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Csoetratcalc Woolgathering
It is understandable that Washington and other major NATO capitals want some construct with which to foracaat the future soviet or Russian threat to European security. Thla seeas needed to decide and gain politioal aupporthole range of vital sattersi the allitary postures and doctrines of the Alliance and its Bombers; the structure and even survival of NATO; nuclear forces and strategy; us military presence in Europe; European security architecture beyond, or after, NATO. But no euch construct is at hand, and no amount of analysis or geopolitical philosophizing seems likely to create one until the air clears on the question that occupies moat of this paper: What is going to happen within the USSR? Moat past aaaumptions about Soviet power and policy cannot be used with any confidence. Simply extrapolating what we perceive as present Soviet realityGorbachev, pereetroiXa, "newefensive doctrine, shrinking forcesis unsetlefactory because, at best, it offers but one alternative future emong several,elatively unlikely one at that.
We oanew important things with confidence; but, even then, implications must be hedged with care. Moat Importantlv, the faailiar or "canonical" threat ia gone or rapidly going,egeaonical USSR animatedostile unlversallat Ideology, present in the heart of Europe with powerful offensive military Csrcea. This thrsat will pat ratum shorteplay of the eventa. Nevertheless, most of the forces embodying that threat are still in place for the moment. Both their immediate locations and their homeland ara undergoing unprecedented turbulence. Itltuatlon ripe for dangerous accident. If not deliberate aggresaion, until Soviet forces are completely gone froa East Europeoint aade publicly by Hungary's President Gonz).
The new Eastern Europe is seen by allich source of ethnic and territorial conflict that could diaturb tha general peace. Butr wars that endanger Western security ara not likely to occur over these conflicts. The mora serious danger is indirect, that interetate conflict in East Europe, along with economic and other troublee, could derail progress toward stable democracy, affording opportunities for interventionevanchlst Moscow at some future time. Although East European instability aay be a
legitimate argument for maintaining NATO's strategic, strength and cohesion, it is unlikely by itself toary persuasive one with publice and parliaments as time passes and contrary concerns
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The real problem boll* down to the Soviet Union or Russia or whatever It turns out to be: What will be the threat, particularly the military threat, to Europe emanating therofros?
A reasonable view mustreathtakingly wide spectrum At one extreme of unpleasantness one oanan authoritarian, chauvinist, and revanchistweak democratic states in East Europe and thelook to the "new European security architecture"the powerful AtlanticATO Perhapsevanchist Russia could findnewrypto-fatelet regimes in East Europe, much as
At the opposite extreme of pleaeantness one canonfraternity of stable democratic etates. Including Russia, whose major security responsibility is to manage local squabbles and to deter external threatsrom China or soma future Islamic Federation ln Southind of lies with armies, but no rogue members with disruptive powor and ambition. (Recalling the League of Hetions, Henry Kissinger rightly notesollective security syetem without enemies tends to fail when one of its members becomes an enemy to other members). If realists find this too farfetched, they must account for tha fact that thie is whet everybody professes to be for ultimately, under labels such as "common European house" and "new European security architecture."-
None of these or other possible constructs can ba fixed upon aa moet likely or excluded as too unlikely for planning purposes on time horizons relevant to such questions ae whether to preserve, alter, build upon, or replace NATO. Such speculations do, however, sharpen appreciation as to the key question: What will bo tha nature of the future Russian state? Especially, will it be democratic or authoritarian? As in the paet, that nature mora than anything will determine the power and aspirations of the Ruseian etate, and the degree to which it threatens the West.
Our statecraft must recognize, as do most Soviet leaders and citizens, that this is the question on history's agenda. But neither we nor they can answer lt now, nor foretell in what manner and when it will be answered. Because we have little else to turn to, historical lessons should be consulted! Russia has always cose out of revolutionary phasee ae it was before, autocratic, xenophobic, and backward, but powerful enough to threaten the neighborhood. Yet historical lessons are for opening, not closing minds, and open-mlndedness reveale brighter prospects today than in the past, especially If one looks outeide rather than inside the Kremlin's walls.
