With politics in the country polarizing, the economy staggering, and the nationalities crisis mounting, theh congress, which is due to openury, promises toatershed. Events of the past month-Boris Yel'tsin's election as Chairman of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet and the establishmentussian Conimunist Party-heighten the stakes.
Gorbachev Is particularly concerned about preventing the traditionalists from using the party against him. This possibility appears to have convinced him to slow down the transfer of power from the party to the new legislature and Presidential Council. Although he will continue to move in that direction:
He now sees the current weakness of those new institutions and the need to preserve the party as an important base of power.
ime of fragmenting power, the party-while severely weakened-is still the only institution with some ability to implement national decisions.
Gorbachev's Objectives at the Congress
Gorbachev wants further democrati/ation of the party and hopes toonsensus upon which the vast majority of the party can unite. He is not likely to
go far enough to satisfy many of the radical reformers, but the changes he favors are certain to produce strong opposition from the traditionalists. These include:
Ending the nomenklatura system, alMilismng or watering down "democraticnd democratizing elections to party posts.
Changing the Politburoresidium, which woulduch larger and less important body.
Replacing the post of general secretary with thathairman accountable to the CPSU congress rather than its Central Committee, giving him greater freedom of action.
Replacing upf the Central Committee and removing several Politburo members, including Zaykov, Vorotnikov, Slyunkov, and possibly Ligachev.
Endorsing more rapid movementarket economy.
Possible Outcomes
The traditionalists' show of strength at the Russian party congress and Gorbachev's consideration this week of postponing the national congress indicate that his success is by no means assured. We believe, however, that he will probably obtain further movement toward party reform. In the past, orthodox opponents have consistently been weaker in political showdowns than they appeared to be before the event.
Even some of Gorbachev's most vocal critics on the right have-said that he is the only leader who can bring the party out of its crisis.
Although Russian Communist Party chief Polozkov is to the right of Gorbachev, there is evidence that in the recent past Gorbachev offered political support to him.
Critics aside, most congress delegates will be mindful of the party's rapidly eroding support in the country and will not want to place the party in opposition to reforms that much of the country and many party members deem necessary.
If Gorbachev is able to neutralize the party's right wing yet again and achieve his objectives, he will have strengthened his control over the party and moved its
center of gravity further toward reform. He will then beosition to take more radical stepseformist direction, with the party less of an impedimentperhaps even capable of becoming an instrument of--reform.
While less likely, there are some reasons to believe that the congress couldess favorable outcome for Gorbachev.
The "Democratichich favors radical reform, will not have as much clout at the party congress as we had earlier believed. The DP will onlyr so delegates at the congress (approximately twond its members are divided over whether to split from the party. The majority of DP members will not be satisfied with the reforms Gorbachev has in mind, and some will break from (he CPSU and form their own social democratic party.
Even more Important than the radical reformers' weakness, however, is tbe new assertiveness of party conservatives. They seem determined to rein in reform and may be able to force Gorbachev to compromise on critical elements of bis program.
They will tight hard to retain democratic centralism and are likely to attempt to enforce ideological conformity in (he party along (he lines of (he April Central Commiitee letter criticizing (he Democratic Platform.
ecord of strong opposition to cooperatives and firm support for collective farms. Backing from people like Polozkov mighl aid ligachev's attempt to slow the movearket economy.
the traditionalists may attempt to replace Gorbachev as party leader, he probably has the political strength to counter the move. But we cannot rule oul that he might decide under such circumstances io quii, concentrating his efforts on the presidency and the Supreme Soviet where support for reform is greater.
However the congress plays oul, It will do Utileeverse Ihe parly's rapidly decliningraditionalist resurgence will increase the number of Democratic Platform members who leave and only make the party more irrelevant to the solution of the country's daunting and growing problems. Il could also hasten the disintegration of the Union by leading more non-Russian Communist partiesull away from (he CPSU.
TheYel'lsin Fac(or
Beyond the congress itself, an emerging keyhe future of Ihe party and Ihe country will be Gorbachev's relationship with Yeltsin. Whether Yel'tsin stays in the CPSU or leaves, his new RSFSR post and widespread popular support giveower base independent of ihe party, both in Russia and nationally.
Power, ultimately, is the issue on which the Yel'lsin-Gorbachev relationship centers and on which ihey will clash. Their competing desires for power and the personal animosities they carry from past battles argue against (heirong-term working relationship. Even in the near term, Yeltsin will continue to press Gorbachev for rapid movementultiparty system in which the CPSU would compete as one among equals.
Yei bolh Gorbachev and Yel'tsin have shown in recentillingness Io make at Icasl some gestures toward conciliation. On some important issues wc believe lhal Ihey can work for common objectives.
Party reform. Yel'tsin would go much further Ihan Gorbachev in democratizing party practices, bul his views arc closer lo Gorbachev's Ihan are (hose of Ihe parly traditionalists.
Economic reform. Gorbachev's latest shift toward market reform narrows the gap between his position and Yel'tsin's. Where Ycl'tsin differs most is on his support for rapid privatization ana crowd-pleasing opposition to any price hikes io the movearket.
The Union. Yel'tsin's quick moves to assert the Russian republic's sovereignly and to meet with Uthuanian leader Landsbergis openly challenged Gorbachev. But their positions on Lithuania, at least, have since narrowed as Gorbachev hasillingness to deal with the Lithuanians and Yel'stin has urged them to suspend their independence declaration and negotiate on the basis of (he secession law.
The strength of the party hardliners will figure prominently in the Yel'tsin-Gorbachev relationship over the next six months. Both will suffer if the hardlinersomeback. Thus, the greater the threat, the more likely that the two leaders will strike tactical compromises.
Original document.
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