fiPPRQVtQ FOHRIIUJSE DATE.1
OF INTELLIGENCE0 Gorbachev's "Consolidation" (U) Summary
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has introduced major institutional and policy changes since the beginning of the year that rake serious questions about his cornmitrnent tohese changes are best interpreted neiOier as an aitempt to move the USSR covertly toward social democracy, nor as an effort to institute benevolent dictatorship, but as elementstrategy of politicalhile this strategy incorporates certain progressive features, it basically represents an authoritarian drift in the manner in which Gorbachev has been posturing himself to deal with the Soviet Union's problems.
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maneuvering is retarding creation of the infrastructure of democracy, impeding the emerging democratic forces in Soviet politics, and delaying establishment of effective parliamentary rule and responsible cabinet government. By so doing, tt reduces Oxe possibility for peaceful management of the explosixe tensions latent in Soiiel society. Gorbachev's coolness toward multiparty competition and commitmentevivified xranguanf" Communist Parry may, at least in part, reflect an underestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet public. What the public does not wantemocratic process controlled and managed by Gorbachev, designed simply to support him and hisideas.
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Recenl Changes
This paper examines the significance of key changes thai Gorbachev bas initialed over ihe past sot months. It then considers how the tougher approach displayed in what is termed "consolidation" is likely-if Gorbachevaffect tbe solution of the major domestic economic, social, and political problems now confronting Moscow. Lastly, it considers the costs ofhe approach's likely impact on Gorbachev's upa)min^hoice of political strategy, and its possible consequences for Gorbachevs own power.
Kev Moves. Gorbachev has introduced major institutional and policy changes since the beginning of the year that raise basic questions about his political intentions. Tbe approach he has adopted provides the framework within which he is now dealing with the accelerating radicalization and polarization of politics in the USSR-reflected, not least, in the recent emergence front center of Yel'tsin and the Russian Question. I
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steps Gorbachev has taken include:
Creationresidency that, while addressing Ihe need in principle for stronger state executive authority and curtailment of the power of the party Politburo, vests Gorbacbev with powers that are subject to only modest and uncertain limitations.
Presentationraft Communis! Party Rules that endorses linrited democratization but abo seeks lo weaken Gorbachev's eneniies in the party and reduce his accountabilityollegia] leadership.
Resistance toward efforts to abolish the traditional ban on "factional" activity in the Communist Party, and support for ousting leaders of ihe democratic wing of the party.
Adoptionarsh policy toward non-Russian secessionism.
Symbolic courting of the political right and hostile treatment of the independent democratic opposition.
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enforcement and repressive capabilities of Ihe
interpretations, One interpretation of these changes is that theyhasepublicly unacknowledged campaign on Gorbachev's pan lo move tbe Sovielsocial dernocracy. Gorbachev's miention, so it might be argued, is to weakenand shift poweremocratizedhat appears to be ais either an attempt in fact to defend nascentrto pressures from the right Gorbachev makes tactical retreats inthat the tide of pressure from below released by eiasnost andwill wash away the defenses of ihe right and facilitate his intendedthe left I
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A different inlerpretalion argues, at the extreme, that Gorbachev is movingdictatorship. This view would concede that Gorbachev's ownmay not be dictatorial Yet, so it is argued, what we see emerging in realityreasscrtjonistorical pattern of autocracy generated by an attcrnDtjodcal crisis of Communism and threatening collapse of the Russian empire.
himself describes his aim asircumlocution that more
aptly describes his intentions, perhaps, than what he has managed to achieve.!
"Consolidation"
As giasnost and dernokmazatsiya began to bear fruit9 in tbe formdebate within the ranks of the Communist Party, the emergenceave of strike activity, and increased ethnic violence and asserth/eness, Gorbachev began to emphasize the need for "consolidation" insociety. First stressedroad global sense, the priority of consensus, cohesion,reduction was then extended by Gorbachev specifically to the political process-
mirroring growing societal fragmentation and strife, and increasingly vocal criticism within the party of his own stewardship The changes cited above lhal Gorbachev has introduced this year fit within Ihe context ofeflecting in their detail Gorbachev's ambivalent approach lo what be terms political "reform."
