and Slovenes
Thc Miliiary and Security Services Theegitimateincreased Us involvement in politics during the pasi year, and this trend will continuehe military leaders are stronglyederalist in iheir thinking, and they have become lhe linchpin of (he loose coalition of leaders who arc ihe bulwark of Yugoslav federation. Wiih tbeof lhc LCY and introductionultiparty system, the miliiary is now one of lhc few Pan-Yugoslav institutions still existing.
Meanwhile, lhc Yugoslav security services ISOB) are weakening through deceniralliation In gencraL this uend will play in favor of increased regionalism and diminished federal loyally.
33
i
mion
Yugoslav society has alradye-Ccrnmunized"atge clienterin of reforms adopted1el trade's planned moveultiparty polilical system will invariablyignificant decline of Communistand influence at thc regional level Constitutional amendments submitted by Markovic to tbe Federal Assembly will be adopted in coming months,lhe process ofational multiparty system.
Outlook for Relations Wllh Moscow and Anli-Soticlism
Improving relations with both Moscow and the West will continue to be foreign policy imperativesics lo lhe USSR have reached their warmest level in decades under Gorbachev, and thc Yugoslavs will work to continue this trend. The only area of strain that might increase tensions0 is Yugoslavia'sillion irade surplus with the Soviet Union, but Moscow wilt probably not makeas increased oil and raw materialsredress the trade balance.
Crunebpoints and Milestone*0 Of Yugoslavia's six republics, Croatia and Slovnia are planning multiparty elections for the Spring, and Montenegro. Bosnia, and Macedonia will probably follow suit by the end of the year. Most of these contests will force Communist backs to the wall; some will invariablyramatic decline ofpolilical influence at the regional level. Moreover, economic beft-tighiening over lhe next year willa succession of confrontations between tbe Markc-vic government and both regional and Army leaders.
Yugoslavs will also beew Constitution this year (separate from Markovic's reformThis could lay the groundworkew ethnic power-sharing arrangement that wouldstability. Agreement is not likely soon, however.
Albania
million
Major ethnic divisions: Albanianserceni
Governmcni
System: The last Stalinist state in Europe.
Leading political figures
Head of state: Rami: Alia. Chairman of the People's Assembly and First Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party, the only legal party.
Head of government: Add Carcanl. Premier and Chairman. Council of Ministers
Others: Mrs. Hoxha, widow of former head of state and party Enver Hoxha
Status of Communist Party; Evidently still in firm control but possibly rent by factionalbetween supporters of Alia and supporters Of Hoxha.
Economy
) (US dollars)
illion (calculated from purchasingparity ratio)
er capitaercent of US CNP per capita)
Hard currency trade and payments: data not available
Total8 million (est.)
Economic situation: The state owns the means of production. Most economic activity isplanned and administered. Limited andreforms have been implemented in recent years. Economic development has been greatly hamperedolicy of self-relianceefusal to borrow from international lenders.
Major Reforms
(None under way or even promised./
Albania: Can Stalinism Survive?
Despite thc regime's obvious willingness to use brutal measures to suppress dissent, chances are Just better than even0 will be the year of Albania's awakening. Opposition groups, centered in tbe schools and univctsitics. have already clashed with thc Aha government. Moreover, there is apparent wavering on thc issue of reforms within the Communist Party, reportedly divided between hardliners led by tbc widow Hoxha and comrades gathered aroundRami* Alia, who appears to recognize the need for some political and economic reform.
Albanians arc hearing and seeing unprecedented snatches of the truth of events in Eastern Europe and (he USSR via Yugoslav and Italian media. Their own state controlled media reported accurately (heof thc Ceauscscu regime in Romania. Such exposure to successful, popular ferment elsewhere ii almost certain to encourage still more homespun dissent.
