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El Salvador's Insurgents: Key Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
CPPHOUiD FOH HELECSl UAH
31H3
El Salvador's Insurgents:
Key Capabilities
and Vulnerabilities
JueW-itt
;
insurgenu of ihe Farabu-do Mani National Ubcrotionai present hive neither the militaiy strenglh noraupporl topovrer in El Salvador, ,nd their protpeeuto appear to be declining FMLN rnanpcw-pcrbapi ihemeasure of theombatantsowneak ofhe insurgent* Increasingly have to rely on forced conscriptiontheir ranks. Since thehe FMLN hat adapted toof its forces and increasing vulnerability to governmentby deploying smaller, more mobile units thai engage intactics, such as twrsomic sabotage, assassinations, ambushes,Although the FMLN is likely to attempt another seriesurban atucks before the endc do not believe itsuch actions long enough toilitary threat toInstead, ihc insurgents booc these highly visible tactics'heir continued military effectiveness, while oemcralmngforces, undermining the government's letytirriacy, and boostingstanding.
Th* FMLN's domestic popularity also appears to have declinedsince ihe. Its long-sought "popular insurrection" failed toin9 as planned, and rebel-orcbcttrated demon-strauons rcpealedly have failed to attract widespread supooiL Indeed, polling data indicate public impatience wilh leftist violence aod damage (o
'TZZZRENA Party's victory in the9 presidential election.0 opinion poll, moreover, SS percent of respondentsthe FMLN was the group that leasi respected human rights compared withercent who cited the Salvador-an Army. I 1
Wiib the ouster of Communis! regimes In Eastern Europe and the wide-ranging reform* in Ibe Soviet Union, the Marxist rebels also find themselves more isolated internationally. The rebels, who have been heavily dependent on Nicaragua for supplies and other support, face potentially serious problems in the wake of the Sandinistas' electoral defeat. Although wc believe Cuba and Sandinisu loyalists wiD continue to
aid lhe FMLN. iheir inability lo operate openly in Nicaragua under the Chamorro ioveinmcni could result In fewer, leu regular supply shiproenU. Tbe FMLN already ha* moved some of its administrative facilities from Nicaragua lo Mexico, and the five lop rebel commanders reportedly have left Managua to establjih newin Mexico. Cuba, or El Salvador!
These myriad pressures also appear to be exacerbating exiiling divisions and power struggle, within the FMLN's coalition of five factions, and unctosbtedry will hicder iu ability to devise andoherent strategy. In our view, the FMLN's growingIrabUity to *eiie power ine prompting some insurgent leaders to consider serious negotiations with tbe government. Disagreements o'er suchissues as participating In ncgoiiauons and elections already have spawned maverick operations by rogue FMLN groups and. if unchecked, could resultplintering of lhe movement | |
Nonetheless, tbe FMLN continues to pose serious problem! for the government. The war force* the governarient toarge standing Army, hampers thecif ceoweralic institutions,aggravates economic problems, and contributes to the political polariiation of tbe society. Moreover, the rebels' ability to operate relatively freely in the capita! helps depict the government as ineffectual and helpless. Systematic attacks on mayors and other elected officials undermine government authority and. in effect, "annul" election results. Sabotage of Ihe economicdams, and the electrical powertho disruption of businesses are battering an economy already plagued by low growih, limited investment, high levels of unemployment aad unotrcm-ploymeni, awl bureaucratic mismanagement. The direct and indirectf the war arc only barely offset byUS-economic assista nccj |
We believe the government will be able to manage Ihese problems, unlessutoff of US military aid or collapse of public suppen for therastic decliie in armed forces performance. Insurgent capabiliiies. on the olher hand, would be seriously weakened in tbe unlikely cases lhat lhe FMLN aad Cuba were unable to adjust to ihe loss of access toNlcaraguan territory, Cuba were to withdraw iuapport for the rebels, or the FMLN were toiplinier.'" |
t'A Salvador's Insurgents: Key Capabilities and Vuliterabililicsr