Political Goats, Political reform, according to Gorbachev's draft partyto eliminate Ihe influence of dogmatic Marxism-Leninism on Soviet Ihe. And
icMMiTn Gorbachev has done much to achieve this objective. Yet his talk about politics, private as well as public "ill incorporates the fundamental assumption that there Is one objectively correct" policy-nomely his own policy, pertstroyka. What is debatable is only how the policy should best be implemented. Here, Gorbachev's ego looms large: he clearly visualizes himself as the perestroyka, while asserting that his opponents or competitors (Tike Yel tsm) are driven by base "egoism" and selfish "political" motives. I
E?cCTgng Cpftlrplompetitive Political Environment. Gorbachev has not renounced giasnost, his political innovation that has revolutionized Soviet life. Nor has8 disowned the principle of politicalnd both of these phenomena have iici'iB-nvn ^eloped their own powerful autonomous dynamic But his acceptance of multiparty
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politics hasess-than-enthusiastic effort to keep up with the proliferation of informal groups and nrotoparties engendered by giasnost and earlier encouragement of nonpartisan electoral competition. From his standpoint, an organized, multiparty competitive political environment is currently part of the problem he will have io deal with,
not part of the solution.
For Gorbachev, the solution lies firstadical restructuring and lestaffing of the Conimiinist Party that sloughs off the party's old managerial functions while equirjpine il lo playactooanant role in the emerging competitive political environment, pa^pjj^pjjjjj
lorbachev created ihc office of President to make hifliilffHlWciv"
Politburo, Central Committee, and the party in general. Yet be thai the presidency aloneeak power base from which to influence the government bureaucracy, which is staffed almost entirely with party meml way in which meaningful reforms can be instituted for Ihe foreseeable
is by means of de facto one-party ruleormal multiparty selling. To <
undermine rule by ihe CPSU would jeopardize his program of peratroyka. Witfiinl-Wr* ISl
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power base lying specifically in the parry apparatus-despite the fact the greatest danger to his personal power to lie on the right. If the party
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wcreToTpTnTJefore or at the July parry congress, this would also split the party apparatus-ihus destroying its effectiveness and undermining his own power base. His main concern, therefore, is toplit in theparty at the congress thatob ably result in the collapse of the CPSU.
Gorbachev is clearly not putting all his eggs in the Communist Pany basket, as creation of the state presidency unambiguously demonstrates. But be is bankingonsiderable degree-futile though this might appear to some observers-on stabilizing and "reforming" the parry. The "vanguard" party he has in mind will engage in electoral competition like any "parliamentary" party but will also seek continuously to affect broad policy positions and personnel appointments by exerting influence over party members who work in key organizations throughout Soviet society. The draft party rules Gorbachevis has put forward for adoption ath CPSU congress attempt to prevent further
"federalization" of the party,ierarchical organizational structure and party apparatus (by reassertion of the principle of "democraticnd preserve the possibility of exerting direct lateral political influence through retention of party units in workplaces and bureaucratic organizations like the military and security forces (by retaining the so-called "territorial-production principle" of structuring they "democratization" of party elections in the draft rules while reasserting the
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i on organized "factionalism" and by replacing the Politburo and General Secretaryew Presidium" andorbachev is attempting to weaken the
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At the tactical level, Gorbachev has attempted to influence and constrain the process of interest articulation along the lines implied by the goal ofe has openly tried to remove the editor of one independeni-minded newspaper and sought to orient the press in General toward adoptiontill critical but more "constructrve'
Ambivalence Toward the Democratic Selection uf Leaders, Gorbachev has in principle strongly backed competitive elections in both the Communist Party and the Soviets. Without this support we would almost surely not be seeing the opening-up of Soviet politics that has occurred over the past year. Yet in both the state and party electoral processes he has attempted to maintain barriers against full democracy, preferringrocess that can be managed from above to some extent Thus, be has resisted the institutionalization of nonofficial group activities that would provide the basis for broad, nonatotnized influence from below over the selection of leaders. He seeks to retain Communist Party influence over personnel appointments. In the staffing of both the proposed party Presidium and the new Presidential Council, co-optation of members plays
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a key role. And he himself has new twice failed to subject his own selection as leader of the Soviet state to the test of direct popular election, preferring instead the safe but flawed legitimization of uncomnciitivc. validationartly non democratically elected congress of People's Deputies.