The Albanian military and security services have oftenuthless loyally to the dictates of the party; they will repress dissent0 with thc same verve as in lhe past. This promises to make the showdown, when itomanian-style Woodlet-Ung.
gcei'cu
-StMMOt-
foi US Interest*0
Prospects appear good for the consolidation ofgains in Eastern Europe0 and/or ihe continued transition to more open. Western-oriented societies. Publics are mobilized anduniled around democratic pros rami. Leaders are increasingly dcmonsirating tbeir commit menuemocratic values and Western models of reform. Parliaments and new institutions are showingquickness in learning the techniques of operating modern mass democracies
Nonetheless, the problems confronting reformistin Eastern Europe are staggering, and, despite current enthusiasm, reform may falter. For tbe most part, the mass public has not been beard from in elections, especially in the Balkans and Hungary. In Poland, jusioercent of young people voted last June. Even so, commitments to democracy are far stronger than to economic reforms. Even with substantial economic aid. the inevitable lengthy period of austerity will foster opposition and unrest, and Ihis may induce leaders to back away from rapid reform ll remains to be seen whet bet any East European country will be technically andable lo provide an effective "safety net" for workers who lose their jobsyproduct of reform.
False stans and wrong turns are inevitable,when leaders do not yet fully understand or iccerM the role of free markets. Foe example, policies under thc rubnc of "stabilization" may take on thc substance of price controls and businessn ti monopoly" rules imposed an nationalmay still leave regional rnor>opolies thai face neither competition nor clear market signals. Wealth bred of entrepreneurial success may inspire new and Hilling taxation.
Given ibese fuiuic jiroWerns. together with the well-recognized curicnl lack of resources and economic institutions, it is highly likely that reassessments of needs for assistance will appear during the next six months, mainly from Poland but also from Hungary. Czechoslovakia, and Romania. This isbest case" scenario, distinct from lhc leal
possibility of more urgentacute loss of reserves, or civilany of the East European countries.
Although these problems enhance thc need foraid. the process of reform will acecleraie thc region's integration into the world economy,if Western countries continue to tie ibeir aid to further reforms and market opening. Membership in various economic organizations, such as the European Free Trade Association. GATT. IMF. and the World Bank are future mileposts of such integration.
Efforts io mobilize international suppori forEast Europeanparticular. IMF assistance, debt rescheduling.and stimulation of foreigncripple thc already shaky and apparently shifting Allied consensus ontransfer to Eastern Europe. Despite recent US concessions, reforming non-Communist governments and ihcir economic allies in ihe West will pressure COCOM for near total relaxation of its restrictions. Pressures within COCOM, especially from thc West Germans, will force tbc pace of decontrol and will raise the prospect of diamaiically increased unilateral disregard of COCOM restrictions.
In several East European countries, moreover, ibe transition io democracy may misfirereating power vacuums Ihat stymie progress toward furthci political and economic reform. Instead of promoting the evolution toward stable democracies, elections in Romania and elsewhere may well produce onlycoalitions and inherently weak and directionless minority governments. The onset of chronic politicalaccompanied by outbreaks of ethnicraise the specter of miliiary takeover in some places. The United States and it* Western Allies would be facedecision of whether or not to lend international support for non-Communrst military governmentseans oforder and preserving lhe optionater irantilion to civilian democracy.
/nevtv^c, if/tznkj
Appendix
East European Political Parties and Pressure Groups
Center-Right Panics
Agrarian Panics: All support conservative social leg-illation, nationalism and private ownership. All claim legacy of thc prewar Polish Peasant Party.
Polish Peasant Party, I'SI. (known unofficially as
ounded:
Membershipdelegates attended founding congress.
Program: Rejects Rural Solidarity Union, saying leadership is loo dose to lefiwing Solidarity faction. Rejects PSI.-Rebirth because of its former association wllh thc Communist Party.
Polish PeasantNot yet officially founded, expectedall first congress shortly. Membership To be determined. Program: Polilical wing of Rural Solidarity.
Polish PeasantFounded:embership:
Program:ocile coalition partner of the Polish United Workers" Party (PZPR) and known as the United Peasant Parly. PSL- Rebirth is now trying to assert itselfegitimate representative of private farmers.
Oilier Cenler-Rigbl Parlies National Party
Founded: Resumed activity,embership: Unknown.
Program: Stiongly Catholic, critical of Mazowiccki governmeni programs, saying these will fail to develop Poland's food self-sufficiency.
Christian National Union Founded:embership: Unknown.
Program: Cenicr-right maniage of Christianand nationalist political traditions Closely lied to Catholic Church.
Young National-Liberal Movement
Founded:embership: Unknown.
Program: Appears to be youth wing of Ihe Christian Nalional Union.
Congress of liberals Founded: Beforeembership: Unknown.
Program: "There is no freedom wiihout propertystablishing contacts with liberal panics in Italy. West Germany, Great Britain, the United Stales, and Canada.
