XOFOM-HOCOVTRA CT-OBCOH
El Salvador's Insurgents:
Key Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
Keyinsurgents of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
at present have neither the military strength nor sufficient
^ofuro""^ support to seize power in El Salvador, and their prospects for
doing so appear lo be declining. FMLNthe most straightforward measure of the insurgency'sremainedombatantsowneak of0he insurgents increasingly have to rely on forced conscription to fill their ranks. Since thehe FMLN has adapted to the shrinkage of its forces and increasing vulnerability to governmentby deploying smaller, more mobile units that engage in low-risk guerrilla tactics, such as economic sabotage, assassinations, ambushes, and harassmcnts. Although tbe FMLN is likely to attempt another series of large-scale urban attacks before the ende do not believe il can sustain such actions long enough toilitary threat to the government. Instead, the insurgents hope these highly visible tactics will demonstrate their continued military effectiveness, while demoralizing the armed forces, undermining the government's legitimacy, and boosting the FMLN's political standing.'
The FMLN's domestic popularity also appears to have declinedsince the. Its long-sought "popular insurrection" failed to materialize in9 as planned, and rebel-orchestratedrepeatedly have failed to attract widespread support. Indeed, polling data indicate public impatience with leftist violence and damage to the economy contributed to Ihe conservative ARENA Party's victory in the9 presidential election.0 opinion poll, moreover,ercent of respondents believed the FMLN was the group that least respected human rights compared withercent who cited the Salvador-an Army J
With the ouster of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the wide-ranging reforms in the Soviet Union, the Marxist rebels also find themselves more isolated internationally. The rebels, who have been heavily dependent on Nicaragua for supplies and other support, face potentially serious problems in the wake of the Sandinistas* electoral defeat. Although we believe Cuba and Sandinista loyalists will continue to
KACT
myriad pressures also appear to be exacerbating existing divisions and power struggles within the FMLN's coalition of five factions, and undoubtedly will hinder its ability to devise andoherent strategy. In our view, the FMLN's growinginability to seize power ine prompting some insurgent leaders to consider serious negotiations with Ihe government. Disagreements over suchIssues as participating in negotiations and elections already have spawned maverick operations by rogue FMLN groups and, if unchecked, could resultplintering of the movement
Nonetheless, the FMLN continues to pose serious problems for the governmeni. The war forces the government toarge standing Army, hampers the development of democratic institutions, aggravates economic problems, and contributes to the political polarization of the society. Moreover, the rebels' ability to operate relatively freely in the capital helps depict the government as ineffectual and helpless. Systematic attack* on mayors and other elected official* uridermioe government authority and. in effect, "annul" election results. Sabotage of the economicdams, and tbe electrical powertbe disruption of businesses arc battering an economy already plagued by low growth, limited investment, high levels of unemployment andand bureaucratic mismanagement. The direct and indirect costs of the war areonly barely offset byassistance!
We believe the government will be able lo manage these problems, unlessutoff of US military aid or collapse of public support for the government -leadrastic decline in armed forces performance. Insurgent capabilities, on the other hand, would be seriously weakened in ihe unlikely cases that the FMLN and Cuba were unable to adjust to ihe loss of access to Nkaraguan territory, Cuba were lo withdraw iu support for the rebels, or the FMLN were to splinter.
