SOVIET COMMERICAL SPACE PHOTOGRAPHY: OFFERING RESOLUTION AS THE SOLUTION (SW 90

Created: 7/1/1990

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Soviet Commercial Space Photography: Offering Resolution as the Solution

hattjum.

HMHOIHEMODllCECiai

Directorate of

lirfeUigcoce

Soviet Commercial Space Photography: Offering Resolution as the Solution

Toilwa* prepared b

Office of Scientific andRetaartfl, -tch contribution! from

VSWK. andOffice of

So>iel AiratyiU. Comment*cniene*cojnemay be directed to tbe Cbiel ,OSWR

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Sot Inpace Photography: Of!*ring Resolution as the Solatio*

USSR has been aggressively marketing satellitef the I'ari h

Wtwnbe Soyuikarta track organization is responsible foe marketing

producu. andmarkets other types of resnote-

sensing imagery, including lynlhetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery. The SovkU' estimated share of the world market remains5 toercent. AJthough Soviet imagery has Ibe highest spatial resolution available commerciallyts coenpcliuvcttcss io the world market is questionable, due to iu technical limitations and Soviet marketing inexperience, lite Sovicu plan lo make modest improvements in spatial resolution and mayor impcoveovenu in spectral resolution of Iheir imagery, bul, given present competition and thai anticipated in ibe future, (be USSR may havehort lime to establish itself in (he marketplace if it it ioajor supplier of commercial satellite imager)

Tbe Soviets, however, arc likely lo remain in ihe world market, regardless of Ihe share they obtain. Budget constraints within their space program have forced the Soviets io cmpbasire space missions with the potential lo generate hard currency ot improve (he national economy. Remote-sensing satellites accompli th both objectives. By marketing imagery, tbe Soviets generate much-needed bard currency. Imagery also holds tbe promise of improving Soviei agnculturr

The most competitive feature of ibe Soviei cornmerclal photography it iu inatial resolution. None of lhc USSR's four commercial

United States. France. Japan, and India match the Sovicu' spatial

resolution capability

The appeal of Soviet commercial imagery it reduced, however, by several disadvantages:

* Soyuikana's film-based producu lack the broader spectra! sensitivity obtainable with nonphotographic syaicms.

' Ike unain ihii paperuwd lorclci topboeogttphy.'. alotlici recantedacauimi at eteeuawagwdie >iuli (eviltsd by abinfti Ttor cabef rmncnuima.by optical. fteclntdatKai. opticalr ettctteaic meant and Co rmi aw him ts ifte original detection nucha mim tix iht imagt

>cfH

Ijtnitcd dm handling and computer processing capabilities, software problenu. and computer incompatibilityare impaired tbe SovieU' ability to supply digital imagery that It required by Western cuitcsrters. Although Ziaj archived digital remote--easing data4 for sale, tbe Sonets have not made thii historical data available to the Wot.

itber tbe Mir space station oor Earth resources satellites, which JJbarty Soyuziarta catneras, sec the same sun an|le on each orbit. Tbjs condition Ls necessary to provide continuity in around coverageimportant feature for mapping.

Unlike Ibe US Lancstat's Thematic Mapper. Soyuzkarta cameras do not image in the thermal infrared band, and their coverage of lhc near-infrared band is more limited than that provideddsat's MuJtupcc-tral Scanner. Thermal infrared data applications include changeand patterns of activity.

Soyuzkarta film is deorbtied vrith the satellite, therefore. Soviet imagery is not as timely as that of its competitors', which is transmitted electronically.

SAP. data from0 has been of average quality, with evidence of handsplicing that degrades the images. Despite Soviet clairns to (he conirery. digital imagery from the satellile has been unavailable, further restricting iti utility to Western scientists

In addition to these inherent

other factors, such as dissemination policy, limned pnotograpoyoor distribution system, the failure lo offer related goods and services,igid pricing structure, as weaknesses in the Soviei offering

Soviets espect to increase iheir market

share by offering imagery2-meter spaiial resolution, imagery with greater spectral range and/or resolution, and digital data. Tbe USSR currently has space sensors collecting such imagery. For example:

flown on Soviet Earth resources photographic satellites, rocdium-reaolution pltotographic reconnaissance satellites,eophy-sical satellites, and near-real tine imaging satellites can achieve bettereler resolution.