Thr Labor Party
Founded Jusi prior toembership: Unknown.
Program: Christian Democratic, closely associated wiih Catholic Church
Ccnler Parlies Democratic Party
Membership: Estimated. Program: Formerly in coalition wiih the PZPR. thc Dcmocraiic Party is trying lo reassert its authoritytrong liberal, free market-oriented parly
Democratic Youth Union
founded.rogram: Support of democratic reforms and free market economy wiih stiong social welfare net.
Parties Polish Socialist Parlyembership: Unknown.
Program: Rejects "socialistantsSwedish model of Social Democracy in Poland.
Thc July 8th Movement
Founded:.
Program: Seeking to create an entirely newleft-wing party in Poland, thereby abolishing thc PZPR.
Social Democracy of the Republic af Poland (formerly the Polish United Workers'Party)embership: Unknown.
Program: Generally supports democratic reforms and introduction of market forces in the economy. Headedharp declineolitical force.
Union of Social Democrats Founded:.
Program: Breakaway Party of Communist reformers, led by official with dose ties to Solidarity.
Lcft-Wing Parties
Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution Founded:embership: Unknown.
Program: Opposed to current program of Sweeping rcprivalization of the economy, bankruptcy and threai of unemployment. Wants toew order'of social justice in cooperation with the nations of Easi-em Europe.
Hungary
Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP)
Founded.9 (legal successor of formci
: -ii- Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party).
Piogram. Reform Communism.
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)
Program: While the nalional leadership seemsto Western liberal values, tbe group's support in the countryside comes largely from populistsationalistic agenda.
Association af Free Democrats Founded:.
Program: The Free Democrat's program is built on classical European and Hungarian liberalism; it is the group's uncompromising anti-Communism that has reportedly been at the root of its growing popularity, however, particularly among unskilled workers.
Christian Democratic People's Party5 (revived..
Program: The Christian Democrats seek to promote religious freedoms and the improvement of public and private morals. Their platform calls for theprotection and security of families, pensioners, thc disabled, and thc unemployed.
Association of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) Founded:
Membership:on university campuses. Program: FIDESZ is an active and effective voice for Hungarians underany members support the establishmentourgeois Western democracy.
Independent Smallholders' Party (ISP)rcvived. Membership:quarter of whom joined
Program: The ISP's platform gives priority toreform, bul it also calls for accelerated economic reform, expansion of thc private sector,reater focus on environmental issues.
e rat.
Social Democratic Party9 (revived in
eil European-style social democratic party; factional infighting, however, has hampered efforts toass following and prevented the party from making inroads in rcccni Nationalelections.
Hungarian People's Party Founded;embership: Unknown.
Program: The People's Party claims devotion to thc problems of people in the countryside and tothe rural way of life, but it has not yetomprehensive approach to Hungary's problems.
Hungarian Socialist Workers'Party (HSWP)6ongress inhe party was reorganized and renamed as thc Hungarian Socialistroup of traditional Communists-including former General Secretary Karolymet and revived thc original party in.
Program: Traditional Marxism-Leninism; partycontinue to think of themselves as the true rcpre-sentatives of Hungary's working class.
Hungarian Independence Party7 (revived in. Membership: Unknown.
Program: Thc Inder>endence Party's programlhe rights of the individual. It calls for tax relief, lhc reprivatization of agriculture, and thezalion or economic decision making.
Hungarian Green Party Founded:embership: Unknown.
Program: Tlie Greens siandree peopleealthy environment. They have promised to work for minorities and against poverty and violence
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ). Membership- Unknown. Program: Reform Communism.
Czechoslovak People's Party
rimarily Roman Catholic and rural based; was token minority party in CPCZ-dominaied National. Membership: Unknown.
Program: Christian democracy, economic reforms, noninterference of state in church matters.
Czechoslovak Socialist Party
7 as National Socialist Party; operated
as token minority party under CPCZ domination.
Membership: Unknown.
Program: Political pluralism, market economy,ofmigres.
Czechoslovak Farmers'Party
Membership: Unknown.
Program: Promotion of agricultural interests.
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party Founded: Prewar party forced to merge with CPCZeestablishedembership: Unknown.
Program: Political pluralism, social security,freedom.
Czechoslovak Green Partycmbeiship: Unknown.
