LITHUANIA: IS A SETTLEMENT IN SIGHT?

Created: 5/1/1990

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

'TEeRexi I

The Director of Central IntelligenceOM>

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National0

executive brief

Lithuania:ettlement In Sight?

Recent signs of compromise hare Improved prospects Tor gelling negotiations started, but remaining obstacles make Ihe odds of ending the confronlalion over the next couple of weeks no better than even.

Gorbachev's insistence that Lithuania pursue independence following Moscow's secession procedures remains non-negotiable; Landsbergis, while more inclined Co compromise, Is slill not willing to accept Moscow's secession law.

Efforts by Latvia and Estonia to achieve independenceess confrontational course could provide Lithuaniaay lo retreat from its present position, but Moscow will have to be more flexible if it Is loaltic-wide confronlalion.

Even as the two sidesay out of tbe impasse, the potential for civil disobedience and possibly violence will grow In Lithuania as the economic noose tightens, greatly raising the domestic and foreign costs lo Gorbachev.

Thu Executive Brief reflects thef Intelligence Community rexresentati^ expressedeeting on0 It *as drafted by the National Intelligence Officer for ihe USSR and coordinated Mth representatives in CIA. State/IVfi. DIA, NSA.

All pnrlioiu claislficd

Recent faints of possible concessions by both Lithuania and Moscow have fueled speculationossible resolution of the crisis.

The Lithuanians have said from the beginning that all is negotiable except independence.

Various Lithuanian leaders indicated over the weekend that they could suspend implementation of laws passed since their declaration of independence as requested by Kohl and Mitterrand and, thus, satisfy one of Moscow's key demands.

Gorbachev's press spokesman has also noted that Moscow woulduspension of the laws and the declaration as meeting tbe requirements for negotiations.

Some Lithuanians are reporting that Moscow has said supplies of natural gas will be increased soajor chemical plant in Lithuania could remain open; while so far unconfirmed by Moscow,tep could be interpreted as an attempt toompromise solution, even though Moscow might be doing it for largely self-serving reasons.

Moscow's Approach be at least suspended and tbat Lithuania comply with Soviet law.

While Gorbachev is undoubtedly being encouraged to adopt this siance by orthodox military and political forces, he clearly sees thisest of bis leadership and believes he must hang tough to prevent other republics from doing Ihe same Thing.

Pressures on Lithuania Building

Serious Problems Remain

differences still separate tbe two sides, however. Not all developments are moving in Moscow's favor.

Lithuanians still seem determined to resist backing down on their declaration ofey Moscow demand.

Latvia and Estonia are moving toward independence albeitess confrontational way. Even so, this is increasing pressure on Moscow to make some compromises to keep the dialogue going andaltic-wide confrontation.

As the economic pain in Lithuania intensifiesense of desperation grows with no settlement in sight, the potential for civil disobedience and even violence will Increase.evelopment would significantly raise both the international and domestic costs to Gorbachev, further complicating bis efforts to develop an economic reform package.

Prospects for political resolution of the confrontation have improved, but are still no better than even in the next couple of weeks.

Many uncertainties remain: most importantly, the pressures within Lithuania toetreat on principle as the economic noose gets tighter.

Even though Landsbcrgis is sounding more inclined to compromise, he is still not .prepared to retreat on principle and accept Moscow's constitution and laws as the only basis for leaving the USSR.

Given the stakes involvedprocedures for secession that are applicable fort is doubtful that Gorbachev will go along with anything less than Lithuanian acceptance of Moscow's rules.

Short of revoking its declaration, Lithuania's prospects for achieving complete independence would probably be improved significantly if it made additional concessions toompromise with Moscow.

Original document.

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