Created: 6/7/1946

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Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR Director of Central Intelligerice





The Central Intelligence Group was6 pursuant to the approvalo. 2. mall group of personnel from the State, War, and Navy Departments had been assembled beginning onanuary, three days after the President signed the letter directing the establishment of the National Intelligence.

The Central Intelligence Group has been organized in accordance. Directive No 2. The major components at the present time are the Central Planning Staff, charged with planning the coordination of intelligence activities, and the Central Reports Staff, responsible for the production ofpolicy intelligence. hief of Operational Services,mall staff, has been designateducleus from which an organi2ation to perform services of common concern may be built. mall Secretariat to serve the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and the Intelligence Advisory Board, has beon created. The Administrative Division consists of an Administrativeecurityersonnel Officer,mall group of trained personnel to

Provide necessary administrative services for the CentralGroup.


Personnel. has been requested and selected on the principle that only the most experienced individuals in each field of intelligence activity should be utilized ln this vital preliminary period. The responsible officers in thehave cooperated wholeheartedly toward this end. the procurement. personnel has necessarilyather slow process, in view of the demobilization and the fact. and departmental requirements for qualified individuals naturally had to be reconciled in many specific cases. The present status. personnel is shown in the following tabulation:

Central Reports Staff Central Planning Staff Administrative Division *

Actual Auth.

5 16

Actual Auth.

) 26

) 20

) 33

Actual Auth.

4 10

8 10

4 15

Actual Auth.

19 61

27 40

25 64




but not yet assigned.




of Authorized



Includes Office of Director, Secretariat, and Chief of Operational Services.uthorized. Directiveersonnel assigned

It may be seen that the organization of the Central Planning Staff has been given priority, since effectiveisecessary prelude to accomplishment of. mission. Concentration is nov placed on manning the Central Reports Staff. The need for filling positions ln the Administrative Division has been largely alleviated by the part-time use of the personnel and facilities of theServices Unit, although this Division vill requirewhen centralized operations are undertaken.

A development of great importance regardinghas been the designation of specially qualifiedto the Director of Central Intelligence. An outstanding scientist vith vide intelligence experience. Dr. H. P. Robertson, ls Senior Scientific Consultant to the Director. Arrangements are veil advanced for the designation of Mr. George F. Kennan, recently Charge d'Affaires in Moscoworeign Service Officeristinguished career, asConsultant to the Director, particularly


The activities of the Central Intelligence Group to date have been characterized principally by the administrative details of organization, the consideration of urgent problems, and the basic planningound future Intelligence program. Basic policies and procedures regarding the organization have been established. Urgent problems in the intelligence field.


especially as regards certain vital operations, have been carefully studied and appropriate action has been or is ready to be taken. Substantial progress has been made in theof long-range intelligence problems. The throes oforganization and planning are, therefore, generally past, and the time for initiation of centralized intelligencehas now been reached.

Coordination of Intelligence Activities. Beginning onour days after the activation. has been receiving numerous suggestions orfor studies leading to the effective coordination of Federal intelligence activities. umber of other studies of this type have been initiated. These problems generally fall into three categories: (a) problems for which partial but inadequate solutions were evolved during the war; (bj problems which existing Governmental machinery was unable to solve or incapable of solving; and (c) problems whichew solutions in the light of the post-hostilities.

Some of these problems, particularly in the third category, require urgent interim solution. Among thesefor which interim solutions have been evolved orare the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit, the development of intelligence onnd theof scientific Intelligence.

Problems for which immediate solutions are wellinclude the following:

for monitoring press andbroadcasts of foreign powers.

for coordinating theforeign publications.

of collection of

of Intelligence research.

elements of Information.

for collecting foreignby clandestine methods.

on foreign industrial

study of the collection ofinformation in China.