Trying To Assure Kngwlcdgeabjeentral differenceand his predecessors has been his recognition that policy must be basedassessment of reality, and his appreciation that bureaucracy has anto distort communication of this reality to policymakers. He has strongly
rs encouraged the ventilation of opposed policy views, openness of decisionmakersfrom below, and discussion of policy issues. And this sensitivity to the mformation
requirements of effective decisionmaking is reflected in his structuring of both the presidency, with its two councils, and the proposed new party Central Committee and Presidium.
The thrust of these reforms, nevertheless, is to strengthen rather than diluterule; and Gorbachev himself has justified his continued simultaneous occupancy5tatcparty leadership posts on the grounds of preventing dyarchy. In practice,
wnat the restructuring changes may do is to bring greater expertise to bearthis is tbe technocratic expertise of an economist like Shatalin in
the Presidential Council, or the knowledge of ethnic interestsepublic first secretary participating in the proposed party Presidium. Gorbachev's objective is-through dialogue in these new forums-to build consensus for his own policy decisions and to ensure that they incorporate those compromises demanded by reality. But he still makes the decisions. The process, in his view, should not be one of pressure-group advocacy, bargaining, and alliance formation-all of which he pejoratively describes asjpj
TJieAyajlability of Coercive Measures To Implemcmj^gjigv, Gorbachevneed to gain public acceptance of his policies and to avoid the "solution" ofthrough resort to physical violence He spends much of his own time attempting
rshape pubhc opinion. Yet the fonnal powers be has gained through introduction ofincorporate strong elements of unilateralism and the application of coercion.
rhev give him far-reaching authority to issue decrees, repress informal organizations (including ethnic and labor as well as politicalontrol undesired actions on the part of local authorities, and impose various forms of extraordinary rule-constrained only by some loosely framed constitutionai restrictions. pJHm
In practice, Gorbachev seems to be attempting to legitimize the use ofin the context of Lithuania, economic reform, agriculture, or otherinvoking the fact of discussion of their application at meetings of the Federal or
Bcils, orstress here is very much on
pseudocollcgial decisionmaking. Because the Presidential Council is not
vested with decisional authority (and in fact does not make policynd because its membership collectively is not subject to parliamentary approval or accountability,- -o* enjoy (hc authenticity or representative legitimacy of cabinet government.
- eaningorbachev'sescribed above, istrategy of oacking into" social democracy. It could be viewedeflection of profound ambivalence toward democracy asestimonial to Gorbachev's roleransitional, predemocratic leader of the USSR. Yet "consolidation" also does not translate into actual authoritarian rule, much less benevolent dictatorship, because
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personally sees force as the last resort and prefers to employ it to the minimal extent possible, and because in any event he is deficient in the actual capacity to impose his
presents an posturing himself to deal with
policies cocrcrvelyociety increasingly driven by its own dynamics and unresponsive to command from the Kremlin- For the time being at least, "consolidation" rer authoritarian drift in the manner that Gorbachev tbe Soviet Union's most fundamental problems.
