Oimi or Strategic Sea vices Rkskarch and Analysis Branch
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CHINESE COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR CIVIL CRISIS IN CHINA
The Chinese Communists now appear to be convinced that, barring an unexpected change in the international situation, full scale civil war with the Central Government Is imminent and unavoidable. At present Yenan considers itself engagedwo-front war, against the Japanese and against Chungking. With the approach of Allied victory over Japan, however. Communist military and political plans and actions apparently aro being focussed more exclusively on the expected Internal crisis in China. Although Communist troops will continue to seize everyto expand their regions of control at the expense of the Japanese, their objective in so doing will be to improve the Communist position for the coming test of strength with Chungking.
The Communists do not minimise the technical superiority which Chungking armies trained and equipped by the United States would have in the approaching struggle. They nevertheless appear confident that the numbers, mobility, training, and spirit of their own troops and the strategic: geographic advantage of their holdings In northern and eastern China will counterbalance Chungking's Initial military superiority. Above all the Communists are counting on their ability to mobilize the Chinese peasantryajor instrument for civil war and for the establishmentommunist regime for all China
The Communists probably will continue to seek closer relations with the United States despite their conviction that the United States has decided to abandon its role as mediator In China and to support the Kuomintang exclusively. The Communists, who think in termsong civil war, are deterrnined to fight any military force which may beagainst them. They predict that should American forces land in eastern China and bring with them Kuomlntang troops or civilclashes with American as well as Kuomintung forces would probably result.
The Communists apparently are beginning to consider thethat the USSR may not be willing to risk an open challenge to the American position, which Yenan believes has crystallized Into full backing for Chungking, and that Soviet support for Yenan mightnot be immediately forth coming. Yenan gives every indication of having formulated its plans and policies Independently of Moscow and of being ready to attempt to carry them through without soviet backing if necessary.
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Political Issues and Communist Strategy
Convinced of the unmlnence of civil war. the Communists arethe political and governmental machinery upon which they intend to rely. Although they still express dread of the prospect, they apparently consider division of China into two warring states Inevitable ti the Kuomintang pursues Its present policy.
Communist leader Chou En-lal's return from Chungking to Party Headquarters at Yenan in5 marked for the Communists the end of negotiations with the Kuomintang under American auspices. From the Communist point of view the Central Government had shown no signs of willingness to meet the basic Communistof minorstablishmentultiparty committee with plenary powers toemocratic coalition government; (S) recognition of Communist-sponsored governments inareas behind Japaneselace for the Communists in the control or Chinese militaryelease of political prisoners and restoration of civil liberties.
Since February Communist propagandists have become increasingly bitter In their criticism of the Central Oovemment. which they claim Is openly prejiaring for civil war. They say the Kuomintang is laying the basisinal break with Yenan by refusing to allow the creationrovisional coalition government and by unilaterallyational Assembly which will only serve to consolidate Kuomintang one-party rule. They accuse the Central Government of preparing for civil strife by hoarding American lend-lease supplies instead of applying them to Che defeat of the Japanese. Although these accusations are leveled primarily against Kuomintanghus apparently notthe possibility of negotiations with "liberal elements" inthe Communists appear convinced that, for the moment at least, chancesompromise are unlikely.
Most recently the Communists have protested against the resolution of the Kuomintang Party Congress in May, which scheduled5 the conventionational Assembly to ratify China's draft constitution This move was interpreted in Yenan as an attempt toavorable impression at home and abroad while in effect fni't^staUlng the establishmentenuinely democratic coalitionThe Communists pointed out that the Assembly would be convened under Kuomintang direction and that the original delegates, elected7 for an Assembly which was never held,umber of persons now holding important positions In theponsored puppet governments.
Despite the Kuomintang resolution that the National Assembly would "embrace representatives of all parties ofhe Communists, together with the liberal minority parties in the Chinese Democratic League, claimruly representative assembly cannot be convoked
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until the restoration of China's lost territories permits free elections to be held throughout theconstitutional" government created during the war. they believe, would only legalize the Kuomintang'smonopoly of power. The Communists have gone so far as to say that If the Assembly is held in November, the Kuomintang will thereby "split the Chinese people" and precipitate civil war.
In protest against the plan for the National Assembly, therefused to participate in the recent meeting of the People'sCouncil (PPC) in Chungking. Theublic forum with no real legislative powers, had been asked by Chiang Kai-shek to discuss the question of membership In the November Assembly and advise the Oovernment of its opinions regarding the adoption of China's draft constitution. The Communists pointed out that they would gain nothing from attending since they have only eight seats In the PPC and since the exact powers and membership of the Assembly will ultimately be determined by the Kuomintang's "reactionary" Central ExecutiveFurthermore, they complained that all PPC delegates, including the Communists, were hand-picked by the Kuomintang.