HOFIHtrSOCOHtHACt-
ORCOS
Contents
Page
Key
Scope
Status of tbe
Insurgent Goals and
PotiUcal
Military_
Insurgent
Recruitment and Morale 5
Command. Control, and
Insurgent
External
Dcrocstic Source* of
The Struggleopula>
orce To Be Reckoned With
ut New Problems
Alternative
ffevrrse
VQFORXSOCOXTRACT-ORCON
Ml
This paper examines the insurgency in El Salvador, with emphasis on the nature of the insurgent challengen the rebels* objectives and strategy, and on their present strengths and exploitable weaknesses. It discusses three critical aspects of the insurgency: its forces and leadership, its logistic and external support network, and its popular support base. Finally, it assesses prospects for changes in the rebels' capabilities and
SOFORN- XOCONTRACT-ORCOCV
flPPPDWOFOHRIllBSE DfllLWflFSJOII
Tbe Marxist insurgents of Ibe Farabundo Marti National Liberation Frontcoalition of five distinctable to confront the Salva-doran Army on nearly equal miliury terms during the, occasionally seizing and occupyingbases. FMLN fortunes on the battlefield began to wane io the second half of the decade, however, when US assistance to San Salvadorthe effectiveness of the armed forces. At the same lime, the evolution of democratic institutions enhanced the government's credibility among Satva-dorans and began to undercut the insurgents' political appeal. The FMLN's all-out offensive in Novemberlargest miliury operation tothe insurgenu' military and logisticbut also served to highlight some fundamental weaknesses in both tbe political and military spheres.esult of thesewell as changes taking place in the Communist world -theppears to be giving negotiations with theigher priority, while nonetheless continuing toilitary strategy ar]
Status of the Insurgency
The extraordinary effort tbe guerrillas expendedthe offensive9 did not appieciably alter the nature of the war at the tactical level, and the FMLN operates today in El Salvador much as it has for the put several yean. The-aan Marxist insurgency is active in rural and urban areas throughout much of the country andarticularly strong presence in eastern and central El Salvador, including the capital and iu surroundings. Although their urban infrastructure was damaged seriously in the offensive, the rebels can still operate in ihe cities and already arc in the process oftheir urban netv
Practicing classic guerrilla warfare, the rebels operate mostly in small, highly mobile groups and usually avoid contact with government forces except -hen theyumerical advantage. Most operations are ambushes, raids, or harassmenls of lightlymiliury UrgcU, economic sabotage, orassassinations. The rebels' key bases are along the northern border with Honduras, where ihey have established temporaryevery month or two for securitysupply caches, training facilities, and an extensive support network among tbe local civilian populali<
Insurgent Goals and Strategy
A review of information I
indicates the FMLN's ultimate objective remains csubiishmcntne-party state modeled after Cuba. Although their goal has remained constant, rebel leaders have adjusted their strategy and uctic* over the years in response to changing military and politicale believe the insurgenu hope to weaken and topple the government cither by forcing itower-sharing arrangement or byopular insurrection. Under circumstance* of power sharing, the FMLN's plans apparently call for slowly expanding iu control over critical sectors by undermining and eventually purging iu coalitionIf fomenting an insurrection proved successful, the rebels believe that newly "radicalized" Salvador-ans, led by Ihc FMLN vanguard, would rise up and help sweep the government from power after acampaign of widespread violence, propaganda, and economic saboui
Political Warfare
Since iu formation0 the FMLN haseen appreciation for,ihc political dimension of the war. As the rebels' prospects for miliury victory
Soctvl
Government Counter insurgency Strategy
believestrong Salvadoran armed forces art pursuing an effective strategy to wear down the Marxist rebels and foster political and social development Tht strategy combines military opera-tiota designed to enhance internal security andthe insurgent infrastructure with peogtaganda and civic action designed to discredit the FMLM and win popular support for the government. Although implementation of this strategy sometimes Is flawed, we believe, on balance, the armea^orces are makingI|
On the battlefield, the armed forces emphasise small-ur.it and night operations^ the FULN leaderships
many as five Fldlfi ccttnmandtrsit-week period Inut they have yet to kill or capture any senior factionalnormally reside In Managua. The armed forces'performance remains tpotty, however, with some commanders and units havingbusiness as usual" approach to the war. and with special operation! units or commandot accounting for the majority of Insurgents killed. Although small unit tactics have provedagainst the rebels, they have been risky when employed In FMLN base areas where the insurgents can auickly mass an overw helming force pj
Moresome keyincreasingly recognise the political nature of the war. while being content to confine themselves to an apolitical role. Commanders throughout the country art emphasising tht Importance of expanding popular support for tht government, and iht armed forces remain critical players in civic action andoperations At Ihe same time, corruption, human rights abuses, or crime by Armynot sanctioned by higher authority detract from theard-won gains and can translateindfall for tht FM,
Tbecurrently arc pursuing several polilical obleciives:
expand Iheir lupportaodtheof front groups and civilian back en and through military gad civic action operation* that demonstrate the FMLN's mbility.
Todiscredit the government and the armedpartienlarly in the eyes of the US Cenagress and international publicportraying them through provocation and propaganda airepressive, and eonicmptuoui of human rights.
