USSR-East Asia: Moscow Realigning Its Policy
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USSR-East Asia: Moscow Realigning Its Policy
USSR-Kast Asia: Moscow Reab'gniofi lis Polic;
Keypolicy toward Easl Asia is shiftingtrategy thai emphasizes im-
tmformaHeMrelations with ooo-Cotrmiunist countries, even at the expense of
clients like Vietnam and North Korea, and enhancing security
through regional arms control agreements. Several factors haveto this newibe new pragmatism of Soviet foreign policyounting awareness of ibe need to build lucrative relationships with (be economically dynamic countries of East Asia, and the desire lo avoid an arms race or other forms of military competition with the United States
Wc expect Moscow to focus primarily on improving relations with Japan and South Korea in hope* of reaping economic benefits andarger role in regional affairs. The USSR's success in expanding economic ties to (hose countries will be limited until it allocates massive resources lo spur the development of Siberia and the Sovici Far East andumber of domestic reforms to make foreign investment in tbe struggling Soviet economy more attractive. Implementing these reforms will take many years under the best of circumstance
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China. The normalization of Si no-Soviet ties is the most important success that Gorbachev has achieved thus far in (he region- Chinese Premier Li Peng's recent visit lo Moscow showed tbat differences on keyexample, bow to settle the conflict in Cambodia- will not hamper cooperation in other areas, especially in the economic sphere. Although Gorbachev will iry to move (he relationship further ahead, his success will depend largely on whether the Chinese allow their distaste for bis political refoims to affect the relationship. The Soviets' main objectives arc closer patlyilitary-to- military dialogue of some kind,arked increase in trade and other forms of economic cooperation,f)
oviet decision to make improved relations withop priority mayajor initiative later this year to sel Ihe stage for Gorbachev's planned visit to Tokyon our view,esture is much more likely now than itear ago, given tbe normalization of Siiso-Sovsel ties
_Moscow is still trying to defuse the territorial dispute by considering compromises it has been unwilling to make up to now. such as demilitarizing ihe disputed islands or leasing them back lo (he Japanese. But Gorbachev may be prepared to consider returning all the islands if Ihe Japanese Governmentillingness to make significant
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KOnonivC and security concession^
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TAr Jwo Koreas. Moscow probably will agree to cslablish iliplomauc relations wilh South Korea laier this year. Gorbachev's decision lo meet wjili South Korean President Roh in early June underscored bistoncreased weighi to relations wjih Seoul despite North Korean obioctioru. Moscow has come to regatd economic relations with South Koreaey part of the answer to the USSR's problems in acquiring in-eipensivc consumer goods, capital, and technology for its eastern provinces. At Ihe same time, tbe Soviets ate showing increasing impatience with North Korean leader Kim Il-song but are likely to continue to provide him with military assistance toolal rupture of relations
The establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Seoul almost certainly would make it easier (or Moscow to acquire South Korean technology and capital. Moreover, it is conceivable that, over the long run, public sentiment in the South would strengthen for Korean neutrality andithdrawal of US forces from the peninsula if the Soviets' arms deliveries to North Korea declined as ibeir relations with South Korea normal-red and economic ties eiparidcd We estimate that, even without full diplomatic relations, Moscow's trade with the South will surpass Soviet-North Korean trade within ihreeive years
Southeast Asia, Moscow's Hanoi connection has become less important now that the Soviets have cinaDded their contacts with ihe non-Commu-nut countries in the region and have improved relations with Bering They are likely to pui more distance between themselves and the Vietnamese this year by reducing both military and economic aidanoi
Although Moscow's arms control initiatives aim to reduce tbe US military presence in Easl Asia and the Western Pacific, the Soviets do not seek to challenge US naval preeminence in the region. The recent cuts in Soviet military forces at Cam Ranh Bay in Viet namelief that
unilateral force reductions aie the best way to convince ihe United Stales
and mm Communist Asian slalca (hat (he (iorbachev regime is serious about deemphaairing tu military role in (be region and focusing instead on political and ccxmocnic ties Moscow may even sec some meritore dramaticforomplete withdrawal from Cam Kanh Day in an effortrompt Manila and otbei Asian capitalsress the United States to reduce its forces in (be area. The Soviets also could demilitarize the contested Northern Territories or cut (heir air and naval forces deployed on Sakhalin or elsewhere near Japan to improve (be atmosphere for Gorbachev's planned mil lo Tokyo
USSR-Easl Asia: Moscow Realigning lis Policy
Tha Sowi leadership hasayor review ol iu cotiey ib East Ma.fJ
buron-io. bu1 Ol Ihe Intcrninonsl Policy Commission of ibe CPSU Central Comicillcc. sharply cimoicd Soviet (rack officials and military leaden in9 (or not devolving mote cITeciivc prog rami and politics for thecpori in Pravda added that Soviet bureaucratic inertia and opposi ionnew thinking- -eie largely respoosibk (or the cool Asian response to Pres-dc nt Gorbachevs "peace" laitiatives and bvds for eipincJed economic ties unce hn speech at Vladnostok ine believe the review also focused on shiftingew stiategr that emphasizes improving relations with nooCociraunni countries, especially Japan and South Korea, and enhancing socunty in theFast without challenging US precriuoence there '
Several factorsontribated to this new approach.
