The Director of Central Intelligence
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Intelligence Council
40
BRIEF
Primary Soviet Objectives for the Summit
With his country's domestic crisis deepening, Gorbachev will want to nail down arms control and trade agreements that will reduce the externalacilitate substantial cuts in defense spending, and Improve prospects for eventual expansion of bilateral trade and US investment.
He is well aware of the economic and political factors that limit the extent of US assistance to the Soviet economy but is likely to come looking for increased investment and technical assistance.
The situation at home gives Gorbachev considerable incentive to avoid initiatives that could soar the outcome of the summit; he probably will not, however, show mach flexibllitv on Lithuania or Germany.
A 'successful" summit would givearginal political boost at home priorivotal party congress but provide little political slack in dealing with the domestic and foreign crises he faces.
These crises have led Gorbachev toore cautious stance on several issues (domestic reform, Germany, andut he retains the clout at home to deal on agreements he believes are in the Soviet Interest.
This Executive Brief is basedeeting of Intelligence Community analysts held ont was produced by the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR and coordinated with Community representatives.
All portions classified "oTWREJ.!-
A Wobbly Home Front
Room?
will come to his second set of talks with President Bush with an even more precarious situation at home than at the time of the Malta meeting. His own position seems relatively secure-with new presidential powers-hut little else is.
The economy gets worse each day. The leadership is unable to stem the decline,ew radical reform program has yet to be passed by the Supreme Soviet
Nationalist challenges to Moscow's control are intensifying, and not only in the Baltics. The breakaway of some republics seems likely over the next few years, although the terms of the "divorce" remain uncertain.
Politics are polarizing: democratic forces inaeasingly arc pushing reform beyond Gorbachev's agenda, and traditionalist elements are attempting toine onictory by Yeltsin in tbe race for president of the Russian Republic would pose the strongest threat yet to Gorbachev's dominance of national politics.
Most Intelligence Community analysts think that these multiple stresses are producing more infighting within the leadership. This factionalism probably will lead to yet another showdown at tbe party congress in Julyormal split in the party over reform.
Gorbachev, of late, has sought to restrain radical pressures. He may continue this tactic in the belief that the country will disintegrate unless some order is imposed on the reform process. In the past however, he has tried to run with or ahead of reformist pressures, and he may do so this time as well when he faces the inevitability of having to decide how fast and bow far reform should go.
Notwithstanding his domestic problems, the Intelligence Community believes lhat Gorbachev retains considerable maneuvering room on summit issues. The runup to the summit has demonstrated that he can even deal on such tough issues as START, where critical national security interests are at stake and theole and equities are greater.
The recent changes in the geopolitical environment have led Gorbachev to reconsider issues like CFE and the German question. He shares the concerns of some traditionalist elements and the military in these areas and is unlikely to be as flexible as he has been previously.
Gorbachev also shares their concerns on tbe Baltic republics. He will want to avoid recriminations over this issue in Washington, as bis willingness to receive Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene during the ministerial indicated. But he does not seem prepared to meet the Lithuanians half way and back off from his demand that the Lithuanians suspend their declaration of independence before negotiations begin. He is likely to make this clear in his discussions here.
What He's After
Gorbachev's primary goal for the summit Is to reach agreements lhat will maintain momentum In his foreign policy successes and eventually provide some relief lo Ihe USSR's seriously ill economy. START, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons agreements will bolster his argument thai thefrom the West continues to recede, thus diminishing the clout of orthodox party critics on these issues andore significant shift of resources away from the defense sector of therade treaty would only pay long-term dividends, but any
invesiment or technical assistance he managed to obtain would be welcomed by public opinion and perhaps provide some early economic relief.
Tbe political benefits to Gorbachevsuccessfur summit would be less concrete.
"triumph* in the United States will provide some boost to bis position in tbe leadership as the party congress
approaches.
his foreign policy exploits have decreasing resonance at home as the domestic crisis deepens.
On the otherailed* summit-no initialing of STARTonfrontation with the President over the Baltics-would add to his woes.
His traditionalist and military critics would claim that their callougher stance on security issues and the Baltics had been justified.
