Created: 6/21/1946

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Significant Trgnrte

Initial Meetings of the Council of


Issues in


US Countermoves In

. QOV^

Tho Council of Foreign Ministers, by its agreement to postpone for oneecision regarding the Italian colonies, has disposed of one ot the three unresolved issues In the Kalian draft treaty butcn the reparations issue have as yot cached no solution. The third and most contested issue, that of Trieste, has not yet come up for discussion.

Soviet concurrence in postponement of the colonial Issuea recession from the previous Soviet position lhat the Big Four must reach agreement on all points In the Axis satellite treaties before they are submittedeace Conference. The Soviets,have shown no similar inclination to modify their position on Italian reparations. Instead, by refusing to abandon their reparations claims, by insisting upon tbe use of current production for reparations acccjiat and by see?ring opportunities for unilateral action with Italy on treaty Implementation, the Soviets are making concerted efforts toasis for long-term interference In Italian affairs.

French demands that current Italian production be available for reparations over an eight-year period parallel the Soviet position but not the Soviet intent.

In an apparent effort tourther excuse for interference in Italy, the Soviets at the opening meeting insisted that tbe Italiansituation be added to the agenda on the grounds that Ithroat of civil war and is directly connected with the questionraft treaty. The Ministers agreed to take up this point as the last item on the agenda, but the Soviets may again press to have it taken up out of order.

Soviet agreement that Austria be placed on the agenda for the current CFM session at present representsimited concession, Molotov has so far agreed to the US proposal only if discussion is concerned with tho Austrian "question" and not an Austrian peace treaty.

Tbe Polish referendum on SO June, originally proposed by the Lefteans of deferring national elections, is expected toecisive role in determining tbe future extent of Communist influence in Poland. The Leftist partios which control the Governmenteferendum on "noo-controversial" questions when, in April, it became apparent thateasant Tarty would not join themingle electoral bloc. The Leftists expected Mfkolajceyfc tothem In the referendum vote and hoped that the resultingpopular endorsement of their policies would give them more time before the elections to consolidate their control over the country and force Mlkolajczyk's acceptance of tbe single electoral list Two cf the questionsthose concerning the Oder-Netsse linerogram of land reform and the nationalization of industryre in effect non-controversial,hird involving the elimination of the Senate has become the subject of bitter dispute.

Encouraged by the outcome of the Frenchay, which also included the issueicameral legislature and became inlebiscite on Communism, the relish feasant ^arty rfoeidod tohowdown withftist parties byegative vote on tbe abolition of the Senate. Mlkolajczyfc has become Increasingly convinced that the leftists are determined to use theresults to discredit his party and possibly even to expel it from participation in the Trovisional Government no has been concerned by the Government's avowed Intent to interpret an affirmative votenicameral legislature as. In effect an amendment towhich the Government is pledged to support and which providesicameral legislature. -Tuch an Interpretation would eliminateelections this fall and would serverecedent for further constitutional changes designed to keep the Leftists in power,

The Leftists apparently ara considerably disturbed by thowhich Mikolajcsyk has provoked. They are insistingefeat Oi tbe referendum will not be tolerated, have Intensified their ruthless oppression of opposition elements, and apparently are makingto stuff the ballothatever the outcome of tho referendum, it appears improbable that the Leftist majority In the Government will feel it can risk vtol<?nce by expelling Mikolafczyk's party. The danger

of violence also is lessoned by recent Indications that Moscow hasore conciliatory .attitude toward Mlko ajczyic- Civil war tn Poland at this time clearly would endanger Soviet long-range Interests and tbe Soviets may well feel tbat Mlkolajceyk wcjld prove less of aa obstacle to Soviet policy If he wereosition of power rather than lender of tbe opposition. Mlkolajczyk has consistently tried to convince Stalin that. If he were given power, he couldore stable, popular and reasonably pro-Soviot regime than could tho Polish


US Counter mo von in Korea

Soviet actions since tbe Japanese surrender indicate ato bring Korea within tho Soviet orbitommunistUnder the guise ofountry "friendly" to the Soviet Union which cannotbase (orn tbe USSR, the Soviets aro seeking to implant Communism firmly in Soviet-occupied northern Korea, to strengthen the Communist Party In tbe US-occupied zone by clandestine means, and torovisional government controlled by tho minority Communist elements.

The U? on the other hand has been Becking to set up agovernment representative of the wishes of the majority of the population. Tlie Soviet and US representatives on the Joint Commission, appointed to setrovisional government for Korea, therefore have been unable to reach agreement, and after several months of futile deliberations the sessions of tho Commission were adjourned on US initiative. The deliberations were deadlocked over the Soviet demand that opponents of the Moscow docislon on an extendedbe excluded from consultation in tho formation of an InterimSince non-Communist elemonts have in general opposed the trusteeship plan, US acquiescence on this point would have resulted in the formationnviet-dominated Communist regime.

The failure torovisional government hrs had serious economic consequences. Tho prosent dual occupation of Korea bisects an economically Integrated country, and tbe continuance of a

rigid enforcemont of this zonal delineation is hindering the economic rehabilitation necessary to effective self-government- Both the US Commander and non-Communist Koreans view this situation with real concern.

Since tlie adjournment of the Joint Commission, the UShas been making determined efforts to build up tho political strength of democratic elements in southern Korea, to prevent Korean Communist infiltration from tho northern into the southern zone, and tn fix on the USSR responsibility for failure torovisional government and eliminate the zonal barriers, tn these objectives General Hodge appears to beertain measure of success. Soviet policy has aroused strong opposition from all Korean groups except the strong Communist-controlled minority, and the vigorous US efforts to block Soviot attempts at political domination of the country have met wide popular support. Rightist and Leftist leaders in southern Korea, with US encouragement, have recently beeniew totrong coalition that could assume greater responsibility in the administration of southern Korea. Tho major parties in this coalition may shortlyommon declaration of amity, and request that the Joint Commission resume deliberations and consult with ail democratic parties without exception or exclusion. Should this coalition movement of the southern Korean parties succeed, the US may be able tooint solution that would not leave the Communists in Initial control.

The Soviets have obviously beenolicy of outstaying the US, hoping that their persistent obstructionoint solution for Korea would eventually induce tho US to forego its alms and withdraw from the country.

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