(town on Mir,Meteor-Priroda saiclli(es. andan supply greater spectral ranee ot resolution. For cuniple, (he spectral resolution of one ofhanneI specttotneter flown on ihe Mir spaceis far better lhan lhal enrrentiy marketed by Soyvxkarta. Glavkosmcuis market-ing radar imagery from0

sUles ihat digitalof much poorer spatialavailable from Mcteor-Priroda andatellites, as well as

The USSR also intends to intro-Iuce three new Earth resources spaceEarth Resources Survey Satellite System, an Earth resources space station module, and ihe AJtrisr.-series of Earth resourca satellites These sysicms, which should be launched in (he, could enhance the Soviets' product line by providing digital data, better spatial and/or spectral resolution, and an all-weather imaging capability

In spile of Soviet claims that tbey will adhere to their interpretation of the UN PnncipJes on Remoteinterpretation that corhsooes ibe sale of imagery only of the customer's own (enitorypolicy oo remote-imagery sales is evolving. Soyuzkarta claims it will sellof all countries eicept the USSR, most Warsaw Pact countries,ew others. By deviating from its previous position, lhc USSR has broadened its potential customer base

We estimate ihat Soviet earnings from satellite imagery sales could increase through Ihe end of ibc century if worldfrom Third Worldsharply. In addition, the hiatus of US land sat coverage anticipated by many eipc'ta could allow the Soviets to siphon off some US clients. However, because of technical constraints, Moscow will be bard pressed to sign clients who need ciucmcly tirne-sciuitive imagery

(REVERSE BLANK)

Conlenls

Pet'

Sojpc

I aucd action

Soviet Film-Baled Imaging SyHcou Proton Soyoikaita

Advantages of Fum-Bascd Imaging

Uautatioos of Film-Hated Imaging

Oibrttl

Spectral

DalaJUndlmg ardjhgiulj^rocesi.ng *

Lijgcuon Ol tbe Sciel Pteduct Line

Other Soviet laaagvag Syfesn* Wwfc Commercial Potential

liiiuxe Seniors and Pis: fern*

Present Maikeimg

The USSR't VlsbUityjUa Contender in ihe

_ Contutiitf

Tbe Appeal of Soywkartt

in MoaeWt

Tba Health of Meavram't

fat dta Uttactl

Append!*

A Hitloty of Soviei Remoie-Senting Policies

T.bl.i

Currently raiding Scyntkana

Soviei Space-Baied. Rcowtc-Senung Imatiag Syiiemi Wuh 1

Ccewnsenatl Potent ill

Remote Seining, _

Western Dhtribatoit of Soviet Remote-Sen*

ni

1

. _

Soviet Commercial Space Photography: OrTerloB Resolution as (be Solution

Inhc Sovku unexpectedly enlcicd the world market for commercial satellite imagery and innouDcod that they would sell imagerypatial resolution as good aa }best spatial resolution available commercially Australia. Kuwait. Angola. North Korea. Vietnam. East Germany. Syria, and Cape Verde oukkly rtpressed interest in obtaining the photoctaphy. according to the Soviet press. Soviet entry into the Earth satellitearket required little investment ihr cameras supplying the photography previously bad been deveksped for and Aown on satellite* and space stations already in the Soviet inventory

To promote commercial sales of space photography, the Sovietsrade-under the Council of Ministers* Mainfor Geodesy and Cartography. Soyurkarta was formed by joining three editing organizations:

Konmoksrta- responsible fot selling spaceand for Soviet map production.

esponsible fot topography, geodesy, and aerial pboiography.

for selling technology,nd

Ghvkcansos. the focal point for Scrrict civil and commercial space products and services, entered the satellite remote-sen sing imagery market8 Sovuriirta tells film-bated products, whereassctbdigital data, including elcctrc-eptieal aad synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery (see inset).

Wc believe that the So*his entered the commercial remote -sensing data market primarily for one economic opportunity. They probably espect tooothold in the market, which many people bclrextrong growih potential because of aa ever-increasing number of remote-sensingIn addiiion, wc believe that tbe Soviets may view the sale of space photographyay to earn hard currency aad to gain access to other commercul marketsounii >

The USSR also may have entered tbe remote-sensing market ro gain influence among lesser develcoed countries that have no remote-sensing capability The imagery could be used to respond to non-timc-sensilive military intelligence tasks involving broad area searches lo detectoads. Largead medium to-large aircraft on theubmarine identification, assessments of airfield serviceability, and detection of force readiness changes, however, cannot be made on tbe basil of such low rcaotulion photography

Sntirt Run-RasedystranSeyuihnrtn Phorwgraph?

