OrricE or Stratkoic Sravicss RkskascrAnalysis Branch
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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY
The virtual disintegration of Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army (INA) in the general Japanese retreat from Burma marks the latest failure In Japan's attempt to exploit Indian nationalism in her war against the Allies in Southeast Asia. In the last few months large-scale surrenders,adical decline In morale, have rapidlyINA ranks Remaining troops have presumably retreated with the Japanese into the Shan mountains towards Thailand. Bose. the INA Commander in Chief, reportedly has fled to Bangkok, from where he is allegedly reorienting his propaganda to longer range objectives.
The INA was established as the military arm of the IndianLeagues which the invading Japanese had organised throughout Southeast Asiaose's troops, operating in conjunctionapanese drive into India, were Intended to engage In militaryespionage, and antl-British propaganda urging the Indians to workapanese victory in the Interests of their own future Independence Japanese anti-British propaganda, with Its slogan of "Asia for theand the policy of singling out the Indian communities forfavorable treatment undoubtedlyertain appeal to Indians in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, ever since the Russo-Japanese warapan has enjoyed increasing prestige as the one Asiatic nation able to establish herself as an Independent equal of the Western powers. In the early years of the Pacific War. Japan's position In Asia wasthan ever, and Great Britain's defeat in India may haveatter of months. Expediency appeared to many Indians to requirewith the Japanese.
In Burma tho Indian Independence League had been concerned largely with protecting the Indian minority from Burmese hostility until Bose arrived3 to assume its leadership and to organise theNationaln4 Burma became the headquarters of the whole movement when the INA First Division was moved up from Malaya to aid the Japanese in the Manipur campaign. Boar, an energetic and persuasive speaker, was probably most popular with those Indians who had some previous contact with political agitation or who came from his own province of Bengal. There Bose had won his largestas one of the most turbulent and conspicuous of the nationalistin India.8 he served as President of the All-India Congress but, when re-electedas virtually forced to resignlash with Gandhi and Nehru, who both distrusted his extremism. Subsequently Bose organized his followers into the left-wing "Forwardhich functioned as an opposition party to the Congress. Already at that time Nehru recorded his fear that Bose was turning fascist.1 after an-
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other arrest, Bose escaped from India and was next heard fromfor the Axis from Berlin.
In Bose the Japanese found an excellent potential puppet. He had frequently been Imprisoned by the British In India, and his hatred for Great Britain was violent He had long argued that there was no hope in the policy of compromise with the British which Gandhi was following, and that Indian independence could be achieved only by force. Until3 the Japanese used another man named Bose, Rash Behari Bose, to spread the Idea of winning Indian freedom with Japanese aid. Rash Behari had fled to Japan after having directed terrorist activities in the Punjab during the last war.1 he organized the first IndianLeague in Japan, which announced as its objective "theof independence of India by all possiblentil Subhas Chandra Bose arrived In Japan from Germany, tbe elder Bose wasleader of the network of Indian Independence LeaguesSoutheast Asia. When in3 tbe younger Bose took overRash Behari apparently retired to Japan, and has since died.
Burma succeeded Malaya as the suitable headquarters for theIndian Independence movement not only because It was to be the staging area for the military attack on India but alsoafter Malaya It provided the largest Indian population outside of India upon which to draw for membership. At the time of the Japanese invasionalf-million Indians remained in Burma. By far thepart of them belonged to the laboring class,arge number of Indian merchants also had heavy financial stakes in the country,through money-lending and rice-selling. Although many of these merchants fled to Indiaome left representatives to protect their Interests and provided Bose's movementource of funds. Tbe Japanese, contrary to Burmese desires, allowed the Indian community to retain control over all Indian-held property In Burma-Indians in Burma have long been conscious ofinority and are Jealous of their statuseparate political group. The Burmese are openly hostile toward the Indians, consideringenace to Burma's national and economic life. As earlyndians had formed aelectorate which, under British auspices, was incorporated Into the present constitution in the face of Burman opposition. Most of theIndians In Burma sympathized with the alms of the IndianCongress, and although the Imported laborers who formed the bulk of the Indian population were politically inactive before the war. Indian National Congress propaganda may have influenced themertain extent before they left India.
During2 the Japaneseampaign to persuade Indian prisoners of war in Hongkong, Shanghai, and Singapore that they should flght along with the Japanese for the 'niberatlon" of India. In June the Japaneseonference In Bangkok at which the INA was formally launched, and by November the Japanese claimed that the
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strength of the force0 troops. Disagreement between Its first leader and Rash Behari Rose ended in the temporary dlxbandment of the IN A. In3 Subhas Chandra Bose arrived from Germany and, besides taking over the Indian Independence Leagues and the new INA as commander in chief, became President, Premier, Foreign Secretary, and Defense Minister of the "Provisional Government of Freeis extensive propaganda and recruiting campaign for the INA was at first conducted among Indian prisoners of war, of which0 were in Japanese hands, and among Indian rubber plantation labor In Malaya. In4 Bose moved INA headquarters to Rangoon, and continued his recruiting from there.
