THE FATHERLAND FRONT GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA

Created: 6/29/1945

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THE FATHERLAND FRONT GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA

The present Bulgarian Government, installed by the Woodless coupust prior to Bulgarian surrender, consistsour-party coalition known as the Fatherland Front. It includes the powerful, well-organized (Communist) Bulgarian Workers' Party; the Agrarian Party,road following among the Bulgarian peasants; the numerically weak Socialist Party; and the People's Union Zveno, whose strength lies chiefly in its long-standing close relations with the Bulgarian Army. For almost four years before the Bulgarian surrender the Fatherland Front, with the Communists as Its most active element, functioned as an underground antl-fesclst organization,he Bulgarian Communists, profiting from apparent Soviet support sjoi from their own superior party organization and tactics, have dominated the Fatherland Front They have succeeded inthe other parties of the coalitioneries of aggressive attacks on non-Communist leaders attempting toeasure of partySimultaneously they havetrong drive for control of key positions in the central and local governments, in the Bulgarian Army, labor organizations, and the press. This rapidof Communist Influence has caused considerable friction with the other parties of the Fatherland Front and frequently threatened the solidarity of the coalition Itself. However, the non-Communist members of the Bulgarian Government, despite their fear of growing Communist control, have thus far been unwilling toabinet crisis.ove, they feel, would accomplish little In their favor as long as the Red Army remains in the country and the USSR continues to be the dominant power in the Bulgarian ACC.

At the time of the September Revolution the two strongest elements Of the Fatherland Front were the Communists and Zveno. Theowed their strength to their efficient organization and their twenty years' experience In underground work. The latter included the organization of the partisan operations of the Fatherland Front.activities were directed throughout by members of the former Comintern still in Moscow, notably George Dlmltrov. Although they have never commanded the supportajority of the people, the Communists wereufficiently strong position to demand four posts In the Fatherland Front Government, Including the key ministries of Interior and Justice.

The strength of the small Zveno group derived from the ability of Its leaders to command the loyaltyarge part of the Bulgarian Army.

OMI.IUIII?

This military support accounts lor tho shsence of any major Internal clasheptember when the Fatherland Front seised power. It also accounts for the fact that Zeeno, use the Communists, was allotted four ministries in the new Government, including the key posts of Prime Minister (Kiroon Oeorgiev) and the Ministry of War. The Zreno group has generally stood for centralized authoritarian government at home and close relations with Russia and Yugoslavia abroad.

The Agrarian Party, generally believed to have numerically the greatest potential following of any Bulgarian political organization, was also awarded four ministries. Its position in the Government,is only secondary because It controls none of the key posts. The Agrarians, who hadelatively passive role in the underground resistance, were divided, disorganized, and without effective leadership at the time of the September Revolution.

Finally, tbe Bulgarian Socialist Party, while It Is the oldest in the Fatherland Front, Is also the weakest. Its two representatives in the Cabinet have been given relatively unimportant positions.

The official foreign policy of the new Government, announced soon after the seizure of power, is directed toward cordial and everlasting friendship with the Soviet Union and the Russian people, friendlywith the western democracies, and close ties with Yugoslavia and the other Balkan countries. The new domestic program includes thoroughgoing reform of all Government departments along leftist democratic lines with particular emphasis on economic and social welfare.

Despite general agreement on this policy, conflicts have since arisen over the interpretation of Its various points Implementation of the program has been overshadowed by the Jockeying for position which quickly developed among the four parties. In this Internal struggle, which has been sharpest between the Communists and Agrarians, theas tended to side with the Agrarians The Socialists either supported the Communists or failed toefinite stand until recently, when they too have come under Communist attack.

Although the lack of harmony within the coalition has occasionally been attributed to Soviet influence, the current struggle between the Communist and Agrarian Parties has its roots In the period of thes, when the Agrarians excluded the Communists from power. The conflict would have been revived after the German withdrawal from Bulgaria even had there been no Soviet troops In the country. While tbe presence of Soviet forces and the dominant position of the USSR representatives on the Allied Control Commission are advantageous to the Bulgarian Communists, there is some doubt whether the Soviets have felt it necessary to lay down the details of the local Communist program and tactics On the other hand. Anglo-American authorities have not encouraged non-Communist Bulgarian leaders to hope for British and American support in their struggle to keep Bulgaria from falling entirely under Communist domination.