Alienation is reflected in concentrated form in public attitudes toward the Communist Party. Concern over the steep erosion of popular support for the party is frequently voiced by party officials, and public opinion data confirm the reality of thiseclining support for tbe party even from its own membership; party officials observe with dismay an increase over thrwar in rccian^^nt-^H
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Gorbachev's problem, however, is not simply withdrawal of support from the party; it is active rising anger directed at the party. What we are seeing-in slower motion thanasternrowing anti-Communist revolution. Actual hostility toward party membership and especially toward the party apparatus, is blurred in much of the reporting, but itowerfultrike committee leader in Donetsk conciserv expresses an extreme form of this mood: -Resignation of the obkom in hs entirety, and immediately-that is tbe minimum for the relaxation of tension. And tbe maximum is an unfolding of eventshe local rebellionsumber of oblast party bureaus this put winterusion of an.iparty sentiment and convictions of deep social injust.ee. And probably the single most potent grievance fueling the sense of injustice isotent force in East European anti-Communist revolutions over the past year. The link between corruption and antiregiroe sentiment accounts for the extraordinary mass resonance of the case inrofving the two anricorraption crusaders, Odryan and Ivanov, as well as for Establishment sensitrvitv toward their charecs
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0 nationwide survey of the population's assessment of ihe cpsu revealed the following:ercent of respondents fell the party's prestige wu declining; tbe percentage of those who totally mistrusted ibe party had grown fromercent in9 toercent; oculy half bchercj tbe party had lest the initiative and had oo appreciable influence on social changes;ercent uid tbeinu as expressed inrogram were crthcr nnirninamc or had lost their topkahty; overerccnl tufty or partiallythat (he party had led the country alongwrong path; almostercent said that its error* had arrested the country's development; andercent believed that the actions of party officials al the workplace level reflected the will and opinion of ihe rank and clc. fmoscownewi
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Gorbachev's hard line loward Ihe Baits may have won Ihe regime aof support in some quarters, as may Ihe measures he has taken to beef upagainst crime. But, basically, it is difficult io see how the changes he has made the political process willasting increase in regime support. They do nothingIhe ideological vacuum; they probably do not add much to the legitimacy of the political
structures; and they will certainly intensify ethnic disaffection and alienation of liberal democratic forces. By impeding the formation of the sociopolitical infrastructure of democracy, theWncreasc the likelihoodiolent outcome of ihe anti-Communist revolution.
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The Weakening of Government, For the last year. Prime Minister Ryzhkov has repeatedly called attention to the dechhing capacity of Moscow to torero the Soviet Union; and, indeed, thisasic problem. Reduction in theanagerial functions and capabilities dictated by Gorbachev has seriously weakened tbe core integrating element of rule at all levels of the system. Collective leadership in the Politburo! continued lo produce stalemate, feckless compromise, or policy swings noi sustained at the top leadership level. Meanwhile, the rise of the congress ofputies/5uprenie Soviet has undercut the Council of Ministers without producing effective parliamentary rule or true cabinet government- Policy implementation by the central bureaucracies is frustrated by decay of the command economyemi-decentralization of power to enterprises and localities; btnMhelatter, in turn, lack the resources lo cope with their expanded responsibilities.
If Gorbachev is persistent, his use of ihe new Presidential powers may helpstalemate in policymaking produced by the format of collegia! decisionmaking ihe party Politburo and Presidium of Ihe Supreme Soviet The presidency does providemechanism in principle for imposing greater orderliness on ihe policy process,of policies, and lighter deadlines-end, with the reduction of Central
Committee apparatus functions, ibis is clearly needed. Presidential authority may help to facilitate policy implementationimited number of areas; it cannot, of course, impose top priority across the board. But if Gorbachev is indecisive, the coUegiality problem may simpjyregenerate itself in debates in the new Presidential Council and party Presidium.
Gorbachev's strategy of restoring dynamism through creationew type of Communist Party "Vanguard" oriented toward broad policy development and personnel placemen! is almost certainly doomed to failure. But its attempted implementation will perpetuate dyarchy between the party apparatus and the soviet/government structure, especially al levels below Ihe Center where control is not fused in one indrvidual-thus weakening Ihe rooting of democratic rule. By siding with the traditionalists wbo seek Io retain ihe so-called "territorial-production" structure of the party, which organizes individual party members in party cells by place of work, Gorbachev may buy some current support on the right-but at the nsk of reinforcing conservatism at the base of Soviet society, shoring up resistance to marketization by maintaining extra parliamentary party intervention in economic decisionmaking by production units, and stoking anti-Communist revolution in every workplace, once the cry for "depojjtKjzation" rises and non-Communist political parties begin demanding equal trealment._
On the state side, in the absenceeveloped social, organizational, and legal infrastructure of support for the Supreme Soviet/congress of People's Deputies, establishment of an authoritarian presidency is likely lo jeopardize the transformation of these elective bodies into effective parliamentary assemblies. The appearance of the
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president, with his pseudorcprcscntativc and underlcgitimated presidential council and council of federation, will further weaken the council of ministersenter of executive power but will not institutionalize responsible cabinet government nor will gorbachev's changes alone improve local government, which depends basically on liquidating central bureaucratic controls and gaining tax-based resources directly from lucers-neither of which will happen in the absence of serious economic reform.
