CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
document nas been approved for release through thaWIWOl the Central int-iliganoa Ao^ncy.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
THE CREEK SITUATION *
The strife in Greece today is the outgrowth of longstanding political differences, accentuated by Soviet-inspired interference and an internal economy severely disrupted during the war. So bitter have these differences become that for months past anti-government forces under Communist leadership have been conducting intensive guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, although the Populist Party group now ln power won an over-all majority in the general elections ofhe government has been severely criticized, not only in the free Greek press, but also by opposition groups represented in Parliament. The consistent failure of Tealdarls to offer these Parliamentary groups genuine and responsible participationnited Greek governmentthe extreme leftists, not represented lnasthe recovery of economic and political stability in Greece. Opposition leaders, too, have been unwilling to ccapromlae theirwith the Tsaldaris government. Unless both sides prove more amenable, there is dangerarge section of the Greek populace composed of political moderates will succumb in disillusionment to the persistent tactics of Soviet propaganda and follow the lead of theleftists.
evelopment would be in line with Soviet policy in Greece and would constitute an important step towards the attainment of the immediate Soviet objective of an independent Macedonia and of the ultimate Soviet objective of the creationommunist Greece. With the realization of this ultimatehe Soviets would gain control of the Aegean and the approaches to theheir dominance of the Balkans would be complete;hey wouldtrategic position in.tho Eastern Mediterranean, thereby outflanking Turkey, threatening the Suez Canal, and endangering the politico of the Near East.
* Although this report was prepared prior to the recent change in the Greek government, CIO considers that the conclusions are atill valid, except as amended by the note on page 3. The intelligence agencies of the State and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces havein this report. Comments by the-Intelligence Division of the War Department are contained ln Enclosure "B* hereto.
The Soviete will not openly pursue their objectives to the point of precipitating an early major conflict. They will continue to work through their satellites (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria! to intensify the dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece by providingaid to Greek leftists, disseminating propaganda against the Rightist Greek government, opposing the retention of British troops in Greece, and maintaining troops along the northern borders as athreat.
If Greece is to be the free country which the majority of the population and the Western Powers desire, the Greeks must counter these tactics. Before they can do this, however, they must achieve general internal stability. In this matter they can do much themselves, but they will also need outside aid. The British are re-arming,enlarging, and reorganizing the Greek army to make it capable of suppressing guerrilla activities and preserving order. Furthermore, the presence of British troops in Greece, especially at strategic Salonika, actseterrent to more direct interference by theand also prevents the leftist guerrilla bands from controlling the northern part of the country.
The US Economic Mission and the Security CouncilCommission are assembling in Greece to make their studies. The Economic Mission willlan for the rehabilitation of the Greek economy and may also indicate that further financial aid is needed from the United States. Such assistance, however, cannot be efficientlyby the Greek government as now constituted. The Security Council Commission is unlikely to find sufficient evidence to indict thestates for Interference in Greek affairs. During its investigation, nevertheless, guerrilla operations (at least in the border areas) will probably decrease, and the country shoulderiod ofcalm. Thc Greeks will thus nave an opportunity totart along the road to general recovery by working on their economic problems, speeding up military reorganization, and composing their political
The most urgent requirement is the formationroader No program of reconstruction can be effectively implementedovernment subjected to constant Parliamentary attack as well as the undermining tactics of extreme leftist elements. Unless the Tsaldarls Cabinet and opposition groups In Farliamentincere andeffort toorkable coalition with other groups (which seems unlikely except under strong pressure from the Westernreece will not be able to achieve the stability necessary to thwart the tactics and aims of thc USSR.
A complete analysis of the situation in Greece Is contained in Enclosure "A" hereto.
After thie study of the Greek situation had been completed, Tsaldaris finally gave In to the strong demands that he relinquish the Premiership, and onew government was sworn in with all Parliamentary parties participating except thc Liberal Party of Themis-tocles Sophoulis. The new government isoalition andf the votes in Parliament: without Sophoulis, however. Itovernment of rightist groups. Tsaldaris was replaced as Primeby Demetriosanker andoreign Although associated with the right and with the King, he is not closely affiliated with any party. He was the only man available under whom all party leaders except Sophoulis were willing to serve.
inancial crisis (always possible in Greece'sunstablet seems probable that the Maximos government will last at least long enough tonited front during theCouncil Commission's investigation of alleged border violations, and the Porter Mission's survey of the economic situation in Greece. Cabinet leaders are aware, moreover, that any loan which the Porter Mission might recommend would hardly be made by the United Statesovernment lacking bona fide representation and unity. If Constontin Rendis should take over the leadership of the Liberal Party from the aged and ailing Sophoulis, the former might bring into the government some less radical members of that Party. The addition of this liberal element to the Cabinet, in which all the moderate rightist groups are already represented, would broaden and strengthen the government.
