National Intelligence Council
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
The Readiness of Soviet General Purpose Forces Through
Memorandum
9
The Readiness of Soviet General Purpose Forces Through
Information availablo as of0 was used in tha preparation of this Memorandum, which was prepared byf_]
2
he Oofense Intelligence Agency, andum was coordinatedirirycnce Community by the Nalional Intelligence Officer for General PurposB Forces.
Key Judgments
The Readiness of Soviet General Purpose Forces Through
Sovicl readiness requirements arc being shaped by changes in doctrine, physical movements of forces out of Rastcra Europe, internal condition* within the USSR, developments in arms conirol, and the demands imposed by increasingly sophisticated weaponry. In general, theater forces will be fully capable of supporting requirements for strategic defense of the homeland. However, timelines for committing forces for offensiveagainst NATO arc being significantly extended.
The Soviet military faces significant constraints, which will degrade its overall force readiness. Among tbe most severe disrupting influences arc the disruption associated with reductions and relocations, the increased nationalistic tendencies, the budgetary reorientation from the miliiary to tbc civilian sector, and the military's increasing uncertainty of its role in Soviet society.
In the, Soviel Ground Forces will continue to be the least ready branch of the armed forces. Thc Soviets will coniinue to emphasize mobilization potential over immcdialc force readiness and will probably vary their unit force struciurc and equipment holdings to preservepotential. We believe thai lhc Soviets will maintain aboul the same ratio of ready to not-ready forces as they have inercent of the total number of divisions in thc Atlantic-to-the-Urals {ATTU) zone will be ready. Most of these divisions will be manned at category B. Remaining divisions probably will be kept in the status of cadre or mobilization-basend D) readiness Forces east of the Urals available for commitment against NATO will also be in low-strength status.
Combat elements of thc Airir Defense Forces. Navy. and. surface-to-surface missile units will continue lo be highly ready and manned at or near wartime levels.
The Soviets are continuing to debate the future manning policy of lhc armed forces. Recent siatcnienis by senior officers suggest growing acceptance of thc ideaore professional force is inevitable. We believe that the Air. Air Defense. Navy, and Slralegic Rocket Forces will
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be irtcreasinely niannecl by volunteer forces. Although there will also be increased professionalizaUon of the Ground Forces, mobilizationwill dictate continuing the draft in modified form. In non-Slavic republics, thc Soviets may allow the creation of formations of national units whose cadre of professionals would train thc conscripts.
Discussion1
Military Docirine: War Goals, Strategy, and Readiness1
In the past Soviet military doctrine depicted war in Europe between tbe Warsaw Pact and NATOecisive clash between two social systems that would result in NATO's total defeat. The conflict would begin with conventional weapons and would probably escalatetrategic nuclear exchange. Soviet theater strategy that developed from this viewon rapid generationeep strategic offensive operation into NATO Europe. The Sovietssurprise and preemption as well as mass and firepower; they would have preferred to attack before NATO was fully prepared.
To support this strategy. Soviet inilitary planners emphasized high readiness of forwardSoviet and selected Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP>_and rapid mobilization of thc remaining theater forces. Theater force posture and readiness were supported by logistic stockpiles deployed in forwardommand and control infrastructure, and large numbers of second-echelon and reserve foices from thc western military districts (MDs) of thc USSR.
New military doctrine and evems in Eastern Europe have led to fundamental changes in Soviet theater strategy and significant modifications in readiness lequircmcnts. President Mikhail Gorbachevsto restructure the Soviet armed forces involves first and forcmosl, an adoption ofa new miliury doctrine. The new "defensive" doctrine announced7esigned to reorient Soviet forces away from
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their traditional offensive posture andess provocative defensive stance This doctrine asserts that the primary Soviet goal is toar with the West and that the development of Soviet forces must be based on tbe concept of "reasonable
The Soviet political leadership probably has accepted the following propositions regarding war with the West:
Soviet forces shoaUt not be postured to threaten thc political existence of NATO member states (that is. both social systems will survive),
Soviet forces will be postured to conduct defensive operations but will retain capabilities for operation-al-levcl offensives.