delay in instituting economicumber of factors explain the slow pace of economic reform. these include:
fundamental divisions among soviet leaders over the scope, character, and timing ofreflected constantly in ugachev's speeches.
assignment of responsibility for planning reform to ryzhkov and his ministerial barons, whose concept ofthe desired change has been limited and gradual.
resistance to reform in many quarters: the congress of people's deputies/supreme soviet the official trade unions, the right wing of tbe communist party, and some popular pressure groups and emerging political parties.
own superficial understanding of the complex issues involved.
conflicting advice to gorbachev from the specialists to whom he
but it appears that the paramount obstacle to reform remains what it has been for at least the last two years: gorbachev's fear that reform will setevolutionary reaction by the public gorbachev advisers, like abalkin, publicly argue that ihecnrreni soviet regime does not enjoy sufficient public trust to follow the polish path. I
the creation of the presidency may help in some ways to advance economic1 ermit the objections of some leaders like ligachev, and the reservations oficl*io<2ivrs ukc ryzhkov, to be overridden. it may permit some bypassing of centers of resistance,
including those in the congress of people's deputies/supreme soviet and the official trade unions. it may facilitate faster generationore coherent internally consistent reform plan. and use of theecree powers mayore decisive reaction to complications that will arise during implementation of reform. ihese would not be negligible gains.
nevertheless, gorbachev's enhanced juridical authority has not altered roblem: bis own fear of the pubbc response. having securedlemmim pwrs, gorbachev has already recoiled from action, suggesting to the rrabficexhortation about "markets- thai he still does not really know where he is goingt
while cxciung fear of price increases and making promises of pain relief that he will not be able to keep. neither use of presidential decrees nor "consensus building" through the presidential councils will enhance the legitimacy of reform decisions; they need au the real democratic authorization they can get employment of these presidential mechanisms, however, will tend to isolate gorbachev as the perceived source of popular suffering.
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The Decline in Public Order. Failure to arrest declining living standards, nonfulfillment of Moscow's promises to respond to earlier strike demands, and the contagion of spiraling intercommunal violence are likely in the near future to further tax the regime's capability to maintain public order. Thereood chance of large-scale strikes this summer. While MVD forces available to put down violence are growing, they are now thinly stretched, and the reliability of military forces if used against Slavic populations would be highly questionable. I
is one area in which Gorbachev's "consolidation" ought to produce tangible results. It couldore coordinated mobilization of capabilities to deal with disorder and violence. By concentrating the authority to employ force domestically in the hands of one leader, it should strengthen the speed and responsiveness of decisionmaking. It might stiffen the resolve of the security forces, and perhaps reduce fear on the part of the military of being targeted for public opprobrium by participating in the suppression of internal disorderjtshould win points for Gorbachev among those in the population who crave
Naturally, more force will not affect the underlying conditionsnd the possibly easier availability of armed coercion will not necessarily
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r iieiMiosvn overcome Gorbachev's demonstrated reluctance to tempt fate by using it-especially if its use risks horizontal escalation of violence in Russia and the Ukraine. If he does significantly increase physical repression, this is more likely to radicalize than pacify the groups affected. One outcome could be the spread ofailure by milita forces to cany out orders could sharply accelerate the anti-Communist revolution. "
Fragmentation. Notwithstanding important differences among the republics, one may hazard some generalizations about the nationality problem that now confronts Moscow. In all republics, nationalism hasualitative radkalization over the past year.umber of the non-Russian republics, the intensity and traumatic character of developments have almost certainly alienated their populations from Russia or the foreseeable future. For many non-Russians, independence is noemote lom^SYrt fugitive dream,resently achievable goal. Secession or fundamental renegotiation of ,U1 the terms of association with Russia are now part of people's mental furniture. Where hostility between non-Russian nationalities has been the pattern, as in the Caucasus and Central Asia, hatred has now come to be directed at Russia too. In some areas, especially Central Asia, the potential for mass anti-Russian violencetepped-up flight of Russian refugees is probably high.H
In the Russian Republic, pressure toeal Russian state that will look to tbe interests of Russia itself after three-quartersentury of national disaster is strong not only on the right, but among all elites and within the population at large-although views differ on the desirability of maintaining the Soviet Russian empire. Among party members, support for the formationeparate Communist Party of Russia is also no monopoly of the right. It seems virtually certain now that there will soontrengthened Russian stateussian Communist Party, with only the question of their respective degrees of authority remaining to be determined. Whatever ideological complexion it assumes, the Russian Question willerious long-term "Yugosiavization" challenge to the viability of any supranational Soviet state, andhort-term
challenge even to Gorbachev's own preeminence, depending on how Yel'tsin fares. The broadly shared desire among Russians to cut "subsidies" to other republics will
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impact most severely on the non-Slavic republics--cspccially the Central Asian. And oven articulation of Russian nationalism will further erode the foundations of non-Russian elite loyalty to the Center.
