irector of Central
Intelligence Council
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Buoyed by their apparent success at the Russian Coinmunist Party gathering in June, the tramnonaiists-Ied by Yegorocal challenge to Gorbachev and bis reform policies ath CPSU Congress. Gorbachev's political skills, his defiant stance on the need for reform, and the apparent reluctance of the right wing to challenge bis leadership directly allowed the General Secretary to solidify his hold over the CPSU and significantly reduce its ability to stand in the way of his efforts at political and economic reform. '
Gorbachev Demotes the Party
Gorbachev's success in restricting tbe traditionalists' influence in the CPSU degrades the party's ability to serveounterweight to his continuing efforts to shift executive authority to the Soviet presidency.
The expansion of the Politburo tooting members, including allepublic party chiefs but excluding all prominent state and government figures except Gorbachev, ensures that this body in the future will play little, If any, role in the day-to-day running of the country.
Gorbachev succeeded inoderate reformer, Vladimir Ivashko. as his deputy, decisively defeating Ligachev in the process. With Ivashko in charge of an expanded Secretariat, Gorbachev will be able to devote more time to overseeing state and government affairs without worrying about an obstreperous party organization on his flank.
The Central Committee has been substantially renovated and purgedumber of Gorbachev'sfoes, including Ligachev; the Committee's size and sharply diminished role in selecting the party leadership sigmficantly constrain itso obstruct Gorbachev's programs.
Changes in the parry rules, coupled with Gorbachev's stated intent to convert the CPSUarliamentary party, will also limit the party's influence.
The weakening of "democratic centralism" will over time significantly erode the party's ability to exercise control over lower partyevelopment consistent with Gorbachev's efforts to decentralize and democratize dedsionmaking
The "rejection of the nomenklatura system will undermine the party's
ability to control personnel appointments. That power will continue to shift to the state and government organs at all levels. . .
Gorbachev's restructuring of the CPSU sharply tircu inscribes its traditional rolevanguard" parry exercising broad control over the aojmiriistration of tbe USSR's political and economic affairs. Unable to push the nitrarradiuoiialists led by ligachev along his reformist path, be has isolated them and limited their ability' to use the party against him; at the same rime, he bas made the party less relevant to the process of change.
These developments will move the CPSU in tbe direction ofarliamentary party which would have to earn popular support by competing successfully with other parties. Even so, it is doubtful this will save the CPSU. The party is now viewed as increasingly ineffective by large segments of Soviet society. Gorbachev's moves will probably accelerate the decline in its prestige and authority and hasten the shift in decisionmaking authority away from the party to the state and government organs.
Although we cannot project withignificant minority of the party'sillion members may vote with their feet for the DP and other emerging political parties.
At the same time, the differences among tbe various groups on the left will inhibit their ability tonified opposition capable of pushing more radical reform.
Yel'tsin's role as chairman of the Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet and his departure from the party place himosition to challenge Gorbachev.
His decision to convene the Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet while the CPSU Congress was still inuccessful effort to secure the appointment of allies to keyhis growing political adroitness.
His approach to sectoring the Russian Republic's independence in economic, political, and foreignpopular among large segments of the population-places him squarely at odds with Gorbachev.
Democratic Platform Bolts
Ycl'tsin's dramatic resignation from the party and the subsequent withdrawal of the key Dernocraric Platform (DP) leaders tarnished Gorbachev's victory.
The net effect of Yel'tsin's defection willurther weakening of the CPStPs authorityastening of the shiftultiparty democracy, a
two-fold process which Gorbachev strongly endorses.
Yel'tsin's defectioo gives him the opportunity to rally reformist elements in Soviet societyarty lhat can challenge the CPSU. His radical approach to reform is viewed increasingly as an alternative to Gorbachev's presently more moderate coarse.
Whether Gorbachev and Yel'tsin can overcome their animosity will depend on how quickly Gorbachev moves out on reform now that he has secured his right flank.
Although the two men may be able to reach tactical compromisesumber of reform issues, their power aspirations and the recent difficult relations between them suggestlash over policies may be inevitable.
Gorbachev Unbound the propagation of their platforms.
Wc believe the decree on the mediaarbinger of what is likely toeries of new policy Initiatives by Gorbachev now that he has weakened the party's right wing.
early acceptancenited Germany's membership in NATOtrong rejection of conservative criticism.
Gorbachev may well be prepared to move beyond past Soviet positions in arms control and other foreign policy issue areas. He will be eager to reach agreementumber of outstanding negotiations, including CFE. He may also demonstrate greater flexibility in other areas, such as the dispute with Japan over the Northern Territories. Although he will continue to listen to the concerns of the military, he will not allow such concerns to stand in the way of agreements he feels are in the Soviet 'national interest.
Gorbachev's focus during bis remarks to the congress on the need to move ahead on reformsew willingness to implement broader economic and political reforms.
Although the congress failed lo come to grips with the country's still formidable economic, political, and social problems, Gorbachev has interpreted the congress' documents as givingandate to pursue his policy agenda more rapidly and decisively. Whether his approach to reform will prove timely enough or go far enough to overcome the USSR's troubles remains in doubt.
Original document.
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