To engage the government in negotiations under terms favorable to the insurgents and to extract key concessions that divide tho government, undermine iu legitimacy, and enhance rebel prestige.
To force tbe severing of US security and economic assistance to the government rj
The rebels attempt to gain popular support through an elaborate network of front groups involved mostly in social welfare activities These groups try toantigovenunent sentiment and attractbooal support for the insurgent cause. The FMLN also conducts political indoctrination and civic action exercises in area* it controls; in9emote village in San Miguel Departmentoccer game, held acivilians were required to provide Ihe meal andand gave tbe villagers rudimentary military training.
The FMLN often it able to score internationalpoints by taking advantage of governmentparticularly human righti abuses by the military. The rebels, for example, have had some successthe government of Prosidenl Alfredo Crisliani asto foreign audiences already suspicious of the conservative adminisiration in Santhe fact that human righu abuses stlnbuubie to tbe armed forces have not increased since be took office inven he less, the murder of tut Jesuit priests by Army persemnd and other events surrounding theffensive have provided grist for ibe FMLN's propagandawhich is far more efTeclivc than any government body at disseminating information. Such propagandaless effective on ihe home from, however.0 public opinion poll,ercent of the respondents said the FMLN was the group that least respected human rights, whileercent named the armed forcesjrrrrri
Military Strategy
Despite iu attention to political activitiesew emphasis on negotiations, the FMLN, in our view, still sees military actionritical component of iu strategy. Most insurgent commanders apparentlythat,inimum, continued military activity is necessary to lend credibility to their politicaland to strengthen their bargaining position, while others reportedly favor the continued pursuit of an outright military victory. The rebels' decision during theo rearm many of their units with Soviet-stylemassivean indication, for instance, of the FMLN's long-term commitment to military operations.ij|*jg|
and public relations arc key tactics in the rebels' politicalin theoften keep the government on tbe diplomatic defensive. Foe example, duringbe FMLN fed exaggerated reports of indiscriminate boaibtdg by the Sarradoean Air Force to the press and pressure groups in the United Sutes. In addition, the FMLN judiciously calls forand frequently prescnU "new peace proposals" designed to curry international favor and lo coax Ibe government into negotiations on the rebels* terms.
The FMLN's military operations have evolved over Ibe years from direct confrontation wilh government troopsreater emphasis on guerrilla warfare. Following the buildup of the Salvadoran miliury in the, tbe insurgenu reorganized into small units to avoid exposing tbe core of their forces lo tbe armed forces" superiorairTheir strategy then focused on prolonging the war through low-risk guerrilla actions in the hope
The Insurgents and Negotiations
The FMLN and the Government of El Salvador In0 once again embarkederies of negotiations to end the war, this time under the auspices of the United Nations. The two sides have held peace talks periodicallyut progress repeatedly has been stymied by Intransigence on both sides. The FMLN traditionally has used negotiationsloy to gain tactical advantages, although changing circumstances may have persuaded some rebel leaders toore seriousM
The insurgents In the past have used proposals containing elements they believe are unacceptable to the government or the armedasthe Constitution, political power sharing, or reconfiguring thean attempt to seise the diplomatic Initiative, while casting the government as obstructionist andndeed, some past rebel proposals appeared designed to be rejected, and we believe they were Issued principally forpurposes. More recently, however, the FMLN has dropped some of its more controversial preconditions and instead Is focusing on issues such as reforming the Judiciary and thethat altoriority for ihr Cristtam
Regardless of their specific proposals, the FMLN's bargaining position has weakened considerablythe past year. The rebels have experiencedreverses militarily,ajor patron, andree election in which their allies were soundly repudiated. Moreover, the Criitlani
Despite disagreements among the FMLN leadership over the efficacy of negotiations, the rebels have Utile choice but toatto dialogue and may propose more down-scaledintended primarily for fortign consumption. While some insurgent leaders eventually maythat talks wouldace-saving way tofrom Ihe war, we believe other, more militant elements would resist any negotiated settlementon their own terms, however. If negotiations already under way turn to thewe would expect them torovocativewhen Ihey murdered prominent leftistAnaya during talks inthe killing on Army or rightist death souads, and withdraw under charges the government Is repressive and acting In bad faith. Given ihe high level of commitment af Insurgent leaders, Il is unlikely they would, afterears of war, settle for such minor concessions as the dismissalandful rj Army cfficers.mmmmmmmmmmm
