Created: 12/5/1944

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible





5, :'j41

approved fdr release date:reaen, ogs;


-nbor of Coaios: 'i

This is Copyiigigh


nited states government

to i or Leo M. A

Executive Officer


swDjECT: "Dogwood Project, Istanbul Mission"

I attacharrative account of theand activities of the DOGWOOD Projectemember it at this time.

The report has been written without recourse to files or to notesave had no way to check errors in fact. Many of the statements contained therein are subject to correction or controversy, but they are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and in accord with xy memory.

The report Is submitted as an original with one carbon copy togetherhart of the chain orRanizstion which has been copiedhotographic copy of my original chart in Istanbul. All rough draft copies are to be destroyed after proofreading and no copies have teen rotalned.

ction I

A. "Introduction

he following account has been written entirely from memory without recourse to notes and without access to files. Much of the material herein contained may be highly controversial, and such statements should be considered only as the personal opinion of the writer. "Without access toannot state how many reports each agent turned ln or his percentage of error. ill try to give, however, my personal estimate of each man's evaluation, his loyalty to the Allied cause or his Axis affiliations. The report startsimple narr^cive, asemember, explaining the organization and expansion of an enterprise known as the Cereus-Dogwood Show. It startea out as "Cereus".

Section II A. Preliminary Discussions with Dogwood

the second week ofr. McFarlandmyaelf^to meetontactbeen turned over to him jointly by Mr. Robertf the British ISLI^ The contact was

Czechosiovarian engineer who hadesident of Istanbul for something more than fifteen years. Ur. UcFarland arranged tne meeting and then withdrew, leaving |cnd myselfjto question and converse with

later took the name of dir. Dogwood, we will refer to his hereafter by that name). Ur. UcFarland did not see Dogwood again until late December.

that first meeting Dogwood explained in some detail


by t. xcFarl^nd that- to uslean billfron the British and froa theDuring our conversations It developed that Dogwood had1

tish Servleeajaml that ho had done thla work without pay. It


at the tiac of our rirst conversation, had gone to England to

* discuss the future plans of his om cepartaent and returned to Turkeyejor's coonisslon fcr Dogwood in the British Army. At the time of our conversation, however, even the possibility of this was unknown to Docivood and to us; and Doe-wood had advised the British that alnco they haa no permanent status for him In their organization, he was leaving their services and roula try to work with the Americans. Mr. HeFar-land's statement that Dogwood came to uslean bill of health led us to believe that this change cat with the approval of the British ISLD,

It also developed that Dogwood had don* intelligence work for the Czech organization froa Jerusalem to Istanbul, he knew, for example. Colonel Koapost who headed the Czech Deiuleae Bureau In Jerusalem. He also knew the Czech representative

in Turkey, but because of some personal clash did not care to work with hla, and we found later that the feeling was mutual.

our original conversations which took place onafternoons. Dogwood demonstrated that helot about the Intelligence business and its secreteoaswunl cat ions. H> showed us several devices whichclever and very effective,Irapreasod nlth his command of the econonic,political and won military status In Central Europe.

B.' Decision to Organise Separate Group

we had concluded our conversations with Dogwood,

|and myaelfjdlscussed the entire proceedings in ook tho stand that Dogwood was exceedinglyshrewd, calculating ana cunning, and that histho Allied cause was perfectly genuine,

talned, hoxever, that Dogwood was too good, ana that Inheerman spy playing the boldest ofah attempt to penetrateoeret service orI had heard all the facts and all the oiscuaslor.sfor se

line with his conviction; and we decided then and thereDangerous. eportea this opinion to

sr. XcFarland who said that he had no opinion on thethat the British had cleared him, ana that weto make up our own minds us to whether to use him orMcFarlana then departed for Cairo. eries ofthat it Bight be worthwhile

to try Dogwood, so we agreed to take him on. Be rad.'ecd Mr.In Cairo for his control and budget and recelwd his

approval to go ahead.

e decided to establish Dogwoodpecial cell having no relation whatsoever to Mr. McFarlsnd's headquarters except that broad matters of policy would be decided by Mr. McFarlanfl and that all reports of an intelligence character would be submitted to Mr. McFarland's office and to no other agency or branch. In thopent several days with Dogwood In his own private office where he maintained and conducted his engineering business. He had three staff members at that time,oung Greek technician by the name of | and secretary, | onfidential assistant who took the name of Gladiola.

one of these staff members ever heard the name ofmany months later, vith the possible exception of HO one ever heard of the OSS. They did not toiowMcFarland's office was located and had no contactwith any members of McFarland's staff except byclever,ow regard him as one of

the best technical helperserson of excep-

tional ability. She could refcd, write and speak fluently English, French, German, Turkish, Greek, Spanish, and sorae Czech and Polish. With one stenographic helper she took care of all the voluae of material that caaie through Dogwood's office. Gladiola wai

I took the entire Dogwood staff with me to the new location.xcessive crowding in Istanbulearch for office space

I found

a suitable office we could take over as cover. The name of the firm was

nsver hid any reason to suspect that |

vertently uncovered our activities even to bis wife, and he gave us help wherever we needed it. The |

and since the conditions of war stopped allusiness the staff had been ruduccd to one person who maintained the office and marked time until the end of the war. This man wasl

| who had worked for

twenty three years. He lived In the village

|was an ex-

tremely pious man with an udmirable wife and family, athe localarranged the office in such a

way,-^ aoom entirely apart from anyactivities that went on, and ho was unablt to seewho came and went; but bb tlni* went on we becameof his loyalty to tho Allied cause and of hiaso we put him on our own payroll and delegated t and to be our cashier. He

handled all the fundsucured from HcFarUnd's office

C. lc-ttlons Laboratory

ound that these two sea had invented thathat Dogwood bad shown us during our firsthis. Their skill in microscopy and alcrophotographyof their laboratory work made them key people Insystems. stablished both of them in awhich wns separate froia tho Dogwood office and locatedground floor of my own office. We used the laboratoryand handle secret ciphers, to give special traininggoing to the field, to mierochotocraph documentsmaterial, and to produce cot=railcationour own use and for the use of Ur. KcFarland's officethey needed'^nown as Harciasua, but we

ible In the office,ried to appear at leastay.

wentonly very

seldom. All policy contacts with that office were made hy myself, butertain length of timeJ jacted aa courier and always took the weekly reports under seal to ScFar-land's headquarters. Of the entirend ayself^wera the only ones who knew the location of KcFor-land's office und no one in XcFarland's office, not even KcFcrland himself,fmSof our establishment.

A. Activlt.c By "be tine the Dogwood Show was established in ita awn

ontiiiasod, one wot.lined c-rvo to obtain military infellicence etie ccononic, political,end aeclcel lnfrmation sbiut the Axis countries. Vie found that most of thetechnical jamais wererestricted in tneir circulation, trial they were no longer available to subscribers, but through t, specialspen the vur.<isii Government received regularly one co=iyeh of the important usriean technical mai-aair.espseers. These documents wore soot to the University of Istanbul technical library and were available onlyertain restricted isowcvcr,larcissus we were able to secure tho copies as they arrived, take them clandestinely to our laboratory, photograph themturn then by the nest aorcing. ?rom them wc- were obit to Obtain aor information mostly of interest to SkA but as time went on cur work grew to such en extente did not have the staff or tine to take curef it. About this tisie weequest fromheadnusrters statins thct ttie penetration of Central iiurope iron Sweden, Switzerland, and SnglPOd had not been successful and asking us to see if we could do anything about it. Thusls countries bCCO-'seie interest of tho Dogwood Show. re not conccrr.e3 with houmsnla oreven though they were Axis partners, or Greece, Yui-oslaviu, or Albaniaere occupied countries, tur activities centered around Hungary, Austria snd Germany, end Czechoslovakia to aoae extent, roblem was to establishnd oi" communication exchange intide Germany and to secure thc services of peopleld travel in and

