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POLITICAL CONFLICT IN CHINA
For twenty years Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has beentotrong central state in China under the leadership of the nationalist party, the Kuomlntang. In this process he has had to cope with three powerful forces of oppositionthe political liberals both inside and outside the Kuomlntang, the provincial warlords, and the Communists.
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67 all of the major political elements in Chinatheir mutual interest in cooperation against Japanese aggression. Under pressure from China's students, shopkeepers, peasants, workers, and eventually from her merchants, bankers, and Industrialists, the landlord-dominated Kuomlntang abandoned its policy of appeasement and7 agreed tooose anti-Japanese coalition including the Communists
Since then, however, the united front has tended to disintegrate. With the loss of the eastern coastal clues to the Japanese, thebanking, and industrial groups lost the basts of their power. Their moderating Influence on tbe reactionary landlord groups in tbedeclined Hostility among all Chinese factions has increased and hasontinuing crisis. In the past year especially, critical military reverses, mounting Inflation, and reported corruption andIn the Chungking administration have seriously weakened theposition of the Central Government.
The Chinese Communist* and liberals of all parties, including the Kuomlntang, agree with Chiang on the necessity oftrong China and driving out the Japanese. But they oppose the Kuomintang's present one-party rule, and demand more effective conduct of the war. democratic reforms,hare In the national government forThe warlords, whose Influence for the most part rests solely on their provincial military and political power, oppose and fear Central Government encroachment on local prerogatives. The liberals and the warlords in southern and southwestern China haveoalition In opposition to the Chungking Government and have made overtures to the third dissident element, the Chinese Communists The Allied war effort in Asia and tho post-war position of China largely depend upon Chiang Kai-shek's ability to drawreponderance of these disparate forces and avoid civil war.
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Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang
Chiang Kai-shek stands above all groups In Free Chinaymbol of leadership toward national unification His professed aim has been totrong, cohesive, modem China which caneneficialin Far Eastern and world affairs. In striving for this goal, the Central Government has maintained that it must reduce wariordism and provincial separatism, and cannot tolerate control of territory or support of an Independent army by the Chinese Communists.
Chiang heads the whole machinery of government, which Is in the handsingle party, the Kuomintang. According to the theory on which the Chinese Republic was founded, the masses of the people are too illiterate and Inexperienced to handle their own destiny until after an indefinite period of tutelage In the exercise of political rights. While the Central Government has promised the adoptionemocraticand the end of Kuomintang tutelage shortly after the war,has continued to concentrate increasing authority In the hands of one man and one party. Chiang, as leader of party, government, and armed forces, wields extraordinarily broad discretionary powersystem of government that does not at present pretend to be responsible to any higher authorityingle political party.
Within that party, thetruggle for power is now going on partlyormal, personal rivalry for power, but alsotruggle between Western-type liberalism versus political reaction. The strongest faction is the extreme nationalist "CC" clique, led by the Chen brothers. These old-line Party members believetrong and united China can be achieved only hy strict Kuomintang control In terms of their strongly nationalistic interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. While willing to accept the technical advantages of Western science, the "CC" clique insists on the renaissance of ancient Chinese culture. Supported by the landlord-official class, this faction and Its Army counterpart, the Whampoa Military Clique, have long dominated the Chungking Government
In China, the landlord ls at the same time merchant, money-lender, and official. Acting In these various capacities, members of the landlord class have been able to monopolize control of the economy andat the village or county level and to supply most of the political leaders for the provincial and national governments as well. The typical land lord-official In China ls concerned chiefly with collecting rents, taxes, and interest. He is opposed to economic changes which would upset his special position and opposed to sharing political power with theand other groups in society. An anti-foreign attitude isesult of fear that pressure from the outside will strengthen the forces tending to undermine his unique position.
Another segment of the Kuomintang consists of members of the once-dominant group of merchants, bankers and Industrialists together with their amall but efficient following of technical assistants. Some of
these members, such as T. V. Soong, still occupy important positions in the Central Government. Since the loss of the economic resources of the coastal cities, this comparatively moderate element In the Kuomlntang has become generally subservient to the reactionary wing of the party.
Recently,mall element of the Kuomlntang led byYuan President Sun Po and including liberal businessmen and Intellectuals has become Increasingly vocal. Members of this group arc generally convinced that their own Interests as well as China's will best be served by the modernization of the country somewhat along the lines of American capitalistic democracy. Aided by strong foreign criticism of China and by weakening of Government prestige through Japanesesuccesses. Sun Fos followers have recently come out more strongly for the loosening of censorship regulations, establishment otomewhat more conciliatory Kuomlntang attitude toward the Chinese Communists. But these comparatively liberal leaders are less politicians than modern civil service administrators, and have neither the organizational nor the Ideological strength of the "CC" and Wham-poa cliques.