Tha Second Russian Revolution
Gorbachev is undoubtedly correct when he aays, aa he haa recently, that Russia ieecond revolution. Although he hopes understandably that it won't cose to this, revolutions, by definition, sweep away whole political and often social orders, creating new ones. One say argue over exactly what stage in the revolutionary process the USSR finds itself, but the process is olearly underway. The result will be, as the term revolution signifies, the removal of the present Soviet regime and probably tha replacement of the present Soviet Union with some new political-territorial configuration.
The soviet economy is now shrinking absolutely and its ability to deliver well-being to all but the most privileged Is shrinking rapidly. Ho reforms or reallocations will turn this around in the short run. All reform moves will, in fact, exacerbate the trend, and those most needed for long-term recovery will be most severe in the short run. Moreover, the economy is "balkanizing" into regional cells with important political as well as economic effects. Widespread interlocking strikes areertainty this
year,
Despite Gorbachev's new presidential powers, central political authority is rapidly eroding as is the pover of traditional party hlerarchs in all regione. Thes splitting and shrinking; no serious observers outsids the leadership givs it suchuture. Making things worsa, while losing its active power, the old euthority structure etill has the pover to block or dierupt positive adaptation to the new situation by the center or nev local authorities.
Both of the above ere rapidly accelerating social disorder andrime. All this has generated deep feare in theidespread talk of coups, impending civil war, "tachnogenic" disasters Ilka Chernobyl,
etc.
In varying degrees, all the non-Russian colonies of the empire house growing nationaliat eeparatlsm. Centrale running behind the Baltics, Transcaucasia, and the Ukraine, but on the ease track, even Russians, especially in Siberia, are increasingly bent on escaping Moscow's authority.
Zn the Russian heartland, thie crisis isolarizing effect ln popularn one hand, the dominant effect over the past year has been the growth of support for genuinely democratic forces, euch ae Democratic Rueeia and the Democratic Platform of communist reformers. On the other hand, this has energized the opposing foroe of Ruesian nationalist authoritarians, powerful institutionally but
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ltaa popular. Many in tha nomenklatura ally with thia conservative fore* in hopaa of ending pereatroika and protecting thair power and privilege. At preaant Gorbachev
appears to be simultaneously appeasing this force and (mialeadingly) holding it out as the most likely sltemative should he fall, hoping thereby to recover aupport fron real democrats and prevent losing it in the Vest.
Certainly tha most promising political phenomenon on this landscape is the growing electoral appeal of the real democratic forces, especially and most surprisingly among tha workers of major Russian cities. The capture of Moscow and Leningrad city governments by these insurgentsramatic examplepreading phenomenon, zte strength, so far, holds out the prospsct that tha second Russian revolution canemocratic
outaome.
Mow this brew will yield some lasting political outcome is now as impossible to predict as the outcome itself. The struggle is increasingly polarized between the democrats and the republic ssparatiets, on one aide, and the authoritarian Russian nationalists on the other. But the political acene remains highly varied and fractured. The democrats have no other source of support than the populace. The authoritarians have more support among the military high command, some elements of the KGB, and the party apparatus, giving them the optionutsch,ery risky one. should the democrats fall to get power or govern effectively, or econoelo aollapee occur, the authoritarians could gain euthentic popular aupport.
In the most desirable scenario, the democrats would gradually win national power in Russia from the localitiea upwards; and Gorbachev, perhaps after disposing of the CPSU at the next congress, vould give up hia balanoing act and Join them. attern rather like that seen inopularly elected government would come to power and Gorbachev might preside, perhaps marginally like Jaruzielaki. other scenarios are all distinctly nastier. Deepening chaoslear victory for the democratic forces increases ths likelihood that Rueaian nationaliat authoritarians will ultimately prevail. Should the latter seek to short-circuit the processilitary putsch, they might eucceed inransient regime reminiscent of Pinochet ln Chile. But an equally likely reault wouldocial uprising against them and, possibly, widesprsad elvil var.