over tunc, conditions would shift In their favor. Although the insurgents occasionally massed their forces to assault major Army bases,7 they have favored less risky standoff bombardments wilh mortars or rockets. During this time period they also bare worked to expand their presence ineliberate strategy and their weakness on the openbas led to an increase in assassinations, bombings, and otherattacks.*
The FMLN's offensive ofin scope, was intended to cause the collapse of the government, in our judgment. The rebels,believing both political and military conditions favored them, sought to destroy the government's political and military leadership, cripple the armed forces, andopular insurrection. When the
offensive failed to meet ihotc objectives, tho rebel* reiunied low-risk operatioiu, such as ambushes and harasimcnU, while they regrouped and reassessed their strategy!1
The rebels' acquisition ofurfacc>lo>air missiles in9 indicatesahai contingency plans to again escalate military attacks.uckey military target, tbe insurgents couM bk the SA-7sto nave ofT aerialhus improving iheir chances for success. To date, ihe rebels have used the missileswithout success suggesting lhat they haveew of the weapon* or thai they arc being held in reserve for another Urge-scale offensive.|
Insurgent Faeces
To carry out militaryach of the FMLN's five factions maintains its own "armedariety ofother Latin Americans andho reportedly serve in leadership, combat, and support rotas The insurgentgenerally are competed of four lypca of
Special forces, totalingor all factions, are tbe FMLN's elite troops. Well trained and well equipped, ihey generally are used against targets of strategic importance, such as major military installations. Tbey alio conductand reportedly help protect senior rebel commanders.
Strategic forces, numbering, are the FMLN's primary offensive combai uniu. Composed of full-time insurgents and supportthese forces usually remain within anregional front- -the Eastern. Weston.or Paracentral- but also can operate ubonwidc.
Local faeces, totalingonduct basic military-political actions, such as ambushes, sabotage, ot distribution of propaganda They also arc rciponsible for expanding the FMLN's control and inftuencepecifichinfront.
Local militia, numbering. are the FMLN's lean effective forces. They normallynear their villages, conducting rudimentary operations At part-timewith little training and second-rateapparently are viewed by the FMLN leaden hip as an expedient source of rectum for rrinforoing or restating exist>ngj
Tbe FMLN's unarmed civilian supporters, the masas (theelp tranaporl supplies, serve at couriers, and collect intelligence.)
masas range trom !dividuals forced to assist ihe FMLNne-time basis: Ihey also participate in political activities and provide rebel combatants wiih food, shelter, and other necessities
Recruitment and Morale
Recruits join the FMLNariety of reasons: ideological commitment, resentment against theor armed forces, family or communityadventure, or, probably in the cases of some jobless youth,ack ofor others, the insurgency offers potential benefits of: more immediate i
govern cient estimates arc somewhat we believe ihe FMLNighters during the offensive; moot of the caiualiics apparently were poorly trained newhose forcibly recruited reportedly tend to pea form poorly ia battle ird often desert Nevertheless, wc believe they can be uaed in simple sabotage or harassment missions that make it appear ai if the FMLNignificant presence throughout ihe country
Command. Control, and Coordination The FMLN's overall system of command and control generally functions well Indeed, we believe theskills and political commitment of tbe insurgents' leadership cadre arc the keybe FMLN's staying power The FMLNoint generalstill based in Managua, while each faction bas its own central command structure. Tbe rebels have alsooint political-military commission lo devise policy on issues of common concern Orders or guidance typically arc passed to the regional or front commanders aod down the chain of command lo leaders of local guerrilla amis or urban commando cells More routine operations can originate with tbe localbeommand structure generally appears able to coordinate successfullyinvolving more than one of (he fiveenior rebel captured9 has reporicd ibat units of differentpecial forces often conduct joint operations and even Integrate their forces down to the Lid level aaj
Command and control over ibe nrban commandos,roblem for ibc FMLN. Urban forces normally operate with virtual autonomy and, for security reasons, rarely communicate with ihe high command.f
Some of (hew difficulties were apparent duringffensive. Although the FMLN apparently had coordinated well io tbe planning stage, it had some difficulties sustaining coordination once tbe lighting began. The joint command succeeded in mobilizing all five factions, in carrying out operations in most parts of tbe country, and ineries of nearly simultaneous action* in the capital.!