out. Vie could hove used Tur.<s any Ti-rK could apply for

ao so sti-alrht to Horlin, but since Turics, with

hardly anre loyui first to Tarecond tore afraid ta trust them with anyions. lways felt tact thoy would tell all they could find out to the Turkish Secret Police to protect themselves. Therefore Axis people were the only ones that we feit willing to use. c concentratefi our efforts on Anti-Nazi Central Europeans in Istanbul andew key people built our various chains of their personal contacts. The risK Of penetration bynts was fairly high, but as longanaged to keepchains in water-tight comportments and to Seep the entiregnorancerflce and OSS we did not "eel thct penetration ofuc oy tne "Jestapo would be of any seri-us consecueace as they could find cut tiling that would be atfOluc to Ger.'iai; Intel'-once. eltad practically nothing to lose one much toje of the first dependable contacts we maderiendeas Periwinkle. He was an birth, I


fcost of our goodines urnlthough for aw length ofid not Know thet lieresponsible, s apparently content Lo lot us think the contacts were his own. Periwinkle ySvised us one day that One of his Oldest friends from Vienna, later celledod arrived la Istanbul und that since his friendan of extensive contacts In tfcearaaohinery we should arrange to see him at once. ?erlwin.<ia arranged for ncleet Stocklosed summer hotelad five meeting with him. Luring these meet-

lags Stock lold no about his connections1


rubber enc" buns manufacturing plants scattered from Cuisberc to XraKowend he told ;rc in greateeapons. This was in September Stack ^ave fuel and construction detoil3 about, its exact size, its speed,nd tho location of various plants which were engaged in iumifacturing or aasem-blins the weapons. Ke included l'enemunde. This material was seatthe Cairo office urtd before loss weetter of cotxicndetion from London for this information and wo foundater that they excoriated their Britishoffice for not divine; thorncation tefoi6 we did. On the basis of thoseded taut Stock$ sincere. Subsequent events ahor;cd that Stock'swas about 'J2 per cent right. Since these reports established our confidence In strck andet thee go ahead and expand that particular coll snd to work

the Cussiu

jieemberecret Corait-tce of fourteena ^roup or able and cxi;crjstrianho -ad organized for the duyt iv^uld be possible to throw the Musis cutstris end re-establish ar. Austrian government.

CJoaaie built up his own Intelligence andaln By appointing as warehouse managers aen whom fte trusted iraoiieitly. These various warehouse men could report directly to Ctsiiia through cooes which they had devised concerning anyveraents or combatthatheir way. It was an extensive und dangerous organizationdangerous for the personnel.


Section IV

A. organization of the Austrian Freedom Movement

L7.While the negotiations with Cassia were proceeding. Dogwood started work oni^lng an Austrian Freedom Movement, which had been in the mind? of several of our affiliates. Cassis himself, although he was unaware of the Istanbul movement along those lines, was devoting much of his time Inside Austria to the promotion of such an organization. Hyacinth, Magnolia, CorreopSls and Crocus had all done some preliminary work on tho Freedom Movement, but their activities had never teen So Dogwood brought them together and we prepared In ouromplete outline of what thc Austrian Freedom Movement should do and how it should be promoted. It can be seen on the accompanying chart that these various people belong to different and non-rolated flower chains. Yet they were all known to each other as personal acquaintances (with theof Cassia) long before any of our chains were organized. Stock also came into theittle later, and he acted OS liaison officer between Cassia and Periwinkle. Dogwood also acted as direct contact. Plans for extensive sabotage within Austria and organization for propaganda outside Europe were the chief concern of Cassia, for his plans fell in very closely with tho Freedom Movement which Dogwood and Correopsls had cooked up.

agnolia and Qurdenla, operating as one chain with the part-time assistance of Correopsls, were in direct contact with the German Ambassador von Papen. This chain was inactive most of the time, but there was one occasion when we did do some work directly with the German Ambassador. This is known to General


Donovan only.

who aa noted above was Interested in the^ovcscnt, was _lso the Istanbul head of theand acted at our licisoo in that entire utter, not information about the Austrian Freedom Movementcither to the German Ambassador or to Camellr. through

the dual contacts Just explained is unknown to me, but the very nature of the Austrian Freedom eovos-nt was such that knowledge of its existence by Cornelia or bypen would have no harmful consequences. Zt turned out later tbat the captured German generals at Stalingraderman Freedom Movement ln Moscow under tha direction of the Soviets, and grew to such proportions that the Movement maintained its own broadcasting progrnn and published Inspapor which was an ttxcollent piece of propaganda.

the saae time that tbewaslittle aoccntua ln Istanbul, und while the Stock-Cassiawas developing, two other major problems started to They were the Ca'-ielia and Jasmine anterprlsvs. Ithe second first.

b. Thta

the early part of September the Assistant Militaryme to his office to interview one of his visitorsthe samet the man later known as Oorbera. bad gone first to Halter Blrge, the American Consuland suggested that he would like to work with Be believed that he could be of considerablecould obtain some help from us. Blrge told him thatno authority to engage in that type of activity andto our Military Attache. was told that the

Military Department had no funds with which to conduct such

operationseeting was arranged with me. ound that Gorbera wos the director of the Jewish Underground in Istanbul and that for some time he had been running an intelligence business in and out Of Europe, particularly

age, was very active, very smart, and acknowledged to bo very trustworthy, fieery good impression on me. He explained his business was principally the smuggling Into Genoany of gold coins which could be turned over to Jews in Central Burope to assist them in getting to Turkey or some other neutral country. To do this work he had employederiod Ofan we called Trillium. Trillium wasto be an untrustworthy double-crossing rat, and we all accepted It at thy start; but he was extreaelyat his business and was using his missions to makea fortune on the side and to work for various agencies. He wasull-time agent for the Hungarian Deuxlece Bureau, workingpy directly under the Hungarian General Staff. The Hungarian Staff had not more confidence in him than we have, but Trillium was able to do certain things and by means of bribery he hud bought his way through the German Gestapo Inay as to permit him to carry on his person into Axis territory from time to tioe as such as seventy-five pounds weight of gold coin. It Is also my unsubstantiated belief that Trillium bought diamonds on the Turkish blackwhich he would smuggle into Germany for his own profit and which wore probably broken into industrial diamonds forproduction. Gerbera's purpose in meeting me was to persuade us to work with hia and use the same awn eitherourier orource of military Intelligence, perhaps

Intelligence, perhaps order of battle. It turned out later,till do not know whether or not Gerbera knew this, that Trillium was anxious to make contact with us.

Tha original negotiations with Trillium UN conducted by Seagcr and Gerbera under the direction of Dogwood. ever saw Trillium until months later and then he met mo under the name of Percy Fredericks. Shortly after the meeting with Cer-bor* w* drewuestionnaire covering some generalabout the big triangle of the Bulgarianlocated at Plovdiv, Pleven and Goroa-Or^ehovlca near Tlrnovo. Since this Information was already in the hands of the British, we thought we could checksincerity. Theasked for Information concerning troop eovoaents and requested that Trillium setmall group of pooplc who could report on railway traffic coming into Sofia fron the north and Its dispersal along the Aegean and Black Suas. tie gave Major Soager twelve hundred lira to bo turned over to Trillium for Incidental -xpensts on his next trip, end Seager passed on seven hundred lira retaining five hundred against the time when Trillium should return withwe mightvaluable Information. These preliminary meetings were ttttended by Trilllua, Seager, Dogaood and Gerbera, but Dogwood -did sanitfe to see Trillium aloneew minutes. With thosp arrangements, Trillium left for Budapest.

