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PAPER IRAQ: SADDAM'S POLITICALOFHONS
AMmjhesolved to maintain hi* hold oo Kuwait, his optionsbecoming increasingly complicated as US troops deploy In force to Saudi Arabia, UN ecimornic sanction* begin to be implemented, and other Arab states become more resolute in their opposition lo the takeover.
o naghdatfi vehement anti-Saudi and anti-US rhetoric of the past few days has replaced previous assurances that Iraq has no hostile intentions against Saudi Arabia and indicates that Baghdad is laving the propaganda groundwork for possible funher miliiary action.
Arabia and Western interests everywhere
o lhe initiative Saddam proposed onugustpokesman demanded the withdrawal of all Israeli rorces from the occupied territories, Syrian withdrawal Irom Ubanon. lhe removal of US and Western forces from Saudi Arabia and their replacement Iry Arab forces, the reversal of UN sanctions, the return of worldwide trade wiih Iraq to thc status quo anie, and negotiations with Saudi Arabia to determine the future of Kuwait. Israeli, US. and Syrian withdrawals musihe Kuwaiti crisis. Saddam threatened Nf America and its allies will not accepi this inmative, wc will resist by force."
We believe Saddam is assessing three options:
o His preferred option al presento til tight ia hopes that poor
enforcement and lack of resolve within the international community will cause UN lanction* Iii unravel.
wc believe be would seek an Arab-mediated formula that grants Iraq agruficam Tiiiandal and territorial conce^oos.
damti$Uh de facto control ofrtf S lht VS iuiu7in Saudi
Iraqightly controlled police cute and Saddarn. wiih the aid of hii masrve propaganda machine and pervasive ic airily services, probably could deal with cxjnsicerabl* kn* of public ujppon. His only real internal threat ia from assassination. *CS^>
Hoping to Wait It Out
Saddam probably calculates that it UN sane-ions are not backed up witha naval Mixkadc-he can outlast U< resolve of the International coenmuciry toand reject Arab mediation efforts. He ia determined not to return Xjwajt to itsstatus or give up us oil wealth and he hepes the world wiU come io accastnf Kuwaitail
o Saddam hope* thai as the crisis drags oo economic aad oil marie! pressurescause some countries u> ssco adhering to the UN sanctions. He is espeeiairy concerned aboul maintaining food imports.peech onurjst, be urged Iraq, women lo begin to conserve food. We estimate Iraq requires at leas: SI bu'lion of food imports annually to avoid widespread shortages.
o Baghdad is likely to continue lo reject Arab mediation efforts while it pu jes the resolve and ability of lhe international community to enforceons.
o Saddam can indefinitely keep lhe US and olher Westerners caught in Iraq to play oo Wesierr popular concerns annul theirandful could be released pcruidically in maintain the appearance Ihat these Westerners are not hostages.
ie prooanty rxiieves _
Uganda machine can maintain popular support for an extended period even iiiKgm to deplete supplies of food and raw materials for industry and agriculture. If supplies run short, he could starve the Kurdish minoriry first, savine key supplies for the miliiary and his Arab constituency.
jliciily called on the Arab "have-nots" lo rise up againsi the oil ri<
In an effort to broaden Arab support at the mass level and deflect criuasm of the inviMon, the regime on Friday appealed lo pan-Arab seniimeats against foreign intervention and called on all Arabs lo revolt againsi US presence in Saudi Arabia,
Saddam states.
iplomatic Solution
If Saddam cnoose* torokered sohjuon to the Kuwaii crisis, we believe heArab-media.ed formula thatiSatt SaSc^ai aemional concesi^ons, and cooiioued de faao control of Karwait
o Saddam probably would accede lo an Arab-broksred compromise only If he Iia naval blockade ot miliury intervention that cripple* Uaq'iincreases discontent within the miliiary. and threatens to desubilizt
o He almost certainly would press for financial concessions lhat Include debt
forgiveness and especajly lane amounts of cash, andborder setUeaienl tha; nv; Iran nesseuion oi* Warbah and Bubiyin Islands, as well as majorcg the land border. His financial demands would be in the tens of bilboes of dollars.
iddam probably would agree louwait ifoe Is confident he can manipulate (he outcome in Iraq's favor, posaibry by demandi enfranchisement fur Kuwait's Palestinian and non-Kuwaiti Arab populations.
Saddam'shetoric, swift annexation of Kuwait, threats to reuliaie for foreip miliury intervention, and massive propaganda effort make it crjsmeJy difHcul; for hix to back down. To avoid the appearance of havingja-ned nothing from the invasion, the regime's propagjnda apparaius would try lo deflect blame for the setback onto olher Arabs who "caved in" tu US manipulation, while tuiNneSaddam as the only Arab leader brave enougli lo stand opestern imperialism. tfB&lP
Saddam's greatest concern in conceding to any mediated solution probably would be to coniaint:ing within Iraq'i miliury esublishmenu
o He especially fears antagonizing his elile Republican Guard Forces, who carried out the conquest of Kuwait,ritical role in preserving his hold on power, and who prohabiy wouldithdrawalisgraceful capitulation lo the US.
o Given Saddam's record of ruthlessly suppressing suspected opponents, he is
probably confident his security services can crush any civil unrest arising from public angeierceived surrender.
Would He Rather Fight Than
If no solution can be reached that allows Saddamiaim some measure ofis likely to turn to miliury ootions.
an Aflb-
o He could with little or no warrungull-scale attack against Saudi Arabia,acainst oil tankers Servian* Saudi Anhla or Peru an
CON
o Grven the rapid deterioration of US-Iraqi ties and Iraq's deepening isolation in the Arab and international communities, Saddam is likely to resort to any means available, includmg the taking of US cittxeos as hostages,orestall US rttalUtion
opular lupport for urK-Joru or
rill MPW
Iraq. Baghdad almost certainly intends its refusal to allow US dtiaeru to leave Iraq nr Kuwaitignal.
o Saddam could use his formidable terrorist capability over the long-termK... European, and Israeli Urects lo weaken oooular suDoort for aanetiftni nrniervent
tMMKt)
SADDAM'S FIGHTING WORDS
Saddam's call-"Save Mecca and lhe tomb ofthe Propr-e: fromdugust for Arabs lo riseagainst the US and Saudi Arabia:
he imiKrrialists, ihe devialionrsls, the traders and -
brokers of politics, aad tbe lackeys of (he .
foreigners have joined ranks against Iraq.-"
he US forces came, and tbe doors of Saudi Arabiato themalse and lying daimarmy of Iraq will continue thetoward them. Neither denial
espfanation has worked. This means that there are eliberate arrangements lo commit aggression againsi !raq_*
o 'Jail the ground beneath tbe feet ofthe aggressive invaders who harbor evil against your people in Iraq, and who have set outpread their evil throughout the Arab homeland lo stifle the voice of justice in tbe Arab
otheir interests wherever Ihey are, and save Mecca and the tomb of the MessengerU)
SADDAM'S PAST RECORD ON COMPROMISE
Notwithstanding his belligerent stance, Saddam has in ihe pastillingness io compromise lo ensure lhe security of bis regrrae.
" Saddam5 signed lhe AJgiers Accord with Iran and made border concessions in return for Iran's igrccmcal io stop assisting Iraq's Kurdish rebellion.'
o9 he retreated from his aggressive efforts to supoK Lebanon's Christians with heavy wearers, when cocarontedyria: aavsj blockade of Lebanon.
Tn none of these situations were the poliiical ortages as aiah or
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