Register of Intelligencewhich are in various stages of study or

planning cover the following additional subjects:

of files ofurvey.



potential program.

of sampling techniques to.

of coverage of the foreignin the United States.

on foreign petroleum.

of geographical and related.

i. Disposition of the Publications Reviewof the Joint Intelligence

Survey of the Joint Intelligence StudyBoard.

k. Disposition of the photographic intelligence file ln the Department of State.

oordinated utilization of private research in the social sciences.

m. Index. residents of foreignpotential.

n. Exploitation of American business concerns with connections abroad as sources of foreign intelligence information.

o. Planning for psychological warfare.

tilization of the services of proposed minerals attaches.

One of the functions. which has assumed great importance is the support of adequate budgets fdrIntelligence. Coordinated representation to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, of the budgetary requirements for intelligence activities, promises to be one of the most effective means for guarding against arbitrary depletion of intelligence resources at the expense of national security. So long as. is dependent upon the Departments for budgetary support, howover, its authority to speak as anguardian of the national security will be suspect and therefore not wholly effective.

Production of National Policy. Directive No.he Central Reports Staffon the productionactual Daily Summary, the

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the first issue of which was datedebruary. Although- this Summary covered operational as well as intelligence matters and involved. interpretation, it has served to keep. personnel currently advised of developments andasis for consideration of future intelligence.

Despite the undermanned condition of the CentralStaff, the urgent needeekly Summary has resulted in the decision to produce the first issue onJune. Until adequately staffed In all geographic areas, however, thiswill concentrate on those areas for which qualified personnel is now available. The concept of this Weeklyis that it should concentrate on significant trends of events supplementing the normal intelligence produced by the Departments. Procedures are being developed to ensure that the items contained therein reflect the best judgment ofpersonnel. and the Departments.

The primary function, in the production of intelligence, however, will be the preparation andof definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries as they affect the national security of the United States. The necessity of assigning the bestand carefully selected personnel to this vital task has delayed its initiation. Solution of the relationship of. activity to the Departments, the State-War-NavyCommittee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies concerned with the national security, has also been deferred


pending Che procurement of adequate personnel. Thishas now been given priority, and it is anticipated that the Central Reports Staff will be prepared to produce national policy intelligence at an early date. of Centralized^ Operational Services. The operation of central services by. has been considered toubject requiring careful study to ensure thatoperations are not impeded or unnecessarily duplicated. The urgent need for central direction of the activities and liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit was recognized by. and an arrangement was effected whereby this Unit is operated by the War Department under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence. This arrangement temporarily. with facilities for direct collection ofinformation but is admittedlytop-gap measure.

. planning and organization has now progressed to the point where firm recommendations may be madeperation of intelligence services which can be moreaccomplished centrally. Among those operations. activities arc:

press and propagandaforeign powers.

of foreign Intelligenceby clandestine methods.

of static intelligenceforeign areas, to replace JointIntelligence Studies (JAMS).


entral Register of telligence information,

research and analysis ofof common interest to all3uch as economics,iographical data, etc.

In the consideration of performance. ofoperations, however, the administrative, budgetary and legal difficulties of the present organization have presented real problems. The reduction of Departmental funds andfor Intelligence activities have made it difficult fordespite their desire to cooperate, to furnish the necessary facilities. The Inability. topersonnel directly from civilian life, and thecomplications of procuring personnel from theare likely to jeopardize effective conduct. operations. The lack of enabling legislation makingegal entity has made it impossible to negotiate contracts which are required for many operations, such as the monitoring of foreign broadcasts.


present organizational relationshipNational Intelligence Authority, the Centraland the Intelligence Advisory Board is sound.

initial organizational and. activities has been completed and the operationIntelligence services should be undertakenat the earliest practicable date.

The National Intelligence Authority and theIntelligence Group should obtain enabling legislation and an independent budget as soon as possible, either as partew national defense organization oreparate agency, in order that (l) urgently needed central intelligencenay be effectively and efficiently conducted by the Central Intelligence Group,he National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group will hove the necessary authority and standing to develop, support,and direct an adequate Federal intelligence program for the national security.


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