The membership of the three main groups In the Kuomlntang is not flxrd. Individual members of the party side with one group on certain Issues and with another group on other Issues. The main distinction among the groups Is their attitude toward democratic reforms andcooperation with the Communistsoalition government. Tbe Kuomlntang liberals want civil liberties and efficient government as much as the Communists do. They are also willing to work with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. The "CC" clique, on the other hand, wants nothing that will shake its grip on the government machine. Its members refuse to compromise with the Communists and express opposition to Soviet participation in the war against Japan. The moderate group in the Kuomlntang does nottrong, independent stand one way or the other. At present it is following the lead of the dominant "CC" clique. Freed of the influence of this clique, most if not all of the moderate group would probably be willing to participateoalition government with the Communists.
The Democratic League
Strong opposition to tbe policies and methods of Chiang and the Central Government comes also from members of the minority parties constituting the Federation of Democratic Parties. They take advantage of their relatively greater freedom in the areas of the anti-Chungking warlords to castigate the government for falling to meet their demands for democratic rights, domestic reforms, and vigorous prosecution of the war They urge concessions to the CommunistsoalitionAt present their only power isressure group both inside and outside the Government.
The most important parties in the League are the Youth Party, the National Socialists, the National Salvationists, and the Third Party. The
membership of the parties is quite small, consisting of college professors newspaper editors, students, some conservative bankers, industrialists minor officials. Junior officers, and small merchants, who have littlebut considerable influence because of their prestige andSince1 the League has expressed opposition topolicies and attempted to bring about coalition amongn tang groups.
The center of League activity has been Kunming, where it operated with relative freedom under the protection of General Lung Yun.of the Yunnan Provincial Government. Membership In this area includes personnel from the faculties of the various universities situated in Kunming. In4 League members In Kunming stated that they had given up hope for reform from the Central Government, thatChiang himself was solely responsible for the weakness of the Chinese Government, andovement had been organized to oppose the Chungking regime.
Provincial Warlords
The Impunity with which the comparatively small liberal group In the Democratic League criticises the Central Government is largely due to Its alliance with the anti-Chungking provincial warlords. Theopposition to the Central Government Is basedradition of provincial authority characteristic of China's semifeudal political life. Chiang's efforts at unification and centralization Inevitably reduce their military and political power. They also declare that Chiang uses their troops In desperate struggles against the Japanese in order to eliminate provincial military strengthactor in the future struggle for power in China. Politically they are at least as authoritarian In their methods aa the Kuomintang. to which some of them belong, and they probably do not sincerely subscribe to the democratic aims of the liberals- But fearing eliminationentralized authority, they may be willing toargain with the popular front
Many provincial leadersemi-autonomous role, and Central Government authority must be maintained by means of workingwith military leaders who are willing to compromise in order to Insure their own survival.ystem of barter and threats, the General -laalmo has managed to keep the controlling power over these warlords. While he Is willing to make certain concessions, Chiang reserves the right to command them to furnish troops when necessary. The warlords are pledged to be loyal and manyudimentary patriotism. But their loyalty Is usually subordinated to their self-interest in the eventlash. The Generalissimo apparently assumes that he can deal with these warlords separately, and that they are individually loo self-seeking ever to combine their forces against the Central Government
However, various warlords appear to be planning cooperation against the Central Government allegedly on the grounds that the Generalissimo Is unwilling to equip provincial troops with American lend-lease weapons.
Even under these circumstances, some of these warlords say they are willing to fight the Japanese If their own provinces are attacked. Others are reported to have reached an agreement not to use their troops against the Japanese in the event of further enemy offensive action. They are said to have decided to take their troops to inaccessible mountainous regions and hold them in readiness for the post-war maintenance of their established positions of provincial leadership. They believe that if they suddenly withdraw their support at the critical moment, Chiang's troops will be defeated by the enemy and Chiang himself will bc overthrown. Both groups of warlords reportedly claim that, If given Americanthey would be willing to place their troops under Americanand allow them to be used against the Japanese.