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some occasions Gorbachev has held out the prospect of independence or confederaLstatusfqr some nationalitics-M
^ Against this type
enaorsementew, "true" federalism, which he still gives evidence of believing can induce voluntary adherence by all non-Russian republics (largely on the grounds of rational economictatements he has made about the likely cataslrophic civil violence waiting to be unleashed throughout the USSR by secessionism, and his evident failure simply ir^jraspthe primordial desire of many non-Russians for national UldcpendcnccH
Gorbachev's tough line in practice toward the Baits may haveemporary deterrent impact on secessionism, although so far it seems to have affected only the style of the Latvians and Estonians' attempted exit. It may also have bought'ttle
Gorbachev's firmness is not likely, as the hardliners may hope, to "bent sense" into the non-Russians interested in independence. And it may well fail, contrary to Gorbachev's evident strategy, to create conditions for negotiations on his own terms by seriously splitting the secessionist leadership. If Gorbachev steps up tatimidation, the effect will probably be to further radicalize the Baits, reduce the likelihood of obtaining acivilian negotiating partner lhat will be obeyed by the indigenous population, increase the likelihood of violence between Baits and local Russians, and narrow the possibility of avoiding direct military rule.
the same time, Gorbachev's moves-the secession law, the "nationalthe law on Baltic economiche law on economic relations betweenand the republics, the law establishing the respective powers of the Center andand, of course, the pressure tactics against the Balls-have probably reduced the
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credibility in the eyes of other nationalities of Gorbachev's promiseeal federalism basedew treaty of union and serious demarcation of republic and federal powers. Whatever Gorbachev's ultimate intentions may be, his visible moves are unlikelyn dealing with the demands o
of non-Russians. Within the Party his maneuverinc could accelerate the split of the party along ethnic lines in some of the non-Russian republics, strengthen the formation of nationalist parties, and reduce or further marginalize the integrative capability of republic branches of the CPSU.
Gorbachev and his allies appear fully aware of the enormous potential threat to the stability and continued existence of tbe Union posed by the emergencellll Russian center, and they attempted first to block or delay this developmentcl>il<?irnt apparently failed, their strategy now must be to attempt to tame the tiger somehow; but
their efforts so far seem ineffectual.enuinely democratic approach to the Union issue mightay for Gorbachev to cope with the Russian Question, his authoritarian drift tends to place himefensive-reactive posture and reduce his ability toess violent long-term restructuring of the Soviet empireJ
Implications
Gorbachevising danger of economic breakdown, the growthconvulsive societal polarization and ladjcahzaubn, ethnic fragmentation, andtoward disintegration of Soviet rule-all of which are underpinned by an evolving anb-
6Communist revolution. His authoritarian drift is, in part, an attempt to appeasea"dictated" to him by the military.
the KGB, orhe party, nor is it an esoteric "one step backward" maneuverovert design to implant soaal democracy in the USSR. Gorbachev still has considerable discretionary leeway, and he has chosen to move to the right both because be
sees his declining popularity impeding his own capacity to compete in an open political environment and because be too fears the "chaos* building and seeks to contain it
_ If Gorbachev persists in his current "consolidation" mode, this is likely at best to produce tactical gains at the expense of high costs for political opportunities forgone and potentially heavy strategic losses for the Soviet people. The latter include:
Retarding formation of the social, cultural, and organizational underpinnings of democracy.