Program: Environmental protection, pluralisticmarket economy, international cooperation, arms reductions.
Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative
Founded: Former dissident group, founded as party
Mcmbeiship: Unknown.
Program: Liberal democracy, individual righis,ofmigres.
Christian Democratic Parry Founded:embership: Unknown
Program: Christian democracy, independent trade unions, private enterprise.
Union Founded:embership: Unknown
Program: Private enterprise, free markei economy.
Slovak Communist Party (CPSU
Founded: Separate party during World War II but
operated under CPCZ direction; In9 sought
greater independence.
Membership: Unknovm
Program: Reform Communism.
Freedom Party
6 as token minority pany under CPCZ domination; based in Slovakia. Membership: Unknown
Program: To be set at extraordinary congress on
Democratic Party
Founded:lovak Revival Party;
resumed prewar name at extraordinary congress on 10
ased in Slovakia.
Membership: Unknown.
Program: Parliamentary democracy.
Democratic Socialist Party
Founded:ased in Slovakia.
Membership: Unknown
Program: Polilical pluralism, economic reforms,rights, social justice.
East Caraway
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)6 as the Socialist Unity Party ofrenamed inrogram Democratic socialism; supports market principles with long-range central planningarge slaie-owncd sector; rule of law.improved intra-German relations, and nowunification under certain circumstances (neutrality)
Former Bloc Parlies
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
Program: Supports confederation and eventualof two Germanics. Wants "socially andcompatible" market economy, disarmament.
liberal Democratic Party (LDP)enamed inrogram: Supports gradual confederation of twoleading to eventual unification within Europe-an context. Supports market economy thatsocial and ecologicalnd disarmament.
National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD)
Program: Supports some form of Germaneventual unification. Wants undefined economic reform, liberalizaiion of GDR society.
Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany (DBD)
Program: Had done the least to distance itself from PDS. but recently rejected electoral alliance with the
Communists.
Major Opposition Groups aad Parties
New Forum (NF) Founded:
Program: Broad-based independent politicalfor political discussion supporting grassroots and "cxtraparliameniary" democracy, environmentaldemilitarization, new constitutional/election law, and "socially and ecologically aware" market economy. Supports German confederation in coniexl of European integration.
Democratic Awakening (DA)
Founded:olitical party in
Program: Social market economy, ecologicalGerman unification.
ounded:
Program: Supports parliameniary democracy, social maiket economy, respect for human rights, environ-menial protection, and German unification. Operates primarily in southern East Germany.
Democracy Sow (DJJ
Founded:
Program: Independent movement supporting free
elections, disarmament, eventual German unification
and neutrality, social market economy, environmental
protection.
Social Democratic Party (SDP) Founded:
Program: Parliamentary democracy, environmental protection, social market economy. German unification.
Otber Opposition Groups and Panics
Greens Party
Founded:
Program: Supports environmental protection, supports some form of German confederation but rejects near-term unification.
United Lcfi
Founded:
Program: Established as independent trade union, bur. has evolved into independent political associationparliameniary democracy, independent trade unions, environmental protection. Rejects Western-style capitalism, German unification.
Initiative foe Peace and Human Rights (IPHR)
Founded.
Program: Protestant-afliliated opposition groupestablished to call attention lo East German human rights abuses and lo campaign foiHas in recent months placed greater emphasis on social and political reform.
Independentarty (UVP) Founded:
Program: Supports parliamentary democracy,protection, deouliurization. SupporU German unification.
German Forum Party (DFP)
Founded:0 as offshoot of New Forum. Program: Supports roughly the same program as New Forum, but believes realization of goals possible only through creationolitical party.
The Carnations (Die Nelken) Founded:
Program: Marxist party advocating rcestnblishment of traditional Communist social, political, andprinciples. Opposes German unification.
Free Democratic Party of the GDR (FDP-GDR) Founded:
Program: Supports social market economy,protection, disarmament, new election law. Favors German confederation, does not rule outunification wilhin European context.
Party for the Reunification of Germany (PWD) Founded:
Program; Apan from support for Germanthe PWD has yet toolitical program.
Bulgaria
Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP/
Membership:.
Program: Reform Communism: introduction of glas-nott and percstroyka to Bulgaria. Relinquishedguaranteed leading role.