The 7th Communist Party Congress, held inerved to tighten Party organization and confirmed Mao Tse-lung as the Party's supreme leader. During the Congress sessions Mao declared that the Kuornintang dictatorship should be supplantedrovisionalCoalition Oovernment to ruleregular democraticcan be set up after the war. According to Communist General Wang Jo M, the Communists recognize that genuine communism Is Impossible in China under current economic conditions and thereforeemocratic government as an intermediate step in theof their ultimate goal.
Mao also indicated that the Communists, having received no promise of an early coalition government and feeling themselves threatened by the scheduled Kuomintang National Assembly, are prepared to hold an assembly of their ownconference of tho people's representatives" from Communist-controlled areas, scheduled to meet before the Kuomlntang-sponsored Assembly in November, is being called to integrate the autonomous "liberated aceas"eople's Liberation Union. Although Mao has been careful to state that this conference Is toonsultative assembly andovernmental assemblya separate regime in opposition to Chungking, its creation would unquestionably provide the Communists with an organization which could easily be convertedrovisional government should abreak with the Central Government seem advisable to them.
Essential to Communist political and military strategy Is thethat the balance of political power In China resides in the peasantry. The Communists believe that, whether or not they have modern military equipment or techniques, the Chinese peasantry In the long run will unseat any regime It opposes and confirm in power any
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regime it favors. Among the predominantly peasant population in the areas they now control the Communists claim the support5 million people. They claim that their success ls due to the following major policies which benefit theand reforms whichthe burdens of land tenancy without dispossessing small and middle-classestriction of the tax burden on theinimum by keeping governmental and military expensesecruitmentoluntary basis rather thanystem which has been successful because of provision for the economic well-being of thelose cooperation between the armed forces and thencouragementigh degree of economic self-sufficiency.
The Communists are confident that they will readily be able to turn against the Kuomintang the popular strength which they mobilized against the Japanese. Yenan propagandists have carriedersistent campaign to discredit the Kuomintang in the eyes of the people in Free China as well as In the northern areas of their own control. The Kuomintang has been accused of being dominated by "reactionaries, monopolists, and bigfpolice-ridden, corrupt, and populace-fearingf having failed to mobilize the people for the war against Japan, and of having connived, through some of its leaders who have become Japanese puppets, to secure Japanese help in defeating the Communists before the eventual defeat of Japan.
Chungking policies of taxation and conscription, the Communists believe, have been so burdensome to the peasants that theay find the most fertile soli for Instigating revolt In precisely those areas over which the Kuomintang has had the fullest measure of controlommunist underground organizations have been active not only in rural areas of southern China, but also In major port cities, where every attempt will be made to stimulate proletarian uprisings when the time comes.
Military Issues and Communist Strategy
The Communists have reacted violently to what they termattempts to create the Impression that the collapse of at least one phase of Inter-party negotiations last winter was solely due to Communist intransigence. To the specific charge stressed by Chungking, that the Communists had refused to incorporate their army in the National Army under the command of an American general, the Communists answered that the suggested arrangement provided for no similar control over Kuomintang forces. The Communists had initially asked for American command of all Chinese forces to prevent the possibility of theuse of its armies to pursue domestic power instead of to combat the Japanese.
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The Communist position would seem toupreme American commander with both Communist and Central Government commanders taking orders directly from him and with no Central Government generals in the chain of command between supreme headquarters and Communist fieldoordinate principle insisted upon by the Communists is that Kuomlntang and Communist troops should not be mixed, but that each shouldeparate geographical sphere of operations.
une Yenan radioequest that the United States discontinue lend-lease supplies to Chungking, which It Implied were being stockpiled for use against the Communists instead of the Japanese. Yenantatement by War Minister General Chen Cheng whlcb it Interpreted aaretext in advance for civil war. General Chen's pledge that all lend-lease armaments would be used against the enemy contained the statement that, "If the Central troops are attacked by unfriendly troops it is against human nature to expect that the former will not use weapons in their possession for self-defense."