Fighting should be confined to conventionaland should not involve theater nuclear weapons.
The purpose of strategic nuclear forces is to deier nuclear escalation, to contribute to Sovietstatus and to fight nuclear war to achieve combat advantages if escalation occurs.
Theater strategy will change fundamentally inOs. Wartime objectives no longer will require sustained, thcaterwide offensive operalions deep into NATO territory. Instead, the strategy will center on defending thc homeland, preferably at forwardm liastern Europe. The degree of military cooperation that can be maintained with Eastcountries, parlicularlyill be an important element in this strategy:
Tbc Soviets probably expect that East European forces will defend their own territory. Because such defensive operalions would contribute to thc USSR's ability io mobilise and duploy iu forces, the Soviets may seek to reinforce with their own units
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and to conduct countcrstrikcs aimed at expelling penetrating enemy forces and restoring theo ante.
Soviet planners arc likely to assume,worsthat an adversary will use East European territory for an atuck on the USSR. Sovietplanning, therefore, will focusefense conducted at the western borders of the USSR.
Readiness Requirements
The Soviets can be expected to reshape the readiness of their forces to meet tbe following requirements:
Abide by CFE restrictions.
Maintain air, missile, and naval forces that can enter combat quickly.
Man ground forces in the ATTU zone at sufficient levels to meet the timelines for mobilization. These timelines already have become extended over those required under certain scenarios inwith the withdrawal of Soviet forces to their own borders East European countries will separate Soviel and NATO forces.
Establish the capability to expand gradually thc general purpose forces in ihe ATTU zone above CFE Treaty constraintshreat materialized.
higher standards for iraining units and individuals to enable them to cope with the growing complexity and sophistication of modern military equipment and fasc-devclopine operations.
Constraints on Readiness
Soviet military leaders recognize lhat war fighting in the future will require better trained and equipped forces. However. Soviet theater foices will be engagedrocess of profound change far surpassing rhe massive demobilization and military reforms of lhc Khrushchev era. Managing this transition period will impair their readiness for at leasl thcears. Tlie changes will include:
discharge of hundreds of iliousands of personnel.
need to provide employment and housing for thousands of officers and warrant officers and their families returninghc USSR, while tbc country is In the throes of economic decline.
deactivation or disbanding of scores of divisions and olher military units.
removal, destruction, conversion to civilian use, dbmaotling, or placing into storage of tens of thousands of items of military equipment from units.
relocation of forces from Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union and the extensive movement of other units within tbe USSR.
reorganization and restructuring of many units, while they adjust lo new organization and equipment.
management ofa highly intrusive NATOregime.
Throughout this transition period and inlo the ncxi century, other constraints will undercut lhc readiness of fuiure Soviet general purpose forces. These include:
The rising level of draft resistance and desertions, particularly among ethnic minorities.
Tbe declining influence of polilical cadre in the armed forces.
The persistent hazing of recruits.
The trend toward abolishing certain forms ofmilitary iraining and miliiary-patrioticin some regions and republics.
Greater efforts to move weapons, equipment, and munitions currently used for iraining in remote facilities and schools inlo secure locations where Ihey will not be misappropriated for clonic strife.
Thc high rejection rale of new inductees for miliiary service.
The growing numbers of non-Russian soldiers in ihe force.
Thc growing numbers of young soldiers with no knowledge or poor knowledge of theercentccording to Sovicl figures).
The growing divergence in views between lhc army's junior, midlevcl. and senior officers.
.;
Tim Son-ATTU Zone. Forces outside the ATTU zone will not be constrained by tbe CFE Treaty. The Soviets are reducing forces in Central Asia and Mongolia, as well as along lhe Sino-Soviet border, in accordance with their program of unilateralTbcy are converting some divisions intooriented, machinegun artilleryc expect that these forces will maintain their present levels of manning and remain at tbe cadre level of readinessith selected formations at higher levels.