a more fundamental adjusting to the potential loss or reduction of their use of Niearnguan territoryupply base and safehaven]
External Support
Despite claims that they are self-sufficient, thehave depended heavily on external assistance, including war materiel, communications support, training, funding, and Safehaven, since athe decision in8 to refit mainline FMLN forces with Soviet-style weapons, includingnd AKM assault rifles, Dragunov sniper rifles, RPK machineguns, andnd -IS rocket launchers, further increased the insurgents' reliance on external assistance. These weapons, along with ammunition and spare parts, must all be smuggled in from outside. We believe the FMLN opted for the Soviet-siyfe arms because of its inability to capture sufficient Western-made rifles and ammunition from the armed forces and the ready availability of Cuban- manufactured ammunition for the AK rifles H
the war the FMLN hasell-dewloped, reasonably secure logistic network using mainly external sources of supply. We believe
The Saodiru'sla lost in the Nicaraguan election may force ihe FMLN io revamp its external support network, but docs not appear to have crippled the insurgents. Support from Nicaragua appeared to be largely unaffected as of President ChamorTo'sin latend continued Sandinistii control of the military and security services could enabie ibem to maintain support lo the FMLN without the Chamorro governments knowledge or approval. The FMLN already conducts resupplyand other clandestine activities in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico without the approval of the governments in those countries.the Sandinistas may reduce tbe levels of assistance in order to be more discreet.ini-mum. Chamorro probably will press FMLN elements in Managua loower profile to avoidWashington andppear lo be in compliance wiih regional agreements prohibiting supports
We believe Cuba eventually will seek new ways of delivering munitions to the FMLN. Havana may try io ferry supplies by sea lo Mexico, or along Central America's long coastline to points where cargo could then be transported to El Salvador. For critical payroads. the Cubans may attempt aerial resupply. Tbe FMLN abo may be forced toew safe haven for its leadership, communications network, and training and administration facilities lhat had been located in Nicaragua.!
APPROVED fOH RELEASE DATL1
in additionith lunai ootainoa abroad, nonmilitary supplies are bought openly with "warhat is. money obtained through robberies, extortion, or ransoms from kidnappings. The rebels also continue to capture some weapons and equipment from military or civil defense units and are able to manufacture homemade items, such as landmines and even simple mortars.
Tbe Struggle for Popular Supper!
We believe the FMLN'* ability to attract popular support has declined during, in large part because of tbe improved performance of tbe Salvador-an Government. Jose Napoleon Duarte's victory in ibc prestdeniial electionhe first democratic election for president in more than SO years, and the Subsequent reduction in human rights abuse*the government's popular standing andits legitimacy. The9 presideniial
election and peaceful transfer of power to Alfredo Cristurther underscored the evolution of the Salvador en political peoceaa. Wc believe theibewith the FMLN's own excesses- has betped tarn the tide of public optnion in FJ Salvador against the rebels. Even oa issues id which there is widespread disapproval of governmentiruTation, foropposition does not translate into active
support for the insurgents. Recent events and public opinion polls rapport this view:
Nearlyercent of eligible voters defied FMLN threats and voted in9 presidential deeuon. Although the participation rate was lower than in previous elections, parlies clearly linked to the insurgents received lessercent of the votes.
