KBY JU2GMKNTS: IRAQI BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMKfJTS
IRAQ HAS THE MOST AGGRESSIVE AND ADVANCEDPROGRAM IN THE ARAB WORLD. 8 ITS SOVIET-SUPPLIEDISSILESATM--TWICE THE NORMALCURRENTLY IS PUSHING FOR INDIGENOUSSEVERAL OTHER MISSILES, INCLUDINGONDOR II AND ANOF THE SCUD
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THE FOLTyOWINO KEY JUDGMENTS ARE REPRINTEDE
EY JUDGMENTS: IRAQI
published intelligence assessment produced BY the oppice op
scientificweapons research. i |
IRAQ HAS THE MOST AGGRESSIVE AND ADVANCED BALLISTIC PROGRAM IH THE ARAB WORLD. IT ALREADY IRAQI-MODIFIED SOVIET SCUD b'S CALLED THEAND THE AL ABBAS--CAPABLE OP REACHING TBL AVIV TARGETSM AWAY. SEEKING AH PRODUCTION CAPABILITY, IRAQ ALSO HAS DEVELOPMENTway OP FIVE OTHER MISSILES CAPABLE Or GREATERPAYLOADS.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IS CRITICAL TO IRAQ'S EFFORT. WITH IT, PRODUCTION OF ONE OR MORE OF IRAQ'S NEW MISSILES COULD POSSIBLY BEGIN DURING THE EARLY. OTHERWISE. PRCCUCTIOM COULD BE DELAYED INTO THE. IRAQ REALIZES THIS DEPENDENCE AND IS WORKING TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT AND TO WEAN ITSELF FROM FOREIGN SUPPORT--DICLUDIMG MOSCOW, ITS ONLY SUPPLIER OFISSILES.
IRAQ HAS ACQUIRED MOST OP ITS MISSILE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE IH LESS THAN THREE YEARS. WITH WEST EUROPEAN DESIGN AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, IT HAS BUILT OVERUILDINGS NEEDED TO PRODUCE AND TEST MAJOR MISSILE COMPONENTS AND TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE SUBCOMPONENTS. AT THE HEART OF THIS BFFORT ARE TWO EXTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION PROJBCTS,ND WHICH INCLUDE FACILITIES FOR SOLID-PROPELLANT PRODUCTION, POR ROCKET MOTOR PRODUCTION AND
THE TECHNICAL CORPS FOR SPECIAL PROJECTS ANDSTATE ENTERPRISE POR MECHANICAL INDUSTRIES--CONTINUEADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS TO SUPPORT PROGRAM.
IRAQ HAS BASED ITS MISSILE PROGRAMIVERSIFIED ACQUISITION STRATEGY, WITH LOW-RISK AND HIGH-RISK DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS RUNNING IN PARALLEL. AT THE LOW-RISK END. THREE OP THE PIVE MISSILES UNDER DEVELOPMENT--THE DOMESTIC VARIANTS OF THE AL HUSAYN AND THE AL ABBAS AND THE TAMUZARB DERIVED PROM BASIC, PROVENECHNOLOGY. THE OTHER TWO THE CONDOR II AND THE AL HAMZA--USB MORE ADVANCED WESTERN PROPULSION AND GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGY. ALL OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE BASED ON FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGN. WE BELIEVE IRAQ WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DESIGN ITS OWN MISSILESEAST PIVB TO 10 YEARS.
CONDUCTING THESE FIVE MISSILE PROJECTS AT ONCE IS COSTLY AND UNDOUBTEDLY STRETCHES IRAQ'S FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER
RESOURCES. THE MULTIPLE DEVELOPMENTS. HOWBVBR, PROVIDENET AND GIVE IRAQ SOMETHING TO FALL BACK ON IP ONEMISSILE PROJECTS FAIL. WORKING WITH SEVERALTECHNOLOGY, SOME OF WHICH IRAQ WILL GRASP VBRYTHIS SAFETY NET.