Although lt cannot ba excluded entirely, one scenario is very unlikely. That is the orderly progress of perestrolka with Gorbachev at the helm of (finally) successful political and economic reforme of the sort ha currently articulates. Mis authority appears too weak and hla pollclaa too incoherent or misguided. But he'e changed course sharply in the peat and could do eo again.
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Tha real issue is not Gorbachev but ths strength snd proaies of the deaoaratio forces. They are greater than ever expectedot of reasons, ths most important one being quite simple. Afterears of misruleelf-appointedpeople want self-government. Education, sodem communications, and painful negative example have taught them eosething about what self government is. They identify democracy with what they poignantlynormal aociety". They are less ready to embrece ths values of democraticarkets and private property, that go with democratic politicsnormalut they are capable of learning if they get the chance. ay, the capacity of the Russian people to exercise the desocratlc politics they are rapidly learning, and then to learn and axsroiss democratic economics is the central uncertainty about ths Russian state at the end ofh century, as it was at the beginning when promising developments were destroyed by war and the Bolsheviks.
Militarynd tho rutmri Pusalon stats
Sines lt emerged in early-modern times, the unified Russian stete hae been identifiedarge peacetime military establishment. The army not only served to consolidate the etate/emplre, itentral legitimising symbol of the state itself. Thie continued under Communism. Because victory in World War II wee the major achlevenent that somehow legitimized the Stalinist system, the Soviet army became, much more than the CPSU, the Soviet institution that enjoyed authentic popular support and therefore legitisized the state. Thie contributed to the militarization of Soviet policies and political culture ln the post-war years. The army's modernization so as to be competitive with armies of neighboring countries wasentral goal during periods of political and economic reform throughout Russian history. Stalin embarked on force-draft industrialisation in large part to create military etrength. Gorbachev launched his assault on the Stalinist system in large part to revive the economic and technological base for that strength.
Today, however, this knot of identity among Rueslsn statehood, modernity, and the army ara under severe challenge that leaves the future of this tradition nearly as uncertain as that of tha regine. First, the Gorbachev leadership hae admitted and, exploiting glaenost, the democratic forcee have amplified the truth that the overwhelming priority of military force building after World War IIcalled the "hypertrophy ofentral cause of the crisis besetting the system today, not only crippling healthy economic development but contributing
Geatly to the eetrangement of the USSR from the advanced dustrlal world. Second, gleenost has unmasked how greatly the amy harbored the corruption, waste, end irrationality that characterized the "stagnation" of the Brezhnev years. To many In the USSR today, the army equateseserved defeat in Afghanistan and brutal conditions for young conscripts. All this
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ha* profoundly undermined the aray at the object of patriotic loyalty. Thle haa in turn deeply outraged and divided the Soviet officer
Th* Soviat ailitary is already involved in necessarily repressive operation* to contain current revolutionary development*. This involvement vill alaoat inevitably grow; and tha ailitary leaderehip le understandably fearful that thla vill further undermine ita popular aupport, even though lt favor* defense of central authority and public order. It reaenta being thrust into this caldron by an adventurous, indecisive politioal leadership.
Should ths Soviet ailitary be drawnutsch against Gorbachev, or by Gorbachev into one againat his radical opposition, or by its own leaders to prsssrvs the state from chaos, this crisis of legitimacy aaong aray, state, and society could eecalate sharply, perhaps fatally. utsch couldider uprising. Or the ailitary could ba engaged against etrixing workers in the Russian heartland even this year. Military involveaent in suppressing unreet Bight succeed, but as likely vould produce mutinies and fracturing. One can imagine an outcome in which the traditional identity of army and state is
Earaanently destroysd in Russia. Leas likely, but not noonceivable, ailitary intervention against pervasivs chaos with ths support of popular ssntiaent, either democratic or nationalist/authoritarian, couldew tradition, eiailar to that in Turkey, wherein the amy is the ultimata foundation and guarantor of the new Russian atate.