Soyuzkarta is marketing photography fromndsec laheadameras are carried on muUifuiKtional manned space stations. Military-controlled, modified Earthsaielliies (EPPHO-Bw) carry ihend probably theamera)

chnlqua ON ucd (or nm.iirowin( al mlcKimix*itel cMe rwifiok rainiS. ialaeu4.scat lendM*on

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BMMitflaM in inAoinm MuhviiU suakaMrVmfj.il) iM etbuw

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t Inogeryor resm thr HWtal asd/or .poetril raohrtiaa ibe rly is* nceaaef it* imaaery.i

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The Rote, ofSeymzfierta and Glevkoimei

Soyuikartaoviet foreign7 to market Soviet spaceThe organ/ration ts subordinate to theMain Administration for Geodesy andSoyuikarta primarily markeis .

The Soviet Main Administration for the Development and Use ofSpace Technology for the Notionaland Scientific Research (Gtavkosmos,5 to facilitate International cooperation In ihe Soviet space program and the commercialisation of Soviet launch services. Glavkotmoi entered ihe digital Imagery marketS.

Soyuikarta and Glavkotmoi have competed forcustomers in the past, creating tensions

^fitavkoimot ts prohibited from entering into independent trade agreement! to ma'ket imagiey abroad, and Soyuikarta it the sole Soviet entity authorised lo lell or dinriliute imagery^

be French Sysleme Probatolre d'Obstrva-tion de la Tare (SPOT) latcllitcactcr loolution innchrocialic imijcij- Tbc Japanese Marine ObaccvaUoa Satellite (MOS) ond (be Indian Reeaote-Scoilng Satellite (IRS) acquire imagery wiihmeter reset ii (ions, respectively.

liadtatloca at Filea-Baicd loosing Systran* Soyuikarta dim-based imagery, however, alto bas several imjortant Enutatidos wheu corupircd io its digiul dsU coaipeliion* For example. Hi photo-gnphfc aystcm lacfca the broader spectral teeisitivity obtainable with rmpbotograpbic systems. (Filmb nol sensitive lo wavelengths longer loanIecause spectral band options with film arc highly limited, it is often impossible lo accurately record the energy reflected or emitted Irom the Earth. For application! where spectralare highly informative, digital da la. as opposed to photography, are preferred

for some applications film must beed. which degrades the resulting product Akhoufb Soyuikarta sells film, the mulling digital data is limited io the information content of Ihe (Hit

ot ftlailaiaglrtg Syiiemi

fhe mosteature of Soyuikartais Ui spatial resolution Photographica high degree of spaiiil detail aadand require leUlrvely fculrindicates thai ibc

lesoluiioniOOO photograph)orm.-ial igood at the Sonets daian The othu lour commuculn ibe >irkciannot match this r> s Tlir Ihcmatu mtpner (TM)on the US lanotil provideseter resolution

In tpite of these changes. Soyuikarta tull hasmarketing responsibility for film-bated producli. and Glenkotmos is responsible for digital protludi.

r

Tbe requirement lo resupply and retrieve film lurtbc limits pbotogiapbic lystems. Before phorociaphy can be eiploilcd, film mull .be deocbilod from space, transportedrocessing center, developed, and disscmlmicd. Therefore, receipt of imagery from cameras providing Soyuikarta photography ii not as convenient or timely as electronicallyata from Undsal, SPOT. MOS. or IRS.Even during crises, film fiom thendas never been retrieved before Ibe third day of tbc minion. Tbese cameras Hy onPIIO satellites thai normally deorbit film liucketi at tbe end

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width of Ibc MUvifiucih| on

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ay missions, lam buckeueeningle lime during ibe mtssronew FRPHOi

Rim from ihend1 ara came) oa space unions, it retrieved oa aa even leas timely basis. Soviet Progress aad Soynx IM (transport modified) vehiclesor ihese cameras when ihey ferry cosmonautspace stn-lions After weeks io months in ocblu film ia retrieved from tbese sutioas by returning Soyui TM

cameras operate in

satellite orbits thai arcdvantageous for remote sensing as arc ihe sun-synchronous orbits of competitors* spacecraft (sec inset) The etTcctivcncat o! cameras in optical bands ss dependentolar illumination The orbi's In which Soyutkarta cameras operate result in changing sun angles and elevations for different passe?

Uakke the French SPOT and US Landsat cameras. Soyurkarta cameras do not provide complete coverage between ibe polar regions. This limitation is the result ol ihe cameras' inability to view off nadir, the sensors* swath width, and orbitalniiampk. can image II degrees en* nadir.

