COLOMBIA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Created: 5/22/1990

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE0

Colombia: Implications of the. Presidential Election

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Ruling Liberal Party candidate Cesar Gaviria le the overwhelming; favorite* in the presidential contest to bo decided enay. Gaviriaajor booet whan the weakened Social Conservative Party split between Rodrigo Lloreda, the party's official candidate, and Alvaro Gomez, leader of the Soctel Conservatives' other faction; both are trailing badly tn tbe polls. Despitm his relative youth,year-old Gaviriarained economist, experienced legislator, and two-time cabinet minister,opular agenda for economic and political reforms thet distinguishes him from aging leaders In Colombia's two major traditional parties. ictory by Gaviria wouldenerational change in Colombian politics and, because his appeal cute across partlssn lines, ho could revive tbe- country's elitlet democratic system.

President Barco's antinarcotlcs offensive, now in its tenth month, baaentral campmign issue. Garlria is'a firm believer in strong drug enforcement

with the Directorate of Operations. Commente and

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measures and, if elected, ha probably willgeneral approach to counternarcoticswith Washington. learaa the candldatm with the mootagainst trafficker violence- and the factprincipal opponents push accommodationist viewspolicy suggest he will hold at leaat somefor continuing the crackdown if he wine bymargin. Nevertheless, thehope to benefitariety ofto drug enforcement, which may includein public sentiment toeal withif violence intensifies. Meanwhile,thereanger that the drug traffickerson their public and private threats toalthoughove would provoke anof the government position, it would, -in increase the chances thst over timescale back Its antlnarcotics effort becauseQavirla'a likely successors are leas commited tofight.

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The Principal Contenders

as off late April, Liberaldvantage over

Party fronfcrunner Ceaar Gaviria car hia nearost opponentield ofontendere. eavy favorite, Gaviria received an additional boost when Social Conservative leader Atvaro Gomez refused to abide by hisecision to nominate Rodrigo Lloreda as its presidential candidate and joined the race under the independent banner of National Salvation Movement. Such divisions among Social Conservatives traditionally have assured victory to the Liberal

Party In Colombia's two-party system, and

both Gomez and Lloreda are floundering. An ad noc" electoral decree allowing for late registration--almod at enabling9 guerrillas toarty and participate in theopened floodgatesush of additional presidential aspirants demanding equal treatment during the campaign. An existing law provides for free and equal television air time to all presidential candidates, and daily political broadcasts now feature campaign commercialsariety off marginal independents, including the colorful Reglna Liska, racticing witch. Although the Supreme Court recently determined the electoral decree to be unconstitutional because of established requirements for choosing and registering candidates, the US Embassy bellevos election slatea will remain in force through the balloting this weekend.

Havingeace agreement with9 earlier thin year, the Barco government appears particularly eager to ensure the participation of leftist groups in the election. In part to undercut the appeal of insurgent groups to Colombian youth. Moreover, the government has long been concerned that high abstention rates raised questions about the legitimacy of Colombia's democracy and presumably hopes that promoting greater pluralism now will help revive public confidence in whatn elitist political system. However, the recent assaaslnations of Patriotic Union (UP) candidate Bernardo Jaramlllo9 candidate Carlos Plzarro by gunmen tied to paramilitary groups with links to drug traffickers have complicated greatly the government's task. The killings have prompted tho Marxist hardcore of the UP and some other opposition elements to cancel their participation in the election. Jaramlllo's faction of UP moderates, however, has joined the Opposition Front, acoalition of leftwing Christian Democratic and socialist groups led by Even after Pisarro's killing,9 coalition reaffirmed its commitment to electoral politics by choosing former guerrilla leader Antonio Navarro Wolf to bear the Front's presidential standard

The Front runner and his Political Agenda Gaviria Tha Reformer

Gaviria has impressive credentials for governing Colombia, and his reformist imago and promiseenerational change in leadership has strengthened his appeal beyond usual partisan lines. An economist whose congressional careererm aa Speaker of the Bouse and who has served as both Finance Minister and Minister of Government In the current administration, Gaviria appears well-prepared to plan and implement economic and political reforms over the next four years. Be is titular head of the progressive New Liberal Movement wing of the Liberal Party that over the last decade has produced skillful politicians and technocrats supportive of both domestic reforms and strong drug enforcement. Gaviria'sonce led by popular antlnarcotlca crusaders like Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla and Senator Luis Carlos Galan, both aasassinated by trafflckers--often has provoked traditional political elites by denouncing machine patronage and corruption within the major parties and the three branches of government. ource with excellent access said tha New Liberals were prepared to break off from the mainstream party--aa they did2 andGaviria's candidacy was obstructed by party elders.verwhelming primary victory In mid-March and subsequent smooth nomination, however, have ntrengthened his offorts to unite tho party bohlnd hint. 1

