Hhltnoy II. Sliepardson
Hr. Reginald C. Foster
FRCtl: Trunk T. Ryan
onpf Proved Understanding
bcfcor, Embassy and
There are several provisions ln this ugroomentieh to comment upon.
n purasruphile following sentence
fur Kb direct intelligence from Spain IsSI operations will cover only ouchas say be requested or agrood to by the Ambassador and iho Military and Hnvnl Attaches, or be required by the Joint Chiefs of Stnff with the concurrence of tho State Department."
It is to bo notedrovision of this sentenceoncurrence by the State Department of any request made ofy tho Joint Chiefs of Stuff. This,elieve, infringes on tiie basic principle of OSS as an intelligence organisation, which,nderstand it, io to servo the Joint Chiefs of Staff as engatherer of strategic information; that le to say, OSS wasfor the purpose of securing intelligence from other than existingamely. State, QUI,.
nder "Functions" roads as followsj
ln Spain will not bocoae involved ln anyemhurrnusing to the Embassy. Tho decision ao to whut le or lo not embarrassing reslo with tho Arabasca-
dor, who should bo kept currently Informed of the
nature of the activities ln which OSS engages or plans to engago ln Spuln."
This provision fulls to comprehend the nature and duties of an Intelligence organization, which, by their very nature, are liuble in tlie courso of their activities to create embarrassments. The lawsountry cannot bo broken without embarrassment. The Ambassador fells to declare at what point he will become "embarrassed". Sir Samuel Hoare (the British.or example,ery thick skin when It cones to intelligence operations, and he doesn't embarrass oasily. Relatively minor happenings, which may be treated very lightly by OSS ae everyday occurrences, may be embarrassing to Ambassador Hayes, thereby enabling him to invoke the provisions set forth inunder "Organization andeading as follows:
"Hence ln cases whore the Ambassador has reason to believeertain individual is connected with OES, and that his activities in Spain are likely to cmiao embarrassment to tho Embassy, the Director of OSS in Spain will, upon the Ambassador' r. ret^tost, Inform him whether or not the individual ln question is ln fact-connected with OSS."
nder "Organization nnd Porsonnel" reads as follows:
"OSS in Spain is coordinate with the officesAttache and Naval Attache, and likea part of tho Embassy. Just aa each of these
offices ishief whose duty lt le to keop Iho Ambassador informed and to book hie counsel and follow his general instructions, so theof the OSS in Spainike duty."
I believe the phrase "and follow hlo general instructions" should be deloted. it is quite possiblo that the instructions which Chief of the OSS Mission In Spain may receive from time to time from Washington might be at variance with ttio Instructions of the Ambassador, If he were authorised to issue instructions.
nder "Organization and Porsonnel" roads as
"The number of American agents now in Spain will, for tho present, suffice for its SI work when the additional officer is added, togetherinance Officer, three code clerks and four stenographers, the need for which the Embassy recognizes."
This provision should be amended to read: "The number of American agents now operating ln Spain under State Dopartment cover will, for the present,tc.".
nder "Security" should be amended to rexdi
conduct of OSS personnel ln Spain, operating under cover of State Department, should be nubject to proper discipline and sanctions."
Tho paragraph ut, ii now stands omite the phrase "operatingof Stole Department". The disciplining of OSSprivate cover will, of course, be tho responsibility ofoffice of OSS.
Pf.ragruphnder "CoordlnuUon" rouds an follows:
"OSS agents operating In oronsuluto will deul with the principal consular officer and not with any Jmbordinatc officer or employee of that Consulate. Principal consular offlcern willin affording security protection for OSS personnel, and documents."
This paragraph cliould be substantially changed, or entirely ellDlnuted, for, as it: now reads, it provides that "all OSS agenta, without regard to nationality, should deal only with the principal consular officer ln tho locality where he is open.ting. The Intent ofrovision should be to limit the contuct of the responsible Aaorlcan OSS ogent in the cuneular territory to the consular officer io charge.
nder "Coordination" roods as followst
"The ambuosador has been authorised by tho Stole Department, with the concurrence of OSS, to exaaino all incoming und outgoing correspondence trans-Bitted through the Embassy. Ho will exorcise this right to the extent he considers necessary."
This pnragruph is linked to the objections raised to provisionsinivdor "Functiono1*. With authority to examine operational pouch material, the Ambassador places himself in theof knowing of the existence and perhaps the identity of "private cover" OSS representatives; and therefore tho ehoncon of his becoming embarrassed are greatly increased. The Ambassador should be In the position to disavow those private cover Americans, and this can aost effectively be accomplished by bis not knowing of their existence, which, ln turn, can only be attained if the operational material of both incoming und outgoing pouches is deprived hia.
In general, it seens apparent from the Agreement that hae been submitted for ratification, that the Ambassador hao succaeded in effectively shackling our Spanish mission, so that it cannot function as an intelligence organization must function to obtain maximum results. This 6pinlon is further strengthened bynderromuote the following:
t should bo borne in mind that ths Ambassador bus boon authbrlsod by Washington to give the most solemn assurances of the United States Government to tho Spanish Foreign Minister that 'none of our personnel in Spuln are engaged in activities which are directed against Spain1."
This provision indicates the major and fundamental difference inbetween the diplomatic manner of conducting intelligence andS way. This may be further illustruted by Argus' cable message, which I
"According to the Ambassador, who objects strongly to any effort by us to penetrate tho foreign office, complete information on the subject of1 was forwarded to Department.11
One of the very first objectivesood intelligenceis to penetrateopposition's Government. Among our first duties would, therefore, be an effortenetrate the Spanish Foreign Ofrice.
To mc lt soems apparent that the Agreement, as drawn up, establishesarmless, innocuous organization that even the Germans would not objoct it. If we cannot operate according to thef intelllgenco, then we might just us well abandon our efforts.
T. It.Original document.