WE BELIEVE IRAQ COULD BEGIN INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION OF ITS VARIANTS OF THF AL HUSAYN AND THE AL ABBAS Bl BOTH SHOULD BE ABLE TOM TARGETS, -G WARHEADS, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, SOME AL ABBAS MISSILES COULD BE EQUIPPEDG WARHEAD TO REACH TARGETSM. IN THE MEANTIME. IRAQ WILL PUSH TO COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONDOR II, WITH PRODUCTION POSSIBLY BEGINNING BY THE EARLY -F FOREIGN ASSISTANCE CONTINUES. IF THE FLOW OF ASSISTANCE IS INTERRUPTED, PRODUCTION COULD BE DELAYED UNTIL THE. IRAQ COULD OPERATE
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES ON ITS OWN, POSSIBLY
WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF THE BEGINNING OF MISSILB PRODUCTION. I
WE JUDGE THAT, IN ADDITION TO HIGH-EXPLOSIVES WARHEADS, IRAQ WILL DEVELOP AND MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL AND POSSIBLY BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS FOR ALL OF ITS MISSILB SYSTEMS. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS ARB MORE COST EFFECTIVE, RESULT IN GREATER NUMBERS OF HUMAN CASUALTIES, SYCHOLOGICAL EDGB, AND MAKE THEORE EFFECTIVE DETERRENT. IRAQ CURRENTLY HAS THE ABILITY TO WEAPONIZB ITS CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. IT MAY ALREADYHEMICAL WARHEAD FOR ITS MODIFIED SCUDS. I
WE ALSO JUDGE THAT, DBPENDING OH THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, IRAQ MAY ALSO BE ABLE TOUCLEAR WARHEAD BEFORE THE END OF THE DECADE. IT IS PROCURING EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOLOGY THAT STRONGLYUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM EXISTS. BUT IT WILL NOTIMPLE TASK TOUCLEAR WEAPONISSILE'S WARHEAD. ALSO, THERE ARE WEAPON!ZATION PROBLEMS--HOW TO ENSUREUCLEAR DEVICE WILL SURVIVE MISSILE PLIGHT--THAT MUST BE SOLVED. IF THESE PROBLEMS ARB NOT READILY SOLVED, IRAQ COULD PACE TWO OR MORE YEARS DELAY INUCLEAR PAYLOAD.
IN OUR ASSESSMENT, THE HIGH-PRIORITY STATUS OP IRAQ'SHILL CONTINUE TO COMMAND THE NECESSARY PERSONNELRESOURCES. IRAQ PROBABLY HAS PLACED SOME OFCAPABLE ENGINEERS, TECHNICIANS, AND MANAGERS ON IRAQ WILL CONTINUE TO FUND DEVELOPMENT,OMBINATION OF IRAQI AND FOREIGN--PROBABLY IN THE FUTURE, IRAQ MAY SELLTO GARNER PRESTIGE AS THE EMERGINGIN THE ARAB WORLD.
IN OUR JUDGMENT, CURRENT IRAQI MISSILE PROJECTS WILL BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO STOP. IMPEDING THE FLOW OP FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. HOWEVER, COULD SLOW DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERABLY. THIS WOULD BEST BB ACHIEVED BY THWARTING IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO SECURE TECHNOLOGY IN AREAS SUCH AS GUIDANCE AND
CONTROL, IN WHICH IRAQ HAS LIMITED, BUT IRAQ HAS, HOWEVER, PROVED ITSELF CAPABLEINTO WESTERN AND OTHER NATIONS' AEROSPACETECHNOLOGY SUPPORT, DESPITE ATTEMPTS BY SOKEPREVENT IT. IT HAS EFFECTIVELYONSORTIUM FIRMS KNOWN AS THE CONSEK GROUP AND HAS ORGANIZEDPROCUREMENT NETWORK OF ITS OWN. THERE ALMOSTNO WAY TO BLOCK SUCH ASSISTANCE ENTIRELY. THECONTROL REGIME WILL HAVE LIMITED SUCCESS AS NONMFMBBR NATIONS LIKE CHINA, INDIA, OR BRAZILWITH ITS PROGRAM. IRAQ PROBABLY WILL ALSO USB PROGRAMONDUIT TO GAIN DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGYMISSILB PROGRAM.
Original document.
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