Several factors aided Bose In his work. At that time British prestige was at Its lowest ebb. Enlistment afforded escape from POW camps, where conditions were bad,ossible opportunity for Indiana toto their homes and families Base's propaganda spoke of "the sacred soil of the motherland" and of raising the flag of Free India In every city, town, and village in India. Many Indians doubtless sincerely believed that by Joining the INA they would participate in achieving real Indian Independence. Furthermore, they were told that they would be welcomed by the British Indian Army, which would refuse to fight them, and that all India would rise to welcome them. Thus the general morale of the INA troops before their first engagement In Arakan was fairly high, and Japanese propaganda was able to aim at the British-Indian Army, urging desertion and telling of comrades-in-arms training outside of India to liberate their native country.
In the military engagements that followed, INA regiments wereprimarily to confuse British-Indian troops in the combat areas by shouting orders in Urdu or English, to encourage deserters, and to take full charge of all British-Indian prisoners in order to persuade them to change loyalties and Join the INA cause They were also used Inreconnaissance and as screens for Japanese troops. Often regarded with suspicion by the Japanese, INA forcea were almost never employed as regular fighting units, and were assigned inferior equipment.
The first encounter between British-Indian and INA troops, aengagement, tookew miles north of Buthidaung in Arakan. INA units were successful through trickery and civilian disguise InBritish-Indian sentries and enabling the Japanese toivisional headquarters. In the next encounter, however, an INA Sikh, who had been encouraged to leave cover shouting slogans and invitations to desert, was riddled with British-Indian bullets
Optimism aroused among the puppet Indians by Initial military successes quickly disappeared. The Ineffectiveness of the INA was clearly demonstrated at the time of the farthest Japanese advance into India in the spring ofapanese expectations had obviously been high and the British themselves had been uncertain how much confusion Base's Indians could cause. But actual encounters proved that British-Indian troops would fight the enemy whether he was Indian or Japanese.
CONFIDENTIAL
Three INAheir morale evidently high, crossed the Chlnd-win In4 (or the Manlpur campaign and the much-heralded "March onndians trained as occupation officers for the "Indian Provisional Government" actually arrived In Tamu (on the frontierImphal) but were soon forced to retreat. Although the JapaneseInto India almost as far as Imphal, by June they were pushed back into Burma. INA troops withdrew in very poor condition Disease swept their ranks, they were Inadequately supplied, and their morale fellJapanese officers In charge of INA Intelligence operations in Manlpur complained that while Japanese were being killed, INA men were no longer willing to die "for the cause of India's freedom."
Japanese failure In the Manlpur campaign seriously Impaired the strength of Bose's "Provisional Government" and dashed the Japanese hope for widespread local revolts against the British resulting from an invasion of Indian soil. Despite military reverses, however, Bose continued his propaganda When the Gandhi-Jlnnah meeting in the summer4 was first scheduled, Bose urged Indians not to believe that abetween the Congress and tbe Muslim League could lead toThe failure of Gandhi and Jlnnah to break the Indian political deadlockeconciliation between nationalist elements andwith the British restored some hopefulness to the"Free India" movement, and in the fall4 Bose talked ofthe INA with Japanese aidew campaign to win Indianby force.
Inn line with renewed Japanese emphasis on the Greater East Asia program, Bose visited Tokyo to establish closerbetween his "Provisional Government of India" and Japan. Anof diplomatic representatives was arranged in the hope ofcollaboration and Improving occasionally strained relations. In the past, members of the INA and even Bose himself had had difficulties with Japanese military men In the field. Another troublesome problem bad been the Burman puppet government's desire to liquidate all Indian claims to property in Burma. Also there had been conflict between Bose and the Japanese concerning propaganda directives beamed to India. With his own diplomatic representative In Tokyo, Bose may have hoped to have his India policies more effectively presented. At the same time, Tokyo's warm and impressive welcome of Bose indicated that thestill considered his role Important to their war effort
Although Ininter operations in Burma, Isolated INA units belonging to the fresh and untried second division are said to have fought with determination, the INAhole continued to be andevice for Japanese exploitation of anti-British sentiment in India. INA strength InS was estimated to have declined toince February, when at Bose's request the INA wasefensive position on the Irrawaddy, Its troops, in units varying In strengthave surrenderedarge scale.
Original document.
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