Uponeturn to Istanbul about four weeks later we got in touch with him through Gerbera and another meeting was arranged with Ssager. Dogwood and Gerbera were alsoand it developed during the talks that Trillium had not brought back the informationrequested. Bis excuse was that he had Just been too busy or. this trip, and that since

his expanses were paid by his regular affiliate, he did not fftcl that he should keep tho seven hundred lira, and he lamedlately returned them, it also developed during theso Dogwood tells me, that Trillium apparently had Information he did not wish to divulge in the presence of Gerbera or Seager, so Dogwood quietly arranged with Trillium ln the Czech language to meet him alone later that evening, Czech being unknown to Gerbera or Seager. The subsequent meeting betweend Trillium lasted all nignt und during that interview. Dogwood found out that Trillium wanted to bypass the other two, that heegular agent or the Hungarian General Stiff, and that the Staff had sent him to contact the Americans who were engaged ln high level secret activities. During thut meeting Trillium said that theStaff wanted toungarian officer to contact usiew toermanent liaison, and that Hungarybe glad to receive an American in exchange to act as liaison officer under cover in Budapest. This may have been prompted by the Regent, but the only named principal was the Hungarian Chief of Staff. It may have been done to feel out the American with reference to separate peace terms. From that time forward all of our dealings were directly with Trillium, and he said he would bring back with him on his nextepresentative of the Hungarianontemporary with the above negotiations, we received through Hyacinth our first communicationsember of the OKW in Berlin whom we called Camelia. o not think thiswas instigated by the High Command,elieve it came directly from the anti-Hitler secret group that wastaking form in the German Army. Camella's first communi-

communication camo through Hyacinth who was an old personal friend and in whoa we had end still have high confidence. C. yhe CamenVrr-rlEe

orneliaolonel in the 0KB who was said to be directly In charge of all the occupation troops In France concerning sose feature of their activities. He was exceedingly cautious and In his first communication explained the need for the greatest care and secrecy in all of our negotiations. He ex-plained that he had sent through an American group Ina message by one of his agents which was to be coded and sent to America In the nost secret code the Americanso not know which American group he gave this communication to, but the fcussage was intercepted on Its way outode to which the Germans already had the complete Key. The Germane promptly decoded the ovssage and laid Its full translation on Ctwella's desk which Just happened to be their regular procedure. Caaelia was tho man to whom this Intercept would naturally come so ho wus able to suppress It and save his subordinate and himself, but itery narrow Bqueek. Camella's first communication told us that he would come to Istanbul provided we could bring to Istanbul to nect and identify Aim either Dorothy Thompson, Oecersl Smuts, or Alexander Kirk, the Aaerlean Minister to Egypt. All of these people wer* old friends of Camelia's in Berlin end In thwe he had the utmost confidence. Furthermore, they had known him well enough to identify him.

he only one available to us was Kirk, and for various reasons we did not wish to bring hia into this negotiation; but since he was the only one.we got in touch with him to see If he could

cos* to Istanbul. hought at that tla* tho request was rather futile since Kirk could not coae to Istanbul without the permission of the State Cepartixnt and Ambassador Stain-hart, that he could not coae Incognito as Canells suggested, and that he probably wouldn't coae anyhow. The latter turned out to be correct cs Kirk flatly refused. In tho meantime, through Hyacinth, we tried our best not to stop negotiations entirely hoping that If Camelia would coma to Istanbul he would talk to someone else besides Kirk andv quite ready to accept him on hyacinth's identification.

By the time Kirk'ft refusal had reached us. It was the fifteenth of November and we found ourselves with three major projectsorkable state. Those threo projects wereai Cassia, Camelia and Jasmin*.

Trillium had come back and had brought with him Jasmine, but on thatslno was not contacted by Dogwood or by any of our organisationelieve thc British contactedt word to us, however, that he would b* glad to work provided he could satisfy himself thatealing with the right people He was not content to deal wltn any run-of-the-mill group of secret agents 3lueetad the Hungarian General Stiff and negotiations would beigherpolitical level, so we devised and agreed to the following schum*. We would broadcast from Algiers radio by shortwave during one of the regular Frenchertain message addressed to Trillium. If Jasmine Intercepted that message

In Budapest, he would know that he was negotiating with the right people since it would be impossible Tor any other group to get that particular message sent out of Algiers radio.

Jasmine agreod that if he received that message, he in turn, the following day, would broadcast from thodupest station, standard broadcast,ortain news progrum, some reference to the Izmir 'air which had closedeek previously and was no longer In the news. The aeseege we were to send was in French, "Message pour Trillium. Sln-corlte' avantnd without delay weignal to McFarland In Cairo explaining the details and asking him to get it put on the Algiers radio. Thla was done at the proper timeicked up the signal myseir at Istanbul. It was also heard In Budapest, because for the next two nightsa proper rvf-ronce to the Izmir Fair was broadcast by Budapest radio.

n the meantime. Jasmine had returnod to Budapest and the Austrian Freedom Movement had continued to develop. One of

members haderies of short propaganda talks In German which we thought would be excellentroadcasting program from Algiers. athered up the propaganda script togetherecording of the voice of their author and made arrangements to fly to Algiers and try to put tno author on the air as ono of our regular features. lso wanted to clarify our relationship and arrange for future coded messages, to be broadcast Into central Europe by station Hippo. eft Immediately, and upon my arrival In Cairo met General Donovan learning for tho first tine about the coning Mens lloufiowhich took piece shortly before the Teheran Conference. After going over the entire Jasmine picture as well as the Cassia pictures with General Donovan, he took np the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had Just arrived in Cairo. He arranged to have me visit the planning board at the Uena

House to discuss the possibilities of Jasmine and thethat Jasmine's agents might penetrate our organization. Our Joint opinion after those discussions was that Jasmine olRht turn out toerman agentlant, but that since he could learn nothing from us of prime militarywe stood to lose nothing und we might gainhen flew to Algiers and made tentative broadcastingwith Hazeltine, the head of the Algiers Psychological Warfare Board. eturned to Cairo and back to Istanbul, arriving there December S.

Section IV

A. cyretinr-is

pooound the liogwood office in pretty muohuproar over the ur.-enoy of two or three prajeote. ?roc3oja :ijve-;tnt,eenttiby WcTerlsnd's office, wasremerit, and word had reached us thet our Statefeeling outr.Tnns ia Ankara, not relatedhe cbu-blialitcntreedom had

beenhat Cassia was making arran:-Rients to oome to Istanbul in the very near future. We would have to hove something for him. urliieiv-iorc, Je&ainc-riilium were about to aske an appearance &nc .myucinth informed us that Ccjaelio was on Lie *ay dov.n. Our cflief worry was C'iitcllo, for he had refused to talk to anyone except iCirlC ond we had beer, unubio to bring Kirk to Istanbul. Thealate problemto find someone to whom 'Ji.twlia woulde were inurryleslected to register with the Turkish police either my returnro or myfor Anders whichi nee iMiod'.ntcly. This forced ee to waste tore tLoe inrt uniierahorse of fallinc to register. t to Ankara uo quickly

i'- r ml , r iry

Attache to Turkey, re tried to figure out sat way ofa pine for Kirk or sending Camelia to Cairo in another plane. e cf 'i'ur^isiiotions one militaryneither plan .oulc .iave worked, so Tyndali ii rally

agreed to coae to Istanbul and hold himself available if Cornelia would talk to him,

Camelia arrived Decembernd Hyacinth persuaded him to soe Tyndali. The meeting took place and lasted uboat an houralf, but apparently Cs<aella got cold feet. Whereas he talked to Tyndali most of the houralf the sum total of his remarks was zero. He spent the time talking of tne importance of the plan which he represented and the need for the greatest possible security since it involved many people of high rank in the German Army. By the time Tyndali arrived at the meeting Camelia hadagealf letter addressed to Ur. Kirk which he asked Tyndali to send for him. The letterersonal greetingeries of disguised hints concerning the import-nee Of Camella's trip, but there uas nothing of interest to us. The letter was later delivered to Xirk and he replied with an unsigned note stating that he saw no reason for them to renew their former acquaintance. This reply was never passed on to Camelia.