In the absenceeorganised government and high command, the main lines of Communist military strategy, though unannounced, are fairly apparent. The Communists claim that their regular army has been strengthened to number more, although all of these may not be armed for combat. Despite the steadily Improving position of Kuomlntang troops south of the Yangtze, the present disposition of Communist forces Indicates that the Communists feel strong enough to carry the war to the Kuomlntang In southern China. Yenan is shifting Its troops from north of the Yellow River to the area immediately to the south and from north of the Yangtze River to tbe area Immediately to the south, and apparently plans toajor effort to secure the important Yangtze River cities.
Civil warmall scale Is already In progress in Shensl, Shansl. Hopel, Honan, Shantung, Anhwel, Hunan, and Chekiang. Communist forces are steadily trying to neutralize Kuomlntang and puppet Chinese pockets of control east of the Japanese north-south corridor In central China. From the Communist point of view there is no distinction between Kuomlntang troops which have remained independent of the Japanese and those which In self-protection have become puppet forces.
Except for Japanese holdings, the Communists virtually dominate the area north of the Lung-Hal railroad, which runs east and west between Tunghal and Sian. Yenan alsoteady Increase in Communist positions south of the Lung-Hai, particularly along the Ping-Han railroad, which runs north and south between Peiplng and Hankow.
South of the Yangtze River the Communists are still In thelargely underground, stages of their program. Thoy areengaged in widespread political activity in all the south-
eastern provinces, and they claimunction ol Communi controlled districts in the area between Shanghai and Hangchow is imminent.
Attitud* Toward the VS and the USSR
For some time Communist propaganda has been insisting that Chiang Kai-shek's regime, without American aid, would have been forced to change Its policies In order to unify the country and gain popular support. Kuomintang leaders, Mao has said, "are preparing toivil war and are only waiting till certain Allied troops have driven the Japanese from certain parts oflthough Communist leaders in China have repeatedly expressed the desire for an orientation toward the Unitedhinese Communist at San Francisco recently stated that, while the Communists dread the division of China into two spheres backed by two great powers. If the United States aids only theYenan will ask for direct help from the USSR. While on the one hand Communist leaders are sharp in their criticism ofhoy have also expressed the conviction that American economic cooperation will bc essential to China's postwar Industrial development.
The Communists apparently feel that they nowhoice between two alternative policies toward the Unitedo cooperate with the United States Army to whatever degree American policy permits, hoping thereby to win some American recognition and to mitigate the difficulties they anticipate from an advance of American and Chungking forces into Communisto attempt tohange in American policy by refusing military cooperation, and at the same time launch an Intensive anti-American propaganda campaign In order to mobilize Chinese popular support. The special disadvantage to the Communists of the latter program would be that Chungking would be given an immediate opportunity to claim itself the sole Chinese force cooperating In the war against Japan.
Although tho Communists look to the USSR for sympathy and probably are making every effort to put their case for eventual aid before the Soviets, they at present apparently have no detailed assurance of Soviet support and no foreknowledge of Soviet plans regarding the Far Eastern war. Contact with the USSR Is probably maintained through Chinese Communists in Moscow and through the radio at Yenan. To date the Chinese Communists have received no Soviet arms. Yenan seeks to Indicate that the extent of its orientation toward the USSR will depend on the attitude taken by the United States on outstanding problems in China,
"Without the participation of the Sovietinal and thorough settlement of the Pacific question" will be Impossible. Mao Tsetung said in his Party Congress address in April Should the USSR
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attack the Japanese in Manchuria, the Communists plan to cooperate by extending their guerrilla operations Into Jehol and south Liaoning. Their underground activities throughout Manchuria would also beThe Communists believe the Soviets will recognise whatever Chinese forces they meet in Manchuria and that the USSR will make no territorial demands as long as Manchuria is controlledriendly regime. Tbe Communists say they would be willing to grant the USSR port and transportation facilitiesommercial basis in Manchuria as long as no infringement of Chinese sovereignty is entailed.
Similarly the Communists declare that Outer and Inner Monoglia will remain parts of China if they are given autonomyederative basis. Active assistance in improving the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the territories would be counted upon to prevent them from seceding to the USSR. So far Soviet policy In Outer Mongolia has been very beneficial to the Mongols, but has not been aggressive, theclaim. They imply that Mongolia can still be redeemed by the Chinese from its present pro-Soviet orientation. The Communists accuse Chungking of provoking the current revolt in China's central Asiatic border province of sinitiangepressive policy toward the local population. They maintain that tbe province will be kept out of the Soviet orbit only by receiving autonomy basedrogressive policy toward Its many racial groups. Yenan accuses the Kuomintang ofthe support of small reactionary ruling minorities everywhere at the expense of losing the allegiance of the people of China.
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