First, there is tbe new pragmoiiim of Sovrti for tig* policy worldwide The Gorbachev leadership has not only accepted tbe dissolution ol tbe Soviet empire in
Eastern Europe but alto has sought belter relations
with auch staunchly ami-Communist states at South
Korea. Israel, and South Africa. By the same token.
Moscow now seems less concerned than in the past about preserving close ties to such old and expensive Communist clients as Cuba. Vietnam, and North
Uipi that could gel In the way of us courtship of more useful non-Communist countries
The crapu*jis no* is on transforming the USSRore traditional great power that bis normalired relations with all states and on establishingorce for peace and stability In this way.
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Moscow hopes to continue I) exert global influenceime of mounting economic and political problcrnsorne
Economic consideration! are an important factor in the rethinking of Moscow's Asian policy. In the interests of strengthening the economy al borne, the Soviets arc more aware of the need to build lucrative reiiuonihipi with the economic powers in the Fat East, especially Japan and South Korea. Tbe growing economic ilrmgtb of Thailand. Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong will probably also attract greatei Soviet alteniion in the near future.
Tbe USSRong way to go in boosting eiports from its far eastern provinces (these accounted forercent of all Soviet exports during theersuading Asiant to invest in joint ventures in thai part of the USSR, or otherwise reaching the point where ceonocnk links to Asian neighborsey role sn revitalizing tbe economy. Wc believe the Gorbachev leadership will find it difficult to eapaad economic ties to many rvon-Communist Asianwithout allocating massive resources to speed up ihe economic development of the Soviet Far East. Moscow also nerds to take acisouumber of ceccorrucopcciilly price reform, which is essential if Ihe ruble is toonvertible currency -to make joml ventures and other forms of investment in the struggling economy more attractive to foreign businessmen. In our judgment, implement-tng most of tbese reforms will require several years under the best of cireuinstances
Meanwhile,rade with Asia-Pacific nations represents onlyercent of all its foreign liade or slightly more than half ihe amount of its Irade with Western Europe in recent years (secsMongolia. North Korea. Vietnam. Inos. andfor more than hall of the USSR's trade with that nail of the
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Sovkl torclguSepteruber 89
(ace table) Trade with Japan, Moscow's most important trading partner in Ibe region, has recovered from its slump during theut remains mod cat for severalthe drop in the world price of oil, which has reduced Sovietpower, and the appreciation of the Japanese yen. which has made goods from Weatern Europe more attractive to Moscow than those from Japan. Soviet trade with South Korea increased from0 millionft to over0 millionutercentage of eitherforeign trade remains insignificant.1
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Another consideration Is the desire lo avoid on arms ratt or other form* of military competition with the United Staler. The Gorbachev leadership seems to be shifting its emphasis, seeking to enhance security in tbe Far East through regional arms control initiatives, instead of trying to gain military parity with theiate* In tbe region,
inister ShevardnadzeS Congressional delegation in mid-January that "there will soon be no Soviet troops in Asia outside tbe USSR'seputy Foreign Minister Rogacbev told the group that Moscow was revamping itspolicies everywhere and stated that, in the Soviet Far East, tbey would now be based on the doctrine of "reasonableeputy director of the
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Insi'ute added that Moscow now regards tberetence of ibe USit* size and nuclear strikea "stabillvlne" in-
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now under way in Vienna. He added that, in Ihti context, ii could be possible to apply "openo ihe Pacific region
Most ofroposals are drawn from earlier initiative* put forward by Gorbachev, starting with his speech al VladivostokulyThese include:Not increasing nuclear weapons in ihe region, f
Soviet Security Proposal*
Al pan of their new. less militant diplomacy,haveajor effort logood neighbor" by pullingnew proposals oo Asian security issues.trying harder lo engage both Tokyoiplomatic dialogue on Asian securityespecially naval arms control discussions-end. the Soviets have announced tbemost of their air assets fromR*nh Baybey also
haveew package of Asian confidence-building measures (CBMs) designed lonii-cd Stale* into naval arms control talks.
The new package, spelled out by Rogaebev incombine* new idea* with older initiatives. Tbe most significant new'wrinkles are:
A bilateral exchange of views with tbe United Stales on reducing regional nival forces, including elaboration of further CBMiV.Earlier Sovietfor limit* and reduction* in naval forces had called foe multilateral talk* between the "main nava] powers."
A proposal to establish principle* for sicp-by-siep reductions in US and Soviet conventional force* downevel of reasonable sufficiency,n' ng in the north weal Pacific region.