After Camelia returned to Germany we found out from Hyucinth thatlle^ed plan was toeparate peace with the English and Americans in return for which the Camelia group in thc ffehrmacht would withdraw key troops by military order from the French coast. This would allow the Anglo-British invasion to enter France with the least possible trouble. The withdrawal of German SS and pro-Nazi troops would permit the Anglo-Americans to march in from thend occupy Germany against token resistance yet enoughto insure the military defeat of the German Aray which Camelia thought necessary to prevent further outbreak of the European War. At the same time the Wehraacht would muster

its strongest forces against the Russians and wouldtoine running from Tilsit to Lwow. It was the opinion of Camelia that the Eastern Front could be held on that line, and perhaps recent events substantiate hishird part of the Camelia plan was to assassinate Hitler, and the persons involved were Rundstedt, Liszt, Haider, von Beck (perhaps Kluge)erson who had been the former burgomels'ter or Berlin named Coerderler. The attempt of4 proves Camilla's sincerity,

Another urgent concern at this time wets the Trlllium-Jasuiine development. On Saturday,asmine arrived andas busy with General Tyndali discussing the events of thc Camelia meeting. Dogwood sat down und prepared overand Sunday an outline to cover the pointsiscussion to be held with Jasmine Sunday afternoonh0 in the home of Jacaranda.

Here is another pointave not yet mentioned. When our broadcast messages to Budapest had been answeredwe sent word to Jasnine through Trillium that if he was sincere, he might get himself appointed Hungarian Military Attache to Turkey. Then we might work together. We did not believe that this could take place, but Jasmine arranged the change and the first word we had of It before it was made public was from Jacarando, Jasmine's old personal friend. At the time of the Sunday meeting. Jasmine's appointment hud bten made public.

resent at the meeting were Jasmine, Jacnranda, Dogwood and myself. With both Jscarando and Dogwood acting as check interpreters the discussion was conducted in German, French

nd Hungarian since Jasmine spoke no English. Host of the talking wus cone by Dogwood from his script which he had prepared in German and ofad no English copy. as not at all satisfied with Dogwood's attitude since his manner was more thatonqueringleadar shouting his termsefeatcdraenyego-clator's attempt to implant confidence enough to secure easy information. The sum total of the discussion was that the Hungarians would have to come over to the Allied side in an active way to secure any assistance from the Allies and that the best way to do It was through political and industrial sabotage to start at once. It must be remembered thatwas not on occupied country at that time. Jasmine demurred on grounds that Germany was prepared for immediate invasion of Hungary at the first sign oft was obvious to ne that Jasmine was not satisfied with

Dogwooderson, first because Dogwood was believed to be part Jewish and second because Dogwoodzech. Finally Jasmine Inquired as to what steps Anglo-Americans would take to protect Hungary from Russia, and ay answer to that was that Russia was one of the United Nations and that no plans would be made with the Hungarians that the Russians would not know about beforehand. He then suggested that Hungaryuarantee of her borders of the last thousand years. This statement clarified his dislike for Dogwood, for his remarks referred to Ruthenla which had been filched from Hungary and given to Slovakia. It explained his dislike for the Czechs, misplaced or not. The meeting terminated with Jasmineto take back to hisesume* of our discussions which we prepared.

Tho next few days word cane In that Cassia planned to arrive shortly, so we delegated to Stock the responsibility for those arrangements. By this time Decemberad arrlvod and on thatent to the American Hospital with doubleand remained in bed until almost thc end of January. The press of affairs got me out of bed at that time,elapse onnd found* In bed under medical care.

During the time that the throe major projects were In progress other minor affairs were also under way. Azalea had come out of Bulgaria to contact us, apparently sent by the Regent and the Prime Minister -fter the death of Boris, and he advised

us that Bulgaria Banted to get out of the war and would nice to deal with the Allies. ade this known to General Donovan In Cairo but was advised by Toulmln that we wore to pull all our men off Bulgaria and give the green lightlscheme known as Project K.

Gorman Gestapo agent whoa we called Plumbago hadapparently lookingoft place to land after thedefeat which he anticipated. He agreed to work withwanted to know what we had to offer in exchange. Wethat if he did any good work which wc consideredwo would agree to notify the proper authoritiesond of hostilities that Plumbago had worked for usus, but that we would guarantee no considerationwhatsoever. If the proper authorities later decidedhim something for his help, that would be theirours. He was satisfied with that arrangement. Weto send him bick to Berlin with one of our oldsots suggesting he toll the Gestapo that ho had pene-

penotrated our organization and fooled us into believing that he had come over to our side. We gavepecial cipher which we devised for his use only, not related to any other cipher we were using, and we expected hlo to turn both radio and ctphor over to the Gestapo- Communication details were explained to him and we fully expected, without telling this to Plumbago, that the Gestapo would contact us via the radio and give us erroneous information thinking taut we would believe it came froa Plumbago. In this way we hoped to lind out Justlea the Gestapo would like us to Accept. Unfortunately we never made contact.

Also going on at this tine was an Albanian scheme which we called Nopal. The pretender to the 2og throne was living in Korea, Albania and we had every reason to believe that ho was anti-Nazi and anti-Italian. His daughter Lived Inersonal friend of mine, and his brother lived in Beylerbey across th* water from my lso know the brother well,as quite pleased when McFarland brought on escaped Albanian to me who wanted to get messages to the man in Korea. In our laboratory we prepared cipher messages and instructions in Albanian and on microfilm and provided my friend lnwith the nvcessary secret devices to carry them through German lines. He left on schedule and arrived safely, but up to the time of ny departure from Istanbul ln4 he had not been able to return. In the aoantlac his brother ln Korea had died. We received news of our courier from time to time but nothing of any importance to intelligence.

Early In3 Dogwood brought ln Heliotrope and Hy-blscus. heliotrope was an ex-Russian sea captain with Greek citizenship, and Hybiscusoung Greek wireless operator

who had his own equipment hidden away in Pireaus. They wanted to help by giving us information about the Germans in Greece,onsideration of course, so we agreed to advance fifty gold sovereignsroject whereby Hybiscus would snuggle himself back into Greece, smuggle his portable radio set to Salonika and broadcast to us military intelligence about the Germans. Further payments were contingent on his arrival in Salonika. Apparently the Germans were so well In control that he never contacted us by radio and never got to Salonika. Under those clrcumstences we refused to pay him any more under our agreement. Hybiscus managed however to get out of Greece againmall sailboat and brought us several written reports. Upon his return to Greece we heard no more from him.

3 Dogwood got in touch with anotherhad spent the last fifteen years in Bulgaria andthe name of Correander. Correanderydraulicwho had spent much of his time installing watersmall towns in Bulgaria and in almost everymilitary airport. YJe set him upmallon the other side of town and provided himnecessary cartographic materials to produce scale maps ofBulgarian airports and many of their major He spenteks doing this and thewas skillfully done and quite voluminous. m unaware

as to whether that material was of top value to the Fifteenth Air Force or not. Once that was completed we did not uso Correander until much later.

ent to the hospital on Christmas day thewe had in the fire were all getting hot at the same time.


ad to turn over the direction of the work to sea*body else. McF-iriand case to the hospitalxplained the situation, whereupon he agreed to take over the direction. Until this time he had never known tho details of ournor its location although he did know Dogwood since hethe first man who brought bin to us. From that timead no administrative responsibilities concerning theShow.