Thc Soviets are likely to maintainozen active division east of tbe Urate that could be usedtrategic reserve. This strategic reserve would be able lo reinforce formations within lhe ATTU zone or elsewhere in the countryrisis period, but their movement into tbe ATTU zone would violate the CFE Treaty. These divisions, locaied in the eastern portion of thc Turkestan MD and in Volga-Ural, Siberia, and Traiubayka! MDs, probably will be manned at low strength cadre status,ew held ai the rcduccd-ttrengtfa ready level, ln addition,amounts of major end items are currently in storage east of the Urals. These stockpiles arebeing augmented, and we cannot judge bow much equipment would be available easi of the Urals for forming divisions5 or beyond. In any case, tbe structure and disposition of forces outside thc ATTU zone will be an important element inSoviet options and capabilities.
Equipment. Soviet Ground lorcespoM-CFE will have less obsolete equipment and will probably modernize at about lhe same rate as ihey have in lhc past During, lhe Soviets are expected loew model Unk. two new armored troop carriers, and four new artillery systems (ooeraiional-Uciical short-range ballistic missilemm towed,m telf-pTOpelled howitzer)
Training and Leadership. Public statements of Soviet military leaders reveal their intention to improve readiness by introducing new approaches to training, making more training resources available, andthc Quality of small-unit leadership
Siting popular support for the armed forces and ihc dramatic increase in violent acts againstofficers.
The likelihood that one or more republics may gain independence over the next decade and thusadditional force relocations and realignment of miliiary plans, logistics, and organizations.
The destabilizing potential of ethnic conflict in lhe USSR and tbc increasing involvement of thc armed forces in internal security operation*.
In view of tbc magnitude of thc changes under way or anticipated and tbc imposing array of potentialthe Soviet miliuryogistic and management nightmare. We expect, therefore, that the readiness of tbe general purpose forces for theater-level miliury operations outside thc Soviet Union will be significantly degraded in.
Readiness of Ibe Sorici Ground Forces in tbe Future
Manning. Soviet military planners probably estimate that they will have limerepare their ground forces for major combat. Nevertheless, they will be worried that air, naval, missile, and possibly some ground forces will become engaged relatively quickly.ibeir future readiness requirements are poi clear, we believe that Ihe Soviets will maintain about lhe same ratio of ready to not-ready forces as Ihey have inercent of the total number of divisions in tbe ATTU zone will be ready However, we believe lhal mosl of ihese divisions in the future will be manned at category B. Thc remaining divisions probably will be kept in tbe (taint of cadre or mobilization-basend D) readiness1
Airborne, Air Defense, and surface-to-surface misiik oniti will coniinue to be manned as highly ready foiccs. Economic considerations will require army ond from nondivisional units to remain ai relatively low levels of readiness Anticipated extended limefor force generation will provide sufficient time for lhc mobilization and preparation of these units
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1 hese statements iiUo suggestptrci-troyka in Ihein tbe ranks, iniliativc by low-level leaders, and the general morale of career military and conscrjpU have not Improved. Soviet military leaders remain very concerned about tbe "fossilized" natureaining, especially iu lack of creativity and initiative and iu penchant forstereotyped exercises. Tbe decision to put all regimental commanders, and eventually all battalion commanders, through specialized field training courses is expected to improve the quality of thc officer corps. This program, however, will Ukc many years tooticeable increase in iho quality of small-unit leadership and unit readiness. Tbe SovieU have indicated that they will reduce the Dumber and size of field exercises. The new training program will emphasize lactical level, opposed-forces exercises.
Although tlse Soviets have career enlisted and warrant officer personnel (praporihckikfy, tbey are notto lhc corps of experienced nonconimissioncd ufficcrs (NCOs) Ibal is thc acknowledged backbone of Western armies. Senior Soviet military leaders seem interested in creatingorps. Nonetheless,orps of NCOs thai is capable ofgreater responsibility for unit training andunit readiness will require sustained andeffort, as well as firm commitment al Ihe top.