Tbe Meruit insurgents or UM Farnbnnclo Marti National Ubanlxm FroaMNonfcbee of frrt diiiiruonfront the Ssiva-doran Aran- on eeaily equal mtitarr Hrana daring the, occasionally seising and occupying gov-rrnmcnt banra. FMIN fortunei on the batilrJield began toin the second half ol ihe decade, however.US autitance to San Salvadorthr irlcctivaneai of the armed forces At tnc same dm. the rvotaraae of democratic inttkatiena enhanced tie fsaeraincnt't tred'b 'n irm| Slha-dorans ana btisnndercut the insuracnti' political ippeal Tar FMLN's all-oul olTensiva In Novemberlariat military operation totheinsurienu' military and logislicbut Lie tervedighlight anme fundamentalboth ite political and military ipbero Aaareswnef ibaac lectors- as wll aa ennntes taaaag place in the CowiitunistFMLN appear* Ui be ai'iac frtjjtut.ceii with ihe coverflhcr prienty. while nonetheless continuing to purtuemilitary ntaiegx.r-
Stafna ol ibr Insurgency
The eatracrdirtary efJcrt the guemlks eipcndrrf dur-iif :be cdTeasncinaidappeeeubly altei tne aarara of Ac war at tbeL aad tan FMLN operates tndit inSalvador nv-ch at it ties forl severaler.an Manai insurgency it active in rural and urban(hroiahoui much of the country andarticularly wrong presence in eastern and (antral BJ Salvador, nd-cVng th* capital and its tcircanditgi Although ttoi urban btfrutruetuedamaged terlenttly iaibeceTcnitir. the rebels can still opcratt in the cilia and airesdy ate in ihe proeeii ofiheir uitan networks
Practicing classic gaanUla -ar'sre. the retell oparaiemalL highly eobiU groans aadoad contacttomtttmi forcct eescaga wtea Iheysxrica"Moat operations are ambusbes, raidt, o* hirastmtnit of bghiiymilitary targets, euonanuc sabotage, or pollcal ataasil na lions Trie rsbelt' key bates are aloag the northern border with Honduras, where ihey Save established tcciooraryevery month or two Tor sccuttytospiy caches, training facilities, and aa tntcasrtc tapport netware: among the local civilian populsticmj )
(ion Is and Strategy
A review ofuniiMMariny ra"indicates ihe FMLN's alumau objective ratnalnt the cslnblishmcnine-party idle modeled after Cuba. Aitliouch iheir goal hat remained oomiant, rebel leaders bareer stralegy andi iht yean ic rripnm ui chiagiog nullify and politkal eweomstance* We believe 'ie luu'ici hope le -taken sad toppk ibc surerasneni rather byower-ahsnng ir-angernenl ot byOpuler insurrection Under circunntsacci of power tha ring. Ihe FMLNt plainall for slowly expanding its control over critical sec tentdar mining and eventually purging iu coalitionIf fornertiiaa aa IncarreebonlueeastCal.rebelsUal rwaty "raaicaWreeT SsKnOor-ana, led by tbenguarc. waM rise npsnd tie'iiihegovefnmcnt frosn powerored!-rated campaign of widespreadpronaiandu.economic ta borage p"
Pulltkal Warfare
Since its fcr mt too0 the FMLN haseen appreciation tor tie polral cnneaaioa of the srar. As ibc rebels' prospeeu for mi limy vlewry
. Strategy
Wr btliertltretng Salnsdara* err-ed /oral are pursuing ani-oltgy lo wear down iht Marttit rebels end foster political and social development. Tne ilralegy mmblnei miliary opera* lions destgned to enhance Internal sttueliy mdlhe Insurttnl Infrastructure wiih protatanda and rme action detigued to diK-tdti Ike FhTLfit and win popular lupporl lor Ih*pi Implementation of this strategy tamellmei Is /tawed, ire believe, en balance, lhe armed forces ere mating definite albeit
lette'it.f
VTfftom -
On Ike battlefield, lhe armed lorn, emphenie tmall-uil and eperetieeu. partumlerl, thote largetitg FMLS leadersklpx
irmymeo kowkilled asii-meet
period inbul they hew yet lo iaT or taptwt any settee factional leaderseomuslly resideanagua the armedeefmrnuuxx with same commanderske war. and wttb special opvellom until at eommandos attommimr for tht mUoettt of insurgents killed Allioug* small unit tattler here provedgainst tht rebels, ihtyeen risk, when employed In FhlljS best areas wkrrt ikr iiumt genii can aviekly most an ovtrwhtlnung fortt.^ ]
Martram* keyincreasingly recognise lhe political nature a! Iht uar. -kilt bring content lo confine ikemsthts ia an apolitical role Commanders throughout iht .oumry are emphaitring lhe importance of expendlig popular support for the povtrnmem. and ike armed teat remain critical players In dvle action and ptycholaei Od operations Al the lame time, corruption, human nghts abuses, or crime by Army per sonnet- althoughsanctioned by highertiratifrvm theard-worn ralm and ran ImmuneUntfmllforlkeFMW.^
diaiinitlved atdeyn polil-al aad dipteenallc ictlvlHegiJ,
-
SVcnH
iniurgenUcurtenily arc pursuing several political crhjsclim:
To espeac lirar tapper',ndthe ecuvrMs of Irani groups and ervfliin bscicn nndit riry and civic action onrraitoni Ihal deraonmatr lha FMLN'* viability.