Section V

a. Termination of Mv Services

uring4as still recovering Trom my

illness, DOGROOD succeeded in separating me from the DOGWOOD show completely, and he did it in the following way:

was when

p to my Illness he had never had contact with MACFitRLAnDad been obliged to turn over the direction of the show to UACFARLAHDas away. Thenew of any trouble

got hold of me, unknown to UACFAELAsD or

DOGWOOD, and related to me some thinps DOGWOOD said toin an attempt to eliminate me. His nature washe resented any intermediate steps between him andauthorities, so when the opportunity of staking thepermanent presented itself DOGWOOD tookster>s. He toldas impossiblewith,as losing my mindad over hadit was impossible for him to eo onere tohould be removed. furious about it

and excoriated DOGVJOOb for saying it and MACF/tRLAND for giving it any credence. It was apparently the out and out Ooublecross and quite understandable considering DOGYJQOD's vanity and his serious consideration of his own importance. There was no question of his importance, but he took it too seriously. He hadood chain in Central Europe and had done some good work,as extremely reluctant to permit his resignation even though his threat to resign may have been bluff. Rv told UaCFARLAUDas insecure, that my personal employees were all German agents, that I

endangering the safety of DOGWOOD and all other Members of the flowar chain. Some of this Information was passed

to me by

by SACriJ^hD rith whom I

a long talk shortly after these complaints. UACFASLAND had aade up his mind,aw him, to do exactly what

suggested and to keep me out.


unknown to me that tnls wasrick on DOGWOOD'S part to muscle himself ln and keep himself ln direct contact with the hoad of the mission, and that he was doing Ithe felt he could got more leniency from MACFAfiLAIID than from sc. elieve was true, and DOGWOOD had found It out during the temporary change. ointed out to HACrAF.LAND that he did not have to do it that way, butas quite willing to let It pass rather than upset any of the important plans which were goingany. Tho whole thing was quite understandable to those of us who Knew DOGWOOD, but HACPARLAJD preferred to do aa DOGTOOD suggested.

eedless to say DOGWOOD's charges were not true. lie was Irked byrestraintut on his purely political projects, and he felt hampered by ay Inslstince that any political project or help given to Axis undergroundwould have to be paid for by those groups with military combat, economic or Industrial intelligence and that if we did not get such Intelligence we would give no help nor would we be concerned in any way. Perhaps these restrictions

took the props out from under promises which DOGWOOD may have mace with Axis contacts without my knowledge, and hetore lenient hand to bolster Ms personal reputation among

the people he deemed important. Regarding the security angle, his charges were pretty absurd as my people were quite

loyal andositive effort to protect my cover.

fter my talk withent to DOGWOOD'S office to inquire into the nature of his remarks and he appeared very crestfallen and embarrassed and assured me ho hod not said many of theepeated and that he had not meant in any way to change the administration of our project. ecided that it had been changed tnd vas content to let it stand that wayhile. | s furious atnd was all for separating him right then, but he accepted my suggestion that wc let It ride as It was.

Section Vr

bout thisiscussed with KACFABLASD trie possibility of preparingossible invasion of the Balkans and the establishmenteam under our office and under my direction to be concerned only with the gathering of secret documents in occupied Axis territory. We had the idea that many documents which could throw light wither on war history or war guilt could be found awing the private papers of prominent people in occupied countries, and that much of it might be burned butot would remain because ofdepartures. hereforerip to Cairo, Algiers, Caserta and Bari for the purpose of finding out what those stations had been thinking along those same lines, or what they had done. lso wished to reestablish and amplify our communications arrangements with Algiers radio, eft Istanbul on thef February for that purpose. ade ay inquiries in the places mentioned and in Maples, but found that practically nothing had beennd nothing was in progress along those lines. id make the comounications arrangements with the Psychological Warfare Board in Algiers, and we drewocument with one Copy for theone copy for HAGKOL In Algiers, one copy for KAiLOB,officer in Cairo, and the original for Istanbul. ater found that the Cairo copy had been burned and that the Istanbul copyen lost as of4 and has never come to light. Failure of the Istanbul office to put the program into effect or acknowledge it at once was the cause of aore confusion at Algierso not think our system ever went into effect. It was also the cause of considerable

strife and trouble in the Istanbul office as it resulted in tbe departure without orders of Tr. COX of the cod* room. Hit apparently left because of lack of security incident to their foilure to usegreement. This trouble In the code room vas contemporary with the departure froaof Major . KEkU and Lt. OL-MKH.

At about thisas still in Cairo waiting for avlaa to return to Turkey. Theeft Istanbul the Turkish Government had passed new regulations to the effuct that any person leaving the country would have to have his reentry visa approved by Ankara bwforo hu could return. This meant that the Turkish Embassy in Cairo could not giveisa until my application had been forwarded to the*nd areply received. Thistook six weeks, andad applied for my visaeft Cairo forid not receive my reentry permit until thef April.

my return to Istanbul Inound that thethc collection of pertinent documents was stilltwo or three weeks later weablestating that the project had been killed. to run ay laboratory and to work

and O'CONKOE on troubles which had arisen on theToOTOOI* project during my absence.

found that the JASKIBE and CASSIA chains had beenby the arrest In Hungary of the principals Involved,result that the Imaginations of our Istanbul staffwild. They assumed fros the start that thetold on the Austrians and vice versa or that DGCftOOD had

disclosed everything to TRILLIUM who had in turn turned in both chains and that the Gestapo kr.ea all about our plans, this was pure imagination, the result of Judgments formed without having the proper facts. In the meantime,flew back and forth, everyone was guilty and every employee of DOGWOOD's chainpy in our camp.

one of this was true. The arrest of CASSIA was notto the arrest of JASMINE'5 group ln any wayprobably was the key man ln the Hungarianit could have been PINK. The chances are that tbeleak occurred In the Hungarian foreign office whichout Laterrty to our deal with theStarr. KALLAY, la said to have known about it. my honest opinion that even KADAR hlmaulf wasthe turn of events. Tho fact that CASSIA was allowedhla business from the Gestapo hotel in Viennaproves that the Geatapo had no evidence againstwas thoughthile that CASSIA's secretaryhla by Inadvertently disclosing somethingounds. o not bellev* that thison't know and never will know exactlytold TRILLIUM or how much TRILLIUM knew. Ithat DOGWOOD took him Intoonfidence sincefrom the start that TRILLIUM was untruntworthy and CASSIAof the Hungarian

operations and neither could STOCK. JAGARANDA never knew anything about CASSIA until CASSIA's arrest In Budapest. JACARANDA did have cont-ct with IRIS. If JACABAMDA had been shadowed professionally, ha coulc have led hla followers

only to TRILLIN, JACAHA..DA, PIsK or his personal fully and friends, jtt lt Is froa JACARAADA thtt me hareIf there Is such aIKI3 la also the Infamous Gestapo chief known as Dr. sCIIhOEOEP. Upon one occasion when JACARilBDA was takenJail to Gwstapo headquarter* for questioning, heleeting glimpse of IRIS leaving the Inner sanctum and IMS immediately scurried out of eight in hopes that JACARjUJDA had not seen hi-..

. By no* WISSHK and KHOSLET had arrived as ChiefOfficer, respectively,ny cameInstructions to reorganize rather than abandon They advised aeecret meetim: that theyspecial Jobs that they would like to havehould hold syself under cover away from thepending tho completion of their On Julyassassination attempt was made on Hitler's life andstarted picking up the high-level members ofschema. as asked by nflUiould takeoperationew group composed of^PEBXSIflKI.E. greed to do so, and WISaER said heme know. This never come to pass. On August 2relations with the Axis whichthatight do or had been doliiff was finished. started liquidating my own setupetumudUnited St.tfli by my own volition, feelingore use In Turkey. eft Istanbuluttold PERIKIHSLE and JACAhftaDAI hoped

to return after tho fall of Hungary perhapslan for all of us to go to Budapest. Subsequent events have shown that perhaps this olan is not feasible.