Tentative Warlord-Liberal Coalition
Since the military reverses of early andentative plans have been madeoose coalition of liberals and provincial warlords In opposition to the Central Oovemment The essential element uniting these groups ls their deep-seated opposition to the policies of the Central Oovemment. The Democratic League ls interested chiefly In reversing what It considers the reactionary trend at Chungking and securing real and Immediate democratic reform. The provincial militarists1 attitude, althoughenuine dissatisfaction with the Central Oovernment's corruption and inefficiency on the home front and its failure to provide properly for the army. Is mainly an opposition to the attemptedof all power and authority In Chungking.
Despite the disparity In objectives, both sides recognize the value of cooperation. The minority parties realize that military power and support are absolutely necessary for any change. They further recognize that many of the Interested militarists are willing to grant more concessions than the Chungking leaders, and feel certain that they would have ainfluence In any new government that they helped establish. The provincial militarists on their part naturally welcome Federation support for the increased prestige and respectability it brings to the movement
Chinese Communists
The Communists are the most powerful group opposing the present Chungking regime, and their military and political power la rapidlyIn contrast to the divided Kuomintang, the Communists have been able tough degree of Internal unityesult of theirrural area of control, their successful economic program, and their protection of the people from the Japanese.
? the Chinese Communist Party existed In underground units throughout Kuomintang China and In small Independent pockets opposing Central Oovemment military forces. In that year theannounced the abandonment of their policy of forcible confiscation of land for redistribution among landless peasants and advanced adesigned to appeal to wider sections of Chinese society. By advo-
eating opposition to Japan and moderate Internal reforms, they have won the cooperation not only of the peasants but also of most landlords, small merchants, intellectuals, and other groups throughout theareas in which they operate.
01 after the Kuomlntang had inaugurated an economic and military blockade of the Communist area in North China, the Communists were In great economic difficulties. But eventually they found that by increasing agricultural and Industrial production they could be almost self-sufficient. The Communist guerrilla forces, several hundred thousand strong, have been able toet of popular resistance around the Japanese garrisons and railways in the vitalof northern and eastern China. Territorially the Communists claim they already control larger, more strategic areas in China than the Kuomlntang. They regard as theirs most of China north of the Yellow River and claim to be gaining ground in the provinces of Honan, Hunan, Kwangtung, Chekiang. Klangsl, and Fuklen.
Kuomin tang-Communist Stalemate
In the long negotiations and maneuverings which have taken place between the Kuomlntang and the Communist Partyeither side has essentially modified Its original proposals. The Communists still Insistoalition government, recognition of Communist Party and army, recognition of governments established behind Japanese lines,of political prisoners,ill of rights involving freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Various parts of these demands are advocated also by antl-Kuomintang military leaders and by the parties comprising the Democratic Federation. On its part the Kuomlntang has refused to accept the existence ofarmies and governments and seems insistent upon retaining its "actual monopoly of power while conceding only advisory roles to other groups.
The Present Balance of Power
Both the Kuomlntang and Its most powerful opponent, thefear hostile Interventionon-Chinese third power. The Kuomlntang claims that the Communist Party in China is the agent of the USSR, and that, should Russia fight Japan, she would cooperate with the Chinese Communists In the vital area of North China. For their part, the Chinese Communists fear an American Intervention that is not equal on the sides of Chungking and the Communists respectively, or Incalculated to preserve the present balance of power. They fear that the United States will virtually abandon Yenan, and they are trying to prove that they look to America as much as to Russia for futureand guidance.
The Communists also profess to fear indirect intervention by Japan. They assert that the Kuomlntang, under the pressure ofilitary threat to Chungking, has enteredecret agreement wnere-
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by Japan will use Its forces only to cut into US military power and will leave Chungking forces intact to carryuthless anti-Communist policy. After the war the Kuomintang would enter an economicwith the Japanese In China, while internationally they wouldto secure US aidhinese civil war against Yenan and the USSR. From the Japanese point of view this future US-Japanese alliance is calculated on the basis of historic American friendship withinto which the Japanese might thus Indirectly insinuate themselves.
In the absence of decisive intervention in China by foreign powers, the "CC" clique In the Kuomlntang has little chance of retaining itspolitical and military control in the face of growing opposition inside and outside the party. Chiang Kai-shek may therefore find itto dissociate the Central Government from the reactionary "CC" clique. The Kuomlntang's roleajor political factor would then depend upon the eventual political resurgence of moderate elements In the party, which will probably result when Chinaeriod ofIndustrial, and financial reconstruction. In any case thegroups, especially the Communists, are firmly established. The early formationroad coalition government, excluding the "CC" clique, appears to offer the Generalissimo the only opportunity of avoiding civil war in China.
Original document.
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