Limited evidence suggests that territorial or regional training centers are being established to improve the quality of training for reservists. These traininghowever, lack dedicated opposing forces and sophisticated tiaicing facilities
Despiie these efforU to improve leadership, wethat atecade of continued command emphasis will be necessary to develop lhe leadership by junior and NCOs that is necessary toigh level of readiness This task will be difficult to accomplish in light of thc multiple constraints on increased readiness noted above
Air Forces
The high state of readiness of Soviet air forces will be affecled ia lhe short icrm by moving aircraft,and materiel from ilie forward areaew
facilities, bui aviation uniu will remain highlyand manned al near wartime levels. If ibe Sovieu retain tome of tbc excess pilou and ma innee capability ihat result, from arms controlas is likely, then pUoMo-aircraft ratios and readiness may actually increase.
Natal Forces
Tbc readiness of the Soviet Navy is expected io improve during ihc next decade. Similarly, if the SovieU retain tbe naval infantry forces, we anticipate that they will continue lo be maintained as ready uniu. Thc improvements will result from changes in equiptnenl. manpower, and,esser extent,capability
Tho Soviets have deleted from tbe naval inventoryarships, all at leastears old, sincehis trend will continue throughout tbe decade butlower ratehese reductions, which save money and manpower, will noi lower combatNew warships carrying more weapons, improved sensors, and belter command, control, andsystems will compensate some* hat for thc decrease in lhe size of lhc Navy, and will make Ihe Soviel Navy more modern.
Thc Navyormidable deficiency in trained manpower thatonscript service of three years for forces afloat does not meet There is evidence ihst tbe Nuvy intends to moveore permanent manning system lo include formationareer NCO corps based upon voluntary enlistment.ighly technical service, such problems as the lack of premilitary technical training, poor Russian language skills, and link desireiliiary career affect the Navy even rnore lhan lhc Ground Forces. Theeported to have decided, as an experiment, ioontract to selected new conscripts lhal includes technical training,onths of service after training, and ihc wagesetty officer rather lhan thoseonscript.
The modernif<itloo of Soviet naval systems andas well as ihc higher level of training and
combal readiness inherentore professional
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willositive effect on the reserve forces and tbeir mobilization capabilities over tbc loaf term.
Neverthelcai. training tbc reserves into cJTectireof Ibe activo-duiy force* will require aand (imc-coniurrucg restructuring.
SusUlnabllJty
Tbe political and military upheaval iu tbc Warsaw Pact will bring about fundamental change* in thc theaterndair defense system. Over thc long term, the political democratization of Eastern Europe anderosion of thc Warsaw Pactilitary alliance will probably leadheater supportbased largely on facilities within Soviet borders.
Soviel logistic plans and organization are beingtotrategic defensive oceration that involves fewer force* and that doe* not extend beyond Pact borders. Large, static, easily targeted from rear basesiability, and ibis may be one of Ihe reasons for the withdrawal of at least aome of tbc large ammunition stocks from tbc forwardore decentralized logistic system will belter protect supplies and suppori units, while giving lower-level commanders more reliable support during defensive operations.ost-CFE environment, therefore, rather than piovisioning tactical units and committing themombal for three to five days, tbey will be expected to engage in combal for periods lasting, per haps, twice as long.
CFE will alioignificant impact on lbc overall stockpile requirement. Current ibeater stockagc levels will fur exceed the requirementsost-CFE force only aboutercent as large as the current sUading force. Furthermore, in lhe case of ammunition, the mix of munitions may need to change to more closely match that necessary for defensive operations. The introduction of improved conventional munitions into tbe inventory should drop thc requirement further.ilt. reduction of stockpiles may be expected.
Ther Su.iri MiliuryPolicy
Traditional manning policy reflected Soviel peicep-iioo> of lbc next war and lhc high priorily Ibe leadership placed on military rower Because miliiary
planners contended that the initial period of war would be decisive, with little time for mobilization, and Ihat rapid escalation was likely, the Sovieu felt tbeyarge standing army with important comnoncnu kepiigh level of combat readiness. Tbey abo thought that war could be protracted and thus would require huge reserves of manpower. The miliury also was assigned the important social role of Sovieti/inc non-Slavs from amonginority groups.