Spectral 1The Soviels presently arephotogiapbs thai arc more limited in spectral coverage than ptsotographs taken by the Urn ted Statca. Unlike the US Uadsai system, corrent Soyni-karta cameras do not operate in the thermal infrared0 IS micrometers)(seehe landsat thermal infrared band is used in vegetationlost nsoisturc discrimination, and thermalapplication

Soyuikana cameras also ate more limited in their coverage of the near.infrared bandicromcters) than US Land sal sensors. Some-sensing specialists believe thai imagery65 micrometers wilhin the near-infrared band ii essential for an Harsh-tenting system.tensors only partially oovei Ihis7he ncar-iafiarn) bandigh rrsponterowing vegetation and dearly delineates water boundaries Cameras operating in ihis band

Figure I

Spectral Connp of rjperatloual CoenniereUl

sensed in three bandsodified MSU-SK (also flown oa Meieorensed in the thermal infrared.

icnsoo has nowhere nearelei ipaiial resolution now marketed byc does have two important advantages. First.s and some Met-PX have ftown in sun-synehiooous orbits, which are more eoodudve to remote sensing lhan either the Mir or ERPHO orbits. Seoood.ndarry eleeittvoplical sensors, so their imagery would have greater appeal to customers preferring to work with non-film-based data. Furthermore, data tram-milted fromould respond lo the tbne-sensitire needs o( customers. The Soviets also could cslaUish gtound sites and processing centers outside tbe USSR for even more timely disIributVor '

The morketinB ofnd/ormagery would expand ihe speclral range of Soviet (emoie-tensing pcoductt. Present Soyurfcarto earners) only sense wavelengths as longicrometers,ndmagingthe eaception of ihe MSU-2 -image up to aticromeier. The Fragment device lhal (lew on Meteor0

In addition lo theamera, tbe Soviets haveariety of remote-sensing- instruments on manned platforms. Our knowledge of these irustru-menli is limited, and, in many cases, we cannot judge whether Ihey are imaging sensors. Instrument* that most likely image include;

The FARA instrument, wbieb flew on. andhis instrument is cryogcnkslly cooled (which implies il is used to detect infraredsenses in Iwo bands, and can operate using cither of two field* of view.

Tbe Bulgarian-designed Spetor-libaud-hdd specieometcr used ono collect Earth resources data. The spectrometer is sensitiveadiation inpectral bandsicrometer. Scanning is performed electronically, and tbe detector output is recorded digitally oo magnetic tape.lb width is noi known

Second-geneiBiioo Okean (Okeao O) satellites have carried or carry imaging sensors These satellites, however, primarily are used to map sea ice and. therefore, arc nol discussed further in this paper

Tbeulgarian-built piogrammaWe Spec-iroovetcr. was launched on Interkosmosnd on1ccording lo Soviet Claims, it operaled inands, each spaced st almost equsl intervals rangingJicrometer Scanning could be performed al tbe rate ofhan nets pet Second; and data could be transmuted in real lime. We do not kno- ibe spcclronveier's spatial Or spectral resolution, and we have no indication if il has been carried on oiber satellite*.

1 be Soviet* already have begun matkeiiog radar imaeery (see figureromalyut-Sim spacecraft thai was launched tn7 on a

HgSSW J. Cwmocll'0 irafhtttrtmat* Q* rmgcivr*

frarlh reg mission. During iM two yean in orbit.primarily conducied geophysical, cartographic, earth resources, and environmental re-search. Althougharried numerous sen-

including multitpectral. infrared, anddetectois. ihe Soviei* indicate that Iheylo sel[ imagery only from thej>nboard'he Soviets

Other Sodrt Inuring Systems With CotnovereisJ rOlrntlal

imagery froeo a

and viuUc and infrared -aveteoglb apocUome-icr (of unknown spatial and spectral (esohtioa) oa ike Mir space station will be for sale in the future According to tbe Soviet press, the ipectrorncier.huhdesigned by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and installed on the Mir ipace station in

I9im. -ill tiudy optical clisract eristics of live Earth's

Secrei

^Secret

atmcnpuerc andcdlutiotL If Ihe Sovietsspace systems, each iih the rnsrnaiypur-

l his irnagery. Soyuzkart* could Ulnaerf aeouirictg Earth resources irdceiwUoa. The

customer* -hove ippiica lions require an assessmentof imagery from any of ihese rrnrms could

ibeiype, and/or ccerfUion, orfealu.es that areenhance <he Soyuikanadentify al lower ipcctral resolution*

3lheSewiet intend loeter resole Uoa imagery

[no details CDOOernirnensors wiLl

provide ihu imagery or ihe orbit or platform onseason arc or may he placed.PlIOTOGEOs. and IMSATs arcuiellilca for pioviding this imagery. Allplatforms coetiotlcd by the military-

