MEMO TO THE MINISTER FROM GEORGE E. BREWER, JR. RE RETURNING FOUR DOCUMENTS AND

Created: 9/4/1944

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

U.S. SJi

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From: Oeorge E. Brewer, Jr.

I an returning the four documents which you handed me on Friday:5 ol augustff August ill and also copy of letter froa Apollo

I am aleo enclosing with these documente the draft of the cable which you aoked me to wake. ave shown It to Tikanderanted to be certain that it did not conflict with any of hia ideas. He has indicated that It does not. ope It may be of some use to you in phrasing your reply,ould be delighted to confer with you if you feel that this la necessary.

I haveurther letter fron my Headquarters In London In reply to my letter of August lb (copyhe firct two sentences of which read as follows:

letter ofh which replied at length to the cable which we forwarded youontained exactly the sort of statement which we wished to have In order to support the representations which we intend to makeuring his visit here. quite agree that the present status of our mission does not permit large-handed operations at this time.11

If you would care to see the wholeill be very glad toopy struck for you.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATErlULHI?

a.s. mget

u.s. cjjBrtr

To: 4

From: . B. Jr.

received this morning the following cable from my Headquarters in London:

"Joseph KLOUAJJ, chief instructor for 0S3 In ffeshington two yearsow with MO, attached SHAEF, chief, considered by us ae valuable assistant to you /grp ind/Weetfield plans and training.

"He worked with LETH3HIDOE whoa you know before coaling to OSS.

"Oover, transportation, and release can be arranged here. HASKELL approves. Please wire your reaction."

I propose to answer lt nn follows:

"KLOUAN welcome addition. Assume his cover Is not repeat not State Department. Please confirm.

"Have hin briefed very carefullyection, nasten hie arrival."

Thia man has nothing whatever to do with Mr. Stahl but would be extremely useful in instructing and briefing any agents whom we may send to the field. ssume oy Headquarters in London haveover job for hia not directly connected with the Legation,ish to query them on this point.

I am holding up my replyear from you that it has your approval.

To: The Minuter

From: Oeorge E. Brewer, Jr.

4

The enclosed cablegram refers to myopy ofent you about ten days ago.

T will cable Ool. Haskell with regard to Mr. Stahl when you decide whether or not you feel you can provideover job In the 8peclal Reporting Section.

Copy for the master

LG

London

)4

erman To:

Rest assured our full agreement. Your letter was deliberately evoked. Follow original directive until further notice. (Hr.rom Joseph Haskell and Hereon). We still suggest 3tahl as assistant unless cover absolutely cannot be arranged. Letter follows.

To: 4

From: Oeorge E. Brewer, Jr.

Dear Ur. Minister,

I have just reoeived the following cable from London with regard to Mr, Stahl, about whom we conversed the other day.

Mr. Stahl laears old and was the world traveling supervisor for the Staley Corn Produota Company5 Ke was the principal admlnlatratlve officer in the Department of Agriculture 3 he was In South America In the Liaison Intelligencetate Departosnt. Later he was Chief of the Central Europeann Washington, and sincee has acted as Assistant to the Chief of the German Desk In London.

I hope that you will find it possible to afford Legation cover for Mr. Stahl in the Speoial Reporting Section. As youeel somewhat embarrassed In making this request because of your great generosity to me in other matters of this sort In tbe past,an assure you, positively, that this will be the last request of this kindhall be forced to make. ill let my superiors in London know your decision whenever you let me know what it is.

Most sincerely yours.

4

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ope Approval in prinoiple Grieg projeot received todayill discusa furthern hie arrival. Meanwhile urge you consideressageugust to Minister and do everything possible to pave way for Grieg approval. This project part of general plan evolved in London for introduction of agonts into Germany during period of collapse. View shortness time oonsider it advisable Odin stay Sweden until collapse period and accompany his men southwards. Odin will be briefed with SHAEF objectives. OWI project one of genuine usefulness and should provide satisfactory cover. Assure you we have full confidence in Odin and have no intention of violating existing agreement.