To meet manpower requiremenu forarge standing armyarge pool of reserve manpower, tbe Sovieu have relied on conscription. Soviet youthandatory premiliury training program, were coriseriplod at aboutnd were assigned to ethnically mixed uniu far from home. After serving two years (three years in naval anoaibey were demobilized into tbc reserves to make up the massive mobilization base that doctrinal precepts demanded. Tbe largely Slavic career force was responsible for turning tbe young conscripts into soldiers, preparing tbcin for war. and keeping ihc complex military bureaucracy running.
This manning system emailed considerable costs to an already strained economy, but Soviet leaders were willing to bear them Daring, when tbe Sovieu confronted increasing demographic(tbe poolyear-old mates8 bad droppedercent from9bey cut back iludcai defcrmenu lo maintain lbc high force levels achieved during tbe manpower glut of.
Petestroyka and Moaning Policy. Poliiical leaderi ire considering major changes in thc force inheritedtbe Brezhnev era. Economic conn derations ap-parenily arc not the only factor behind the currenl debate on manning and restructuring. Many of thc proposals uridei debate would not substantially lower costs; one ofrxoposcd shiftolunteer militarycost more lhan the large conscript army it would replace.
Thc doctrinal developments dovcuil wiih trendsmiliiary technology Thev pointifferent kind of nystcni than the large standing army
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Gorbachev inherited. Integrating more sophisticated equipment into ground (orce uniti hu increased the need for mining and specialized skills As ibecomplexity of weaponry increases, orerrcliance on conscripts to man lhe armed forces impairs Ihe use of weapons technology.
In addition, Gorbachev's poliiical reforms arcthe nature of the policymaking system itself by bringing in new groups that are dubious about thc strong commitment to military power of tbe previous leaders. For example, minority activists are hostile to the miliury in general and the draft in particular. Some regard the armed forcesramatic symbol of centralized Soviel power. Piotesu against tbe draft or against stationing Soviet forces on republichave become more populareans ofminority demands.
The conscript army remains largely intact afterfive years of pcrestroyka. but proposals being discussed involve the use of minority soldiers,of draft policy, and proposal* to replace (hc conscripuolunteer military.
Use af Minority SottUert, Proposals underwould modify the tradition of assigning draftees to uniu far from home. Soviet legislators from many republics advocate borne stationing for theirTbc party leadership in some republics has backed these demands.
Fort her more, activisu from several regions have ad-vocalod formation of their own republic armies or national units analogous lo those set up during the Civil Warears ago. (National uniu were phased out in lhe, resurrected during World War II. and phased out again after the war.)
Soviel military leaders have strongly opposed these proposals Tbey have agreed lo some borne sialioning, but they contend lhal lhc distribution of manpower among the republics does not coincide with military needs. Moreovei. home stationing would interfere with thc ethnic mix of many military uniU and create units dominated hy thc resident minority.
Senior miliury leaders even more vigorously oppose tbe formation of national units or republic armies Miliury leaders argue that reviving nationalii not feasible because of the nature of weapons technology and Ihe need for training so manyiliiary specialisU. They also maintain that tryinganage the armed forces in numerous languages wouldommand and conlrol nightmare.
Miliiary leaders also assert thai concessions towould exacerbate ethnic qua neb and promote rcsisunce to Moscow's rule. As military cfitciab have pointed oul, lhe Armenian-Azen confrontation, which is fueled by stolen weapons, would have become another Lebanon if the Iwo republics had had their owu divisions.
Thc resolution of this debate will be influenced by Soviel approaches to the nationalities problem. Most of the advocates of national uniu and home stationing of conscripu live in those non-Slavic republics man eager to secede from thc USSR. If secessions occur, therefore, tbe Soviel army willmaller but more homogeneous force. On the other hand, lo head off moves toward secession. Gorbachev bas promised to workadically new relationship between Moscow and tbc union republics These concesaioas may include allowing the formation of national uniu lo be stationed at home.
Draft Policy. Otber proposals would change policy toward conscription The Sovieltbe strong objection of thc highbowed to public pressure and reinstated thc student deferment (phased out gradually in the early and) and applied it retroactivelyhose students already drafted. Abo under consideration, and opposed by military leaders, arc proposals for alternative service for those draft-eligible persons who oppose military service on religious or moral grounds and forihc lour of service from Iwo years lo one Several Fast European stales already have reduces drafl lours.