USSR isew satellite uomUsey willeter resolution imagery

urrently operational satellite is used to supplyeter reaoUtum imagery. w< believe the IMSAI is therlr candidaie Allhough IMSAT currcntiv is ibe only Soviet syitcm capable of providing digital imagery at this spatial resolution, the fact that it is tbeewest military imaging satellite probably will preclude il* commercial use The Soviet* probably believe thai ibe release of imagery from this system could provide insight inio tbe buutiaraof theu aninitsry rcrpnniiisaiirc capa-

bwaljf

The Soviets haveariety ofmageis ou theirods (Met-P) satellites andore recent series of satellite* called RetursO(teend It Although theaicUMct have served as leal tnsds for cipcrisnenial senson. thr Soocls have declared at least two of Ihese scannerslow resolutionnd Ihe medium-resolution MSII S

One ijstemnr. Rraourccs Survey(SSIPR) -wffl provide esrcuunicsRydata that probably will be of higherIbe digitized film data now available

millvments willagU-rcaotetsontber information

indicates lhc SSIPR system will consul of Iwo utel-in sun lynebroooui orbits. Oa the basis oforbital rnrarncteri. each saiellitc willils ground trace about everyays, therefore,spot on Earth could be covered about oncewill

down-link Oataaitcm Europe. Cuba. Mongolia, arm Vietnam SSIPR probably will Inactiontore-dump mode, as no present Soviet data-relay satellite or future ones filed with the IFRI1 canigabcrti (GHz) frequency^ _'}

do not know when kMTK. undersine* ai least ihe early IvHlh. will be launched Soviet sUiemenls9 ruined stronglyatellite matching the SSIPR description would be launchedIM1 *ndcf therogran

A second system ts the Eanb resource* space station module. which the Sovieu plan to docl lo tbeir Mir ipace stauoa ia (be ncit in so ibiee years. Ifand radar imagery from thisould beicrowave range of Ihe ckctromag-

neiie spectrum not presently marketed by

Soyuzkana

Could be obUiacd tn all kindseeaosc Clouds, fog. and precipitation have little cfTcci on mictowavra

Could be obtained at any nmr of Ibe nigbl or day because radar sensonheir illvm-oa

Sensors and Plstfi

^Soviet pressouC

indicate ihai lhc Soviets intend to iniroduce thiee

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tarn* at nadir. Iloatw.ihciraolulnn near imtini of in

mottdlri

innuit|bu wWi; ibr iinallorc*or cwfc

ia> third MewormKiwa. aawlliw*in nii.itr.dr.frcalar.otS

io the Soviet itiedia. the moduleby tbe USSR and Cwcbwteivakbtelevision equipment, in wu menu (orspace, aodayieU part ol. or could be, the Soviet'*'ipace peoyect "Priretua" (nature) According

jibe to.nl project i* to beith Bulgaria. Crrvhr.lo.akia.rid. and Rait

jibe project will develop icchnottfgie* in themote to microwave regions ol the lpocuum for

-Table 3

Meteo.-Pri.odn Remote-Sensing Satellites

l_.un.-b

Oibtl-

Orbiul

Nam-quired fee Ok

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Cyck

4

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ul 11

ie rising of the Earth's bimpbere. Part of project Ptifoda involves Ibe placementariety of lenwiitil module,elevision system ardinS-bandirfcloc-JngSAK,

A third ayitcm thai the Soviets hope to use is theollow-on series -referred lo by tbe Soncu as the Atrnar series Thewill* cope rational sttrllitc in Joiy Iftvlready have approached the French with requests for onhoaid tensors The second satellite in the series will be launched)4 Accordingheir recent statements, the Sovieuloide varsety ot* imagery from futurelighu

Future Almarbem.

'?-degree-inclination orbiu. Eachurelliie willARS meterultichannel microwave radiometer operating atndHs. and optMal tensors The satellites will perform both digital data recording and ptoouting.

Principles on Remote Staling

The UN principle! on ttmole ttnsing statt lhai inch aellrity should nor be tonducttdannerto the legitimate rights and interests al the senstd stale. Although the principles do noi directly address the sale tsf Imageryountry other than thttale, they basically reaffirm ihr policylate entering In remote tensing need not obtain prior consent of slates bring remotely tensed tithtr to conduct the tensing or to disseminate the tetult evenhird eountr.

the US practice of free and open data dissemination of unclassified space imagerypeaceful purposes. Inhe Soviet newspaper Trad stated thai.void breaches of mililary security, the USSR would sell ipace photography taken only of sown8 Soviet broadcast Itatedhc USSR aupplics only pictures nf Ihe country from where the order comes."