To diicrcdil lhe government nnd lhahe cva ol ihe L'SCaoareraand aterwiuowal paboc oauucav -by atrtrarat ihern ihroogri provocation aad proesruuutia atmdomo-eratic repraiive. and contentplum of baaun tiahia.
To engage tht goiernmen In negceiatieni tadcr terms favorable lo the irururgenes aad lo catnctc. aaaraaaawaai tsat dntde lhand ensiiee rebel
To force the levering r/ liS security and eunoniKmiianoe lo ihe government
The robe* aiterrpl to gun popular rapport through ar. ela turtle ectwork of front groups inxilved mostly ir ior>a'>et'irr acinrifi These greupa liy a> en-cenragc utigovernrncni ttrttmec aid attract inter-catoral support for tbe insurgent came Thr FMLN aim contacts political indoctrination and oira aciion eierciw la ureal it controls: In April IW*amotr village ir San Mute) Department lie ii geeucccr ru> held acrrlhiatrequirednrde the meal and and fave the villagers rvfimontary mUivaiv training
Propaganda and public reunions are trryhetrategy perucularrria iha kuarrra-ticoalofiea tore ihef* diplomam dc'cnilvt Fo> dimple, daring illia IWv, tke FMLN led eantgeraied repeiia of indliatmisaie bombing by Ihe Salvaooran AM Force to lie pern aad prctiurc groups in the Urutad Stales lahe FMLN jadacloutly cafe for ergot ia-tices and frec-ea'-Iy preaaau "lev peace pracoiaLs-deng'fil lo curry IrMernalott. favor aad lohe government into negMiations on the retell'term.
Tbeften i| able lo scwe intcrnaiionulpoMili by taking advantage of gc-et rutwotpartvwlarry bomaa rurfui abuses by (he euluary The rebels lor caareple. have bad aernc aacceai deewt-iag ibr government, re* Pr rodentCnauanloreign audrSACCe already aiispieioui of (he eomotvative adminlllratiun in San Salvador--despite the fac( Ihal human rghti abuse)to the armed forces save nee rnereateC MuMlreliArrinJeeeNewertkclaat, lha mareer ol eiciraii by Army perunnel iM cOher evenU terrronndingIstC-lPS? offensive hive provided grist for lhe FMLN'* propagandawhich la fai more eCTcelive than any government body ai dine mi nating informailon Sach propaganda ap-peari leas effective on tha hnrne Iroal, hiraevcrarchpubic oaaruort poll, ii percent of tha -rspoaderti slid theai the gross thai least respected human rights, wlnie II percent named the armed
DesrMe ill attention to political activities tnd aoa ncgousLoas, the FMLN. ia our.rrlsral coennoeianl or*ia
strateayinsurgent eomminden appairwry be-lieve ihal,inimum, continued military activity ii nccetsary to lend credibility to their politicalind io urcngiben (hair bargaining pceiiMn. while otben reportedlyba .oniauicd punail of aa cetigti rrwhriary victeey. The itaretl' decruon dcring the periodlo rearm maay M" theu uaiti with Soviu-nyleassrveas indication, 'or instance, of ih* FMLN's long-tarm commitment to military oewralirms.Q
The FMlNi fniktary oowratiaas have erervwd over the years Irani direcl cor.lro-if aiico withoapirenter eciphain on guerrilla war die Following lhe Guildipof lheilitary in the early IvaOs. (he irwurgents reorganiaad ioiauuil uniuvcad caposing the core ef their foreaa to the armed foreaa' sapcroraarThen Hrategy then focused on prolonging the war through low-risk guerilla actions in the hupe
Swcfal
3 IS 3
Iheand frgotietiem
FMIM and ikt Govtrnmeni of El Salvador in0 once again embarktderiesOtiatloni io end ike war. tklt time under ihe auspices of Ihe Untied Nationr. The two sides have held peaee talks periodicallyut progress repeatedly has been stymied by inraiaigence on both sides. The FMLN traditionally has used negotiationsloy to gain tactical advantages, although changing elreumssanets may hate persuaded some rebel leaders toore serious approach. ^
The Insurgents In the past hare used proposals containing elements they believe are unacceptable to ike government or ihe armedatihe Contitiuilon. political power shoring, or retorfigurlng thean attempt lo seise tke diplomatic initiativt. irktte easting the governmeni ai obstructionist andIndeed, some past rebel proposals appeared dttlgned so be rejected, end we believe ihey were issued principally forpurposes. More recently, howrur.IJV hat dropped some af Its mart eontro-'erstal pretonttlilons and instead is foeuilng on inuessuch asudiciary and tkeikot alsoriority for the Cristiani administration. |'
Regardless af their specific proposals,LNs bargaining position has weahenri considerably dur-let ihe pan year The rebels have experienced sub-Hential reverses miliiorily.ajor patron, andree election in which tkelr alliesoundly rtpudiattd. Moreover, the Cristiani
administration Is tpt to be highly skeptical of FMLN Intentions on dialogue, pointinghe rebels' active preparation for ihtfensive even while nestoiiations were under way in Mexico and San date.