Abandoning conscripdon in favorolunteerwouldifferent set of imp*>caHons. Tbe volunteer force (in view of tbe expense of attracting them) probably would be much smaller and more Slavic The career enlisted contingent and the NCO corps would need to expand. Given sufficient funding to offset quanHiatlve reductions by Qualitativetbe result wouldmaller but highly capable force. The high command's resistancerofessional military probably stems from lack: of experience Intreamlined, technicallymilitary and an awareness thatualitative excellence isoviet strong poinl.
We believe that manpower policies in tbe Soviet armed services gradually will accommodate tbepositions now under discussion. Thc Soviets arc likely to moveore professional miliury. but their requirements for roobilization wiil dictate continuing the draft in modified form. Wc anticipate that Air, Air Defense, Naval, and Strategic Rocket Forces increasingly will be manned by volunteer soldiers; conscripts will be used in tbc lean skilled posi lions.
Similar palierns of manning probably will occur ia Ihe ground forces: missile, airborne, and other units will need highly skilled volunteer soldiers, as will units located in remote, sparsely populated areas and in selected maneuver divisions. Most of tbc cadre-manned fo; ma lions including macbinegun artillery divisions -can be mainuinederritorial mililia In non-Slavic republics, the Soviets may allow forma (ion of nalional unils whose professionals would train the conscripts
Active service for conscripts is likely to be shortened Once their service is completed, conscripts wouldto iheir homes for assignmentearby reserve nail, (bey would be called up annually for several weeks of (raining over an extended period This system would resemble lhat of lhc Red Army during Ihc decade beginning in lhc tnid-IQJth. when national policy also emphasized economic regeneration, secern, through defense, and political change.
Conscript Versus Volunteer Poller. Senior Ministry of Defense and General Suff officials have argued against jettisoning tbe draft in favorotunlecr military. They contendolunteer army would be loo expensive and would preclude the developmentarge mobilization bate of trained reservists. Military leaders also point out that the move to a
volunteer force would forgo the benefits of seoaliza-
tiononscript army provides.
Recent lUlemcnu by senior officers suggest growing acceptance of the ideaore professional force is inevitable. Rival draft laws on defense drawn up by the Ministry of Defense and tbc Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security bothstepsore professional force. Tbe introdQction of an all-volunteer army would be more expensive; personnel and military construction costs would be increased to pay for salaries and "quality-of-lifc" improvements needed forilitary.esult, resource constraints probably will limit tbe speed with which the Soviets could switch to an all-volunteer military if they chose lo do so.
Implications. Tbe resolution of these debates will have profound consequcnees for tbc structure offorces. Retaining conscription, while conceding to minority demands for home stationing and creating national units, would radically alter (he ethnicof thc military. Units with personnel drafted from Slavic areas would retain Russian as thclanguage. The high command would perceive them as more reliable and combat effective than troops from non-Slavic areas where the minority language probably would be used as tbe command language at least at the loweron-Slavic officer corns to provide leadership to minority unils probably would be needed Moreover, national unils. or units dominated by tbe resident ethnic group, would have major consequences for relations between center and periphery; it would endow republicwiib (heir own military forces. This strategy also would raise questions about procuring manpower for forces deployed beyond Soviet borders or for Soviet territory in the Far ttast, whichimited conscription base.
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Tbe reforms required id achieve an elTcctive NCOinitialise, imaginative and effective training, and "democratized" relations betweenfundamental and will require many yean for results. Yet socb reforms are essential to tbe creationiable professional military. Tbelevel of public criticism of military life and heavy poliiical, social, economic, and militarysuggest thai implementing military reform in the USSR willlow andocess.
These constraints will impair the readiness of Soviet general purpose forces throughout thc CFE reduction period and into the nett century. Theater force* will be fully capable of supporting thc reducedof thc new doctrine of itrategic defense of the borne land. But tbc readiness of Soviet general purpose forces for theater-level military operations outside Soviet borders will be significantly degraded during tbe extended period of dramatic adjustments that peresiroyka continues to require.
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Original document.
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