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Colombia: ImpHcatlonn of tha Election
Summary
Ruling Liberal Party candidate Cesar Gaviria le the overwhelming favorite in the presidential contest to be decided onay. Gaviriaajor boost when the weakened Social Conservative Party split between Rodrigo LJoreda, the party's official candidate, and Alvaro Gomes, leader of the Social Conservatives' other faction; both are trailing badly in the polls. Despite his relative youth,year-old Gaviriarained economist, experienced legislator, and two-time cabinet minister,opular agenda for economic and political reforms that distinguishes him from aging leaders In Colombia's two major traditional parties. ictory by Gaviria wouldenerational change in Colombian politics end, because his appeal cuts across partlssn lines, he could revive the country's elitist democratic system. |
President Barco's antlnarcotlcs offensive, now innth month, hasentral campaign issue. Gaviria is'a firm believer in strong drug enforcement
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measures and, if aloeted. he probably will adopt Barco's general approach to countemarcotics and cooperation with Washington. Gaviria'a clear public identification aa the candidate with the moot hardline position againat trafficker violence and the fact that hie principal opponents push accoaVBodatloniat views on drug policy suggest he will hold at loaat some initial mandate for continuing the crackdown if he winsubstantial margin. Nevertheless, the traffickers probably hope to benefitariety of potential obstacles to drug enforcement, which may include an increase in public sentiment toeal with drug kingpins if violence intensifies. Meanwhile, we believe thereanger that the drug traffickers aay act on their public and private threats to kill Gaviria; althoughove would provoke an initial hardening of the government position, it would, in our judgment, increase the chances that over time Bogota would scale back its antinarcotics effort because most of Gavtria'a MkolysuccestiorB are Jesa commit ad to the drug fight.
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The Principal Contenders
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3 to 1 advantage aver
hin nearest opponent infield ofontendere. eavy favorite, Gaviria received an additional booat when Social Conservative leader Alvaro Gomez refused to abide by his party's decision to nominate Rodrigo Lloreda as Its presidential candidate and joined the race under the independent banner of National Salvation Noveawnt. Such divisions among Social Conservatives traditionally have assured victory to the Liberal Party ln Colombia's two-party system, and |
both Gomez and Lloreda are floundering. decree allowing for late regietration--aimod at enabling9 guerrillas toarty and participate ln theopened floodgatesush of additional presidential aspirants demanding equal treatment during the campaign. An existing law provides for free and equal television air tine to all presidential candidates, and daily political broadcasts now feature campaign commercial*ariety of marginal Independents, including the colorful Reglnaracticing witch. Although the Supreme Court recently determined the electoral decree to be unconstitutional because of established requirements for choosing and registering candidates, the US Embassy believes election elates will remain ln force through the balloting this weekend.
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Havingeace agreement with9 earlier this year, the Barco government appears particularly eager to ensure the participation of leftist groups in tha election, in part to undercut the appeal of insurgent groups to Colombian youth. Moreover, the government has long been concerned that high abstention rates raised questions about the legitimacy of Colombia's democracy and presumably hopes that promoting greater pluralism now will help revive public confidence in what ia an elitist political system. However, the recent assassinations of Patriotic Union (UP) candidate Bernardo Jaramillo9 candidate Carlos Pizarro by gunmen tied to paramilitary groups with links to drug traffickers have complicated greatly the government's task. The killings have prompted the Marxist hardcore of the UP and some other opposition elements to cancel their participation in the election. Jaramillo's faction of UP moderates, howover, has joined the Opposition Front, acoalition of leftwing Christian Democratic and socialist groups led by Even after Pizarro's killing,9 coalition reaffirmed its commitment to electoral politics by choosing former guerrilla leader^Antonlo Navarro Wolf to bear the Front's presidential standard.
The Frontrunner and his Political Agenda
Gaviria The Reformer
Gaviria has Impressive credentials for governing Colombia, and hie reformist imago and promiseenerational change in leadership has strengthened his appeal beyond usual partisan lines. An econceaist whose congressional careererm as Speaker of the Bouse and who has served as both Finance Minister and Minister of Government in the current administration, Gaviria appears well-prepared to plan and Implement economic and political reforms over the next four years. He is titular head of the progressive New Liberal Movement wing of the Liberal Party that over the last decade has produced skillful politicians and technocrats supportive of both domestic reforms and strong drug enforcement. Gaviria's faction--once led by popular antlnarcotlcs crusaders like Justice Minister Rodrlgo Lara Bonilla and Senator Luis Carlos Galan, both assassinated byhas provoked traditional political elites by denouncing machine patronage and corruption within the major parties and the three branches of government. ource with excellent access said the Nsw Liberals were prepared to break off from the mainstreamthey did2f Gaviria's candidacy was obstructed by party elders.verwhelming primary victory in mid-March and subsequent smooth nomination, however, have strengthened his efforts to unite the party behind him. ^mmmmmmmHHmmmma
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Aa part of Ma roformist agenda, Caviria haeeading advocate of abe held on the Bame day ao the presidential ballotlng--that would empower the new president topecial assembly to reform the constitution. Barco has authorized the holdingonstitutional referendum onay, and Gaviria reportedly views it as key to his plan to revamp the legislative and judicial systems and further pressure the drug mafia. Despite protests by the bicameral Congress that it alone has the authority to alter the constitution and remains disinclined to do so, recent opinion polls indicate overercent public approval for the referendum. According to the DS Embassy, this support reflects popular sentiment for legislative, judicial, and political party reforms, aa well as reconciliation with Marxist Insurgents and other alienated elements of society. Although efforts to change the constitution will provide tha traffickers with new opportunities to sxert influence, reform could work to sustain government counternarcotics policies such as extradition of traffickers and seizure of their assets. Once codified in constitutional amendments these and other emergency antidrug measures could not be revoked by the courtn or cn^glled by the government as partemporary state of siege. Lf)^LflLa
Gaviria's Views on Narcotics Issues
Reflecting his own personal commitment and the responsibility he feels as Galan's heir, Gaviria has been an outspoken advocste of continuing the Baroo government's antinarcotics crackdown and haa madeentral campaign issue.