Present Marketing

he iissr wiu

aonere to ine UN principles (tee mtellon remote sensing. Soviet interpretation of these principles,ii not consistent with US interpretation or with

m-t

that Soviei policy is evolv-Jtnai Ihey would sell imagery of all

fel

onsumer response lo soviei imsgery has been tacsiuiter to dan C

j lhal the Soviets have been

We

tf ImsfHv at

N> Aranem*ciuera

ansa a* Mi oT HunmHa wnk is>

rina-tMwTfeiiasiswH

mturn'OI

According to available in form at ion. Moacow hai had three lai go-tea'- orderi lo date:

the Diaiiiiaa National

iroeiiuis1 million aider for Demographic coverageenure km of agricultural land in the Amnion highland*

According lo ihe Sonet press. China hat purchased morehotos of Chincac_territory and hai rcqucalcd additional coveragr

law Aseeuluf Seyv-raaMiFor canographiceterii moat valuable. Aa more potential cuitomers become aware or the appliea :ionserer rcsolii-tion imageiy. however, we eipecl the demand forand even higherincrease

Another potential usereler resolution imagery il tbe newt media, which requires imagery containing scene* ew objects visually roeogniublc by ihe public Accordingestern industry eapeit. imagery withmelee resolution would be required for news media purposesissemination and copy right pobeset severely limit media use If the Soviets were to significantly sborlcn tbe turnaround time from when raw data is acquired by the orbiting tensor io Ihe time imagery is available lo the ultimate consumer, their product would be more attractive to ibe newi network

Obstacles la Mown.'. Patb

Dcirsitr its marketing campaign. Mcneow (aceslhat probably will hamper its abiliiy so eipand sales of reirtote-sensing data, particularly lo Western customers Some factors rahibiiiag sales'-

The Soviet policy of dcnyiag dux mm. ion of all imagery lo third parties could restrict ihe number ofarticularly when "value-added" lerviees. luch at processing, analysis, interpretation, and

integration with additional data, arc performed almost exclusively in tbe West

Soviet archives of imagery are limited and cannot ne used lo quickly satisfy large-acnle requests.of0 and Kate-MM6 pheNography from those senson isata arebaved

space iswotog-

raphy -Ou-vie hign rcwiui-iir is of poor qualily. Photo* seen by potential dicnts have been marred by scratches and poor processing. In addition, recent SAW. dale Irompparently was spliced together by hand.would greallyhigh volume production of commercial imageiy.

Sepr>

.tlcaur to toe edge of tbc (mmei of Soyuikarta photography (icebc Imagery, tbercfore. hit little uie if ra diandric data air needed.

Tbc time bclwreo data acquisition aad oaitomer delivery puts tbe Sovietsisadvantage with other imagery providen. becaue many commercial customers demand limdy delivery of data

"^customers requiring timely data dclivciy will accountrowing sbare of tbe recvi'e-vnviri market in criming yean.

1 Tbe Soywalarta distributionot as eaten-stye or convenient as these for Laadsai aad SPOT

CZ. -

distributoii are allowed to market Soyuikattsonly of their respective geographical regions.

some remote-ic mine applications, non-hlm-bssed imager) is preferable lo film-Uaird pbotogra-

increasingly sophisticatedi has been drawa lo the Aeaibtlity of digital media These ofheiab sayercent of then customers by count andercent by revenue want their dsta on digital computer compatible tapes.

failure toull complement of related goods and services has dampened interest in Soviet remote-sensing products

^lumiied. ia part, by inadequatethe Soviets have act entered ibevalue-added services, and they do nol sellIndicate

ustomeromputer -com pa rible tape (CCT) of data, ratherontscl print or piece of film, must supply the CCT.

* Tbc Soyurkart* pricing structure provides fewtocustomer cannot choose the level ofdesired, bay data with uarrsirieicdor request the option ol along tuck(Along track shifting allows ihepoint of Interest lo be shifted lo Ihethe image, eliminating tbe need to burad)ieent iccne.