Applying the principle of "transparency.'" which Rogachev said worked well in Europe, to northeast Asia. He proposed an exchange of official data on US and Soviet forces in the regionilateral discussion of their doctrines pertaining to theidea parallel lo tbe talks on confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) for Europe
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conventional inrce ream-ih>ik.
Expanding the US-Sovietultilateral forum.
Establishing "safety zones" for ships and aircraft.
Obligaiory notification of al) naval exercises,joint exercises wlih allies and inviiaticets to
The Soviets seem lo be advancing these proposals with some serious intent, which would be consistent withEuropean initiatives, while jettisoning much of ihe propaganda baggage from ihe past. In fact, Rogaebev failed toumber of earlier proposals for ibe Asia-Pacific region thai Moscow may now considerexample, Gorbachev's suggestions ai Vladivostok that regional alliances be disbanded and that naval operations in ihe Pacific Ocean, especially with nuclear-capable ships, be curtailed. In Ibe past, the Soviet leader also had endorsed the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in ihe South Pacific oo the Korean Peninsula, and in Southeast Asia, and'bad called for an international conference on establishing an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. Rogacbev's package of CBMs also omitted previous proposals to ban antisubmarine operation* in certain areas andutual withdrawal from Cam Ranb Bay and the Philippine?
Gorbachev wants to free resource* for civiliantbe economy and probably viewsne-fourth of which arein its eastern province* or with thean attractive target for savings inand scarce materials. At the same lime, thethat regional arms control andate unlikelyake much progressas Washington remains
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Forte Reductions in ike East
At the beginninghe Soviets hodround Forcer division? andir Forces regiments in the eastern USSR (the provinces east of thelusajor surface combatants In the Pacific Fleet. As pari of the SOO.OOO-man unilateral reductions that Gorbachev announced Inoviet forces east ofs are to be cut byerceni by
So far. reductions In the eastern pari of the USSR generally appear to be proceeding in accordance with Gorbachevs commitment.he Soviets have disbanded three divisions opposite Iran and Afghanistan and one division opposite China. They also have deactivated three divisions opposite China. Ten other divisions east of the Urals appear headed
for deactivation. At leastbsolescent Pacific Fleet ships have been scrapped. Moreover, the Soviet and Mongolian Governments have agreed that all Soviet
forces will be withdrawn by the endhe Soviet commander recently sto"J e units will begin leaving on IS May.
The "yrVObhaxr:
fiem the Atlantlc-
depots east of the
Urals. Some equipment.iz replacing older
systems In active units.
far in Ibe region, and we believe Moscow will try to move Ibe relationship forward despite Chinese mlsgiv-ings about bis policies. Thus far. Sine-Soviet ex-changes have proceeded without internsptioo. even in the face of the turmoil io China and the Soviet Union over the past year. In fact, both sides have pointed to Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Moscow in latetbe six agreements signed during bisproof that differences on such key issues as the conflict in Cambodia will not hamper cooperation in other areas, esrxctally In the econoouc sphere. From Moscow's viewpoint. Ihe most importantprobably are the resumption of formal party ties and military contacts and the convening of the first talks on force reductions alongm border;
Chinese and Soviet party delegations traded visits infirst such visits inbe two sides reportedly plan to bold two or three high-level partyhinese delegation headed by party propaganda chief Wang Rcnzhi visited Moscow in March,oviet party dele-gatioo from the foreign affairs department rated Beijing in mid-April.
The Chinese and Soviet Foreign Mtrusters signed an agreement on principles for force cuts and for CBMs along Ihe Siiiodioviet frontier during Li's visit In late April. Tbe new agreement should help speed op the deliberations of the working group on mutual force reductions created in
scholars and policymakers
now seem io ueucve that they can make better headway with US officials on Asian arms control issues by adopting an incremental approscb, rather than the sweeping one of the past. By the same token, the USSR clearly hopes that the recent cut* In its nuTltary force, at Cam Ranb Bay will help convince the United State* and key Asian state* that Moscow is rcJdcusing Its tj^kmaUffort* on political aod economic
New Problems With the Chinese
The normalization of Sino-Sovict relations is tbe most important success that Gorbachev has achieved thus
* Li and Gorbachev reportedly also agreed tovisits of Soviet and Chinese mfliury leaders, presaging the first senior military contacts since the Sinct-Soviet split. Chinese observer* had earlierSoviet military training on the Kamchatka Peninsula inhe first lime in overears that the Chinese hadovietSoviet military officer* attending the second round of working-level talk* on mutual forceheld in Beijing io February, were receivedeputy chief of the Chinese general siafl and viaited headquarter*hinese infantry
Moscow also has been encouraged by other recent developments. Soviet and Chinese oflsdals held a
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Chinese Views afGorbeeher
leadership perceptions of Gorbachev have changed dramatically over the past year. Be/ore his villi In9 and the Tiananmen crackdown. Beljtng retarded Gorbachev as Ihe mostSoviet leader to Its Interests In decades. The Chinese view was shaped by ihe Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Gorbachevs pledges of troop cuts In Asia, and Moscow's role In nudgingambodian settlement^
^Oeljtng atlrlbuteahanges to xrorbaehev personally, and It almost certainly wanted lo reinforce his internal position and his directions In foreign policy by "rewarding" him with the first Slno-Sovltl summit since Khrushchev mel with Chairman Mao,
These negative views af Ike Soviet leader are widely held among the Beijing leadership:
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Deng Xiaoping, for example, recently blamedreforms for the domestic crisis besetting ihe USSR and warned top-level Chinese officials lo guard against the "serious threat"from the North, according to Hong Kong press reports.
