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CHINESE ATriTUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION
The Soviet denunciation ol the Russo-Japanese neutrality pactpril served to intensify speculation In China regarding Sovietin the Far East. Avowed Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union for many years has been one of friendly respect, but Chinese leaders differ as to the value to China of Soviet participation in the war against Japan Liberals and Communists urge closer Sino-Soviet ties In the present crisis. Semi-official groups within China are taking steps toapprochement between the two countries. Chinese Government leaders, however, have shown few signs of giving up their long-held suspicions of Soviet designs on Manchuria. Slnklang, and the Chinese Communist areas. Meanwhile, the USSR has recently been Increasingly critical of the Kuomlntang Government and more and more commendatory of the Chinese Communists.
Enthusiastic press and official comment on the Soviet movepril concealed this basic cleavage among the various factions inpolitical life. At one extreme, the Venan Emancipation Dailystrove to Justify the USSR's previous policy toward Japan, and called upon the Kuomlntang Government to abandon Its "erroneous policy" and Improve relations between the Soviet Union and China. Ta Rung Poo. Chungking Independent newspaper, greeted the movedownpour on the Japanese leakynd soberly suggested that the Governmentpecial envoy to Moscow "to discuss the Far Eastern program/'
Kuomlntang Government officials likewise hailed the Soviet action. Minister of Information Wang Shih-chleh and Wei Tao-mlng.to the United States, stressed the effect on the morale of the United Nations. Wang stated that "the moral and psychological effect of this decision of the Soviet Government, even apart from other measures that may be taken, will berom now on the path Is cleared for Soviet Russia, China, and other United Nations to collaborate withoutormalmoassador Wei called theost significant move that will greatly strengthen the cause for which we are fighting."
Actual political alignments in China regarding relations with the USSR closely parallel alignments on Internal matters. Those elements seeking democratic reforms and Kuomlntang-Communistfavor closer ties, while Chiang and the reactionary cliquesthe Kuomlntangeep distrust of the Soviet Union which Is connected with their intractable attitude toward the Chinese
Chiang, his Chief of Staff Ho Ying-chln, and theWhampoa military clique have been implacable enemies of the Communists since7 split In the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and subsequent Kuomintang campaigns to eradicate the ChineseChiang's personal advisor on Russian affairs, Chu Hsin-ming. has been equally hostile to both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. Education Minister Chu Chla-hua and the "CC" clique, led by the brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu, Party Organization Minister, represent two powerful Kuomintang factions and are perhaps the most anti-foreign and anti-Soviet elements In the Party.
Other influential personalities and groups within the Kuonilntangore moderate attitude toward the USSR than the "CC" and Whampoa cliques. Foreign Minister T. V. Soong was reported to be.reaty of amity with the Soviet Union and haspecial envoy to Moscow. Sun Fo, prominent liberalleader whoertain special Immunity In speech and action as son of Sun Yet-sen. consistently advocates closer relations with the Soviet Union, and claimstrong, united China Is In the Soviet Interest. He Is president of the Slno-Sovlet Cultural Association In Chungking, an organization dedicated to the furtherance of Sino-Soviet friendship through discussions, movies, and meetings commemorating Important Soviet holidays. However, Sun's actual political influence in offsetting the present anti-foreign tendencies of the innermost Kuomintang cliques is severely limited by his lack of military strengthersonalThe middle-of-the-road Political Science Group has not beenvocal with respect to the USSR, and may be expected to continue its general support of the dominant anti-Russian conservative group in the Kuomintang.
Outside the Kuomintang, the League of Democratic Parties,largely preoccupied with Internal reform, is concerned lest the Kuomlntang's tactics with regard to Russia draw the two countries into actual conflict, and has expressed increasing interest in Improving Sino-Soviet relations.
Finally the Chinese Communists, like the liberals, would welcome Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Formal relations between Moscow and Yenan. the capital of Communist China, are non-existent; each has been careful not to embarrass the other by Indicating anattachment; and even the Kuomintang officially states that the Communists are not under Russian control. Until recently the Soviet press, though represented by two Tass correspondents at Yenan, has devoted very little space to the Chinese Communists. Now, increasingly numerous items in the Soviet press indicate Russian approbation of the Chinese Communist war effort and of their extensive political andreforms, as contrasted with conditions in Kuomintang China.
On their part, the Chinese Communists have shown considerable interest In Soviet Russia. Many of their leaders have studied In the USSR, and others are now being trained in the Russian language. Chinese Com-
munlst newspapers feature Tass reports. They applauded both theof the neutrality pact with Japannd its recentThe Russian position on such problems as Poland. Yugoslavia, and Germany and the exploits of the Russian Army are given prominence in Border Region newspapers.
Even those Chinese leaders who distrust Soviet intentions appear awareeed for indicating their interest in closer friendship and understanding with the USSR.peech before the People's Political Council (PPC) in4 Chiang Kai-shek himself, stressing the necessity for cooperation with the Soviet Union, stated that "the Government has readjusted the factors which are regarded as sufficient to cause obstruction, and the international relations between China and the Soviet Union, it Is hoped, will becomehree days lateresolution calling for the strengthening of Slno-Russianon the basisonviction that China and the Soviet Union, as the "pillars of peace" on the Asiatic mainland, cannot fully discharge this responsibility without complete understanding and closeThe PPC decided to implement the resolution by requesting the Government to strengthen Slno-Russlan cooperation in accordance with Its fixed policy, and by conferring with the Government abouteople's goodwill mission to the USSR. The Chinese News Service in the United States was instructed by the Government tothe "good relations" existing between China and the USSR,esearch worker was hired to prepare articles for the Service on Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese also claimed that Ihe removal of Sheng Shlh-tsai as Governor of Slnkiangesture of friendliness toward the Soviet Union. Most recently, the semi-official People's ForeignAssociation decided tooodwill mission to the USSR.
But despite these protestations of friendship, other movesasically unfriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. The PPCmission was never sent. Kuomlntang policies toward Northwest China and the Border Region are motivated in part by hostility toward the Soviet Union. The removal of Governor Sheng Shlh-tsai,ove to appease the USSR, has not been followed by any change In the anti-Soviet policy in Slnkiang. Kuomintang elementsto blame Soviet Instigation for the recent uprising in the province which neutral observers contend was due to Chinese suppression of minority peoples there.
Meanwhile the Chinese Government has been faced with anchange In Soviet policy.eriod of years, following theattack on Chinahe Soviet press was generally friendly to the Kuomintang Government, and the USSR, although ain the Pacific War. early took the lead in supplying equipment,advisors, and transportation facilities to aid the Chinese war effort. The Soviet Union continues to maintain formal recognitionorrect official relationship with China. However, the Soviet Unionelief that the presently-constituted Kuomintang Gov-
erameril has madeinimum contribution to the defeat of thehas failed to fulfill its promises of Internal political and economic reforms and has adopted an untenable position in its refusal tooalition government. The Russian press meanwhile has been expressing admiration for the partisan warfare carried on by the Chineseagainst the Japanese, and for the effective manner in which the Communists have secured popular support In the regions they occupy. Commentators lately have also expressed support for theposition in its struggle with the Kuomintang.
Original document.
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