"Tot - Copies to Ool. Haskell and

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As suggested in my cablewo oables have raised oomplioated issues, and they will have to be dealt with at some length and in considerable detail.

I am still proceeding on the principlem to report directly to you (vian all German matters, and not directlyj although you and/or Ool. Haskell forwardedecent oebleithout comment (except forhloh

Before getting Into tbe meat'bant to point out that there appears toerious mlsoonceptlon In his mind, and possibly in Ool. Haskell's mind too, of our capacity to recruit andperators. My report ofh, quoted an earlier letter asking you if you were interested Inperator into Germany, and It stated, "There are possibilities that we might makewhloh would eventually leadeasible plan to do that.* Later tn the report ths comment was made that "It looks now as though,we might need Palladium's eervloes to train and instructperators for work In Germany, as has been done In the cess of

As Headquarters London knew, the Danes in question were refugees with varying experience in They wars interrogated and tested by Palladiua, and on the basis of his reoommendatlon, some of them were sent to the UK for complete training. Theeferred to'are also refugees. Two or them haveertain degree of wireless experience, and my thought was that If they provedto you, from the security point of view, and if they wars reasonably proficientee, Palladium oould polish then up and instruct themechnique, ths use of skeds.ight here on the spot.

discussed this togetheras in London last month. Washington, not knowing the background, evidently has interpreted these comments far too optlaistlcally, and evidently believes that weauoh wider field for recruitment than is the carte. If we had any Buohfor recruiting and training as they believed, lt must have been obvioueould have devoted more than six linespage report to this subject. hink you, or Ool. Haskell, ought to make this dear at once, by oable, because his ordsr that two teams be infiltrated into Germany at onoa, and three teams be placed in training, simply oannot be complied with. There are not ten men He shall be luoky, indeed, If wa get four satisfactory"

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reoruita,an give no positive guarantee that even these will have the neoaasary qualitlee for under oover Ufa In Germany or would be willing to go.

Speolfioally, tbore are two Oermane, already knownhoa we may be able to raorult. Thay are Oerman deserters .who claimed on arrival to be Polishnd who stated that they would be willing to return toaa alreadyeport6 about these two man, and It is ny belief that be felt the seourlty risk in ualng themretty severe one. Neither of the two nan la trained Inork, or in intelligence, although both, if tbslr story la to be believed, have experience of living illegally in Oermany. In addition to thesenforms oe that there are one or two Poles who may bs available, who have sons knowledge of Korea. Whether thay oould poaalbly live under oovar in Germany, or if the Poliah authorltlea here will releaaa thaa to ua, la not known at tha Moment. However* Inquiries ara now being madend wa ehould knowew days. He tells ma that it ia also poaslble that there may be one or two Dutoh citizens who might also ba raorulted for tbla purpose. However, thia would have to be dona with tba consent of the Dutch intelligence people, and it la by no means osrtaln that wa oan gat thalr services, although ws are now endeavoring to find out all wa oan about thaia and to line them up aa poaslble reorulta. There may bs one or possibly two mora Geroana among tbe rofugeea who could ba considered, but wa hare abaolutely no security oheok on any of than. That la about tha field.

Aa to tbe larger laauea raised by iC9'e oablea: tbsy seem to apply alsoat wholly to ths German sectionn assuming teat no radloal alteration is dealred in tba activities either of the Danish or of tbe Norwegian Seotlone.

with regard to the work of tbe Germanhoroughly appreolate the naoesslty for urgent action, in vies of tha rapidly developing military altu&tlon on tha continent. However, we suet be abaolutely realistic aa to what we are to dot bow wa ara to do it, and whan wa ara to do It.