Dtipite disagreements among ikt FMIJVihe eSUecy alnegotiaiMni. the rebels havebut to reaiand may propoie more down-scaledIntended primarily far foreignsome Insurgent leaders eventually mayihai lalks wouldettstving way tofrom the war. we bellerr ether, martwould rtsisl any negolialed settlementon iheir own terms, however. Ifunder way tun to tkewe -ould expect ihem to siege awhen tkty murdered prominent leftistAnaya duringtalksblame ihtArmy or rightist death sauaJs. andthe tcwernmem is repressive andbad faith. Given the hlgk lertl of commitmentleaders. IT Is unlikely they would, alterof war. sank for such minor concessions asafe handful of Army
over lime, conditions would shift in iheir favor. Although Ihe insurgenti ccctiiorsslly massed Iheir rorces to assault major Army basts,7 ihey have favored less risky standoff bombardment *iih mcnars or rockeit. [hiring this time period they aboorked to expand their presence laeliberate strategy and iheir -eakness on tbe openhas led io an increase in attatsinations, bombings, and other lerror-tt-iype attacks [ I
The FMLN's otTensive ofin scope, wu intended to cause the collapseof the government. Inour judgment The rebels,bcllevini buth political and military eonefciions favored them, sought lo destroy the govemmeni's political and miliury leadership, cripple tha armed forcet.andccular insurrection. When the
offensive failed to race* those objectives, ihe rebels low-riskuch at nmbuihei and heratnmenf*.ihey recouped and rcMsc&cd their strategy. I-
Theifice-to-air missiles In9 indicatesa minimum-:tey have contingency plans to again escalate military attacks.oncerted attackey military target, the insurgents could use theo slave off aerial ecomtemtaeks. thra improving their chaaccs for success. To date, the rebels have used the rnasileswithoutting that they haveew of the weapons or that they are being held in reserve for another large-scale offensive^
Fetes*
Tocnrryout military operations. Hen of tbe FMLN's five factwns maintains III own "armedarieiyofocber Latin Amoricant andreportedly serve in leadership, combat, and support role* The Insurgent "armlet" geaeraJy are composed of four types or units:
S-pecjflf/orcei. (otalingn SCO for aa factions, are the FMLN's elite ireops. Wdl trained and well equipped, ihey generally are used against targets of siraiegic Importance, sach as major military insullailoas. They also eoeduei rcconnais-sanceaod reportedly blip protect sensor rebel commanders.
Stratttteforcti. numberingOOre ihe FMLN's primary cflentive combat units. Composed of full-time insurgent, and supportthese forces usually remain whhin anregionilEsstern, Western.oralto can operale nationwide.
Local fortts. totalingCOonduct basic military-political actions, such as ambushes, sabotage, or distribution of propaganda. They also are responsible furhe
FM LN's control and influencepcciftc roseront.