Hie potential economic gains would be lost or at least postponed.
For this reason, he will continue to workuccessful outcome. He mighturprise or two up bis sleeve, such as announcing another nuclear testing moratorium, proposing radical cuts in nuclear or conventional arms, or tabling some new regional proposal. But he is not likely -to risk initiatives that could sidetrack the discussions or reduce the achievements of the summit to ephemeral headlines.
request to President Bush. Some of bismost radical-economic advisers have recently emphasized the criticality of Western economic assistance in the Soviet shiftarket economy.
Gorbachev is likely to tout the various radical economic reform programs being debated as evidence that the USSR is serious about reform and about joining the international economic system. He probably will allude to serious repercussions for tbe United States and the West if Soviet economic reform fails.
He may hope that this will convince US Government and business leaders lhat assistance to and investment in the Soviet Union is in their interest.
To emphasize the point, be may announce the conclusion of some new business deals with US firms while in the country, although we have no hard evidence that any are near closure.
We believe Gorbachev is eager to conclude the trade treaty at the summit. The Soviets have moved to wrap up most of the technical details of the treaty and are working to clear up arrearages with US firms, in part through increasing gold sales. Although tbe Supreme Soviet's plans to discuss the new emigration bill are unclear at the moment, Gorbachev may try to persuade it to expedite the bill to facilitate signing the trade treaty at the summit.
The German Question
Issues
Although Gorbachev appears to realize the economic and political limits on what the US Government can do for the Soviet economy, his indication at the Moscow ministerial of the USSR's needajor infusion of Western capital strongly suggests that he will make such a
Gorbachev will try to impress upon President Bush the depth of Soviet concernnified Germany in NATO and the shift in the European balance of power this would bring. He is likely toelatively tough line and does not anticipate major movement on Germany at the summit.
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Sbevardnaaze puolidyoint at tbe Two-Plus-Four talks in Bonn of emphasizing the constraints that Soviet popular opinion allegedly puts on Moscow's ability to compromise. He implied-and other Soviet leaders have contended to Western audiences inGorbachev might not survive politicallynified Germany remained in NATO.
The Community is split on how vulnerable domestically Gorbachev is on the German question. Some analysts believe that Shevardnadze was not posturing and that the visceral views the military leadership and ligachev have on the German question make it very unlikely lhat Gorbachev couldnified Germany in NATO. They believe that, in the end, Gorbachev will refuse to remove Soviet troops if be does not obtain the creationew European security structure in which NATO is atolitical shell.
Most analysts, however, see the statements of Shevardnadze and other Soviet officials largely as negotiating ploys to gain some leverage over the eventual external security settlement and generally to buy time.
point to
evidence mdicanngpopulace is not seized with the German issue, as well as Soviet recognition that little can be done to stop unification.
addition, they argue that although the views of Ligachev and the military cannot be ignored, Gorbachev is strong enough to survive their opposition if be gets most of the assurances on Germany that the West seems inclined to offer.
Gorbachev will push tonified Germany out of NATO or at least out of the NATO unified military command. He also will seek to tie the Soviet troop presence in the East to the US presence in the West. Most analysts believe, however, that Gorbachev ultimately will concede on these points andnified Germany in NATO if he obtains most of the following important assurances:
NATO or West German forces in the current GDRelatively lengthy transition period (three or more years) for tbe departure of Soviet troops.
A commitmentharp reduction of the German armed forces.
commitmentubstantial cut in-possibly elimination of-NATO nuclear weapons on German soil.
Gestures by NATO toward transforming the alliance into moreolitical institutioneexamination of its strategy.
Movement toward the creationan-European security structure based on CSCE.
Substantial assistance from Bonn in footing tbe bill for maintaining Soviet troops in Germany during the tradition period and commitments to increase German investment in the USSR.
A document or series of documents Moscow can point to aseace treaty formally ending World
Most analysts believeefusal by Gorbachev to remove Soviet troops is not likely, Moscow keenlyood long-term relationshipnited Germany (not least for economic reasons) and realizes tbat refusing to leave would severely strain relations with the United States and other Western powers.
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