The first point ia that wa here oust know exactly what wa ara shooting at. Until the reoalpt of tharetty clear idea of what waa wanted from thia Ulaelon by London, and since my return four waakaave been working along the lines whloh wa dlaouased in London, and, ae you know from my routine reports, wa have made pretty good progreaa. udge, however,'e cablee, that the whole program for work inolde 0eratany is now to be given much greater emphaala, and la to be carried

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outuch more ambitious scale than bad bean planned. Tbe difficulty at the moment lam not at all olear aa to what the nature and aoope of thess operations is to bo. ave you ay opinion for what lt was worthas in London, that the quiokeet dividends were going to beIn the field of intelligence, rather than In the field of sabotage, and for that rsason my work here, and that of theranoh, was being oarried out In ths olosost possible collaboration. sraan Section here shared thess views, and they, and we, and thsranoh have tended to

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ool all our resources and informationonmon effort, still think this ls the most effective way whloh we can work from Stockholm,till bsllsvs that the total amount of aotual sabotage whloh oould bs carried on inside Oeraany, based from Sweden, will prove to be nothingrop in the buokst.

Oon you giva me some clearer picture aa to what ths general program la so that we can fit our work moreinto Its patternT m listing In later paragraphs in this letter all our prossnt resources and plans so that you can beosition to estimate ths degree ofwhloh you aan reasonably expect from Stookhola.

Once the picture of major strategy is olear, the next step is for us to analyse the exact contribution which we in "estfield onn make. seashington, London, and Stookhola (and presumably other outpost aiaslons similar to Stookhola) ere all part of ons organised team. Each has certain facilities and capabilities and each has certainin respect to the aotlon lt can take. Based on thess faoilltles and limitations, saoh has osrtaln logloal rsspon-slbllltles with regard to the overall German Mission.

Xt seeas to me that we must all bs quits clear about these points, too, ifare to coordinate our efforts suocsss-fully for work Inside Oeraany.

The two cables Imply that thsrstratsgio plan for SO operations in Germany. now enough about SO work to know what the general nature of these plans must be, but here in Stookhola ws have no apeoiflo knowledge of any of its details. For instance, ths demand that two teamsperators bs infiltrated into Oeraany at ones, gives no clue as to what part of Garmany they will bs operating In, or whether or not thsy are to link up with an existing organisation Inside Osrioany, or whether they ars to attaoh theaselves to an expedition or an organisation which will ba eent out from ths UK, or one of the other advanced operating bases. Xt ls obvious, that thsre must be some plan of this sort bsoauss two wireless operators working by thsaselves, nslthsr of whom la required, by the telegram, to be trainsd lar SO techniques, would obviously not be able to serve any purpose.

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Tbe greatest practical difficulty whioh confronts Westfield with regard to Ita Oaroan operations, at the moment, le that ye have no going underground organisation of our oan within Oermany* nor any oonneotlon with whatever underground organisation that Special force Headquarters in London has already astabllehed.

X rather gathered froa my oonvereationa witheotlons in London, thatBave soy effective organised oelle within Oermany with whloh we could oaksby oouriers fro* Sweden, or to whoa we oouldgent a. leo gathered that theyewaddresses* and 'letter boxes* which oould be used once they wereof the security of tbe courier route* whloh Wsstflsld la ourrently working on.

From any operational point of view, oouriar routee ebould be kept entirely separate from the undergroundlteelf. The job Of tha courier la Just that, and nothingo deliver messages from one place to another. Xt is the Job of the organiser himself to supply "eafe addresses and "letter boxes.11 We hnve lined up oourier routes whloh can take messagee and supplies, and probably "bodies* from Stockholm to various Oeraan ports. ay this advlaadly, becauaa tha oourier routee have not yet been teeted, but froa current reports of my agants, they are ready to function just as aoon aa wo ara ready to giveob to perform, the fact of the matter is that we do not have anyone at tbe other end to reoelve the messages aa we have in the oase of the Norwegian and the Danish Sectlona.

In the case of such countries aa Norway and Denmark, France and tbe Low Oountrlea, where from our point of view weriendly population, trained organisers ware despatohed froa the UX by air or boat to carry out tbe work of organising cells, securing "safend eav tabllahlng oomounloatlonaith Headquarters. In the case of theae countries there wars plenty of potential re-orulte in the UK to reoelve thia training and to ba deepatched in tine to the field.