Loral mtHiia, numbering. are ihe FMLNi least efleeilve forces They normallynear iheir villages, conductis| rudimentary nperationi As port-limewilh little trailing andl apparenlly are viewed by the FMLN leadership as an expedient source cf lecralts for rfenforont or realarnejtxiStiiigunil
the mo rn i
The FMLN's unarmed ci.ilian (Ihe massesl, help transport supplies. andcolleeiintelligBnce.r
supponersw Individuals forcedtstlt ihca one-tine basis; ihey also participate inaid provide rebel comtnUnrt wit*acd other
nd Morale
Recruits joU ibe FMLNariety ofcommitment. rescouneM against theor armed forces, family or communityadveniure. or. probably in the cases Cfyouih.ack of allcrrativBs.ihe irsurgency offers potcnlial benefits ofimmolate nature. Many rebelsfrnslvc. for inttsnee, report thayima tattle dm by tke prospect of ushering inpccitksl-eeonomic system, but by promisesjobs and new cars
Recent reporting Indicates ihe FMLN is haingdifcally obtaining voluntary recruUs. In icceni yeBn.manpov.tr shortages apparently have prompted tha insurgews io rcCmll more children and
mot* (aU,
edVr
Wftghteri during tht ofanaive; meat of the eaiuahua apparently were poorly trainedrecmlli Thoae forcibly recruited reportedly tend to perforra poorly in battle and often detert NeyenatlMi. wa brJicve they can be uwd in tunplc tobologt or hanuiinonl minim thai make il appear at if iheigniflcaai pretence ihrouihout the country.( |
Battlefield revrriah and heavy caiuallict appnetHy have ilTccied taorale thretcghoui FMLN ranki.p^
T eaeralaa
The FMLN'i overall lywem of eorr.enand tad control generally furxeieear, -ellhe mil. uiy ablet and politicaltnt of iba uaurietiti I I cadre are the Uy to the- FMLN'i Haying po-er. The FMLNnert! general. maad iiill boaed in Managua.ta own central command urueiirebooi.lieal-aailnary commaaiorr lo deviie policy oa Inwei erf common concern. Oden or guidance typically are paited to the regbnal or front comma rider* and down the chain of commandeaden of local guerrilla uniti or urban commandoora routine operation! canh llie local commander. The FMLN'i command iiruciure generally appear* able to coordinate iuceetafally enter atiom involving morethnx or*of th* fiveanior rebel captured9 ha* reported thai uniti of differ mi faciioni* tpceUI force* often conduct joiat operation* arid even integrate their forcei down lo the tquad level
Command and centre,rbari commandea.reMMera for tha FMLN Urban tercel normally operate wieh virtual luloaomy aad. for leeurityemy cemmuructw -ah the bigt
system's greatest strengths have been lis ftesibil ty, redindancy, and corrrpartmeo ultra Ucn. which base ensured reliability aad secariiyl;
(hough (be joint command structure it generadifferences among (he factions do esnitunes have contributed to poor coordinttioncoportiinlUea at the tactical teveiU
^iixrMLN nowore fnodaui adjusting so the potcatlal loss ortheir use cf Nicarsguan territoryupplyi-A
Soma of these difficulties were apparent dtulm Ihemsive. Although ihc FMLNad coordinated well in (he planning stage, ii had tcrnc difricultiea sustaining coordination once the ngJuing began. The joint eeramnnd succeeded in mobilizing all fivearrying out operations In most parts of Ihe country, and incrid of eenrty simultaneous actions in lae
EUaraali
Dcspiie claims thai tbey are sdf-sujrlcleot, ibc Iesui-genu have depended heavily on etterns) awainnce, mduding war otateriel. coenmankaliont support, training, funding, and safehaven, since athe decision In8 lo refit mainline FMLN forces with Soviei-ilyk weapons, IncludingM asuuli rifles. Droguecv sniper rifles. RPK maclineguns. aodocket launchers, further increased ibe Insurgews' reliance oo external assstiance. These weapuw. along wilh ammunition and spare paru, must all be smuggled in from outside. We believe (he FMLN opted for ihe Soviet-ttyle arms because of iis inability lo capture tumcienl Western-made lilies and ammunition from Ihc armed forces and the ready availability of Cubtn-manufactu red ammunition for the AK ri"
Tac FMLN's inability io unify its fin. groups has. in our view, hampered efforts so define and implement scene key aspeeit of rU strategy j |
Disagreementher tu boycoil ihc pedsdenua) election9 no doubt caused confusion among both rank-and-file rebels and front groups, and some insurgent corn-manders roporiedly already are debating how io reset to local elections scheduled