These polls suggest lhat the FMLN's front groups, despite their visibility, have been unable to expand the rebels' political base significantly The public, in fact, often ignores their calls for dcroonstrations and other activities. The FMLN-coottolled National Unity of Satvadoran Workers, for example, heaped to attract at0 partkipanu to aaxigoveronitat activities on Mayut fewerctually
turnout fo^ntig^cnTmenipeoteauo^tay0 wu0 tomoil of ihe participant! were affiliated with prcekrnocratk labor unions or other groups critical of various government policies but not supportive of the FMLN. The effectiveness of tbe front groups was reduced even more by tbe November offensive. Many front group members were publicly exposed as pro-FMLN activists, at least temporarily crippling the
Selected Insurgent From Groups
Association of Salvadoran
University Students
Human Rights
Commission of El Salvador
of Cooperative As-
sociations of El Salvador
FEUS
FES
Federation of Salvadoran Workers Unions
Federation of SalvadoranStudents
Federation of Secondary School Students
COM AD RES
COMAFAC
CRJPDES
csr
FEASIES FECMAFAM
of Families for Ihe for Politicalthe Disappeared of ElGarcia
Committee of Mothers andof Polllieal Prisoners, the Dls- PUT appeared, and Assassinated of El Salvador-Monsignor Oscar Ar- MPTL nulfo Romero
Committee of Mothers and Fam- of Political Prisoners, iheAssassinated of El Sal- Octavio
Christian Committee for theof El
Coordinator for
Solidarity
Federation of Independentof El
Federation of Committees of Mothers and Families of Political Prisoners, the Disappeared, and Assassinated-Monsignor Oscar Ar-nulfo Romero
Trade Union Federation ofWorkers
Revolutionary Trade Union Federation
United Front of Workers
Movement for Bread, land. Work, and Liberty
Movement of Salvadoran Children
Movement of Salvadoran Women
Social Security Institute Workers Union
National Campesino Union
National Unity of Salvadoran Workers, the FMLN's umbrella labor organization
University Unity
The FMLN's Marxist ideology probablyimited role in winning domestic support for the group. Ideologicalmod cases, we believe, Uavgwed by personalis confined rnostty to tbe FMLN leadership,jfl 'fljj^'aij^all recruitsliB dose of indoctn-iiatiooTnour view, most voluntary support for the(be motive* of volunteer recruits-appears based on more general or personal factors. Such as resentment of Army or rightist abuses or social inequities Despite ttt inability to attract broad popular support, the insurgency remains the dominant political force in many remote areas where tnchas no effective presence.oid left by years of neglect by San Salvador, the rebels take advantage of the tradition of political apathy or ant (government sentiment and focus on indoctrinating the local population and binding them to the insurgent cause The repatriation btai year ofarvadoran refugee* fromot* whom already were pro-FMLN and returned to participate io thelso provided the insurgent* with additional opportunitic* to expand their local support bases'!
A* tbe insurgents' populartheirfx militarydeclined, they have increasingly used force and intimidation to obtain recruit* and other support from tbe civilianwbieb generally bas no choice but to accede. The FMLN's popular standing abo is limited by the rebels* penchant for high-visibility, low-risk opera-tioni, such as assassinations, economic sabotage, and attacks on urban target* Although intended to assert tbeilitary effectiveness, these tactic* often harm the civilian population and leave the FMLN open to charges of terrorism. The insurgenu' failure to claim responsibility for many of these actions underscores their own concern aboutocument captured inenior insurgent commander noted the negative impact on domestic and international opinion of atuckscivilians.^
The problem is particularly acute for insurgentsia San Salvador. The FMLN believes the densely populated capital offer* the best arena in which to "radicahre" tbe civilian populace through well-chosen miliury, political, and propagandaand to draw the attention of the international media and the diplomatic community. But this high degree of visibility can also turn against the urban guerrillas when they miscalculate or bungle anTheir assassination of Mi miter of the Presidency Rodriguez Forthor example, was cordemned as an act of wanton terrorism!
