DIRECTORATE 07 ZHTELLIGEMCE
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Tugoslavlai intervention Crowing M
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The forces favoring Intervention by tbe. Yugoslav Peopla'a Amy (JNA) to preserve tha federation hava never been greater. Last week's confrontation in Croatia underscore! our judgment that communal conflict between the Croatian govetruaent and ita ethnic Serb ninority would be the Boat likely catalyst for federal military intervention. Slovenia's and Croatia's threat to secede if they fall in their quest to turn Yugoslaviaoose confederation could also generate widespread pressure on federal military forces to intervene. At least some key military leaders appear increasingly willing to intervene if the Presidency orders them to do so. Wills the military haa the capability to take over the northern republics, Yugoslav leaders realize that such actions could quickly fracture the JNA along ethnic lines and lead to civil war. Military intervention in the northern republics would set back OS efforts to see democracy spread in Yugoslavia and would portend greater instability in the Balkans. Human rights abuses would increase as the more authoritarian Serbs took the lead in
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running Yugoslavia. Balkan stability would suffer, eakened Yugoslavia wouldempting target for jsible irredentist claiavs from neighboring countries.
Discussion
Grounds for Intervention Growing
The growing possibility of ethnic violence between Serbs and Croats, and Slovenia's and Croatia's push to turn the Yugoslav federationoose confederation of sovereign states are increasing the prospect of Military intervention to hold the country together. Both northern republics have threatened to secede from Yugoslavia.if agreeaent is not reached on an acceptable confederation. MUMtamumBBm
Ethnic Flashpoints. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's effortsa sovereign state have sharply increasedercent of theCroatian majority. Civil conflict was narrowly avertedwhen arned Serbs took control of several towns in theKnin region of Croatia in order toeferendum Earlier, the republic's Serbs had issued theirof autonomy" in reaction to changes tothat emphasize Croatian cultural rights. Theto appoint their own police chiefs and are refusing tonew Croatian flag. In addition, Serbs throughoutpromising to Join the fray if violence results.
Tudjman is countering that an autonomous region for Serbs within Croatia is unacceptable and has charged Serbia with fomenting unrest to undermine his government. Although he allowed the referendum to be held, his nationalist government is monitoring closely how the minority tries to articulate itsudjman is convinced that Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic and his supporters are using the referendum to destabilise his government and provoke federal military intervention in Croatia. Tudjman is likely to come under intense pressure to regain thetgMn;ove that would probably be met by armed resistance.
Pushing for Confederation, since the non-Communist DEMOS coalition wonpost-World War II free election last April, tho new government's program to establish Slovene sovereignty has lederies of confrontations with Belgrade. The most serious conflicts have arisen over last month's
"declaration of sovereignty" that callseparate republic amy. The DEMOS government already has declared it will meet only half of its quota of federal military conscripts in September and that they will solely serve in Slovenia and Croatia. The decision puts Sloveniaollision course with Belgrade, and the federal ministry of defense has warned that "appropriate measures" will be taken to ensure adherence to the draft laws. The Slovenes also are reviewing republic federal laws. They assert that in cases of conflict the republic laws will prevail. ^
Tudjman has cautiously followed the Slovene lead, but last weekend's events may accelerate his timetable for Croatian sovereignty. The Croatian government has noted Belgrade-passivity during tho crisis inrlent
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Jence-orlented policies, Tudjman, who was jail*
autonomy2ants toovereign Croatian state that would control its own military, according to press interviews. The Croats recently amended their republic ^titution to emphasize political and economicf
Military Prepared to React
Civil conflict in Croatia would be the most likely trigger for federal military intervention. A. military spokesman has stated that the JNA has the responsibility to prevent fratricidal war in any part of Yugoslavia and would carry out this task unconditionally. If Tudjman cuppresses ethnic Serbian leaders or dispatches Croatian forces into Serb-controlled areas, he could easily spark rioting or organized resistance. Splraling ethnic conflict in the republic might force the JNA to act to limit violence before the collective Presidency could comeecision. Once in place, the military would be under pressure, especially from Serbia, to remove Tudjman from power.
In our view, Slovenia's
Lon, the sides are far apart, and Belgrade probably will opt for legal sanctions, such as arresting individuals who fail to report for service and forcing
* Despite denials by Belgrade that the JNAole in the recent disturbances inro-Serb bias was evident in many of its actions. Yugoslav air force MiGs intercepted and turned back Croatian police helicopters headed for the Serb-controlled region of Croatia. JNA Chief of Staff Adzic warned Croatian leaders_lhav Amy would intervene if one person was killed in Croatia.
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Slovenes to serve outside Croatia and Slovenia. Even these measures. hovever^jBighj^Slovenia to precipitately form an army secede. Mm?