Section VII

found upon my arrival at headquarters that certainthis organization,, looked uponIstanbul Mission as an exceedingly futile,stupid project. m definitely Included inof distaste and some of thin, Colonel Aldrichhave been doing soite indiscriminate talkingeffect thatid was loaf around and live offof the land. ot heard thin before about others

I might feel crestfallen,o not. now theof the Istanbul Mission better than they, and itad coiMK-ntary that there vhodoing most of the talking are those who know the least -tfcout it. Just for the record.ere Idle at any time in Istanbul, It was by order and if it app*arodived off the fat of the land, it was because the others hadn't the wit to live as well. most members of tne mission were not accustomed to living abroad and were Inexperienced when it came tothems-Ives properly. ook upon this as one of the causes of their disappointment concerning the work of the mission, since they neverroper base from which to conduct any negotiations. My establishment *as saall and thoroughly ln keeping with thc status of under whichemained in Turkey. The only charge which was made about the others and which has apparently not been placed at my door is the charge about keeping four or five mistresses in various places.

complications stemmed from the British. Theyrumour all the way to Washington thatad

ope fiend, and that the man in charge or theShow, leaning myself, vis directly responsible for all the leaks about our work to the Gcnun High Command. They advised our Washington ofricaad deliberately brought In German Grstapo agents to help penetrate our organization and thKt the Germans were payingt toss of money for my Invaluable services to the Fuehrer. These reports would be hilarious man it not for the suspicionelieves the*. s also told by ooo of oy British friends, when he hadittle more than was good for his, thatsections In ourvlleved the reports to be true. kUCFARLAKD'3 acttonu lead me to think that he, too, may huve believed them. Tho reports are not only lies but stupid ones at that.

ome of the circumstances which made the work of tha Istanbul main office difficult were first that tee chief of mission did not pay enough attention to the morale of his stalf; second, that when he requested staff members una equipment whioh had to come through the Cairo office, tho moat able members and the best equipment stayed in Cairo whilegottovers; third, tho office was not organized inay as to do Ita work quietly and expanded to such size tost It could not remain hidden If it wished. elieve one of the alnor mistake* maden Istanbul was thatepresentative established his offices In the mission headquarters. lways felthould be entirely apart and strictly undercover. This was impossible in the main office since the State Department, OWI, thoend Bavsl Attaches were all more or less parties to what

was going on In lACFARLASD's office. My own enterprise was kept under some sort of cover tbe entire tiaeould b* the Lest to deny that the cover was full of holes by the tin*4 rolled around. In ay own opinion HACFARLAHD's office should never have attnapted to stay under cover but that it should hxvf various enterprises into small offices scattered ovor Istanbul with carefully workod out secret liaisons. Furthermore, they should never have mixed the work of groups interacted ln occupied countries with tho groups* concentrating on Axis countries themselves. Thereistinct and cif-ferent approach to each. Liaison with th* British should have been perforata by only one parson. But probably tho greatest handicap was the difficulty of comvunlcition* with headquarters. Good communications ahoulu have beenln Turkey before the mission arrived, or cettainly before It wvor started to work.

whan under thatei'

Agents were recru'.ied only by our -wn xey act end every reorulttc have the unanimous approval of

Blv'jA uL end cysclf. The renrults wererule by LCCKCCIi,cTOCX,Oddould opprovo

recruits recomended by those people rluoe wo hodIn thanewere unable tohorough otteektandpoint. To protectoralnut error In this reepoctsw reorct froaof-ieo.

were the severalunning out ofCentral .- ne ectreelelly

See Chert. Snch chain is shown la Its relationship to Ik&JGGD and to other citlns. Tho connecting linescoot ;ot or liaison. At the bottom of the chartroup of independent ajents or eouroesunrelated U. each other or to other chains, and responsible only to UiCOCD, fnew,id not. nly xnev We activities of the CA^iEi-IA, MAQitOLln,IKX and STVCKo not fully av.ore of tUe activities of iho I'Mii'iCCE,fi.IA end VlOlXJTCTIi: croups since they wire established after my authority cesced. o know, however, that UolUA was concerned v'.tli tlirwansodith Souta Qeraao industrial ery wealthy m'.nufaeturor of


over the world. Q8ail typesheln of OMOSSS throuohcut -catrnl. vac thoAlbanian Ixti'iot, head ofbanian ponvtretlon sohsSMl. 5. Sketches of bgents belenlncbe eeveralhell not ito describe aorc then thc <oy svmbere of the choln. eel the othersi, lA.ff.utlzech,

but 'lotid laaVorso for worl:.

Co la ponderousr and soraci-aat opinlonulod and ;ecantlc. He is volserman way, ono is laprei red by people of position or political power, ills vanity is pro^aoly his weakest

point especially when hooked up to his aild reverence Tor what wehot. He is orslny vIiC thorough which is beet illustrated by the following:

He sever

actually resentod authority, but he was exceedingly put out when myoneh his own plans or crossed up In nsttere of policy. He Is hard to handle. .urhaps heittle too trustworthy, but that was probably based on his fallibility torn or personal vanity.


<b) PSIvI'.lSiCs.s ac Austrian

[See report). Reave


basal on nle outstanding ability to nCet people andtlu-ifi like him. tie iseorc-ost of interesting frieacs who ell like him, and yet neot outstandingly brilliant or brainy. In my opinion he is perfectly sincere and sanest, good-naturedaultood nan to have around.

(e) STOCK. STOCKovial Austrian of unquestioned executive fibillty,il-connected with prominent Austrian familiesveryesponsible person. His ratine for veracity is the highest of oil our ager.ts and the material thfit he was ableve us vOs of ^jeat etrstesio Imycrtonce. e 1j; cinort one honest in *hut heoing, he never expected any fu;;cs for tils services. ooks like ur. EnfilLahEen and dresses like one,udge that he isyours old, complesloned, about | eighs something Like pounds, Interested lr. good food and wines, we3 our beatustrian Jokes and humcr. c an eye for women and vloe-versa. ull'.en lie and PEHIV.IHKLZ cot together.

(d) MAGNOLIA. ifA'JCLIAery active and learned German economist

j.*rsona- mead ol r. anz ton PA* In. find .as beec for many years, yet he seldor, contacted the German ambassadorthrough tr.or. PAPA'S personal physician, ile aas been a

|snd :ie Is outstandingly antl-kazi. ais mencsnip for vonan be explained by the raet thet the German Ambassador himself la clso enU-Naxl Ihe is not pro-Ally; heo-Gcraaoi.

(e) HY.vcrra. irrACim is t

u person 1

evaluate HYACIKTH as the very highest type ulthwe core . - contact. s would hold true whether he wera German, -cxlcnn or Uottentot. tieery culet lire Ln onf fine *crslan rugs, every one ft museum piece. h'Ls wifeypical heuslonde AustrianInterestseoncsmed , ith

nc food. Jle mm closely connected with

tho old Junker fa&ilics ofi Gcrainy, and cany of his friends acre famouspowerful ln ti>clr

Cay. KYACIMTil Is about tbet as ItACirtOM.,

| Itlip^uali him that we contacted CAMELIA, HYACINTH and KACiKLIA were great personal rrtends and both were Interested in tho Austrian ?reedom Movement. iD JACARASUA. JACARAHUAungarian I

e meabor of the Austro-Suaguriiin lesser nobility.

until Turiceyffith the Axis onyust 2. JAGARAIfLAoyal Hungarian and Lb onti-Oerman orca would entailer the independence and sovereignty of file own country. His family ia known to thent iiorthy andiijfielr can ooersonal acquaintance of the liegent. a; the first one to make contact with JACARANDA ano he expressed his willingness to help the Allied cause. Ke mace two refusals

Intheemtat of which the first was his reluctancerxany Jewish organization, only because all Jews were very closely watched in Hungary;econd, he could take no money for ony services ho ni/ht render. ;ie is of eeciun height ond

y.od company, highlyfi portionrbanerson of definite culture and tests and his record with

proves thet he has ability 'ad brains, lie is exceedingly cautious and secur!, snd ell ofith him vers carefully planned end secret, iris only household servant, an elderly Grco< wemon, had aecn trained tc he oxccedin&ly cautious of visitors or Of divulging any information about them, lie was an old personal frlc;id Of JASMIN, snd waa inontact withricn offlci-loantul,and msny of the Oxr/sens. carried out our instructions In detail and crowed hlcseJf cuite ,vblc to cope with unforeseen situations wiilch arose. ; noi;ier hiir. perfectly trustworthy and loyal. e otherof the chela who were personally ten.wn to me there are none of enough ifiircrtsnceve len;;thysketch, ilov.evcr, tne ciiart li^ts the persons known to ;uchould any specialion be needed abouthall be glad to givenow.

and by when and under shot circucctuneca wu the Hungarian General Staff eontected? Covered In report.