Prospects
StillFore* To Be Reckonedlthough weakened by manpower, morale, andresupply dimoultiea. the FMLN, in our view, retains tuflkicni destructive capacity toajor problem for (he government fee year* to come. We believe tbe insurgents can continue to carry out costlyharassment,nd am bothroughout most of the country. These will not defeat tbe armedut they will continue to give the FMLN international credibilityever to press the governmeni to react to the insurgents' political agenda. At Ihc same time, the FMLN will be able to mobilirc enough support to carry oui *omc political activities, disseminate international propaganda, and issue peace initiative* that, together, will continue to exert strong pressure* on the governmeni *JJ
Given their manpower and firepower constraints, (be rebels are likely lo continue to emphasire high-visibility atucks on soft targets such as the economic Infrastructure, civil defensend politicalAttacks on militarylthough vital if the movement hopes to reuin credibility, arc api to be mostly ambuihe* and harass menu. We believe any atUckajor military facility i* more likely toand off bombardment, requiring fewer men and resourcesigher risk all-out assauli Although the FMLN nt likely io attempt another series of large-scale urban attack* before the ende do not believe il can suiuin such actions long enough toilitary threat to the government.IJlHB
Tbe insurgents probably will nuke greater use of themissile stockpiles and integration of the weaponsany future large-scale oJfcn-siTe. They couldactical military victory by rising theoncerted attackey military target to prevent the Air Force from providing close air support to ground troops J
The FMLN is abo likely to maintain its emphasb on political and diplomatic initiatives against thesuch as using front groups to mount rallies, demonstrations, and other antigovernment activity, particularly in the capital, where maximum media exposure is ensured. These actions, by themselves, however, are unlikelynspire many SaHadorans to rally to the insurgent cause. Propaganda aimed al curtailing US aid and discrediting San Salvador wiih other foreign audiences willigh priority. For example, we expect new and provocative dialogue proposals, designed primarily to influenceopinion
External factors or blunders by the government are more likely to boost the FMLN's prospects than any concrete achievement by the rebels themselves.publicised cases of human rights abuses by the armed forces, for example, could seriously damage the government's standing. Consequently, violent rebel acts designed toacklash by the armed forces will remain an integral part of the FMLN's Urates)1
ut New Problems Loom The FMLN's reliance on Cuba and Nicaragua for external support,ource of strength for tbe insurgency, hasotential vulnerability over the long term. Regardless of what compensatory adjustments Cuba and tbe FMLN might make, new sapply efforts are unlikely to match Ihe level of deliveries made possible by full Sandinbta control over Nicaraguan territory. Communications andadministrative support probably also will be im-paircd, given the FMLN's heavy reliance onIn addition, tbe top rebel leaders, their staffs, and families must find new, secure residences. We believe this disruption of their external supportwill lead to an eventual decline in their miliary
capabilities. The FMLN, over the long term, may prove unable to sustain its current force levels and have to rely on more rudimentary weapons and tactics. Tougher, coordinated government interdiction could further disrupt insurgent
The FMLN also is likely toolitical backlash from events in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua. At Marxists, the FMLN commandersidely discredited ideology and, although they often present themselves as democratictheir vehement opposition lo past elections and their long association with and dependence on Cuba are likely to make them appearolitical-ideological sense. J
We believe these pressures and the substantialreverses experienced during the past year may lead some FMLN leaden to reassess their viewegotiated settlement. Until recently, the rebeUtalks with ibe government largelyactical maneuver tootal military victory.8 communique, for example, senior FMLNJoaquin Villalobos asserted that tbe desire of democracies to negotiateulnerability the rebel* could exploit. In our judgment, the FMLN's lop leaders are increasinglyonly tothe dialogue and keep their optionsmake proposab that will be regarded by mostespecially those in Washington, as reasonable. Even so, tome commanders continue to favorilitary solution and could launch: jt'e.
In any case, weharpening of divisions within the FMLN leadership. Such an exacerbation of existing personal and ideologicalcould result in contradictions in the rebels' strategy and hamper theira vulnerability thai could be exploited by ihe Salvadoran Government to divide, weaken, or fraeture the movement and reduce its effectiveness. For example, tbe government could create turmoil among the rebel leaders ihroughoperations designed lo exploit theamong the top five
Altematl'c Scenario*
The insurgency could be hurlt the next few year* if the FMLN and Cuba fail to adjust to ihe probable loot ot* free acceaa to Nicareguan territory. Not only could thererecipitate drop in supplies, but the insurgents could alto luffer command and control problems if they were unable to replicate communications networks. Under thesetbe FMLN's military' capabilities coulddramatically. This abo could occur if the FMLN were to splinter. The insurgents would be bun even more, perhaps fatally, in our judgment. If the Cuban regime withdrew iu support for the insurgents, eitheresult of the pressures mounting on Castro or because Fidel were replacedess aggressive
Although current trends argueramatic improvement in the FMLN's fortunes, such acould occuresult of developments largely outside the insurgents* direct control. The moat likely cause wouldrastic decline in Sih/ndoranperformance, perhaps promptedut in US military aid or the emergence of extreme factionalism in the armed forces. The rebeb also would benefitollapse of domestic support for the Salvador-an Gover nrner-t. which could be precipitated byfactors,idespread resurgence of death squad activity or the auassi nation of President Crrs-lisni muU
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