As part of hia roformist agenda, Gaviria haeeading advocate of abe held on the same day ao the presidentialwould empower the new president topecial assembly to reform the constitution. Barco has authorized the holdingonstitutional referendum onay, and Gaviria reportedly views it aa key to hia plan to revamp the legislative and judicial systems and further pressure the drug mafia. Despite protests by the bicameral Congress that it alone has the authority to alter the constitution and remalna disinclined to do so, recent opinion polls indicate overercent public approval for the referendum. According to the US Embassy, this support reflects popular sentiment for legislative, judicial, and political party reforms, aa well aa reconciliation with Marxist Insurgents and other alienated elements of society. Although efforts to change the constitution will provide the traffickers with new opportunities to exert influence, reform could work to sustain government counternarcotlce policies such as extradition of traffickers and seizure of their sssets. Once codified in constitutional amendments these and other emergency antidrug measures could not be revoked by the courts or cancelled by tho government as partemporary state of siege.

Gaviria'a Views on Narcotics Issues

Reflecting his own personal commitment and the responsibility ha feels ss Galen's heir, Gaviria has been an outspoken advocate of continuing the Barco government's antinarcotics crackdown and haa madeentral campaign issue.

The US Embassy saya Gaviria'a platform calls for strengthening drug enforcement procedures, constructing maximum security prisons for traffickers, building protective residential enclaves for high riak judgea, and dlamantling private paramilitary organizations.

Gaviria alao aays he would like to cancel the six-year-old atate of siege in exchange for permanent legislation giving the government more power to.deal with violence.

The idea of removing the state of siege appeala to most Colombians, who prefer strict llmita on the prealdential use of discretionaryas employing the armed forces in the curront offensive against drug criminals. However, in the absence of permanent and enforceable antidrug laws It is unlikely that Gaviria, as president, would immediately cancel the state of siege and thereby eliminate his only legal basis to sustain the crackdown.

Although Gaviria consistently has defended extradition, US Embassy reporting indicates the candidate is uncomfortable with

the policy for reasons of sovereignty andand media coverage often paint the current governmentaccommodating toward Washington. All of Gaviria'swithin and without his party oppose Barco'o extradition

policy,/-

I These lectors and tne deteriorating securityand his family are under heavy guard in response to drug-related deathcaused Gaviria to moderate his campaign rhetoric on the isBue.

Gaviria'.

strategy as president,

would^ES"

to cease

extradition ot tramercers and prosecute in Colombiapecial court system had been established.

aviria reportedlylan toS-style judicial body that would be more investigative and aggressive in prosecuting traffickers while employing plea bargaining to streamline the process.

For the time being, however, US Embassy and other reporting indicates that Gaviria will uphold extradition because he recognises that strengthening the judicial system will take time.

Presumably to avoid endorsed an appeal for peace

belng'Toolated politics 1

earlier this year made jointlyroad spectrum of Colombian leaders that suggested the drug lords end their violence and smuggling operations in return for milder treatment from the government. Gaviria also haa clouded hla position by stating on the one hand that drug crimlnala cannot be negotiated with nor given amnesty, while on the other hand offering flexibility in dealing with traffickers who shun violence. There are indications that Gaviria might in the future pragmatically reassess the issue of coming to terms with the traffickers, especially If drug klngplng Pablo Escobar were captured or killed. In mid-April, Caviria told the press that negotiations with traffickers might be viable when conditions becomen apparent reference to reducing current levels of violence. This interpretation was subsequently reinforced by Gaviria's preas spokesman who said that when Escobar is captured the overall atmoaphere will changehe situation will "easo", and Colombia can look for "other solutions" to the problem of drug trafficking.

For the moment,ody of information indicates Gaviria personally remains opposed to holding talks with traffickers. eeting with the US Ambassador, for example, he criticized Barco for holding secret discussions in January

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with drug intermediaries to secure tha release of kidnap hostages. Including relatives of the President and the son of his closest adviser. Moreover, since the murder last month9 candidate Pizarro, Gaviria has been more strident In his public statements against dialogue with narco-terrorlBts.

Other Candidates Exploit the Drug Issus

Gaviria's major challengers have seised on the narcotics issue to try and undermine the frontrunner. They are aware that moat Colombians view cocaine traffickingreater problem for consumers--the US and Europe--than for Andean producers, and they recognize the growing public concern over drug-related violence that has resulted from Barco's crackdown. Social Conaervative candidate Rodrigoormer foreign minlstor and ambassador to the US who last yearolid supporter of the government's antidrug offensive, now attacks the Administration'sn extradition and nsgotiatlons with traffickers.

platform calls for amneaty for those traffickers who retire from the drug trade, agree to compensate Innocent vlctlma of terrorism, and turn themselves in for judgment by Colombian courts.

He also has stated that indlviduala dealing in cocaine would have little to fear from his presidency provided they were not guilty of coram!ting violent crimes.