The internal revolutionery dynaaic that definaa the new Russian state, although highly unpredictable, will probably be doainent in defining tha relationship of that state to its ailitary eeteblishaent. But external factors will also be important, perhaps in contradictoryhan Russia emerges froa the current travail, whoa will its* see aa its enemies? How strong or threatening will they appear to be? Powerful threat perceptions vill encourage reversion to paranoid xenophobia inflating tha state'* perceived ailitary neede. The role of foreign etates, especially nsighbors, in the revolutionary process itself willactor in shaping those perceptions, es lt was. But the outcome of that process will be critical. Had the Bolsheviks failed to seize and hold power. Allied intervention in Russia early in this century might be reaembered more fondly. And, of course, the geography and intensity of threat perceptionsost-communist Russian state will be influenced by what happens to the non-Russian colonies, how their new status was achisved, and how the new Russian stats accommodatee to thea.
The future Russian state could face potential or pressing security problems froa several sidsst Europe,nited Germany and democratizing East Europe; islamic South Asia, with involveaent of Iren end especially Turkey in the affairs of its Csntral Asian colonies: China, undergoing revolutionary developaents of its own; and Japan, growing in econoaio and
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possibly military powar. Whether thaaa regiona ara perceived by Russia to be genuinely thraataning (or Inviting of Russia's own interventionist aBbitlona) will be influenced very auch by developaenta internal to thea. China will probably be the most severe challenge over the long run because ef ite inherent strength, nuclear power, and instability. Xslamlo South Asia willroblem for Russia,esser threat becauae of ite geopolitical fragmentation and backwardness. Europe will probably be perceived ae leaat threatening becauae of its evolving democratic nature, anti-militarism, and likely helpfulness in easing Russian economicnless ths new Russian stateevanchist, chauviniat autocracy, in which case democratic Europe could be eeen as the major enemy.
Whatever the geopolitical setting and the internal outoome of the second Ruesian rsvolution, it is likelynified Ruasian atate will survive (or raemerge) and that lt will have the ability and desire toowerful ailitary establishment,ormidable nuclear arsenal. Bow powerful and how hostile to the West that state proves to be will depend, once again, aoatly on its nature, democratic or authoritarian.
Tha Variable, of Pego?ragy
Why should the variable of deaooracy in future Russia be soonsideration in our perceptions of the threats it may pose to the West? This should bs self-evident to deaocratlc societies. The Cold War, indeed aost of the great conflicts ofh Century, have been about democracy. Yet the aatter must be treated explicitly because its future is both crucial and uncertain, and also becauae auch of Westsrn opinionuddled view of lt, underestimating tha potential for and aleidentifying the Strongest sources of real democracy in Russia.
The old truths are still true. Democracy tende etrongly, if not automatically and absolutely, to make atates leas threatening to other states, especially if tha other states are also democratic. This is not becauae of the nobility of democratic souls but because of the limitations that deaocratlc societies put on the state as the repoaitory of coercive, armed might. They do thle for their own proaperity and protection end to keep themselves out of needless trouble with their neighbors. As the history of our.country shows, democracies can go to war and spsnd whole CNPs on ailitary power, but the cauae haa to bs and remain persuasiveot of people under very critical scrutiny. That there are dangerous departures froa this dominanturrent tensions betweenPakistan and India, does not deprive it of its persuasivenessajor contributor to peace.