Iimura.nl Logliric*
Throughsut (he war ibc FMLN has mainiainedareasonably secure logistic network using mainly external sources of supply. We believe
tin PeHilea! Ally
The Fhtl.Wt Nam-Co,
rVf-medht Revolutionary Democraticwas originally composed afthrttdemocratic groups' ihe NationalMovementhr Popular SattaHnMovement IMPSQ. end ihe nowMovemtnl of SahadoranTht FDR elHed lutlfwith the FMLNond during thej was InstrumentalInternational support io theinfluence within ihe movemeni hasand today relations between ihe twostrained. Tensions fiend In8 andtke opposition of someMS Rand MPSC entered intocoalition to participate in theAs of0 elements ofthe FDRas legal political parties withouttheir ties to ihe
Tnc Snndiniila leu ia the Nicaiaguaa election may force ihe FMLN to revamp it* external tupport network, bvi doe* nM appear to have crippled the trnurgenu Support from Nicaragua appeared to be largely unaffected at of President Chamoiro'iin latend continued Sandinitia control of the military and security services could enable them to rmertatn support to the FMLNout tbe Chamorro government'! kno-tedge or approval. The FMLN already conducts rctupply Opei-iliont and other clandestine aaivities in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico without theof the gorernrnenti in those ccnrairiea. Ncne-tfc*less, the Sandicatai may reduce tbe lereH of tHistsecc ia order to be more diserroL At aChamorro probably -ill press FMLN dementi in Managaa toower profile to avoid aniagc-niiing WaahingtOE and to tppear to be in compliance -lib regional agreement* prohibiting tupport lo sub-rersive movements! |
We believe Cuba eventually will seek new way* of delivering munition* to the FMLN. Havana may try to ferry suppb'et by ten to Mexico, ee along Central America's Vang ccnsiline to points where cargo could then be transported| Salvador, fo, critical
payloada. the Cubits nay attempt aerial rctupply The FMLN alio may be forced loew tafehaven for it< leadership, communications network, tnd naming and administration facUlies lhal had been located in Nkarsguaf
Other foreign cour/jtei aid groups also hate aided ibe FMLN. thpuehar lesser degree than Cuba tnd Nicaragua!
airmcm
FMLNoreign
combataMi utaally art armed .ilk Handera1 Winer* orodil Miliary email armi. Tke typical rebel wren*d-mmm atrio-maiie aiiauli riAi man commonly.. hraill Gam.KAdi. Welli. a' Belgian. FAU. The retell altoariety of handgMnt. imtmathtmiuni. and other ty,ts of imall armi. luth att. and ikoegvni For keenerhey0 eMSovtet-ityle MFK llphl maehint-tum. tO caliber end lOe+Hber9 renadetrtety af rackettU VS-made LAW at* Soviet de-ttenedtGT. ami Kf^lB-eeMIkuI mm. tndroittbl, Ifrmm9 the FMLN alia keeked enISAnrfece la-tie mUaiei. the rehettaded toaw, wap.
For taeacal roerxmumcot.anl.ieophxiiUaied Jepaneuaptvrti US mat.eld .edict
btained abroad.wppl.c. arc bosrhi openly willthal u, money Obtained through robberoriun. gr lanaomi (ram kidnappings Tho rrbeli alao continue io capture some weapons and equipment from militaryl defemc uniti and are able to manufacture hoownunlcuch aa landmtnct and even ilrtvnle murian.
for Popular Sudroii
We believe the FMLN'i ability to itlrace popular suppon hai declined duringane put becauie of tbe improved perform* ne* ol ihe Salvador ioae Nipdeon Duarte'a victory ia rJeetKx., Ua AM democratic
f*50
prc-ed ihe gcweremeMi arrpedara
fe-nnaaev. The March IW pnariwijil
3nS
itjI ptxcefol transfer of power lo Alfredourther underscored Ibe evolution ef the Salvadoraarocess. We believe the lc|ltlma-cy ifToiflcd thewith tht FMLN's Withelped turn the tide of public opinion in Bl Salvador against the rebels. Even on issues in which there It widespread disapproval of govern meatin fiat km. foropposition doe) not translate into active
support for the insurgents Decent even la and public opinion pniliihw view:
Nearlysieetnt of ehgihU rotors detled FMLN threats and iDlcd in4 peeadenllal dectioei. Althe^i'i the participation rate was lower lhan in previost elections, parties clearly linked to the insurgent! received lassercent ot the *ote*.
ID/Gaiiup pell cesnfutted is4 paces! of the rcspcetoMi. blamed tic FMLN, Cube, or Nscaiagaa for tha eontiaaalKxe of the cndlwparid withercent afse bUmed either the (aves-nnseni or ibe Salvadoraa armed forces.