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the wake of ihe prodemocracy demonstrationsChinese leaders began critically"new thinking."reportedly viewing irexcessive stress on political reform andof Ihe Individual. The Chinese leadershiphorrified by the political changer inand fears thai events there willpressures for
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Jrn taieoy tne Chinese Polil-ouro privately labeledsocial democrai" insteadtrue socialist" and blamed him for "directing" the retreat of Communism In Eastern Europe.
Chinese officials expect turmoil In Ihe USSRa greater effect on domestic developmentsthanroot.
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At ihe same time. Chinese officials have been told to maintain relations with Moscow ol current levels and to avoid oublic criticism af the USSRGorbachev
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ncreasingly negative view of Gorbachev probably has ledeassessment of what China hopes to accomplish in Its bilateral relations with Moscow. Although the Chines* probably wont lo strengthen itate-to-staie contacts, calculating that such advances are necessary lo avoid losing leverage with both the Untied States and the USSR, weukewarm embrace at best. Deepdifferences, lingering distrust, and regionalwill continue to curb tht rapprochement. We believe Beijing Is especially interested In playing down party lies that might suggest endorsement of Gorbachev's political reformsagt Ihe influx Of his subversive "new iMnklng."
fourth round of border demarcation talk* Innd the reporting on ihcoe discussion* in ihe Soviet and Chinese mediaihe firstthe two sides are pre^nred to begin serious bargaining on the main slickingislands ai the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers in tbe easl, opposite Khabarovsk, and the Pamirs tract in the west (seeuring Li's recent visit to Moscow, the two sides confirmed thaif the boundary has been settled and promised to continue working on the other are*!
The Li visit also produced four economic accords giving new impetus to the bilateralnd Ryzhkovyear agreement on wide-ranging economic and technological cooperation, an idea that Beijing had resisted before tbe Sino-Soviet summit inecond agreement on cooperation In space exploration. Moving beyond bartereijing has now also agreed to provide credit* for Moscow's imports of Chinese consumer goods. The Soviets, in turn, have agreed to provide Beijing credits for buying their nuclear power facilities. The two sides reportedly also have discussed Soviet military sale* to Chin* although no arms deals have been confirmed..
Gorbachev will hare lo deal with several troubling issues, however, as he iries lo move Sino-Soviet relations forward:
Beijing's strong opposition to his political reforms and their impact throughout the Communist world could yet have an adverse effect on tbe retatioasbia. So far, however, the Chinese have generallyfrom publicly criticizing Gorbachev and his reforms, seeking toownturn in Sino-Soviet relation*ime when Sine-US ties remain strained.
leadenolster his domestic and international imagetatesman, and thus enhance bisagainst his rivals, particularly Jiang. Tbehave no reason to help LI. At the same time, they cannot afford lo give Beijing any grounds forthem with "interference" in its domestic affairs.
Tbe Chinese may bold progress on mutual force reduction* hostageesolution of tbe border dispute, as they hinted in9 at tbe first round of talks, even though officials on both sides are now saying this will not be Ibe case. In any evenl, there is certain lobe hard bara-aining over the details of mutual troop reduction'
Thus far, Moscow has played down tbecriticism of Gorbachev's politicalthat il will noturtherSino-Soviet lies. Soviet otndats point lo (hedevelopment of bilateral exchanges inincluding such delicate matters as their talksforce reductions, as proof thatprevail over ideology in Ibe relationship.recognize that Beijing cannot affordMoscowime when Sino-USand may even worsen in the coming
months.
