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JAPANESE SEIZURE OF FRENCH INDOCHINA
arch the Japanese. Impelled by mounting distrust or the French administration and by rapid Allied advances in Burma and the Philippines, seized full control in Indochina. Heretofore, preferring to use the existing French administrative machinery, the Japanese had postponed the outright annexation of the country. Even now they are apparently anxious toomplete administrative breakdown, and are encouraging all French officials and technical workers In ther in private companies to remain at their posts "to work under the same conditions aso strengthen their position, thehave made an Intensive effort toift between French and native resistance elements, and to enlist native support with promises of "independence" as soon as conditions permit
Indochina Is of vital strategic Importance to Japan In the defense of her continental holdings. Japanese military control in Indochina, besides facilitating Japanese operations in China, will protect important escape routes forapanese troops still stationed in the Netherlands East Indies and continental Southeast Asia. For some time the Japanese have been aware that Oorernor-General Decoux has been in contact both with the French Government and the Allies. They nave accused French Indochinese forces of failing to fire on American aircraft, harboring enemy airmen shot down over Indochina, and helping Allied submarines In their raids on Japanese shipping along the Indochina coast.
The Japanese have hesitated to take the drastic step of complete occupation ever since they moved Into Indochina with Vichy consentokyo was not encouraged by the administrative difficultiesby the Japanese Military Administration in Malaya and Java, and it did not have enough trained personnel to handle theproblems resulting from the racial and linguistic complexity of Indochina Moreover, the Japanese probably felt that French assistance in exploiting the area for food and raw materials would be valuable.
These considerations did not prevent the Japanese from beingof Decoux' pledge of allegiance. During the initial stage ofpenetration of Indochina. Decoux, unable to get outside aid, was forced to yield to Japanese demands. But when the Japanese became involved in far-flung Pacific operations at the endheir hold on Indochina relaxed somewhat Decoux was quick to take advantage of the opportunity to fortify his precarious position byrivate army, an Indochina branch of the pro-Petainist Legion des Combattants. He
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was able apparently by stressing its totalitarian character to secure arms' and ammunition from the Japanese. One of the most effective French Government obstacles to Japanese controliaison agency, the Mitiion Pronco-Japonaiae. establishedctually this bodyottleneck which operated to alow up action In Japanese demands by multiplying opportunities for discussion and compromise.
Franco-Japanese relationsritical strain during the Allied invasion of North Africaecause the Japanese feared Decoux might offer assistance to the Allies in the Far East paralleling Darlan's coup In the West. The tension eased when Decoux apparently managed to assure Tokyo of his loyalty to Vichy. After the liberation of metropolitan France, however, Japan became Increasingly apprehensive over Decoux' openly expressed admiration for De Gaulle and over signs of French Indochinese duplicity in tho face of Allied advances.
Whenarch Vice-Admiral Decoux refused Japanese demands for control of Indochinese troops and police and all communications, the Japanese promptlytate of martial law, began disarming French indochinese troops, and took members of the Frenchand military staff into "protectiven addition they took over key Industries, barracks, airfields. Government residences, police stations, railroad stations, and utilities. This action abrogated the Joint Defense Agreement ofnder which the French retained control of the civil administration, the principal communication facilities, and small garrison forces.
Although the Japanese are minimizing the resistance being offered by French garrisons, fighting was still going on in northern Indochina two weeks after the Japanese coup. Much of the colonialroops of which lesshird are Frenchmen and the majority are Annamites, apparently remains loyal to the French. Theh United States Alrforce has come to the assistance of the hard-pressed troops,uerrilla movement of French and Annamites reportedly Is to the process of organization. Neighboring Thailand has been ordered by the Japanese to close her Indochina border, to seize the arms of all French soldiers seeking refuge in Thailand, and to arrest all Indochinese and French residents in Thailand. Thailand reportedly has not yet complied in full with these demands and Is still negotiating with the Japanese.
In taking over Indochina the Japanese have already made efforts to arouse local anti-French sentiment by sponsoring the "integrity" and "Independence" of the five Indochinese provinces. Furthermore, the hard-pressed Japanese probably cannot at present afford the manpower to undertake radical changes In the local governments. Therefore,some replacements have been made on the cabinet level, they are trying to enlist the support of the present officials as an emergency procedure. King Bao Dal of An nam and King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia have proclaimed the "Independence" of their kingdoms,their treaties with France, and pledging to support the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The local government of Laos also Ts reported to have been left In the hands of the present ruler. In Tonkin and Cochin China, the Japanese apparently are retaining the French administrative system, except on the policy level. As earlyarch Dome! radio announced that pro-Japanese independence organisations in Tonkin hadederation to support independence forand cooperation with Japan.
Despite the current Tokyo insistence that Japan has no territorial ambitions In French Indochina, and is "now able to extend wholehearted cooperation to theho have beennder foreignhe Indochinose natives are not likely to show realWhen the Japanese first occupied Indochina the majority of the natives responded to Japanese Greater East Asia slogans and promises of cheap goods and considerate treatment. They quickly became alienated by the brutal treatment they received and by the rapid deterioration of their economy under Japanese exploitation.oux Government has been able to exploit this situation. By permitting the establishment of local Industry, lowering existing race barriers, and granting thearger share in the administration, it has improved French-native relations, and encouraged the developmentative anti-Japanese movement under French leadership.
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