REDIRECTING IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY: RAFSANJANI'S PROGRESS

Created: 6/1/1990

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

10

Redirecting Iranian ForelgnPoHcy: Rafsanjanrs Profrtss

Summary

Since assuming office lass August Iranian President Rapanjani gradually has subordinated militant Islamic ideology to pfacacaJ considerations in his conduct of foreign policy.onsequence, Imuan foreign policy has become less confrontational and moreo expand Iranian relations with,

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Rgnrignilny Policy

Rafsanjani's emphasis oo Iranian national intercsu has noi been deraonsiraiedingle, dramatic change in foreign policy, buteries of incremental shifts. Taken together, these shifts in policy have helped sat ibe stageerious effort by Raf-sanjani to erpand relations with liis regional adversaries and the West:

o Afterey role io improving relations with the Soviet Unionafsanjani worked hard to preserve bilateral lies despite vocal domestic criticism of Soviet suppression of Muslims in Soviet Azerbaijan and Central Asia in January andfficial Iranian statements at trie time only "regretted" Soviet actions andeaceful resolution of (he problem. Since then. Tehran has shipping natural gas to the Soviel Union and,

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The Iranian-Soviet Thiw

The improvement of relations with ibe Soviet Union is one of tbe roost iigrificant recent changes in Iranian policy. Prior9 Tehran regarded Moscowear and loathing drawn from memories of two centuries of Russian and Soviet intervention in Iran, ideological rejection of Communism, and alarm at tbe occupttion of Afghanistan. Inowever, Khomeini scot an envoyersonal message to Mikhail Gorbacbev-Kboroelrii'i first such communicationead of suie-whTchurning point in Iranian relations with tbe Soviet

Union and basjeajtinuaed Rafsanjani's subsequenieffons to expand ibe

relationship. flaaeei

Tbe letter praised Gorbachev for revising Marxism and allowing greater religious freedom, and urged him to study Islam. It was followed by an end to mutual propaganda attackseeting in Tehran between the Soviei foreign minister and Khomeini. Economic delegations also were exchanged between Moscow and Tehran in tbe following months. Tbe Importance Rafsanjani places on better ties to the Soviets was most clearly demonstrated Inowever, when Rafsanjani visited Moscow less than three weeks after Khomeinis death. During this visit Rafsanjani signed agreements on economic and political cooperation, which, although largely symbolic, laid tbe groundwork for the supply of Soviet weapons to Iran and the resumption of Iranian gas sales to tbe Soviet union, which had slopped ten years before. Tbe convergence of Iranian and Soviei interests in minimMng Western influence in Afghanistan and tbe Persian Gulf, as well as in avoiding interference Ln each otber*sJnternal affairs, argues in favor of continued cooperation for the next several years. HB

Carufraints on Rahanjini

We believe lhat domestic upjwsition limits, but does not dictate, Rafsanjani'* conduct of Iranian foreign policy. Kafsanjaoi's domestic opponents-most notably Mijles Deputy Mohtashemi-Pur, Ayatollah Khomeinis son Ahmad, and,esser extent, Majles Speaker Mehdi Karubi-have vigorously criticized Rafsanjani'spragmatic priorities. Their attacks, conducted largely in the press and in the Majles, nave focused oa perceived affronts to Islam in France, Turkey, and tbe Soviet Union, and on the untnisrworthy nature of the West. They have characterized RtfianjanJ's initiatives as departing from Khomeini's policies. This criticism bas blocked or delayed some of Rafsanjaris mtiatives. ^Haamm

o Ratsaniani lolcraled considerable, aod at times inflammatory, press and clerical attacks on Soviet actions in Azerbaijan, despite Soviet irritation, and his own efforts toift wilh Moscow. Iran's Islamic Propagation Organization also has announced plans to produce an Azeri translation of tbe Koran to be shipped to Soviet Azerbaijan, and to provide instruction to Soviet Muslims-actions that are likely to create occasional friction with Moscow.

Implication! for the Uniied Stales

In any case, the United Slates willore adept diplomatic opponent In Iran over the next year, whether or not outstanding disputes with Tehran are resolved Iran's relations with Moscow, for example, already have allowed Tehran toarger political role in the settle meat of the Afghanistan conflict than iu limited miliury involvement there would seem to warrant. In addition, Tehran's coodusioo of an arms aeieement with tbe Soviets will diminish tbe impact of Wuhirujtooi weapons eml

Original document.

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