Moscow wants to resolve (he boundary dispute and, to that end, may eventually give up the islands opposite Khabarovsk in exchange for Chinese concessions in the western sector, especially in the Pamirs tract that border* both China and Afghanistan. In fact, the border demarcaiion talks evidently have already made significant progress; although key western areasin dispute, there is virtual aareernent nn tK> boundary in Ihe northeast. [_
Soviet* must avoid getting ensnared in an internal Beijing power play. Li Peng was not the Soviets' first choice to visit Moscow; in ibe fallhey lobbied for General Secretary Jiang Zemin, in part because Jiang did notole In the crackdown against tbe Chinese prodemocracy demonstrator* ini probably hope* to use bis talks with Gorbachev and other Soviet
Wooing the Japanese
Soviet official* evidently see Japan as the lasiwary of their regional security initiative* and lukewarm to bids for closer economic cooperation, reservations that are compounded by the
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Sino-Sovlet Mutual Force Reductions: Hard bargoiBine Ahead
Beijing and Moscow have now agreed In general principle loeir military foreei along the Slno-Soviet border, hard bargaining over the detail! almost certainly lies ahead- The Chinese havemaking cut! onlyelatively narrow tone along the border, but Moscow reportedlyake maje- withdrawals from northeastern China Into the Interior limiting the reduction!elatively narrow tone would mean few. if any. changes for Chinese forces because only three poorly equipped dtviiioni arem of the Soviet or the Mongolian border; most of the Soviet divisions deployed oapaiite China arem of the border.
The two sides alto dltfer over the definition of what fortes would be involved. Moscow reportedly wonts reduction! to cover all armed fortes, but the Chinr.te want so limit the scope io "military forces."probably in an attempt to exclude Internalthe paramilitary People's Armedan
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Tbe Sovtcu have also put various forms of pressure on Tokyooretheomins response to their initiatives for better relations. For cuenpte, their decision to postpone Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo. which wis originally scheduled lor March, wasto exploit the grow-in* concern by the Japanese that they arc being left behind as the rest of Use world works out new relationship* with Moscow.rowing sense ia the Japanese foreign Ministry, the CBttodian of Tokyo's hard fine, thatythem to make substantial adjustments, j
I fheroacowpar some
The Japanese are already pronding limitedassistance and modes? espoet credits even while ibe dispute over ihe Northern Territories issue remains unresolved
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dispute over the Northern Territories (see figureut they also believe thai relations with Tokyo CSnnot be kept on the back burner indefinitely u* the USSR ii toignificant role in Asian affairs-
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earlyrominent academic expert on Soviet affairs commentede Japan Times that.ate for the return of the four contested islands were guaranteedoviet-Japanese peace treaty. Tokyo need not Insist on their irnmediate return or the return of all of tbcm atapproach that
LOP strongman Shin Kancmaru and other ruling party poliiiciam have hinted would be acceptable.
Foreign Ministry hat agreed to putn arrni control and disarmament issues on tbe agenda Tor Sbevardnadic'i vi-.il to Tokyo. It alio Uauch CBMi at an incidents-ai-sea pactro-para ol port calls by both nivves
We bate very iiitle informitwn on boo the Sonets assess tlieu prospects to light ol Ibese developments Their media have commented favorably on recent instances where Japanese officials or aeademKt havepproach on ihe raatier. but without addressing Ihe prospottireakthrough id rela-uoni '
A Soviet dec it too to make eloset tict lo Jtpan a' top priority in Fail Asian policy mightramatic gesture in tbe ncii few months. In our view,esture it roach more likely now ihaa iiear ago. given the nc-emalsutton of Sino-Sonei illations and the hint of fleiibslity byokyo on Ihe Northern Terriiories disputeould propose io demilitarize the contested islands or cut its air and naval forces deployed elsewhere near Japan In fact. Soviet omesals. journalists, and tcadem.esseveral hints that Moscow may be considering one or more of these options;
oviet Air Force colonel servingilitary analyst with the Novosii News Agency inld Japanese reporters thai be ihowgfcl there was no need to keep troops on ibe contested itlands He tied their eventual withdrawal to Ihe creationcmilitariicdncompassing the Northernand Hokkaido
- Inoviet diplomat iaapa nese reporters that, in his oeaiuon. ibe islands "do not have much strategic importance "
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"Xtjscow nad acted inegi.i. innen it unnaieratly ibeogsiedwith Tokyo wbeieby Ihe Sonets had promised to return two of ibe disputed islands tfieieace ireaiy. ,
Relations WllhSouth Korea
Gorbachev's decision lo meet with South Korean President Rob ia early June ekinonstrates that Ihe Sonets tee both an opportunityeed for closer ties lo Seoul to order lo get South Korean assistance in the economic development of ihe USSR's eastern provinces and that they rcengnire (hat an upgrading ol the poliiical relationship is required to espcdltc the process (seerustration over the lack ofin relations with Tokyo also may be contributingelertlsoe of (he dialogue with South Korea:
USSR and South Korea agreed al ibe end9 lo establish consular tiesbe first time the Soviets have accepted an official relationship with Ibe Soulh Koreans Although the Iwo sides had opened unofficial trade offices in Moscow and Seoul eaibcfhey coniinued to handle coasultr millers through third countries, an arrangement that icnded to slow ihe growth of economic lies.
officials are now cipreasing (merest inagreements with the Souih Korean Government io (educe Unfit and so guarantee soint-reaiurcthat would greatly facili-(ale increased trade and investment in their itma economy, according toC
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ews conferenceorbachevuestion about (he possibility ol Moscow and Seoul establishing diplomaticby saying the prospect! areovietarlier hinted thai formal dicadmaiie relations areccording toSov'b Korean and lapa nese press reports,only after trade and other forms of economic oooperaiion have grown.