The US Embsssy saya Caviria's platform calls for strengthening drug enforcement procedures, constructing maximum security prisons for traffickers, building protectivs residentlsl enclaves for high risk judges, and dismantling private paramilitary organisations.
Caviria also says he would like to cancel the six-year-old state of siege in exchange for permanent legislation giving the government more power to deal with violence.
The idea of removing the state of slsgs appeals to most Colombians, who prefer strict limits on the presidential use of discretlonsry powers--such as employing tho armed forces In the curront offensive against drug criminals. However, in the absence of permanent and enforceable antidrug laws it Is unlikely that Gaviria, as president, would immediately cancel tho state of siege and thereby eliminate his only legal basis to sustsin the crackdown, jj
Although Caviria consistently hss defended extradition, US Embassy roporting indicates the candidste Is uncorafortsble with
tho policy for reesons of sovereignty and lnage--public opinion polls and media coverage often paint the current government aa too accommodating toward Washington. All of Cavlrla's rivals both
policy.
I These lactorn .iliaezerior.it 1family are under heavy guard
in response to drug-related death threats--have caused Gaviria to modorate his campaign rhetoric on the issue.
strategy aa president,
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c^ and prosecute in Colombiapecial court system had been established.
Caviria reportedlylan toS-style judicial body that would be more investigative and aggressive in prosecuting traffickers while employing plea bargaining to streamline the process.
Fol the Line being, however, US Embassyreporting indicates that Gaviria will uphold extradition because he recognizes that strengthening the Judicial system will take time.
ling isolated politically, he endorsed an appeal for peace earlier this year made Jointlyroad spectrum of Colombian leaders that suggested the drug lords end their violence and smuggling operations in return for milder treatment from the government. Caviria also has clouded his position by stating on the one hand that drug criminals cannot be negotiated with nor given amnesty, while on the other hand offering flexibility in dasllng with traffickers who shun violence. There are Indications that Caviria might in the future pragmatically reassess the issue of coming to terms with the traffickera, especially if drug kingplng Pablo Escobar were captured or killed. In mid-April, Caviria told tho press that negotiations with traffickers might be viable when conditions become "normal', an apparent reference to reducing current levels of violence. This interpretation wae aubsequently reinforced by Caviria'a press spokesman who said that when Escobar is captured the overall atmosphere will changehe situation will "ease", and Colombia can look for "other solutions" to tho problem of drug trafficking.
For the moment, however,ody of information Indicates Gaviria personally remains opposed to holding talks with traffickers. eeting with the US Ambassador, for example, he criticized Barco for holding secret discussions in January
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with drug intermediaries to secure the releaee of kidnap hostages. Including relatives of the President and the son of his closest adviser. Moreover, since the nurder last month9 candidate Pizarro, Oaviria has been more strident in his public statements against dialogue withp]
Other Candidatea Exploit the Drug Issue
Gaviria's major challengers have seized on the narcotics Issue to try and undermine the frontrunner. They are aware that most Colombians view cocaine traffickingreater problem forUS andfor Andean producers, and they recognize the growing public concern over drug-related violence that has resulted from Barco's crackdown. Social Conservative candidate Rodrigoormer foreign minister and ambassador to the US who last yearolid supporter of the government's antidrug offensive, now attacks theon extradition and negotiations with traffickers.
His platform calls for amnesty for those traffickers who retire from the drug trade, agree to compensate innocent victims of terrorism, and turn themselves in for judgment by Colombian courts.
He also has stated that individuals dealing in cocaine would have little to fear from his presidency provided they were not guilty of commiting violent crimes.
Alvaro Gomez has been even more strident in attacking Barco's antidrug policies.
Be has calledull pardon for kingpins who show they are serious about retiring from the drug trade, has characterized extradition ao Washington's "passingnd has called on tho government to extend the scope of peace talks with leftlet guerrillas to resolving the war with traffickers.
Citing trafficker violence and lack of adequate security for presidential candidates, Gomez has urged Barco to delegate full reeponaibllity for security and public orderpecial military triumvlrate.