Weakening the emerging democratic elites in Soviet society.
Delaying the emergence of effective parliamentary rule and responsible cabinet government
Increasing the likelihoodrotracted and potentially explosive divestiture of power by the Communist Party.
Introducing economic reformanner that is short on legitimacy and democratic authorization, reducing tbe chances that it will stick.
Heightening the likelihood of escalating violence in ethnic confrontations.
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* Gearing up Io cope with civil unrestanner likely lo radicalize ihe population, increase violence and, possibly, spread terrorism.
arc losses thai could affect the United Slates as well. While it is certainly
onceivableiolent revolutionary upheaval in the USSR couldemocratic outcome, tbe chances are probably as great-if not greater-thai it would produceeturn to dictatorshipore hostile foreign policy, or persistence of an internationally destabilizing maelstrom of bloodshed and civil war. I
[eMul8 the prospects fororbachev may be focusing his attention on
1erosion of his own popularity and on the possible outcome of the anti-Communist
revolution. Soviet public opinion polls, Ihe recent election victories of democratic forces in Moscow, Leningrad, and other crtics and election losses of the faruggest that there is more potential popular acceptance oFpeaoeruiaenuocrauc WHrtfc^cxonomic reform, and even secession of non-Russian republics, than Western analysts or Gorbachev himself may have expected. The popular appeal of Yel'tsin's program, with its nonimperialistic Russian nationalism, is evidence of this potential. What the public does not wantemocratic Droccss^controlled and managed by Gorbachev simply to support him and his program.
Gorbachev's Upcoming.Strategic Choice. Within the next several months, as the Russian Question bears in on the Kremlin, ash congress of Ihe CPSU allocates power within the party and copes with internal schism, and as the democratic forces in major cities struggle for control with the party apparatus traditionalists and the central bureaucracy, Gorbachev willritical choice of strategic direction. In an environment of growing polarization and incipient collapse of the Center, Gorbachev could opt for deepening democracy. The elements ofhoice might include:
Acceptance of real reform in the Communist Party: abolition of the principle of "democratic centralism" and the central role of the party apparatus; elimination of the ban on "factional" activity by party members; the organizing of party members by electoral constituencies and liquidation of party units in workplaces and bureaucratic hierarchies; and provision for ethnic "federalization" of the party.
A political alliance with democratic forces in the Russian Republic-expressedersonal rapprochement between Gorbachev and Yel'tsin.
Sponsorship of cooperative relations between the central authorities and democratically controlled local government bodies.
bandonment of pressure tactics toward the Baltic revocation of legislative measures predeterminingthe USSR and the constituent nationalrocess designed torulyof ethnic union (or disassociation).
Alternatively, Gorbachev could opt to turn further toward the right. The moves here might include more vigorous use ofihe coercive powers vested in ihe presidency, active supporturge of Democratic Platform adherents from the Communist Party, an attempted political alliancehauvinisticaliy minded Communist Party of Russia,
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attempts to undermine local governments controlled by thedernocrats,ightening of the screws on the Baits and other would-be secessionists. |
If ihe argument presented in this paper is correct, it would clearly be innd possibly his own-for Gorbachev to really "goome advisers have reportedly been urging him to followourse of action. Whateversituation may have been several years ago, trading democracy for "stability" is now aoption. The chances are, however, that he will not do so-at least not in the
consistent way that we would like to see.