The oase of Oermany haa bean vary different, and the job has bad to be approaohedomewhat different manner. However, we cannot gat around the faot that there suet be trained organisers introduced into Germany. Here in Swedenery United field for recruitment, indeed, and absolutely no training faollltlee at all. hink we may all just aa well faoe the faot frankly that we are probably not going to find any Oerman nationals here who will seat the bill. There must be many times the number of prlaonera-of-war in tbe UK and in the USA froa which auoh reorulta might ba drawn, than there are in Sweden. Here thereary email number of Oeraan deserters and refugees, most of whoa ara highly untrustworthy, and almost none of whon are oubjeot

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to any security check. They have all been ooneldered either by SI, the Labor representative (whouet getting tornd very few of them oould even be oonsldered for the Job.

I think the do at fruitful field for recruitment lies in Denmark, rather than In Sweden. ave talked this matter over4 who believes that it might be feasible to set up, through MINT mall recuriting organisation in Denmark. There, there iserman minority and native Danes with good German oonneoticns who oould conceivably llvs under cover inside Germany. If euch an organization were approved by you atould suggest that you have direct communications with themn the recruiting program. Once tbey were established and had made contacts at ths various north German ports, we could probably supply them with material, maintain communications with them, and issue any instructions desired by Headquarters by written message. Xf you in London oan despatch organisers to the field by air or boat, wa should be able to maintain the same sort ofwith then. We will try our best to recruit such organisers here in Sweden, and also more remotely in Norway*-There is some possibility that the latter country may yield one or two recruits for eventual despatoh to Germany, m not very hopeful about this matter so far as Sweden is oonosrned.

X gather SX has one or two contaots in Qermany, but quite understandably, they do not want to imperil theseby turning over whatever "safe houuas" they may have to us as termini for our courier routes. uite understand thlapprove of their seourlty in thia matter*

X have dealt so far with the limitations with which we are confronted here In the matter of recruitment. So far as training is concerned, we have no facilities at all, with the possible exception of Palladium,entionedwho could be used to brush up men who are already familiar with the Horse code, but quite obviously, has neither the facilities nor the time to train raw reoruits.

So far as transport ls concerned lt ls obvious that we oannot introduce agents into Qermany by air lift. There are two methods open to us. The first of these is by ships leaving Swedish or Norwegian ports; the second is bychannels through Denmark.

At present we are working at top spesd to seours boat routes which ply direotly from Swedish ports to north German ports. We have been rather fortunate in the last two weeks, and apart from the case ofe have discovered two other possible routes, one of which looks very promising, indeed.

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wtglan porta wo have estab-

lished an organization in Gothenburg whioh in turn has made oontaot In Xristiansand, Norway. Through our Norwegian chan-ne.lBhav* dlreot communication with the ohlef organizerhe boat routes in Kriotlansand, by overland oourier ssrvios. At presenteel free to tell youave good hopes that we oan arrange for oourier servloe froa Norwegian ports dlreotly to tbe north Oeraan ports, andelieve these routes oan be UBed not only for the transmission of messages, but also to carry "bodies."

lreot linewsdieherman port is preferable to the Norwegian or Danish routes, because in the latter two oases, three frontiers have to be crossed illegally, two of whloh are under enemy control.

In the matter of communications and supplies froa Stockholm to anyone whoa wo may be able to infiltrate into Germany, the servloe ie bound to be both irregular and alow

pomaunioationa with Germany, nor is it ths polloy of London to permit us to do so. hould reckon that it would take between five and six weeks for ua toessage from Stockholm to any or the north German porta and reoelve an answer back.

Apart from tbeave alrsady mentioned,

? * Voperating from Stookholo under diplomatlo oover. In other words, we are engaging in wholly illegal activitieseutral country whlohery active and effiolent counter-espionage department. low-up of any proportions would havs esrioue roperoussions in the State Department, without whose help we cannot function at all. You will realise that this foroos us to use tbe greatest possible oars In our security, whioh in turn imposes delays of many kinds on our aotlona.

I may add in passing that we have not yet rsoelvsd permission froa the State Department for the use of their pouch servloe for our illegal activities.