One of the first end most Important steps of the Communists to extend their influence was to secure the Ministry of Interior. With this key post in its hands, the party immediately proceeded to reorganize the police force, now called the militia and composed almost exclusively of Communists. The Communists, despite the fact that the Ministry of War is held by Zpeno, have also had considerable success inthe army, the chief source of Zveno strength. The new Assistant Minister of War, Chief of Staff, Assistant Commander in Chief, and Chief ot Intelligence are all Communists-hird of the regular Bulgarian Army commissions are estimated to have been given to Communists or to men with strong pro-Russian leanings Political commissars, virtually all of them Communists, have been attached to all army units.

urther means of consolidating their influence the Communists have created or provided leadership for large mass organisations within which political subdivisions are not tolerated. None of the individual parties are allowed to be politically active In these organisations.political commissars carry on intensive political education and propagandaFatherland Frontargely determined by the Communists. The Communist contention is that tbe Bulgarian people need unified political education and that every Bulgarian should belong to one or more of such mass organisations Among thethus created or exploited by tbe Communists are the General Workers' Trade Union, the Sports Federation, the Women's Union, and the An tl-Fascist Youth Organization,

The Communists have also taken numerous measures through thelr party and Fatherland Front organizations to control Bulgarian economic activities. The serious deterioration of economic conditions since the Bulgarian surrender, stemming primarily from the after-effects of the war, hasonstantly aggravating factor In the political clashes of recent months. Prices of consumers' goods, temporarily lowered last fall, have risen to inflationary levels; thereourishing black market; and certain categories of Industrial wages are reported to have been fixed so high as to make production Impossible. Many Bulgarians believe that economic recovery has been retarded by what they regard as excessive Communist seal In promoting basic reforms and bybureaucratic supervision. The Communists, who regard any possible failure of the Fatherland Front economic programrave threat to themselves, appear little disposed to relax present controls.

As In other countries, the Communists in Bulgaria have played the leading role In instituting trials of collaborationists and other persons charged with responsibility for Bulgaria's entrance Into the war on the side of Germany. The presence In the country of the Red Army, the strength of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the bitterness ofpersonal political grudges have all contributedore thorough purge In Bulgaria than has taken place In any other country. The latitude taken by the courts in defining war guilt has led to heavy

sentences and to the punishment of certain right-wing AgrarianThese men refused to Join the Fatherland Front in the months preceding the September Revolution and are regarded by some Agrarians as victims of Communist political vengeance.

In addition to these methods of extending their Influence, the Communists have attempted to weaken the other parties of theFront either by direct attack on the parties themselves foralleged fascist sympathizers, or by forcing out of positions of power those of their leaders who oppose complete subservience to Communist policy. For example, the Communists haveeries of attacks on the Agrarian leader, George M. Dlmltrov (not to be confused with the Communist, George. M. Dlmltrov was made Chiefof the newly united Agrarian Party innd ls believed to have one of the largest followlngs of any Bulgarian politician. He has consistently opposed the extension of Communist Influence in Bulgaria beyond the letter and spirit of the agreement which provides for equal Agrarian and Communist representation In the Fatherland Front and in the Government. He lstrong proponent of close relations with Great Britain and the United States as well as with the Soviet Union.

The Communists accuse Dlmltrov of fomenting disunity within the Fatherland Front and of predicting an eventual clash between the Western Allies and Soviet Russia. Despite the difficulty of proving that he had everraitor to his country, the fact that Dimitrov has worked for British Intelligence has made the Soviets mistrust him and has provided ammunition for his enemies In Bulgaria. On the other hand, some of Dlmitrov's many followers felt that his inability to win Soviet confidenceerious disadvantage to the party. Also, Dimitrov had many personal enemies within the Agrarian Party who assisted the Communists in pressing for his removal. Dimitrov resigned as leader of the party inowever, his resignation was preceded by an executive committee vote of confidence In his policies along with the appointmentimitrov supporter, Nikola Petkov, as his successor.

Despite Dlmitrov's complete withdrawal from political activity, he and his policies continued to be the object of violent Communist attacks. These culminated last Aprilemand that Petkov and his associates shouldublic denunciation of Dlmltrov. The demand wasand the Agrarian cabinet ministers offered to resign rather than make further concessions to Communist pressure. However, Premier Georgiev, the leading Zveno representative in the Cabinet, fearing that If the Agrarians should be seriously weakened the turn of Zveno would come next, urged the Communists to show restraint and the Agrarians to be more conciliatory. The Bulgarian Regents and the Sovietof the ACC also urged the Agrarians to compromise,abinet crisis was averted.

Having failed to win Petkov over to the antl-Dlmltrov camp, the Communists tried new tactics. Exploiting the genuine differences which existed within the Agrarian Party, they increased their demands that the "reactionary" followers of Dlmltrov be expelled. They promised that the party, when purged, would be granted fuller participation in local Fatherland Front Committees and in the central and localadministration. At the same time theyroup of dissident Agarians headed by Alexander Obbov to seize the partyThis time the Communists were moreonvention held by the Obbov factionay decided to expel all Dimitrov followers,ew party administrative council consisting almost entirely of Agrarians willing to adapt party policy to the wishes of the Communists, and reaffirmed Nikola Petkov as head of the party. The retention of Petkov appears to have been motivated by the fact that, while he has notlose personal associate of Dimitrov, hethe loyalty of Dlmitrov's large following among the rank and file of the Agrarian Party.