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with Seoul to get money,
nd mansi peruse fori ihe time
halthc
Souih Koreans arc not at eagci to separate poliiics
tbe crtablaibcical of party lie* to ibe Korean rating petty and said there"no major iiumblingblock" to noon*llzinibe two aides also discussed upgrading relations to tbe Consulate General seed aa an interim step. Soviet media accounts of the visit kept silent about certain points- -especially Kim's meeting with Gorbachev and tbe possible discussion or upgradingIhe high-level attention that Kim receivedime when the Soviet leadership was preoccupied with tbe unreal in Ihe Balticand ether domestic problems points up Moscow'i interest In moving Forward with the South Koreans.
Moscow will try lo accelerate the movementloser relationship with Seoul, even if reialjooa wiib Japan do Improve lo some client during the nest year. Soviet officials might even calculate thai improved relations with Seoul will put increased pressure on Tokyo to be more flexible on the Northern Territories dispute and other contentious issues I
Meanwhile. Soviet influence in Pyongyangdecline
"^ueisnu. all the economic andassistance that Moscow has givenaregime during the pastear*.described ihe relationship as
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Soviet contacts wiih Seoul account for mg^pffrietior between Moscow and P'yo"iyan)l_
| cany reoruary ace ihe "ob^lve reahtv"Koreas exisi
characierired the agreement to
Soviet-North Koreanlliiary Ties
USSR remainj North Korea's primaryercent of Pyongyang's foreign trade Is with Moscow, whereasercent of Soviet trade Is with NorthIts only source of advanced weaponry. Although the Soviets refuse to provide credits for North Korean purchases of ctvlltan goods, they are tnieresied In expanding other forms of economic cooperation, especially deals to help the North repay Its6 billion debt to the USSR. In fact, we believe they will keep theirto help North Korea build Its first nuclear power station If the North signs the safeguards agreem-ni to the Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).,
Soviet annual military assistance to P'yongyanj> has been running betweenC million and StOO million5 and has Included equipment thai the North Koreans cannot duplicate and that Chin* cannot provide:
'In the last two years, ihe Soviets launchers anC
L_ ground attacK aircraft. er aircraft.
Total military aid reached roughly US SI billion in lOHJt *nd an estimated0 million
Military cooperation, however, seems to have been confinedew coordinated naval exercises, plus air and naval visits during Importantrominent Soviet academic expert on Asian affairs reportedly staled in late0 that1 Soviet-North Korean Treaty will soon be revised to clarify that it can be Invoked only If one of the signatories has been "invaded"hird country, not merely If It has been "attacked" or finds itselftate of war. as the present language stipulates.
Koreao trade missions lo perform consular function! (the South Korean Consular Department opened in late February) as de factomoat forthright comment io dateovietofficial,
Tbe Soviet-North Koreao relationship it alsoby other sore points:
toyed by Pyongyang's refusal to scno observers to the Soviet racHfie Fleet exercise In
_Jbave been increasinglyby the continual faauro of Pyongyang to deliver exports to the USSR on time and retaliated last summer by temporarily suspending theirof crude oil and coke to North Korea.
According to Pravda, Soviet and North Korean journalistsfrank" discussion inbout Gorbachev's reforms, recent events in Eastern Europe, and other "contentious" issues. The Pravda account suggested that they resolved few. if any, of their major differences.
The Soviet media have recentlyore evenhanded stance on the dialogue between tbe twocompromise on both sides while criticizing both Pyongyang and Seoulack of sincerity at their bilateral talks.
The Soviet media also have criticized P'yongyang't refusal to sign the safeguards agreement io the Nuclearion Treaty and (he negative North Korean reaction to the reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe.
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. Soviet newspapers and liMmli Hi -ilijM mote in the Korean language, which presumably ,re aimed pesasersly at listeners oa the Korean Pen.asuU- have ind.-cesly nd.culod Ike cull of personality around Kim ll-aong and Kim Chong-il. hU too and designated successor. The Soviets have km, been uneasy about thehe younger Kim at tooeeator and are now thowina concern about bis performance
At the same time. Menco- it likely to coatirme prodding liauted miliury assbiance to Pyongyang to tbore up the Soviet-North Korean reUtionthip or at least keep iheonf regime from feeling so UoUted and paranoid that itew attempt to minify tbe Korean Peninsula by force. Arms tale* to Fycaygyang also are likely to give Moscow some umuence with whatever regime succeeds Kim ll-aong These shipments teem toey part of tbe dual-track itrategyursuing The Soviets preo-abty ttill view rnilrtary aid as the best card they can play with Pyongyang, but they alto seem convinced that the best long-term solution would be forto respond positively to tbtxr proposals forbilateral moratorium on military tbipmcntt to tbe two Koreas. The Soviets seem to believe thatoratorium could help unprove Sc-iet South Korean relations by alleviating Seoul's enncems about Sonet arms deliveries io Pyongyang, and that by reducing the military threat the North Koreans rserceive from the South, it could enhance stability on ihe Peninsula.