Tbe Health of Moscow's Competitors At present, Moscow compete*mall number of lernotoieasieg lorotieri (see tablehe USSR's main rival Is France, whose SPOT systemplash in the industry6 wilh its offering ofii .i. imagery.he firm SPOT Image soldillion worth of satrlliicneatlyercent of the lotal commercisltrade. Industry espals st tribute SPOTs success to its ability lo provide timely datacaddy usable formhroughout Ibc

A-vospccis for SPOTs success in ibc"arket remain rood because of its icsponsivcuesi to clients* needs and its eiteiuivt mi-work of ground its tio.ii

SPOTs aha re of the world market will fluctuate in response lo changing customer demands,he media was eaploitingover scitsiliver.li as Krasnoysrsk and Vladivostok. However.the drought aad aabse-queai crop lenseshe laodsai lafrsredio monitor crop bcslth (which SPOT lacks) boosted landiat sales ai the eapeme of SPOT sales.

Mow longnd sat data now bandied by Ihe Farib Observsiioii Satellite Companyill be able to maintain its maiket ibsrc isap innticipated because of the biiiua between the lerrninalioa ofndnd Ibe launch ofcheduled for the. Ncitbei EOSAT aoe other US aerospace enanpsnies plan toivilian remote-sensing instrument in ihe foreseeable futureesolution thai equsls or eacecda Soyuikarta's reioluiioi

Mravcow may havebort time to establish itself in ibc market before competition beats up By the end of ihn century, tbe list of nations with emlisn imaging systems in spate will st least double (see lable ij. Inn Indian tcmoic-semins satellite was launched by the USSR. Although New Delhi officials indicate imagery is eollecied primarily foi domestic purposes, samevailable for

own uoo tJotx

IjjiU RW(<i m

Filmto 0

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for

laic Japan alao tell* remote sensing dataHatea^alkaa Satellites, la, Jaj plan* In launch lhc Japanese EarthAP.ana) tcanntrt wiih IIv<ili]ii- in. In additiCanada and Ihe Europei Space Agency plan lo launch SAR remoto-teou satellites by ibend aandriandt. aa well aa China and Brazil, ore plaaai La each joint remoeo-*eoriag talcUjlca. Italy. S* ond Iha United Kingdom ait considering orbital aateUile.

Imybkaliooa (or the Uolted State.

Wc catinsalr that Scrriet arcings fromservice* could increate through the end off svct-ldftselcd by newtharply. Wc estimate that.

Third World nation* will account fot much o( future Soviet tales

Although Ihe United State* ho* continently ittpport-ed nondiscriminatory distemlnation of remote-teasing data,ia lleoic of internatioosJ competition could pit US commercialeruncg ccanponic* lhat wont to acquire and tell higher rcsolctioa data against the US Stale Department or US Department of4 remote-aenoing law rorrulrca US companies that launch re mo to-tenting tatoltilc* toicense from the USparimcat ilipaltung (hat tbe attentat ag-rce* to protect the national aecurily of ibe United Stales. Thb law grunt* tbe So retries of State and Defense veto power over remote-tensiog license application* when national tc-curity or foreign policy issue* are involved. Some US com panics anue thai thi* veto power impoar* live restriction! on themime when lb* rernote-sensmg twines* it about lo boom.*

' AJOuitk UN United SutraKb iouiui am liriMni IS diOaa rcoMU-tciBiaa aairiliuirevvl* Imaavr) wnhetteri.M- IMS

i.a.

longer tbe hiatus in Landsai coverage. Ihe greater the opportunity for the USSR to liphon off some USecause of technicalowever. Moscow will be baid pressed to aign clients who require extremely time-sensitive imagery.

(REVERSE BLANK)

SeCreT

Appendix

A History of Sovietolicies

The USSR bis been concerned about military end economic spying Irom outer apace since tbe. Early on. it denounced all reconnaissance pcograms as space espionage and. hence, illri.il under internatlostsI law. During the. Moscow attempted loaa on reservations frocn outer space toUN General Assembly reseeulion. The Soviets eventually dropped this demandan in order to reach agreemcnU oqJ UN Declara-liort of Pi maples Governing tbe Use of .Outer Space and7 Outer Space Treaty

Sown oppcautjOfl to saiclhle photography increased with ibe United Slates' offer to share remote sensing data wiih ibe world communityhe United Stales proposed to ibc UN General Assembly lhal UN members join in studying Lhc data received by remote sensing. The USSR argued thai the US proposal would legitimate re tbc pbMogripfaing of foreign territory under the guise of developinglo delect Earth resources, making il easier to carry oui military reccrnnaissancc. Tbe Sovietsthai no remole sensing be undertakenprior notification to and approval by ibe countrye imaged and thai access lo iemote-sens,rig data be controlled by international regulations.N committeen hod io debate ihe legal implications of remote sensing of tbe Earth, wilh the intent ion of concluding an International agreement.