Alvaro Gomez has been even more Btrident In attacking Barco'a antidrug policies.

has calledull pardon for kingpina who show they are serious about retiring from the drug trade, has characterized extradition as Washington's 'panning fancy", and haa called on the government to extend the acope of peace talka with leftist guerrillas to reaolvlng the war with trafflckera.

iting trafficker violence and lack of adequate security for presidentiel candidates, Gomez has urged Barco to delegate full responsibility for security and public orderpodal military triumvirate.

has borrowed proposals from some of Cavlria'a rivals in the Liberal Party that narcotics be legalized so ss to end the criminality associated with the drug industry.

Outlook and Implications for the US

' Tn addition. Social connervat

candidates traditionally have been helped by low turnout, and Colombia'a normally high abstention rate may be even higher this year because of guerrilla anti-election operations and election-related violence sponsored by rightwlng vlgilsnte groups and narco-trafflckers. US Embassy reporting suggests that abstentlonlsm may also be Increased somewhat by public disillusionment with Barco's domestic policies and frustration over perceived irregularities in the March legislative and mayoral elections, in which the new computer system for tallying votes broke down and prevented official results from being released for six

Oaviria is expected to win becsuse he hasore convincing platform for political and economic progress than any of his opponents andar better directed and funded organization. His margin of victory probably will be slimmer

' however, due to

Nevertheless, we expect Gaviria to winomfortable margin and believe that hie personal style and administrative experience will benefit him when he assumes officeugust.

Although Gaviria likely wouldministerial and administrative posts with diverse Liberals, he appears to recognize that Barco'a refusal6 to adhere to longstanding precedents for appointing opposition elements to the government contributed elgnlficantly to the President's political problems.

Gaviria will offer some

influential positions to Social Conservatives and other opposition politicians in an effort to strengthen national unity. This, coupled with his well-honed instincts for compromise, should facilitate efforts to launch badly needed domestic reforms.

An English-speaker and admirer of the US, Gaviria has made clear that he hopes totrong working relationship with Washington. As an economistationalist, he hopes the US partnership will yield greater dividends for Colombia on financial and trade lasues, aa well ao foreign aasiatance. Like Barco, however, Gaviria realizes that during the current period of heightened nationalistic sensitivities in Colombia, there are risks Involved in being viewed as "Washington's man." Barco made concessions to nationalist sentiment by giving relatively free reign in foreign policy to his combative Foreign Minister Julio Londono. an outspoken critic of US power in the region.

1 Oavlrla

will also have to look cor ways to strike an Independent posture.

On the antinarcotlcs front, we believe Gaviria will try to build on Barco'a cooperation with the US while attempting to carry out longterm judicial reforms aimed at decreasing Bogota's reliance on extradition as well as curbing the surge of violence and lawlessness in Colombia. Because Gaviria has been clearly identifiedardliner on drug issues compared to his opponents in the campaign, the Liberal candidate should beelatively good position to continue the crackdown if he winsubstantial margin. Nevertheless, Caviria will need continuing successes like the recent military assault on the Petrolera cocaine complex In southeastern Colombia to prevent his critics from controlling the public relations battle. Moreover, capturing or killing Pablo Escobar couldrucial watershed in determining whether the government decides to stay the course against those traffickers who are less inclined toward political violence. In our view, pressure on the government to declare "victory" and scale back ita campaign against the drug industry

would increase markedly following the elimination of Escobar and one or two other ruthless kingpins, and could leadreater divergence of interests between Bogota and Washington.

Meanwhile, the traffickers probably hope to benefit from other potential roadblocks to effective drug enforcement in the next administration. They probably would not attempt to block judicial reforms, such as the creation of specialised courts to handle trafficker caaea, because they would see this aa an opportunity to reduce the threat of extradition through bribery and Intimidation. Traffickers alao can be expected to manipulate the convocationonatituent assembly, on the assumption that by pressuring legislators they could defeat proposals for constitutional changea that might reinforce presidential power to confront the drug industry. Theto renew its dellberationa In late July-demonstrated last Decemberhowdown with Barco that it waa significantly Intimidated and subverted by the traffickers, and tha most prominent frontmen for drug interests were reelected in the March legislative electlona, according to the US Embassy. Moreover. Barco's successor will have to be sensitiveighly volatile public that ia skeptical of US atrategy for drug enforcement and that may become even more supportive of negotiations with the drug lords if the crackdown produces more random and lethal violence.

Finally, there exists the real danger that drug criminals might make good on public threats to assassinate Gaviria. Despite extraordinary security measures to protect the Liberal Party candidate and hia family, he is vulnerable to attack both before and after the election. Colombia haa no provisionsice presidential successor toresident who dies In office, but the constitution stipulates that an unelected "designate" would be chosen by the Congress from among the leaders of the ruling party. In our judgment, Gavlrla's murder wouldajor blow to the proepecta for reenergizing Colombia's democracy and staying the course over time against the narco-klngplns. Initially, Gavlrla'athat ofwouId provoke intensified government efforts against the traffickers, but because none of hia likely successorsimilar commitment to the drug fight we suspect the crackdown would gradually begin to ebb, and the chorus for some sort of accommodation with the traffickers would increase.

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