"Alternative Socialistaction Founded:
Membership: Sizecomposed of radical reformed, former dissidenu, intellectuals. Program: Radical reform socialism; resignation of BCP Central Committee, caretaker leadership to prepare for March party congress.
Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union
Membership:. Program: Long subservient to the BCP. iu new leadership wanU lo contest elections on an equalaction, the Nikola Petkov BulgarianParty, also seeks rehabilitation of Agrarian figures persecuted by Communists in the, as well as more rapid reforms.
Union af Democratic Forces of Bulgaria Founded:
Membership; Coalition ofozen dissident groups, including Podkrepa, thc independent trade union, environmentalist group Ecoglasnost, IheWorkers'Social Democratic Parlynd others.
Program: Abolition of BCP's monopoly of power; resignation of the BCP's Politburo and Centralfree elections; depoliticiration of tbe army, militia, and judiciary; minority righu; legalization of private properly; religious freedom; and the concerns of the individual groups.
Radical Democratic Party Founded.embership: Unknown. Program: No further information.
Christian Republican Party (located in Plovdlr) Foundedembership: Unknown Program: No further information
Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (United)
Founded:cmbeiship: Unknown Program: No further information.
Romania
National Saltation Framt (FSN)
Founded:9 (some evidence of earlier
underground existence).
Membership:embers, with an executive board Key figures arc reform Communists, such as former UN Ambassador Sirviu Brucan and President of Romania Ion lliescu. former Communist Pany Secretary, as well as former diplomats, technocrat, cultural figures.
Program: Transitional body assembled to address immediaic problems, establish political pluralism, raise living standards. Plans to run candidates in May elections.
The Liberal Party Founded:embership: Unknown. Program: No further infeematton
The Parly for Rebuilding (possibly Romanian Resurrection Party) Founded:
Membership: Chairman Ion Mates, chemistryNo information on number of adhcrenU. Program:noint manifesto
Magyar Democratic Union Founded:embership; Ethnic Hungarians. Program: Protection of rights of all ethnic minorities, cooperation with (he Romanian majority.ormer candidate Communist Party Centralalternate member Gcza Domokos.
Ecological Movement (notarty yet) Founded:embership; Scientists and writers. Program: Environmental issues, support of FSNs. program while reserving the right lo criticize it.
Romanlan Democratic Forty Founded:
Membership: Anti-Communists numbering in (hc "hundreds."
Program: Freedom of press, religion, opinion, repriva-tization of (hc economy and esi.atJ.ithmeni of small businesses, especially in consumer and service sectors.
Group for Social Dialogue (notany) Founded:
Membership: Intellectuals and FSN members such as Doina Cornea. Culture Minister Andrei Plesu. other longtime dissidents.
Program: Informal watchdog group formed to ensure that FSN is not dominated by Ceausescu-regime Communists.
National Christian Peasant Party/Christian Democratic Party (PCNT) (both merged)
Founded:
Membership: Intellectuals and clerics such as Doina Cornea. Catholic Bishop loan Robu, Orthodox Bishop Justinian. Also includes minority intellectuals and FSN members.
Program: Nationalistic, Christian values, defense of workers, peasants, intellectuals, environment. Plans national congressebruary. President of emigre organization ion Ratiu intends to run for office.
National Peasant Party
Founded:9 (suppressedembership: Prewar party members, such as former deputy secretary general Corncliu Copoou. hopingounger following. Coposu claimed that tbc membership was two million strongwith National Liberal Party to field common slate in April elections.
Program. Mixed, market-based economy along French lines. Would welcome King Michael back as constitutional monarch.
Association of Farmer Political Prisonersarty)
Founded:embership: Former political prisoners Program Investigate Ccautcscu-cra ciimes. seekfoi ex prisoners Sire of movemeni is unknown.
Romanian Communist Party Faction Founded:
Membership: "Initiative group" of party members, size unknown.
Program: Support for lhe FSN, (tee elections,party congress lo dissolve lhe Romanian Communist Party and tarn ils assets over to lhc FSN
Printers and Journalists' Trade Union Founded
Membership: Printers and journalists; sire unknown. Program: Independcni trade union.
Yugoslavia
League of Communists of Yugoslavia The only constitutionally recognized political party it Yugoslavia. Operates in realityederation of republican parties, some of which have allowed an increasing measure of official and unofficialvarying by republic. Croatian and Slovenian parties are contesting multiparty elections in thc spring. Fourlecoih Partyanuary.