Gomez has borrowed proposals from some of Gaviria'a rivals in the Liberal Party that narcotics be legalized so as to end the criminality associated with the drug industry.
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Meanwhile, leftist groups participating in the presidential election criticize the government for ite perceived subservience to Washington and charge that ITS aid for drug enforcement is being used illegally for counter/insurgency. Before their recent assassinations. Patriotic Union candidate Jaramillo and Opposition Front leader Flcarro had campaigned to curtail extradition and end cooperation with US drug programs on sovereignty and legal grounds. The coalition platform of both organizations is designed to appeal to public eentiment for peace talks to end the drug war, while also calling for demilitarization of drug enforcement and international funding to provide new jobs, housing, credit, and other assistance for tens of thousands of peasant farmers snd urban poor employed by the drug industry.
Outlook and Implications for the US
Oavlria is expected to win because he hasore convincing platform for political and economic progress than any of his opponents andar better directed and funded
lanization. His margin of victory probably will be slimmer
several factors.
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in helped by low turnout, and Colombia's normally high abstention rate may be even higher this year because of guerrilla anti-election operations and election-related violence sponsored by rightwing vigilante groups and narco-traffickers. US Embassy roportlng suggests that abstentlonlsra may also be Increased somewhat by public disillusionment with Barco's domestic policies and frustration over perceived irregularities in the March legislative and mayoral elections, in which the new computer system for tsllying votes broke down and prevented offlclsl results from being released for six weeks.*
administrative posts with diverse Liberals, he appears to recognize that Barco's refusal6 to adhere to longstanding precedents for appointing opposition elements to the government contributed significantly to tha President's political problems.
Gaviria will offer some miuentiai positionsociai uonservatives and other opposition politicians In an effort to strengthen national unity. This, coupled with his well-honed instincts for compromise, should facilitate efforts to launch badly needed domestic reforna.
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An English-speaker and admirer of the US, Gaviria has made clear that he hopes totrong working relationship with Washington. As an oconomistationalist, he hopes the US partnership will yield grester dividends for Colombia on financial and trade Issues, as well as foreign assistance. Like Barco, however, Gaviria realises that during the current period of heightened nationalistic sensitivities ln Colombia, there are risks Involved in being viewed as "Washington's man." Barco made concessions to nationalist sentiment by giving relatively free reign ln foreign policy to his combative Foreign Minister Julio Londono, an outapokon critic of US power in the region.
will also have posture.
On the antinarcotlcs front, we believe Gaviria will try to build on Barco's cooperation with the US while attempting to carry out longterm judicial reforms aimed at decreasing Bogota's reliance on extradition as well as curbing the surge of violence and lawlessness in Colombia. Because Gaviria has been clearly identifiedardliner on drug issuee compared to his opponents in the campaign, tho Liberal candidate should beelatively good position to continue the crackdown If he winsubstantial margin. Nevertheless, Gaviria will need continuing successes like the recent military assault on the Petrolera cocaine complex in southeastern Colombia to provent hie critics from controlling tha public relations battle. Moreover, capturing or killing Pablo Escobar couldrucial watershed ln determining whether the government decides to stay the courae against those traffickers who are less inclined toward political violence. In our view, pressure on the government to declare "victory" and scale back its campaign against the drug industry
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would Increase markedly following the elimination of Escobar and one or two other ruthless kingpins, and could leadreater divergence of interests between Bogota and Washington. ksmsBBBsf
Meanwhile, the traffickers probably hope to benefit from other potential roadblocks to effective drug enforcement in the next administration. They probably would not attempt to block judicial reforms, such as the creation of specialised courts to handle trafficker cases, because they would see this as an opportunity to reduce the threat of extradition through bribery and Intimidation. Traffickers also can be expected to manipulate the convocationonstituent assembly, on the assumption that by preasuring legislators they could defeat proposals for constitutional changes that might reinforce presidential powsr to confront the drug Industry. The Congrees--set to renew Its doiibcrations In latelast Decemberhowdown with Barco that It was significantly intimidated and subverted by the traffickers, and the most prominent frontmen for drug interests were reelected in the March legislative elections, according to the US Embassy. Moreover, Barco's successor will have to be sensitiveighly volatile public that is skeptical of US strategy for drug enforcement and that may become even more supportive of negotiations with the drug lords if the crackdown produces more random and lethal violence. ^
Finally, there exists the real danger that drug criminals might make good on public threats to assassinate Gaviria. Despite extraordinary security measures to protect the Liberal Party candidate and hih family, he is vulnerable to attack both befors and after the election. Colombia has no provisionsice presidential successor toresident who dies In office, but the conetitution stipulates that an unelected "designate* would be chosen by the Congress from among tha leaders of the ruling party, in our Judgment, Oaviria's murder wouldajor blow to tho prospects for reenergizing Colombls's democracy and staying the course over time against the narco-klngpins. Initially, Cavlria's death--like that of Galan--would provoke intensified government efforts against the traffickers, but because none of his likely successorsimilar coonltment to the drug fight we suspect the crackdown would gradually begin to ebb, and the chorus for aomesort of accoBunodation with the traffickers would increase. mHaMaaaaa
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