Contrary to rebel plana and canccsiiiona. Salvador-ant decanal to herd 'he rtbcb' call for an iasarrec-tun dinng the9 oHuitivc. Indiaativewed as pan of the reason lor the ofleasive's failuie were the results9 public Opinion pull. In whichercent nf Salvador jr* from scroti ihc nxmeewvxtik ipecirum ratedperformance as sillier "good" or "excel*
lent.-C^
These polls tuggeai that ihe FMLN's front haveuble to expendpcicical base ugnincantfy The public. Inignores Ibctr calls for cUssocnUraiioaa andTha FM LN ccotrcilad Ntaioaatl UnityWorkers, for taaaaagii. boped in attract2iBOO ptrtsctgwaes ta iragmrsiscmMayat frtr than tOX)Although the
tnrnout for anlifovcnmenl pretesti rm May0 an rnuih better an estimator: iS.OOO to JO.OOO^-eaosi of the pauiicipanis were affiliated with prcderncctauc labor unions or other troupa critical or vaiious fwr.mem pohcsta but not lupporiiie of Ibe FMI.N. The tfTrct(<cneai of the front groupi was reduced tve more by (he Nmtntbei offenshv. Many Front groin mem ben ware pubtacly exposed as pro-FMLN activists, ut lean lamporarllp crippling the
Seleelra- InlM-tfl Frail Gevupi
CDUESODtfAM
COMADRES
COMAFAC
CRIPDES
CST
FEASIES
pecmafam
General Association ofSiudetat
Non-Governmental Humanof El Salvador
Conftderasion af Cooperativeof El Salvador
Committee af Families forfor Politicalthe Disappeared of-
Garde
Committee of Mothers and ram-
ilies af PoHticul Prisoners, theand Assassinated of El
MSC MSM STISSS
UNC VMS
UU
Sahador-Monrlgnor (Hear
Committer of Mothers andafPoHttcal Prtioners, theAssassinated ofEISal-Octavlo Ortiz-
Christum Committee for the Dts-Ploced of El Salvador
Coordinator for Workers Solidarity
Federation of Independent Vnkmi Association of EI Salvador
Federation af Committees af Mothers and Families of Polllieal Prisoners, ihe Disappeared, and Assassinated-Monsignor Oscar Ar-llulfo Romero
National Federation of Salvadoran Werken Unions
Fcderaiim of SalvadoranStudents
Federal ton of Secondary School Students
Trade Virion Federation ofWorkers
Revolutionary Trade Union Federelion
United From of Workers
Movement for Bread, land. Work, and Liberty
Moment of Salvadoran Children
Movement ofSotvodoean Women
Social Security Institute Workers Union
National Camptslno Union
National Unity of Salvadoran Workers, the FMLN's umbrella labor organisation
University Unity
ir*l^
political apparatus In the capital
prabiem is particularly acute for insurgentsin San Salvador. The FMLN believes the densely populated capital offers Ihe best arena in which to "radicalite" the civilian populace through wcl^ckosca military, political, and propagandaand lo dran Ihe attention of the International media and the diplomatic community. But thai high degieeof vitibHily can also turn against tbe urban guerrillas wkea they miscalculate or bungle aa opera-lion. Their assassination of Minister of ihe Presidency Rodriguez Poithor example, was widely condemned as an act of wanton terrornm. I I
Prospect*
ore* To Be Reckonedlthough weakened by manpower, morale, andrempcUy dimcultlet, ihe FMLN. in our view, retains SufBoett destructive capacity toajor problem fcr the governmeni for yren to come. Wc believe tbe insurgents can continue to carry out cosilyharassment, raids, aodthroughput most of ihe country.| not defeat ihe arn-cd forces, but Ihey Wll cwlirec lo give the FMLN international credibilityever to pressgovernment to react lo the insurgents' political agenda. Al ihe tame lime, the FMLN will be able to mobilize enough support to carry oat tome political activities, dittcminsie imcrniilonal propaganda.and issue peace initiatives lhat. together, nill continue lo exert lining pressures on the government. | |
Civet* Iheir manpower ant firepower conn rain is. the rebels arc likely to continuemphasixe high-visibility attacks em soft targets such as the economic infrnstruciire, civil defense units, and politicalAttacks on military targets, although vital if ihe movement hopes to retain credibility, are apt to be mostly ambushes andc believe any attackalor military facility Is more likely totandoff bcrnbardmcni, requiring fewer men and resourcesigher risk all-out aisault. Although the FMLN I) likely to attempt another series of Urge-scale urban atucks before the ende do not believe it can sustain such actions long enough toilitary ihrcal to Iht government.)