Associationugoslav DemocraticA YDI)
Seeks to be an all-Yugoslav organization Insists thai ils aim is lo transform Yugoslaviaullystale bui thai it is notolitical parly. Now has chapiers in all republics and provinces. Major figure in Croatian Chapter is Brankoresident of ihe Council. Serbian chapter has not been able to register.
Slovenia
Uniled Democratic Opposition af Slovenia (DEMOS) Jozc Pucnik. President. New umbrella group tothc0 Slovene elections Includes five groups: Ihe SDA, SDU, and Christian Democrats, with thc Greens and SPA. Advocates sovereignly for ihe Republic of Slovenia, demilitarization of Slovenia, pailiamenury dernocracy. and respect for human rights and freedoms.
Slovene Democratic Alliance (SDA) Hubert Pozarnik. President.
Founded:irst congress: Maribor.
Slovene Social-Democratic Union (SDU) Jozc Pucnik. President.
Program: Declaration. Mladina.ot allowed ioounding Congress Lost many members9 leadership battles
Slovene Christian Democrats Viktor Biaric. President. Founded:
Slovene Peasant Alliance (SPA) Ivan Oman, President Founded:
Green Movement
Dr. Dusan Pint.
Founded:ost politically motivated of the Greens in Yugoslavia:reen Slovenia.Europe,reen planet."
Slovene Christian Socialist Movement Founded: Ljubljana,
"For Freedom of Thought in theJoze Skolc. President. The old Slovene Youthwhich left the federal youth league in November, then declared itself an independent polilical party. Plans to held candidates in tbc spring. ZSMS: New name, old acronym.
Croatia
s
Coalition of Croatian Alternative Associations Slavko Goldstein (of thembrella organization, organized in early February; so far includes SLA, HKDS. Greens. HSS, and SDSH. HDS will probably join.
Croatian Democratic
Demokrattkm ZnjedmicM(HSZ)
Franjo Tudjman, President. Most rationalist and potentially the most powerful of Croatia's alternative political groups. Has not received official permission to operate. The biggest group, with more than
embers worldwide. Gets support fromsources, including Croatian emigre groups.referred to as Croation Democratic Alliance.
Croatian Democratic Union (HDS) Dr. Vladimir Veselica. Offshoot of Tudjman's HDZ; but with less nationalist agenda. Like HDZ, the name is sometimes.hich iscloser in this case.
Croatian Social-LiberalSoctjalno Uberatni Saves(HSLS) Slavko Goldstcjn. President of Alliance. Program declaration,oundedas SAWP acceptance.
Croatian Socialist Alliance
Founded9 from ihe old parly front organizationnnounced intent locontest thc spring elections.
Croatian Christian Democratic Union (HKDS) Green Alliance
Head: Zoran Osiric. Came under fire al meeting of Greens in Ociobcr for delays in forming the group officially.
The Green Action (Split) Zeljko Rogosic.
Founded: Octoberaction gioup
Croatian Peasants Party (HSS)
Social-Democratic Party af Croatia (SOSH)
Dr. Anion Vujic. President.
Founded.9 Name is sometimes
Union or Alliance.
Serbia
The Dtmocratic Party Dr. Koala Ca.wjj.ki. Founded:
The Dtmocratie Forum
Founded:ays ii isoliiical party but will support cenain candidates at clectioos.
Movementemocratic Rene*<al (PDO) Srbodan (Srba) Brankovk, Slobodan Anionic. Milutin Dzinovk. Grew out of the Serbian Youth Federation, split ol' in December and now in thc process ofarty.
Vojvodtna
Novi Sad Democratic Circle
Vojvodina Peasant Alliance Ruia Denes. Presideni.
Probably the same as lhc Peasants league, Novi Sad. Thie manendi* it Xtt**l
Alliance of Radical Democrats: Oliver Novakovk
Founded: Novi Sad, based in Belgrade, say ihey will be Yugoslav.
Kosovo
Democratic Alliance
Dr. Ibrahim Rugova (also chairs lhe Writers' Association).
ercegovina
Committee for Yugoslav Patriotic Initiative Green Movement (Sarejero,
Montenegro
Democratic Party
Dr. Slobodan Vujosevic
Founded:ontenegrin Assembly has given observer status
47
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