Petkov himself, who had not been consulted. Immediately declared that the use of his name had been unauthorized, that the convention had been called without the consent or knowledge of the authorized leaders of the Agrarian Party, and that the new party administrative council was spurious. His prepared public statement to this effect, however, was barred from the Bulgarian press and radio. When Petkov and his associates complained to Soviet ACC authorities the latter arc said to have advised Petkov not to break openly with the Obbov group. Petkov has as yet taken no decisive action, but the purge of the Agrarian Party has conUnued.

The expulsion of Dimitrov, formally announced onay, was followed closely by that of Minister of Public Works Bumbarov, who shares Dlmitrov's opposition to Communist domination. Despite his expulsion from the party, Bumbarov has not yet resigned from the Cabinet. Finally, the pro-Communist Agrarian authorities are said to have requested the Agrarian Minister of Agriculture to resign from the Cabinet, though he has not yet been expelled from the party. Onune the same group "elected" their own leader, Obbov, to bc Chief Secretary of the party, thus replacing Petkov. If Petkov continues to oppose the Obbov Agrarians, this step may be followed by his expulsion from the party andemand for his resignation from the Governmenta major Cabinet reshuffle will probably be deferred until after the inuruhent Big Three Conference.

Meanwhile, Agrarian and Zveno leaders, who had hoped to avoid Communist domination and who had expected that the end of the war in Europe would be followed by more active Anglo-Americanin the affairs of the Bulgarian ACC, pressed the Americanfor some indication of United States policy in regard to Bulgaria. With increasing frequency the American members were asked whether non-Communist Bulgarians should give up their struggle for

political Independence, in which many lives are claimed to have been lost, and Join the Communist Party in order to obtain as favorable treatment as possible from the Soviets.

The only encouragement which Petkov and his followers haveIn their opposition to the Obbov Agrarians has been the United States action in granting asylum to G. M. Dlmltrov. On the night ofay, Dimitrov, many of whose followers had been arrested and whose own removal to prison appeared imminent, escaped from his closely-guarded apartment. He took refuge firstritish member of the ACC, who was unable to grant him the protection of diplomaticand subsequently at the home of the American representative, where he has remained. The United States Government has taken the position that Dimitrov will not be relinquished unless the Bulgarian Government offers satisfactory guarantees for his personal safety.

Similar to the pattern of Communist attacks on Agrarians who have attempted to preserve party Independence are the more recent attacks on Socialist leaders. The initial Communist pressure on the Socialist Party to purge Itself of leaders who opposed Communist domination of the Fatherland Front met with relatively weak resistance. Independent-minded leaders were quietly dropped from the party until by May few "unreconstructed" Socialist leaders remained. In recent weeks the Communists and their allies within the Socialist Party have encountered stiffer but still largely Ineffective resistance. Onay the chief secretary of the Socialist party was replacedro-Communist leader. At present the one remaining Independent Socialist leader, Minister of Social Welfare CheshmedzlefT, Isosition similar to that of Petkov and his Agrarian associates. Though he has actively opposed thefaction headed by Minister of Commerce Neikov, he must either tolerate the subservience of his party to Communist policy or resign his posts in the party and in the Government, thus further strengthening the trend toward Communist domination.

Zveno leaders have not yet shown the same determination as other non-Communists to maintain independent party action. Reports from Sofia indicate that should they do so, there are other men within the party who, like Obbov and Neikov, would be willing to coordinate Zveno policies with those of the Communists rather than see the partyThis is particularly true among the military adherents of Zveno who do not wish to Jeopardize their army careers-

In recent months all Bulgarian parties have been tacreaslnglywith the electionsegular National Assembly, now scheduled forugust. This body will be asked to approve all legislative decrees issued by the Fatherland Front Government sinceulgaria's future form of government will be an important topic ofthough constitutional procedure would demand the callingrand National Assemblyinal decision In this matter.

Until the tune of O. at Dimitrov'* expulsion from the Agrarian Party, the electoral procedures to be followed were the subject of sharpbetween the Agrarian and Communist Parties. Dlmltrov and his followers contended that the parties should present separate lists of candidates In order that the elections should accurately reflect the numerical strength of each party. The Communists, on the other hand, appeared determined to force the useommon Fatherland Front Ust. which wouldredetermined number of candidates from each party and would thus enable the Communists to preserve their dominant position. Since the purge of the Agrarian Party and the seizure of party control by Agrarians who are unwilling to opposedemands, the electoral controversy has become largely academic. The electoral law, as determinedppears on the surface to be entirely democratic. The ballot Is to be free, secret, and universal, and each party has the option of submitting Its own list of candidates or of participating in the ticket of the Fatherland Front Under Its new leadership, however, the Agrarian Party has already agreed not toeparate list In addition the courts will pass on the anti-fascist record of every potential nominee. Since the Ministry of Justice Is In the hands of the Communists, this process may tend toumber of the stronger non-Communist candidates. The fact that the police system ls Communist-controlled may also tend to Influence the balloting. Under such conditions the coming elections cannot be expected to gauge accurately the following of the individual parties or to affect seriously the present balance of power in Bulgaria.

Original document.

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