The poaelbllltlea of increasing our officer pereonnel In Stockholm, whioh was suggested's long oable. la severely limited by the question of oover. Almost the only cover we can use today la that wbloh can be afforded by the State Department. annot speak for the Minister,irmly believe that we have almost reached tbe limit The Legation le already heavily loadednd further requests for an lnoreaee in tbe present numbera will, in my view, almost oertainly meet with realstanoe, the reason foran well understand.

I hope that thia aooount will givelearer picture than you may have had, of the basio limitations to

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the scope of action which we oan expeot to carry on from this bass.

I now want to giveery quiok resumehe positive side of the ploture:

1. e organisation we have direct ohannels for distributing United quantities of blackinslds Oermany. We know that theseare effective because we have had positive proof that atertain portion of the material sent through them has actually been delivered. Those ohannels are sntirely open to us for our use at any tins wa wlah to make use of them.

3. 8 haa also suooeeded inane who ia expsoted to depart for Hamburg Just as soon ae London oan furnish us with tbe nsoessary forged documents. If this agent is suooessful in his Mission, he will organise "letter boxes" and "safe addressee" not only in Hamburg, but In other north German ports, to whloh, eventually, our oourier routes (Westfield'e) will lead, so that we may eetablieh and maintain oomiunioationa.

If major is suooessful in bis operation, we will havelreot lutelllgenoe channel from Berlin to Stockholm, with really aeoure and swift communications by mail. We will also haveeneral "letter box" to wblob any other oontaots we may have in Germany may deliver their messagsa for direct transmission toand from whloh they oan reoelve dlreot cozaunloatlona sent them from Stookbola.

Wa have lined up the various boat routesave already mentioned for courier aervioe.

Apart from Oermany proper, we have eetabllehed routes into Norway and Denmark for the dissemination of blaok propaganda, which have already been proven, and whioh have already performed excellently in this reepsot.

If you in London can reoruit and train organisersperators for the field, and are prepared to drop these men, not directly in Oermany, but to reception committees in Norway and In Denmark, the ohanoea that we oould arrange from hers for their further transport into Oermany seems pretty fair. m making this suggaatlon because wa aeea to havofor tranaport, and you certainly have the greater resources for recruiting and training.

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Xt h1 'io seeas to ae London's duty to establish the overall operational polioy for Osraany and to prspare tbe operational plans. That doss not ssea to as, frankly, to be the Job of this Mission. If lt is, then tbe operational headquarters of the German Seotlon should logically be lo Stockholm and not in London. WO will also havs to oount on London to supply us with forged papers,nd propaganda material, and for security oheoks (insofar as they are requirsd) of anyone whoa we may be able to recruit hers.

At the risk of beingeel that tbe greatest need, at the moment, ls ths Introduction of three or four ooapletely trained organlsere into Oeraany. Thsrs are no training schools hsrs, and the only place in which thsy oan be trained is in tbe UK. resume that you have trained peraonnel thsrs. If thsrs is any way In whloh we oan assist you In getting those people into Germany, either via Norway or via Denmark, or evenlnoh, via Sweden, we are prepared to help. But we oannot produoa the trained agents here. Inhould like to emphasise the importance of Westfield's oloss Integration with thsranoh and with the BO*. The resources of any one of thess tbrss is quits limited; the oomblned resources of all three are many tlaes greater.

X hope you will let me have your views of thla general analysis as promptly as possible,ops equally that this rathsr long account any provs to ba of soae value to you in your future planning.

Sincerely yours.

4

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August 11

Followingashington cable received1

Westfleld mission according to its report has folllties for training and reoruitlng WE operators and agents in Sweden for Infiltration into Germany.

Tho time has come that this mission must perform and utilize (massage nr.rom Joseph Haskell and) its long period of preparation,

wo teams should be infiltrated into Germany at onoe and three more placed in training to dollow as opportunities permit.