If the Presidency fails to act, military leaders might be tempted to move without its approval to head off separatist forces before they gain greater momentum. Military leaders might believe intervening now in Slovenia and perhaps Croatia would be less
aving to deal with the violent breakup of the country.
The jna has the assets in place to seise of powerauthorities in the two northern republics of Slovenia Military units in the two northern republics areof the 5th Army headquartered in Zagreb. Inare four infantry brigades, two tank brigades, andregiment. In Croatia, there are two infantryfive infantry regiments, three tank brigades and twoand two artillery regiments. The three tank brigadesare reportedly among the largest and best equipped inand are maintainedpercent strength. The 5thhas direct control over two helicopter squadrons,reginenta^nd various anti-aircraft, engineer, and
There would be little warning of intervention because these units would simply move out of garrison. Few, if any units, would have to be moved from ono republic to another. In our view, swift deployment of units to strategic locationsjjrnhably would result in quick capitulation of the two republics. Mm
jna Intervention Carries High Risks
Intervention in the northern republics probably would cause the military to splinter along ethnic lines. In our view, the introduction of the multiethnic JNA into Serb areas of Croatia would alienate Croat officers and soldiers and cause many to disobey orders and desert. Slovene soldiers would also be tempted to leave the service, realising Army intervention in Croatia wouldrecedent for their republic. If Croat and Slovene deserters from federal units joined with local Territorial Defense Units (TDF) units to form republic guerilla organizations, they couldtrong opposition to federal forces. An occupation in Croatia or Slovenia would be likely to prompta^ide spread terrorist campaign against federal targets.
Implications of intervention for the Onited States
Military intervention in the northern republics wouldetrimental impact on OS and European interests in the region. Ethnic violence would likely bo widespread, particularly in Croatia
and Bosnia, where Serb and Croat tensions are most acute. accusations of human rights violations wouldCommunity members to delay any plans tomembership into the EC end handicap Yugoslavthe International Monetary Fund and World Bank. human rights violatlona would also deprive Yugoslavia of somespecial status it derives from ite participation in tbemovement. The West could feel compelled toountry that has attempted to move intomainstream since World War
Military intervention could also have serious repercussions for the region. Italy, Austria, and Hungary probably would have to copelood of refugees. The Kosovo Albanians might use the interventionignal to rise up against Serb persecution and soek to align themselves with Tirana, especially if Albanian President Alia's reforms appear to be liberalising Albania. Although unlikely, Budapest might be tempted to take advantaqe of
La might try to reassert its historical
of Vojvodina. Likewise claims to Macedonia.
Yugoslavia's weakened state torab for the -Hungarian parts
Theof Yugoslav Unity
Since the deaise of the Yugoslav Ctommunlst party earlier thie year, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) has been the only significant integrative force in the federation. The JNAnified, ethnically-integrated military service composed of ground, air, and naval forcesurrent strength ofen. The JNA officer corp is predominantly Serb, but non-
of the officer corps, enlisted ranks.
The Territorial Defense Force (TDF) is aforce at the republic level that could be transformedarmies. The TDF was designed to fight awar against foreign invaders and has large quantitiesweapons stored throughout the country. In exercises,have proved capable of mobilizing local TDFhours,,
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APPENDIX B
Deciding on unitary Intervention
The Yugoslav collective Presidency, with its constitutional role as commander in chief of the military, presides over the rapidly crumbling Titoist political system. Belgrade lacksthe threat of militaryforce the Slovenes and Croats to moderate their drive toward confederation or secession. How it responds in the next few months could determine whether Yugoslaviaeaceful transitionam constitutional orderthat includes multiparty democracy, or drifts into civil war. A B
He believe the eight-man Presidency views military interventionast resort but probably could marshal1 the majority of votes needed to order intervention to prevent the violent breakup of tha country or contain major ethnic violence in Croatia. The dire implications ofcivil war and the fracturing of the Army along ethnic llnea, economic disruptions, and the International condemnation ofsuggests that falling to act would have to be catastrophic to influence swing votes like Bosnla-Hercegovina and Macedonia, to favor use of the military.
Boanis-Hercegovina mighterbian-led coalition In the Presidency If it appeared Croatia's secession would lead Serbia or Croatia to take over parts of Bosnia. Violence between Bosaia-Hercegovina's three major ethnicSerbs, andthe prospect of unrest spreading from Croatia also sight lead Bosnians to support military intervention.
Macedonia might agree to intervention to safeguard its long-term interest in keeping Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia to counterbalance the Serbs. The Macedonians feel pressed from the north by aggressive Serb nationalism, from the south and east by Greece and Bulgaria, and from inside by an increasingly restlesspopulation. The departure of the northern republics from the federation would further isolate Macedonia and expose the republic to the machinations of its nationalistic neighbors, asj asj
Original document.
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