How didInto the picture? Covered in report.

a. Was there ever any indicationit have

boen In the oontroi ofroans? Covered In report, v. -id Uocl'.dfLiufbm'fj |tny other staff. Inst

Yes. As soon as the signal was reoolvcd fro*aI was cn and undercircumstances did iiaoFARLAffD rtoot

no seci.Tlheld ir. tho hoae orNLA at five o'clock" ia the -cralng.

war the nature of the Huc-arlaapreliminary to opernllons7

See report.

Didever confer directly withXA1 Yes. CASSIA conferred vith hln and separately with

Undor what circumstancesission doapotoned to Hungary and whet happened to mentors ofsslon after their arrival?

We neverjs.-ion to Hungry bit eoporently other branch or station of CGi. did so. irst

hoard about tt while flyingBarl to Malta about tbe first of April. int thot oao of my old friends had been dropped ia. Theeard washen JjiCaIU-'OA having returned fromays imprisonment In Eufiapest #ave me the following story: Arrangements hudith KADAH, Chief of the Hunserlsn Deuxieme L'ureuu, to receive tnree American officers who vould eater :itinst;ry by parachute on March lo. Arrengencnts were made to receive t'.em secretly, that Is, unknown to the Germans, and to' lake thee: to the lltuigftrlea Generalr-ed lately upon arrival. Sigocls were orrcngedpot deel^atea. Due to bad flying weatiier the trio tiic not arrive onut on that day KAD.uielephone cell from florin Oestapo -leadouarters in Budapest asking

'- vl;;. : I. : 1

arrived or were cine to arrive. Tr.ia opparently was thc first time that KAJ1AH even suspected that the Germans knew about it. He replied that the trio had not arrived, but that thc Hungarians were waiting them and expected to bring trtec to thc Gost&po prior to tbe telephone call. :CkDA3 waa forced to voi-is vith then in case the men were to arrive, anrchas :lso bud for flying but onh the three Americans arrived by parachute at thc appointed place and were metelcoming committee of Hungarian Staff officials and German Gestapo. They were taken iimediateiy to thc Gestapo jail in ^uflripest

. arriving there an iMarco IS. as athe same place sac witnessed their arrivalorcontact will! tueai. Cn -larch i9


Americans were questioned very carefully far ab:;ut ten days but tiiey all stuck to thc story that they were trying to find Tito's sdvenced forces snd in the tad flying weatnerovershot their lancing place coning down in Hungarystske. This apparently satisfied the Gestapo, for thc threere removed from jailrisoner of was- cam? in accord with tho Geneve Convention. o not know wiio Bent the trio,they came frorc ors the acturo of their mission. o not believe it wos connected in any way with

Did the Istanbul mission or any of its members knoweparately projected missions into Hungary? Yes- General Donovan advisedn Cairo that another Hungarian scheme was uuUcr way.

What were the circumstan es of CASSIA'S apprehension by the -Gestapo'?

lifter the conference mentioned previously CASSIAVienna and thenrip to Switzerland,contact Alar. DULLES or one of -la associates. second return to Vienna, he made arrangements to.v:.i aver In ai: own

motor car. ntotel where he was accustomed to stay and established himself in the usual fashion

without having made 1BJtsoevcr to contact-'nflersround. Tbe "JnderfYound, however.hla arrival and the HungarianGASSIA's

rooo lc the hotel to paylalt. Aa aooo at thehad entered theestapo agent* who had been fOl losing hla talked in the toor aoC arretted tne HungarianA. c told the hotal rooa nat thoroughly andtely seerohed aa wolJ as Its two oooupantsut no incriminating evidenoo or any itlnd Hi found. Nevertheless the two mon wore nold in oustody. o Know what happened to the Hungarian, butwas allowed to return to Vlenno la .lc car under Gestapo guard. Ke was te-ceo to thcotel ln Vienna whore former Chancellorla -eld. s hotelettopo Jell for high level prisoners and to the best of ayowl edge, CASSIA is still there. Ke continues

on to obluln the in-dusirlsl orders or the day.

What is known aboutbetween Istanbul

and Boflft,and Vienn.iv

I knew; very llttlo about JASjJK-'b movements outsido or lataabul. riULLXUC may know and pernaps It would appear la his lengthy report to Uie British ln Syria or Palestine. aveineogra, had excerpts from thla reportJava cotjtny way of knowing that the Laformotioo received froa the1ce ever: thing UtlliTHI said to thea.


the mnrOQ >vite dntea?

, vhat were

w-i3 in direct contact withCOi;, l

once in jlovember, certainly twice in Decemberu-


and nerhent on ono other Decision.

DidaliOw unynterest in thc opera-

of the Iston'-ui L'loolon?

Ho, he die not. ills quectlona were designed to convince tin testec Hag with tho rlcct people. Keon sone Uiunnt'l that we could get to our oaiofs of staff tnd it was at that tlue thatlil. allowed JabdUSbi t-e latter of cuinorlty. uTlRf did not see the letter oxcopt 'tfli;lancev* it on good aithojlty ttivt JASiltfii does not reed aagliea or apeak it. 7ACAMUBA tolu him ha.ever In German andHungarian that the authority What were the cireumatancOB leat-inr, uprrest?

fttgMTMB, SUUinXC.JU.TU; had arranged to oeetudapest coffee shop where they set far so'4 little tine ia ordinary conversation. Tiilli;'^ is salt to have left the (TOO* at that tin* oa< JASUEts sad tfCitUMLA proceeded to Xr^UltK'n quarters1. They wire sitting thore engonedocial vlnlt when tho coor flew open und rive plainclothes men Jumped Into theith pistols drawn. JMAUXftA refuted to put up his hands thinking that thisoke'being pulled by oae* or rASKXNI'a friendsubjected to rougheuuse of It. The twouand toeas sesrohed


and although no evidence whatsoever was found they were taken toestapo jail Whet interpretation should be iiven to |

arrest or altered errant, refuse mid GesWpo permission to return to Istanbul in early July?

JASMHIK's arrest and release con be interpreted in ersonally believe nogenuine. Scfore fie mode his first trip tol, he was

Iwhered eont'eted'Jj!. After deciding to ccae to Istanbul to contact us, he covered himself byell on LSLIOS who? he knew well and whothe Gestapo chief for all of Bulgaria,in Sofia. JASWIME explained to MJLIUS that heconaiuerlm; going to Turkey to try to penetrate the AngLo-.iir.erlean groups there. DliLIUS know that JASMIS3 bad

and had always been "riendly wits the Americansentered thethe scheme was a

good ooo and ur^cd JASillKEhead ond try It. ills arrest JASiilira was in jail for about two weeks during which blue both he and JaCCANLa were questioned at sreat length, at period JnSKCIS told the Oestapo tnat of coarse:.a; contacted the Americans, thiit he had gone to Turkey for that nurpoee, that If the Gestapo wanted verification all they had to do was to call lililUS. LSI.1USrip to Budapest and Cf-fiie to theere he advised tho Oestapo that -TASXINS'3 statements were absolutely correct ond that he, DELTOB, had known oil about the 3uheme before it ever started.

It was on th* rtroa;te of this that jas13mz wue rc-

ver was deteinwd.