Wo understand there is olose collaboration with SI. therefore the teams should be joint SO/SI missions. SO people will lie engaged in the first instance primarily inAotion against targets should be timed with military*

Despite your tentative objections suggsstasses Szahl rpt STagl at onoe, to organize reoruitlngecent message to Minister should help arrange oover quickly. Wire lramediatoly arrangements made.

r

WAS

at*HjjL ta^JC/

4

August 5

2his is iaeasa:jo. , ?leaac deliver the following messagee to Keraphel Jolaiaon personally:

?araave been deeply grateful for ail your help. How that the war lias progrosuod to tho point where it iu apparent we should abandon the passive phase of our activities in yourd initiate affirr.wfcivehould like to 3Uboit to you for your advioeia**nee thetters which hive been fully disvusscdthe State Department here.

Aica the French phsiae hasow problemehall no longer have friendly forcea behindines tc acsist us.ill be necessary torer^tionoll patrols executing assault3 fror.lantsaMns audacious raids.

elieve wo slir.ll be facedoui eneny driven underground, "here will be no lack of sources on which they can draw: yoiuv; rind sinoore ftasis, the veoted interests of the liaai reside, the losers in the Sudetenland and similar

arena, deposed officials, youns rzezy officers.

Parailore expert in undergroundn their origins they cane up fron tho rindor^ound and they have had to dc-al with all fclndn of iinu^sroiwd nover/cnts. Ehcy havereparing for underjpound activities] alnce the beginniiis: they havo jllsood prospective leadcrc in innocent civil service or -police positions; they have woa over phuslolans and scientist^ to their sldoray eld in hiding iicais in hospitals, asylums,end little taiorm potential leaders to asylum elsewhoro to be ready when needed. V'o shall needr visilanoc and skill to ooribat tfcoa . .'e ust identify their Cvd-harsnta, locate thoir supply dunrps and secure intelligence as to their plana and activities.

rare.ur SO activities will havo to bo done by raor: we select for the work, 'i.'e cannot rely on native help. lobeunite nuat converse on Ger-:nayur baaos in neutral countries as wall as from our elements located vrLth tho arnica.oCiOUld coy.teraplr.tc using Swedenpringboard forin Ger.Tinay and ITor.vay and would not conduct SO activltior; in Sweden. itself.

?arae should not wo integrated with SOB for SO work, since staff officers of one country cannot properly control armed units of another. Iheao activities must be controlled in the field. However, tho closest collaboration with SOU le.

I'araishould bo gratedul for augsoationa fren you ooreerrdng the possibilities of rrakinj youraueyrin^board) for the subversive andphases of our activitiesay and Germany both directly and throughhould like you to considersubrdtting;oo: jv.er.de.r.etri;*ion ofy intelligence andnits, rrxl the ontr-Dlichwontour area ofithunits in thoer-ticulaxly want your opinionto how lifcwly it ir; that thorci efficient functioningpossibly controlledweden (at least in part) with "stay-behindightly knit orgsni action which we con oonbat in LTje'Jl trained peraonnel. Shove must be well lc:ovra Anti-Kazis in Sweden who would be glad to aid in dealing with Saaieuot look to our Swedish representative not only for tho work he has been doing

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with you in intelligence, hutorward operational job as well.

Para ii. Some of the questions that should he condid-cred aret A) Can youo obt:iin and give toist of possible Gerrcns who will assume loader ship in underground resistance? B) Can affirmative actionhere be initiated among French and other liberated labour groups in Germany?

Para"hese questionsorely su.xeuiive. Iyou the formulation of other cuosticno and answers thatfrom thinking along* these lines. In answering thessshould be understoodwndon would largely befor initiating and carrying through effectiveheretrained men to meet anyou ore pre-

pared to support! we will advance funds andweden with supplies and leaders as the need crises.

m trying to prepare for the changedthat will existuoceodr.jor breakthrough to German !inc3 in the nextknowvo thought about thosehould lihe ;he benefit of your thinking and the aid of your effective cooperation ind carrying through ways of meeting theroblem that will arixe withoftself.

thile it is necessary to implement thisanted to do nothing without first advising you of theand the necessity of immediate action.

Original document.

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