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EXECUTIVE BRIEF
The Soviet Attitude Toward CFE
Achieving an agreement to limit Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE)igh priority for Gorbachev, and be still aims to achieve an agreement this year.
Tbe collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Im pending unification of Germany have seriously complicated the Soviet military calculus In CFE and thereby created political problems in Moscow. But Gorbachev continues to see CFE as vital to larger domestic and foreign policy objectives.
Partly to appease Soviet military leaders, Gorbachev must make certain that the size of Ihe German Army is limited and that Soviet forces arc allotted at leastoercent of total Warsaw Pact equipment In the Allanllc-to-lhe-Urals Zone.
Germans have Indicated to the Soviets that
incywouia agreepercent cut In their army- bringing them in the range of Soviel desires.
- We judge the Soviets would need an allotment ofoercent of total Pact equipment to be confident of their ability lo defend their territory.
. Key to resolving the current impasse on aircraft limits will be
negotiating mutually acceptable constraints on land-based naval air
forces.
Even if all of the East's proposals were accepted, the General Staff's confidence In the Soviet Union's ability to conduct deep offensive operations against NATO would remain very low.
The Intelligence Community is concerned about several monitoring Issues, Including the continuing movement of treaty-limited equipment east or the Urals and about the possibility the Soviets may resubordlnate large numbers of combat aircraft to land-based naval air forces.
TTiij Executive Brief reflects lhe view of Ihe Inietbgence Community expressedpecial warning meeting held ont was drafttd byNational Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces and informally coordinated with represeniativcs from CIA, DIA, and State/INR.
All portions classified
Soviets say they are reviewing their positions at the CFE negotiations because of events in Eastern Europe and German unification. This has led to somein the West over me prospects for successful completionFE Treaty.
The Intelligence Community, however, believes that Gorbachevignificant stake in the negotiations and that Soviet military concerns can be accommodated without significantly enhancing Soviet offensive capabilities.
Gorbachev's Priorities
In our view, Gorbachev is committed toFE agreement this year. He sees an agreementrerequisite to the planned large-scale reallocation of resources away from the military, to the establishmentew European security order (to be initialedSCE summit thisnd to the success of negotiations on short-range nuclear forces. We also believe that he recognizes the need to achieve an agreement in the next few months:
After German unification, he will have much less leverage to use in efforts to constrain the size of the German Army.
The rapid dissolution of the Warsaw Pact means that the longer thecontinue, the more difficult bloc-to-bloc negotiations become.
NATO bas stressedSCE summit is contingent on the successful completion of CFE.
The Military Dimension
The demise of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet unilateral reductions are removing the Soviets' capability to conduct deep offensive operations against NATO without extensive reinforcements from inside the USSR. The CFE reductions will eliminate the superiority in forces they have traditionally reviewed as essential for offensive operations. Moreover, we believe that, even if all of the East's proposals were accepted, the General Staffs confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to conduct deep offensive operations against NATO would remain very low.
Gorbachev continues toFE Treaty as in the Soviet interest, but the conservative militaryomewhat different view that lately has beenore favorable hearing. Tbe Soviet General Staff has made it clear that its underlying assumptions about CFE have changed su'mficantly over the past six months. The militarynited Germany as increasing the threat to the Soviet Union. The General Staff is concerned tbatesult of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and the acceptance of limits on Soviet forces within the Soviet Union, that the military could no longer guarantee the defense of the homeland. CFE, in the view of the General Staff, could institutionalize Soviet military inferiority.
Consequently, wejudge, the Soviets will not agreeFE treaty unless they can achieve two vital objectives: limiting the size of the German Army and, under the "equipment sufficiencyeing allowed toatisfactory proportion of aggregate Pact equipment.
The Soviets have indicated for some time that they want the German Army capped at about SO percent of current strength. They have failed to bring this about in the Two Plus Four Talks, but
[tbe Germans-juvicis may iuvc agreed that the German military would be reduced as part of overall personnel reductions in CrE. We do not know whether this would take the formilateral protocolFE Treaty or would directly address the problemersonnel sufficiency rule for the Central Region.
Of vital concern to the Sovietssize of the German Armyproportion of totalthe;
The Soviets assert that their loss of control over Eastern Europe and the expected failure of the East Europeans to fill their CFE allotments of equipment would result in "Potemkinhe Soviets want to compensate for this by setting their allotment betweenndercent of the total Pact equipment in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone.
We believeoviet allotment of atercent could increase the Soviet General Staffs confidence in its strategic defensive capability along the country's border.
Some analysts believe the higher range would also provide some limited capability to conduct offensive, operations either in the Central Region or along NATO's flanks.
Other Unresolved Differences
Monitoring Concerns
The Intelligence Community is monitoring Soviet activities that could, if continued or expanded, result inthe spirit of the CFE treaty. The Soviets could, for example,
Continue to move substantial amounts of treaty-limited equipment east of the Urals before tbe treaty is signed.
Resubordinate substantial amounts of equipment to paramilitary forces.
Transfer substantial numbers of aircraft to their naval air forces.
The most serious rjossibility is the first one. The Soviets are moving tanks and artillery from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone into storage east of the Urals. This equipment could be used totrategic reserve, though no new units have yet been formed. The size and readiness ofeserve would help determine US requirements for reserves available to reinforce Europe and, therefore, figure in future East/West discussions about naval force levels.
to be agreed upon are such issues as counting rules, definitions, ceilings of treaty-limited equipment, destruction requirements, interzonal flow, and inspection quotas. The difficulty of resolving these technical matters has contributed to the sense of pessimism over CFE prospects.
Limiting aircrafttumbling block to progress in CFE and the key to resolving it will be negotiating constraints on land-based naval aircraft. Gorbachev likely will continue to insist that any aircraft ceilings exclude land-based naval air unless the west is willing to engage in naval arms control. The Soviets, for their part, probably would be prepared to defer aircraft reductions to follow on negotiations.
Even if all of the East's proposals were accepted, the Generalonfidence in the Soviet Union's ability to conduct deep offensive operations against NATO would remain very low.
The Soviets have announced that they are expanding their internal security forces, but this is clearly in response to the need for more such forces to deal with domestic unrest So far, there has been very little resubordination of treaty-limited equipment to paramilitary forces.
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Finally, some analysts foresee theof uovousuaiued resubordination of aircraft to the Soviet naval air forces. They contend that Soviet land-based naval aircraft must be explicitly limited. Others suggest it might be possible toutually acceptable way to bring the more threatening land-based naval aircraft, particularly the Backfires and Fencers, under the aircraft limits of CFE.
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Original document.
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