The Sovietchangedowever,Ibe launch of ibe brsi US remote-sensing saidbtc, fsvorable world reaction to it. and Ibe signing of tbcgreements Moreover, the USSR began to develop its own remole sensing systems By the lerms of SALT I, Moscow recognircd the legality ol scene satellite leconnaissancc activities when il agreed thai 'each psily shall use national technical means ofion at its disposalanner consistent "ilt Ihe generally recogniied principles of internationalt Ihis time, the Soviets shifted their focus from

demsnding prior notification aad content of Ibclo be photographed lo attempts to restrict the dissemination of renvoie-sensing date

Moscow's concept of national sovereignlyirect bearing on Its position on Inter national distend nation of ranote-sensing data and was reflected in Ibc pretpoaab it snade in the UN to restrict suchThe Soviets claimedtale has full sovereignly over the natural resources located within its leniiory. that ififormaiioo about Ihese resourcesalue and betongi in the possessing atatc and that this information cannot be transferred to snot be; state wiihoui permission of Ibe possessing stale.position was lhal any dissemination of inform* -tion to third parties on Soviet natural resources could have military or economic significance, therebyiheir national sovereignty snd interfering wiih internal affairs. Tbc Soviets also claimed the right to counter satellites conducting rccrsnaabsaarc over then territory, urbacb was not required for verification of tbe SALT agreement-

The Soviei* made several propcnali lo control the dissemination of remote-sensing data. One proposal would bave given Moscow veto power over release of unprocessed data on lb* USSR coning directlyatellite to third parties Another proposal would have classified remote-sensing data as global,or local. Only global and regional data would be ideated without consent, protecting data of higher resolution on Ibehird proposal would have limited the dtsaerniaalaoa of dais of bettermeter revolution without prior consent of Ihe country imaged

As Soviet systems developed to lhc point thai Moscow could offer other nations re mote-sensing information io develop iheir resources, ihc Soviets concludedateral agree men ta. Inhe USSR and lis Past European alliesemole-sensing

cooperative agreement bated onclerlimit Tor data diucmlnaiion and requiring ptioi content fordlitcmlnation. InecoattrainU oadiuemi-natjon of Soviet Imagery also applied to information derived froen tbe SovieU* remote-sensing data. Thit information wai broadly defined at the 'end-product of the analytical peocas"ploiting it etc data and potentially Indoded any boo* or article that made even slight ute of latellilc imagery Tbe Soviets probably espoaed tbJs agreement to lervenodei for interna tkmal rrstiictiooi. sod they put pretsnre on ibe Weal toeenxstt"

Tbe Sovieu exolutoed lo lobb,fKonjtrained ditterruastioo of rernotcseniing daU2 at the Second UN Conference on Riptocation and Use of Outer Space for Peacefulo support theirgointl snlimiled ditsemiiutidn. they cited the US trans miss ion to Great Britain of aalellite data gathered ewer the Falkland Island) during2 cooflrct as an eiampleensing state violating the sovereign rig hit of the target tute. Tbe final confer-cnccdocumeot. however. did not reflect their posattOCL

After failing to gain UN lupporl fot limiu on the dissemination of remote-sensing dala, the Sonr.it begano mess the moral obligation of sutes not in release dau harmful to other countries. For the neat three ycart, the issue af state responsibility (or remote-sensing ictlvitirtocui of UN debate. Ibe SovieU maintained thit tbe collection andof remote sent ing daU from space had to conform with tbe Outer Space Tteaty Thit licaty

requires nations to assume Intcrnatioaal responsibility for their activities in outer ipace. whether conducted by goveastnacntal or rtongoYcromcntal orgonirstioeii During this period, Moscow almost certainly realised that an irreversible stop had been token with the bunch of the French SPOT satellite, mikieg it impossible to develop legal restrictions on the dttuerai-nation cf rernote-seosing daU

be Soviets Anally tweceeded io gelling the UN Oenerol Assembly loesolution on 'Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of ibe Earth Frombese principle* aute thai re mote-tensing activities abould not be conductedanner detrimental to lhc legitimate rights and inter est* of the sensed state Although Ibe Sovietlion was cce-xnied that neither commercial remote sensing activity nor dissemination of remote-tens ins dau to third panics was restricted by thehey did bail tbe resolutionuccess As recently ssovtet Deputy Foreign Minister Pct/ovjaiy tUtcd pnbbcsy that the USSR believes that UN General Assembly reaolutiontroortl and politicalnd that they play an important role in shaping international lawie of the controlled ditscminal ion ofeter resolution phoiograpby, we believe tbal the USSK would point to6 resolution to ptoiest the future dissemination of icmoic-seusing dau that it found harmful

Original document.

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