Gorbachev almost certainly thinks there still are possibilities forenter despite growing political polarization, and it is conceivable that for awhile he may be right. The strategy toward Communist Party "reform" embodied in his draft party program and rules is fundamentally at odds with the Democratic Platform's designarliamentaryrom the standpoint of stability and liberal reform there would seem toowerful case to be madeapprochement between Gorbachev and theindeed, there are signs of preliminary maneuvering on both sides following Yel'tsin's victory. Gorbachev may believe that support from the Russian Republic leadership for economic reform could move the process forward and spread responsibility for unpleasant actions. Yet Yel'tsin's push for Russian Republic sovereignty and his support forcompatible they may be in principle with Gorbachev's more philosophic musings about possible long-term differentiated federal/confederal relations between national republics and Moscow-are fundamentally at odds with Gorbachev's current goals and strategy of dealing wilh the nationality question. It is extremely doubtful that Gorbachev is prepared psychologically or politically to "get ahead" of ethnic disintegration by asking the republics: Which of you would like to unite in some sort of confederalersonal level, Gorbachev's willingness in general to share power with other individual leaders, much less align the Soviet "all-union" stateingle republic (even the Russian Republic) is highly suspect. Powerful mutual antagonism and competition between Gorbachev and Ycl'iMfw^Mjrobably complemented by visceral distrust by Gorbachev of the liberal politicians.
At the same time, Gorbachev is also unlikely toadical turn towardHe is certainly aware that his fiercest political enemies lie on this flank, and thatcxUcmcthere would be little prospect of reconciliation.
rs Temperamentally and politically, he has demonstrated an inclination to avoid the useforce where this has been possible. He would not be convincingpokesman
for Russian chauvinism. And almost certainly he fs lookingompromise with the Baits that would avert any domino effect but still notnd accommodate Soviet foreign policy and trade interests.
The likeliest course of action for Gorbachev, consequently,ontinued altempt to pursue "consolidation" and ton the near term, this strategy would display itself in moves at the upcoming party congress lo carry through the projected structural changes in the party, remove as many traditionalist opponents as he can from leading party posts, retain as much of the mass membership of the party as possible, and get rid of irreconcilably oppositionist leftist leaders. With Yel'tsin and an assertive Russian Republic government, Gorbachev's relations are likely to be combative.
Likewise, in dealing with the Baltic problem Gorbachev will probably continue to seekconditionspolitical" resolution of the problem on his own terms bypublic resistance and splitting the local
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Gorbachev's Personal Power- Gorbachev's persistence with "consolidation" could severely increase the vulnerability of his own position-primarily because of the ineffectiveness of this approach in dealing with fundamental policy problems and its inadequacy in shoring up political support His authoritarian drift may alleviate some pressures on him from the right in the Politburo, Central Committee, and military. But it is unlikely to mollify the hardcore opposition from this quarter, which believesolitical war to the death is now under way in the USSR and that Gorbachev is in the way or on the wrong side. At the same time, Gorbachev is weakening his more natural base of support among democratic elites. Probably he will not succecdin averting fractionization of the CPSU ath congress, notwithstanding his likely attempt to peel off just the Democratic Platform leaders from the party. This outcome could mortgage his future to the tailing political force that he himself, paVadcrxically, has done so much toasically traditionalist CPSU apparatus. I
Gorbachev's greatest personal vulnerability in all arenas-the Politburo, theand the Supreme Soviet/congress of People's Deputies-lies at thewhere fear of his continued rule on the part of moderate (not justijqss elements in these bodies comes to outweigh fear of possible reprisalctively "conspire" against him, feariolent popular backlash againstor fearightwing takeover. The KGB leadership, as long as it continues
to cast its lot with Gorbachev, may be able to influence the reprisal element of the
But tbe basic contingencies likely to affect the fear calculus would appear to be two. First, the eruption of widespread strikes or mass violence could render such calculations irrelevant Or, second, Gorbachev's popular standing could plummet toevel that his removal mightatter of indifference to the public Further consumer distress could produceesult. Gorbachev's increasing efforts to rebut rumors of personal corruption and his public endorsementtalinist-type draft bill to protect the dignity" of the President suggest still another scenario that should also not be ignored. The ineffectiveness of Gorbachev's "consolidation" and its authoritarian approach in coping with fundamental Soviet problemseriod of rapid political polarization is steadily increasing the likelihood of one or the other of these contingencies.
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Original document.
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