A democratic Ruasia is fsr more likely than en autocratic one to aanifest these tendencies, if perhaps only gradually and haltingly. It would be very unlikely to sustain the kind of arsenal economic performance witnessed in the post-war period of strategic buildup even after recovering economic health, unless
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facedompelling naad that withstood constant public scrutiny. aaocrstlc Russia would wrastls with powerful nationalist and xenophobic, even imperialistic sentiments, but marshaling ailitary power to express thea would have to overcoae the pervasive desire of people to live normally, whioh, on the whole, Includes living fairly with neighbors. emocratic Russis would lneist on auch aore humane conditions for its service aen, whichaaller ailitary and in tlaeolunteer ailitary. uaaia would argue eonatantly and publicly with itself about real ailitary needa and the costs of aeeting thea. It would in tlae recover the ability to bear those costs, perhaps better than an autocratic Russia, but ba ever less willing to bear thea. All these arguaenta apply equally to those many other dimensions of "thsntelligence and subversion activities, foreign adventures, eto.
Nevertheless, if and when econoalc and social health wereeaocratlc Russia would shars with its autocraticesire to be an equal to the other auperpower or powers, whatever that may come to mean in the yaara ahead. That such equality auat include dimensions of povsr other than and competitive with the demands of ailitary power is clear to aoat educated Russians now.
All this says that the future of our Russian threat ia being decided in the struggle of Russia's democratic forces. To ths extent Gorbachev and hie policies aid thea, they serve our eecurity interests. Although Gorbachev merita historic crsdit for unleashing these forces on the Soviet scene, hia record of supporting thea haa been ambiguous, especially lately. The democratic forces heve shown remarkable strength. They hold the possibilityransformation in Russia as sweeping ae those seen ln East Europe. But thair success is far froa assured.
Concluding Reflections
What concluaiona can be drawn froa these speoulstions?
Russia is headedevolution that will replace the current regime. Orderly evolution of the present regiae into some condition foreshadowed by its current policies is no aore than,ikely.
This rsvolution will be marked by chaos snd violence, because it already is so Barked and thia seems likely to continue. Massive violence and civil war are not inevitable, however. elatively peaceful revolutionetter than Roaanla'a experience) Is possible. The faster the democratic forces rise to powerwith or without Gorbachev's leadershipths more likely that civil war will be avoided. Extended chaos or repressive intervention by authoritarian forcea makes civil war and an authoritarian outcoae aore likely, but not certain.
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A unified Huaslan stats will eaerge froa thia revolution. Tba nore democratic it ia tha core likely it will ba able to retain confederal relatione with parts of the preeent empire (Ukraine, Byeloruasla, parte of Central Asia) and accommodats to departure of others (Baltics, Transcaucasia, perhaps Western Ukraine). The more euthoritarian lt ls, and based purely on Russian nationalise and the claims of order, ths more likely that non-Russian parte will leave the empire.
The process of revolution ls likely to laat atecade. The shapa and sconomio health of the new Russian atata will then begin to emerge. It will recover ita ability end desire toompetitive militery posture, including strategic nuclear power, egainst whomever it perceivee to be its snesles ln the neighborhood and to balance off to some degree the militsry strength of other large powers, including the US.
How great Russian military power is, how it is configursd, and how it is aimed egainst the values and security of the Wast depend most critically on the variable of democracy versus nationalist authoritarianism in Russia. Democracy tends toees threatening Russis, cooperating in Western collective securityi authoritarian Russia means hostility to the West, althoughelations would come and go.
Although authoritarianism would aean more hostility to the West, it would probably mean less capability to generate truly competitive countervailing military strength, because authoritarianism probably would brake aocial, economic, and technological modernization. Democracy will in the long run mean more Russian capability, but lass hostility to mobilize it. iddling formula that must concern us, however, sight be ssenorporatiat Russian authoritarianism, somewhat along the lir.ee of Mussolini's Italy.
With or without NATO, the future security architecture of Europe will tend to ba for democracies and againet non-democraciae. Democratic Russia could be integrated into it. Authoritarian Russia would inevitably be ite enemy.
A European security architecture that is strong and explicitly designed for democracies would ba among the most powerful external factore to help the democratic forcee in Russia.
Original document.
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