byettlement of the war inialogue between the Irsdochinete _nd ASEAN Unlet, and the proposed creationoutheast Asian nucsear-weapons-free rone
Kspanded contacts with sever si noo-Cocnmunis!
its lea in Southeast Asia, tbe recent rmgaoverneni in
retarding their expensive clients have made the llano.
coa.neewao^
Now that the Vietnamese have withdrawn theirforces from Cambodia, we expect the Soviets lo cui thesr military ntsbunce to Hanoi The USSR has already informed the Vietnanvote that mihury aidbe cui by about one-third tuningccording to unconfirmed press reporu
The Sovicit also haveanoi that financial support for its neat five-year plan beginning1 depends on ho. much progress it makes with etornes-tic reforms Although gross levelt of Soviet economic assistance remain ftirly constant, Moscow baabegun pressuring Vietnam to fulfill tnost of iu
protocol call* for Hanoi toillion rublesgoods to Moscowp substantially frommillion-ruble level ioUse netScwi'1aid will thereforeen,b"
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trade crediuf Hanoi'strade with the USSR
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Readjustiag Priorities la Southeast Asia
Ecctscansc eoavudetatseuas also havefactor behind the shiftore pragmaticoutheast Asia, where the Gorbachev leadership hasnoreolicy toward Hanoi and itepped Up its efforts to woo most non Communist countries In theof which remain staunchly anti-Communist. Simuluneously, Moscow is continuing its bask Strategy ol recent years, which has sought to present tbe USSRorce for peace and liability in ibe area for example.
At ihee. the Soviet, have beenore active role in the dirOomatic maneuvering on Ihe CambodianHanoi and Pbnom Peob toward more fteaibdiiy on suet- matters as UN in votvement and advocaUng reciprocal meaaurct tn discussions wilh the Uniied States, regional actors, and especially. China Although Use ctvmpletion of ihe VKtivarrtese troop withdrawal from Cambodia and .he normalization of Sino-Sovlet ties have leftwith leas incentive to pressure itt clients to male furtheron such crucials .nieronl
power-sharing arrangements, ihe Sovieta icalUe that coaUnocal cm) war and ihctr ongoing military aim-lance will da marc [bar relations with ASKAN coun-iries and could lead to renewed strains with Beijing. Tactically, Ibe Soviets will lake the high road by urging an agreement to end military aid lo allfaction* and insisting that some aspectsettlement must be worted owl by tbe Khmer factionshile Irving to make Prince Sibanouk and hi* Western backers responsible for llmitini the Khmerrole in any power sharing arrange-ment.'
The Soviets probablyettlement inwill eventually make it easier for themake inroads with tbe ASEAN Mate* and other Southeast Asian countries that are seeking to diversify their market* and toore balanced posiuoois the United States. Tbe USSR* inability to produce tbe sopbtstkaled, high-quality products desired by these countries will limit bilateral trade, but Moscow has already 'topped up iu efforts to court them:
Prime Minister Ryihkoveeklong tripSingapore, and Auitrnbs inmarking the highest level Soviet visit toCommunis! countries In Southeast Asia.critics red for.from Mosww ai tfeijg*tbw*ithe. pressbusmen there. *f_
flioeewould be able to defend his absence with ibe discovery, especially in Thailand, of potentially large savings through direct deals with Asianof goods the Soviets had previously bought through Ea^oposB middlemen During hb atop in Australia, Ryihkov alsoong-term commodities agreement thai include* Soviet fishing access to Australian port* and limited AeroDot landing rights.
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naval ihipe took part in an "interna dona! royal Beet review" in May, winch marked ibe first Soviet naval visit to an ASEAN country.
President Soehano visiied MoscowIbe first Indonesian presidential visit lo the USSR inears.
Soviets opened an embassy in Papua New
Guinea in Marc* "heir first resadenl mission in tbe South Pacific
Outlook
A thorough review of their prospects in Eastikely to prompt the Soviets to focus on improving relatione with Japan, the one country in the region where Ihe raUtionsfaip falls short of Moscow'sAlthough the Soviets seem to be looking for ways lo defuse the Northern Territories disputegiving up the disputed islands. Gorbachev may
be prepared to return oil of the coo teat ed aland* eventually if the Japanese GovernmentiB-ingneat lo make ugnificanl economic and securityHe knowsill lake Ibe rclum of all four island* to achieve Ibe kind of diplomatic breakthroughs thai haveoward the United State* aad Europe.