'n&Ul'NS line boon honjed. matn La said to have comeegular sericsn broadcast, una 1that we OVI Intercepted It. JACAXAiUA remained Ln Jt.llotal ofaysat finally released and tant back to Istanbulect; nt, having agreed to work rorSermon service. Kir mother and slater are atill la tUdapt-st, sad he was given tothat they would be hostages if he ahould not be dependable. His orders fron the Gestapo were to send In all tho Information he could nattier In Intonbul on tho Joulouolea, ciffcroncuo of opinion andthatow up betweenjrlctns, llrltlBh and liusalunt.

jxrai'M rotopaH t- ^stcnbui end Ankara in July of this your cfter his release froo prison. He either sawor sent word to him that he uad returned oo this flying trip to gotfcers yersoaal erreott and destroy somehich he had What role >Hdn Ittunbul and Budapest? JACAaAXlA aoted aa courier und contaot mar. between Istanbul ond Budapest, as chiefly concerned with tlie JASMIMS project but he also oarrisd .nesBogeo to and from Itflg. Ills contacthue was mad* by ordinary pott box or nessenger in Budapest, and IBIS sent by theout* material to be brought br.ok toad


'.That Is known,E, how was hoe play, preliminary ta theoperations into Hungary andon old friend ofH>t. The twoschool together sons tweuty years ago and hodor lessnd lainate either by mailvisits for the past twelve years. Bsriy inore ay arrival lo Istanbul,aid aDWCGt ia Istunbul. 1 tine LOG-GCb huddinner partyoh DLUtCIiSSutS was present. SAEClSouS at so."j3 length aoout IhXS sndto LOGwlJCD, and fliutMssus held thethat their old friendship was genuine,y nutters, wives,o Ce on thc best ter.ts of long standing ffcise to believe

hisrte. aescribedlv,told

hat ISdS lived outside of Budapesteryand attractive country estate. LGGiSOOS iilwoya said that 1TI5 was on fiood teres vith Gerrnan militaryGestapo hirjher-ups. He explained that IHIS's wifeeb sno dorlcroon wr.ich moy explain the poor quality of the alerefill that IRIS sent out to us. It was definitely the work of an amateur,not cone byjestapo professional, sroman gather ISIS worked withduring the year

whenOE was ofrilUted -itn tbe British. the British, who baa orl^lnslly turnedover to Utic-rAl.InKD Inter regrettedeneraoity. r3 the British ooaplolneo toND that one ofndes, no doubt referring 'o us, we stealing Iirltlsh agents, and they tried to periuv.deto provide tncoist of our omenta to that they ooulfi aeo whether or not we wereyi.wanted to do this,ersuaded aiz to asK the British loetesdat of the agents tney tbougnt be -ed italen, cau toon we would advise whether we wore using sny or not. rltlsh ate about LOWiuGli, cad they toes, of hie connection with IBIS, and wo always felt thet IMS uue theo hod atolen from then If ony. ave reason to believe thtt the British thou;jbt he was :ood ot thntish to digress here and edd thet tho British tried to cot one of our agents away from us through I -ten I

trouble und ustasslnation. Theyney apparently oueosedad us with the lr.torEStionta recordingndseoret weapons so they approachedth on offer that he csmo one vorfc vith them. Tney ceidUioy would pny him sore toney than we did, but STOCK oounterod bythat we hud never paid him anything and that he would money for the work that he wae

then told oTOCK thrt hetieteke to work

with thems, tlict wis not our sphere

afterr wo woulonterest orn Sarope, that tho .Titian wculd be in fullof Austria, that thereforeool not tatfc tbe DrltlsB and aouncoa tiie .aericens. STvCX sale ia reply tact thutood idee, -od that ho would coze unC worK uith the -xltiuh at once if | ulo providetu letter signed by Anthonyconfirming whut | |nw Juot nolo. This of course sto.-pod tho show.

ana undor What oircumolances did tKlLl-lUK meet UCCVOmL?

Covered by report.


Wasis I

beerrenbelieve ltlant b> tho Uua-prien Chief ofif thatoocpt it cs genuine. Ithove been ft Qcniion

. s.s Known e':outcftotLution? Andhe dlopositlon of vneets?

To tor beet of ay ^nowle'f'.eounceedod in lottingone set into luoa-icst. 'uiIi^IUl. carried lt anc Ists mm delivered It to ShUHSZ and the ifen&arlun Staff, Ea never rwde (OBlvM, After ay authorityound out that unother tet net bean cent ino not know the circuauj Lances.

cioca thatvith LiLIUS. Won to this .matter:

Section I,

any otheraced Oormun

ibwehr ofrioiois?

Upon one ofreturn viBit3 to Dudapeatnegotiation:e res ordered toBratislava ur.ero he aayaat ;roat

length bynod Military officials.

were DOOBOOD'i rolatljno1 above.

S. Knot connection didLOG .'COL and othor

members of the Istanbul Mission?

I think SOGVCCO is thc :nly one that sow hie. Heyt^l'sI cell eve. houjbt at one Use taet PHK had JILSa toon't kanbls is true. 0. Hon often did he travel between Budapest andon't know.

10. What wsa the relationship orffice to the

and In particular the POOROO Chain?

ffloe was established as en independentthe Istanbul oisclon and had no relationshipDOflBDOD chain exceptstartedperations before

ad extendedhe freedom of our office fornfornotlon tiist wo ml.-Jit fcuve. Our lnb was at theirand we did tone work for them.


11. under wheta She bOGWtCO Chainiteclrcu.astsnccs under which the ixj-j- -CCLxceedingly cistasteful to ce. isit lo .nyo ootolahow to handle the foatlcrpecificallyuna he node notesthat it was totoeeting ofto ascertain just what contacts wouldif LvOV.Cw'L were separated one tiie cl.oiabroken up. La wasositionoc con:acts for reorganization, and Iovoid losinc the /woe men or creating: anyanimosity acio.tgf thcin who wereConfidential or secret activity. If it were toI urired that it beinayleave all members happy and sa'isfleO since theof personnel could expose up to trouble. these Bug-eat ions were promptly disregardedendwalked intoook fromeyo-efiles, end advised; that the office asot ante vithout further notice. to nayelf aOOtil's colary for%-hicb is ei-slvalcnt Lo the treatmenta domestic servant. the office had toprevent such an unsavory situntion was tofew watches with sone notes of appreciationtheir becks or toew appreciativethe un?ald servicesf our personnel hud

rendered. The entire procedure left ull of LGG'nGCD's me^bero and key people withfeeling or unfair treatment. ol wes particularly crushed. Up to theeft Istanbul, however, there had been no dangerous aftermath as the personnel caused oo trouble but the reputation of the American Secret Strategic groupaa rclapoc among those who had been associated with us. The Key people arc still personally loyal to me since they rcco/nizead no part ln their dismissal.

Is where; That is, tha nature of the dispersionBOGSOOD Chain?

IC ond some others are in Turkishcamps. .TACAltAKMi, KAGWOLIA, pattt.'INKLB and 3ARCISSUS arc still unmolested in Istanbul. TSIL-IUtt, DAHLIA and OLKA.TLSK areHied territoryan't remember much about thc reot. elieve, has had no trouble. CASSIA is in Vienna. JASMIME, PtKK,

-. SYHItlSA are in Husgary.

GER3EKA is in Tel-Aviv, Palestine. liMiTiiSSIA is still Ir. Istanbul as are Gi.CHIb and ALCATkA:;.

should JACAHaTILA's request for Allied protection

Of some ten members or theOD Chain be interpreted? What ore thc reriis of eoCh Case?

I don't snow the oerlte of JACAKAMDA'sie list was civen to me thc dayeft Istanbul. It Is my opinion however that JACAl-.AHDA hopes to getrotection for personal friends who hed helped him in our work or "ho had helped tho parachute mission. Two members on the list are JACAftANDA's mother and



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