S'IB'-l
insurgents proWbly will make greater tne of (hehew mrtitk stockpiles and in lean (ion of ihe weaponsany future buac-scaleThey couldactical nilitary victory by using theoncerted ittackey military tared to prevent the Air Force from providing Close air sipeort to (round iroops.f
The FMLN Is alto likely to maintain its emphasisand diptorntUe initiatrvet against thesuch a* using front groups to noun iaad other amigcwerarnenlin the capital, where maximumensured. Thee* actions, byara unlikely to inspire mam Salvadoran*to the insurgent cause. PropsaimedUS aid and discrediting San Salvadorforeign nudkeces willighrumple, we expect sew and prtrrceatrvedesigned primarily to inftrence
External faciort or blunders by the government are more likely to bees: the FMLN's pteseecis than any concrete achievement by the rebeliigh-ly publicized casta of human rights abusei by the armed forces, for eiample. could senemly damage tbe government's lUnding.violent icbel acts desigricd toacklash by the armed forces will remain aa Integral pert of the FMLN's straiegy.| |
ut New Problem. law,
The FMLN'i reliaeee on Cuba and Nicaragua for external Support,ource of iinngih for the insurgency, hatotentialover Ibe long term. Regardless of what coeipen.atory adjustments Cuba aad lhe FMLN night make, new supply efforts are unlikely to match the level of deliveries made possible by full Ssndnista control over Nicaraguan leniiory. CcrnmuniMIMrr. andadministrative support probably alio will begiven the FMLN'a heavy rehlnce cola addition, ihe top rebel leaden,uffs, and families musi and new. secure residences. We believe this disruption of their cxternil supportwill leads eventual decline in their military
capabilities. The FMLN, over Ihe long term, may prove unable to sustain in cur reel force kvcli and have lo rely era more rudimentary weapons and tactics. Tougher, coordinated government rnterdiciion could further disrupt insurgent tagisties.r^
The FMLN also is likely toolitical backlash from eventi in Pastern Europe, ihe Soviet Union, and Nicaragua. As Marxists, tho FMLN commandersnoety discredited ideology aad, although they often present themtelvc* as dernoeratieiheir veoeraent opposition to pastd their long asiocaiion with and dependence on Cuba are likely to make them appear increasingly anachro-nistieolibcaI-ideological I
We believe these preuu-es and Ihe substantialreverses etperienced during the past year may lead tome FMLN leaders lo retailed iheir viewegotiated iwUrcnent. Until recenlly. (he rebelstalks wiih tbe government largelyactical maneuverocal rolWtaty victory.1 communique, for example, senior FMLNJeooum Vi'laloboa assericd lhat the desire of democracies to legoilateulnerability the rcbds could capital. In our judgment, lhe FMLN'a top leaders are increasinglyonly toibe dialogue aad keep their options open-to make proposals lhat -ill be regarded by mostespecially loose in Washington, as reasonable. Even so, some commanders continue to favorilitary solution and could launch independent fttiacka.| |
In aay case, weharpening of diviners within ihe FMLN leadership. Such an esacerhMJon of etisiing personal and ideologicalcould result in cornradici ions in lhe rebels' strategy and hamper theira vulnerability thai could be eietaiicd by the Salvadoran Government to divide, weaken, ot fracture the movement aad reduce itt effectiveness. For exeunpie. the government could creaw lurmoii among the rebel leaders ihrough psy-Chokgical coeraiioni designed to cxelcil the differ cocci among the top five commander.
t
Alternative Scenarios
The instriency could be hurt seriously over ineyean if Ibc FMLN ind Cuba faildjust toBa of free access to Nicaragua*only could (here bepredprute drop intbe uuorgcmi could alto safer commandprccJemi if (hey were arable tooeiwcrrks. Under (basethe FMLN's military usabilities coulddramatically. This also could occur Ifwere io splinter. The insurgents would bemore, perhips faislly, In our judgment. ITregime withdrew us Support foresult of the pressures mounting onbecause Fidel were replacedess
Although current trends argueramatic irnpre)veroent in tbe FMLN's fortunes,urn-abcet could occuresult of development! largely outside the insurgents' direct control. The most likely came wouldrasile decline inmiti-Ury performance, perhaps promptedut in US military aid or Ihc emergence of CJireme factionalism in ihe armed forces The rebels alto would beceniollapse of domesisC support for tbe Salvador-an Covcrnmeni, which ecu Id be prodpitated by sever-a! .'acton,ideipread resurgence of death,aetrvily or the assasslnaiion of Prcsldcai Cris-tismj I
Original document.
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