If Moscow decides to return Ibe Northern Territories, its initiative ii likely lo take one of iwo forma:
"phased- return. This optioa could begin with returning Shtkotsn andaboctii Islands, which arc not ocenpted by Soviet forces anderiod of several years. Il might involve ihe phased withdrawal of troops from Kuna-shrri and Etorofu. We believeroposal would be acceptable to Tokyo, and It would have both practical and political advantage* for the Sovicts. They would have mote lame lo manage the details of resettlement and to make regional militaryProgress in reversion could bo lied lo agreed benchmark* in Japanese economic aublance.
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Proposal offull faun of the islsndihort, welt defined liove frame. ThU proposal aroahf be preferable to tbe Japanese and would probably be carter for Soviet mililary leaden lo acceptphased" return,ould not require them looken military presence on tbeis lands for any length of time. It would have the disadvantage, however, of committing the Soviets without theire to verify the sincerity of Japan* quid pro que1
An agreement on the Northern Territories would yield tangible political bcucfll* for the USSR thai would have implications foe US policy. It wouldore positive image of tbe Soviet Union In the eyes of the Japanese public and ran* act Moscow'i ciedi-bilitynonsible political and economk ntaver in
relatiom with South Korea would improve Moscow's image in the region and encourage scene Asianto reconsider their existing *ccurityespecially those with Ihe Unitedvcr thc longer run, public scntimertt could strengthen in the South for Korean neutrality andithdrawal of US forces from the Peninsula if Soviet arms ddivcric* to the North declined as Soviet South Korean re*atio*vi normalized and ecotsocnic tie* ca-
fcvgn without full diplomatice expect Soviet trade with South Korea lo grow well beyond it* current level of about0 rnilbdo per year. In fact,ikely to double within the next three to five yean, eclipsing tbe amount of Soviet trade with North Koreae believe Moscow will alsoajor effort to persuade South Korean companies to circumvent COCOM restrictions on shipment* to (he USSR. Moreover, theew trade cAce ia Seoul should make it easier for them io Up South Korea's gros. ing technological expertise despite Seoul's effort* to prevent COCOM-restricted items from reaching the USSR sod to use South Korea as asource for USa lower poce.
believe Moscow will agree to etiabiiab diplomatic relations with South Korea, by the enda is the case with the Northern Territories issue, however, Gorbachev wants something from Seoul insubstantial increase in economic tics. At (be same time. Moscow is likely toreata effort toialogue between North and South Korea this year, especially on military CBMi for the Korean Peninsula, and to urge the United State* tad Japan to expand their contact* withseeking lo establish (he USSR's bona odeseacemaker on the Peninsula
The establishment of formal diplomatK relation* with South Korea, which already ranks as the USSR'a third-nscat-important doe-Communist trading partner in tbe Asia-Pacific region, alrnoai certainty would make it easier for Moscow to acquire Souih Korean technology and capital for ibe Soviet economy. Soviet policymaker* might also anticipatearming of
The unilateral force reduction* in the eastern USSR teem to be proceeding on schedule, and we believe that Moscow will make Additional positive gesture* in the corninghese could even include teJio-quishing its mililary baae at Cam Ranh Bay regard, leu of whether the United Suie* gives up ill bases in thebe bate at Cam Ranh Bay could easily be destroyed in wartime and has become less useful to the Soviets over the past few yean, given their reduced out-of-arca naval deployment* At the stme lime, they clearly have been reassessing their partnership with Vietnam, which bateluctant host to ihe Soviet force* tutioned tbete
Gorbachev might believeotnpletc withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay would eventually force the
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States to reduce its military presence in ibemaking Manila and otbee Asian capital) leas bamealed la security cooperation withand lea* willing to boat US bssca,ceeat to US air and aaval forces, or conduct joint eaerciies with USoviet cdBcJab,ad aca-decnica are alreadyajor efloct to promote mch acntinteat throughout Eastin Japan and South Korea, a* well aa in tbeomplete withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay would also ptceac Soviet budget cut ten and rcenove airritant to Sino-Soviet resataoan. >
In an etTort to force movement on regional aeourity issue* before Got bachev'ied visit to Tokyooscow might consider unilateralourse that the Soviets dearly believe helped to advance their objectives in Earooean lecarity policies In the Asian conical, Moscow might announce a
demilitarization of the Northern territories or cut Soviet air and naval force* in the northwest Pacific region, especially those oo Sakhalin. Theof aelf-impo-ed restrictions on Soviet naval movements in the region, especially of nuclear-armedwould be another option. Moscow also couldan oa Soviet sntiiabenarine operation* ia certainr nromiae to give advance aotilacaiioo of all naval csetcaaca in Eastjoial cacrciae* withto issue invitationsorbachev might calculate thai one or more moves of ihi* bad with "no airings attached" would help place pressure oa the United Stains to accept hia bid for talk* on Asian security issue*.
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Original document.
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