Newspapers of the lert and center continue to attack the new governmenteak, ultra-conservative compromise, but Maximos issincere in his promises of pacification and political reform. He has declared that he intends to release all women and childrenprisoners, grant amnesty to and even protection for guerrillas who lay down their armstated period, and disarm all illegal bands. Including rightist"-. rogram, if carried out, should not only prolong the life of the government, but should also bringreater measure of unity in Greece than has existed since the liberation, thus paving thc way for general recovery.
TIE GREEK SITUATION
General. Today Greece Is virtuallytate of civil war. Left wing elements, opposed to the rightist government and to theregime, and receiving clandestine aid from the Soviet-satellite states of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, are carrying out intensive guerrilla operations, especially ln the border areaa." The guerrilla activities have reached such proportions that the Greek army finds it difficult to suppress them. This situation narks the culmination of ong-standing differences between the various political factions of the left and right which became violent during the period of Axis occupation and have not been resolved since the liberation.
Early evidence of the international aspect of the Greek troubles was supplied by local clashes along the Albanian border which began in In6 the Ukrainian delegate protested to the Security Council in behalf of Albaniaember of the UNI against alleged Greek violations of the border. The USSR, however, vetoed the suggestionorrnicolon be sent to investigate border difficulties.
Following the rightist victory in the Greek Parliamentaryofn which the extreme leftist elements did not vote, guerrilla activities in Northern Greece began to assume serious proportions. They increased in violence after the plebiscite, which recalled King George II to Greece. Insisting that the troubles were largely inspired from outside, Constontin Tsaldarls, Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, finally decided, to go to New York and complain to the Security Council of foreign interference in Greek internal affairs.
Greece and the LOT. ecember the Greek appealetter to the Secretary General of the United Nationa. The letter was accompaniedemorandum containing details of Incidents with supporting photographs. It requested the Security Council toa situation 'which is leading to friction between Greece and her neighbors, by reason of the fact that the latter are lending their support to the violent guerrilla warfare now being waged in northern Greece against public order and thc territorial Integrity" of Greece.
See map accompanying this report.
The letter claims that aid from abroad Is being given tobands in Western Macedonia and that the war Is being supported by NOP (the Slav National Liberationn organization which has for Its aim the expansion of Yugoslav Macedonia to thc Aegean Sea. Itclaims that insurgents (Slav-speaking Greek nationals, fugitives from Justice, andre trained at Buljkes in Yugoslavia and then, under the protection of frontier guards, are returned to Greece to Join insurgents already there. The letter also contains allegations that certain statements have been made which Indicate that these activities have thc official support of thc Yugoslavlthough the main weight of thc Greek appeal is thus directed against Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria are also held responsible for their alleged part in the
The Security Council opened its examination of tho Greekonecember. During the sessions, Yugoslavia, Albania, andall made counter-charges, accusing Greece of violating their They also denied any responsibility for the present unrest in Greece and claimed that the trouble lay in attempts by the Tsaldaris government to coerce and terrorize the Greek people. The USSR member, Andrei Gromyko, repeated these counter-charges and added that one main cause of all the troubles was the presence of foreignritish) troops in Greece.
Onh of December the Council unanimously decided to dispatch an investigating commission, not later thanto ascertain the facte relating to the alleged border violations along the frontiers." The Commissionandate to visit any part or Oreece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and consists of oneof each member of7 Security Council, with technical assistants. It is empowered to*question government officials andcitizens. The Soviet and UK members of the Security Council, who were over-ruled, both indicated their preference that the investigation be confined to borderhe Commission's task will probably be made more difficult by the efforts or those to whom guilt might beto cover up damaging evidence. There have been reports, for example, that the training camp at Buljkes, in Yugoslavia, is being broken up.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Political. Arter seven months or resistance to Italian and later to German forces, organized Oreek operations against the Axis ceased On this date. King George IIakeshift Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos, formed in April in Athens, went into exile. The various puppet governments set up in
Greece by thc occupation forces had no influence on the people, who soon formed underground resistance groups. The leftist EAM (National Liberationith its own army ELAS (National Popular Army ofecame the largest of those groups by systematically eliminating other groups until the only remaining one of anywas the conservative EDES (National Democratic GreekAM was dominated by KKE (Greek Communlat Party). By stressingmotives and with the advantageell-integrated organization, the Communlata succeeded at first ln enlisting the support of manyand republicans and even aome of the clergy and royalists who saw in EAM the best means of resisting the common enemy. The mainof EDES was also expulsion of the enemy; it soonholly rightist, royalist organization which before long came Into open conflict with the much larger anti-royalist ELAS forces.
Although the resistance groups fought over their differences, which were accentuated by German propaganda, all except EDESew minor groups had in common their dislike of the Tsouderos government and the King. Most Greeks had not forgotten the King's violation of thelnictatorship. Differences between the Govern-ment-in-Exlle and the underground forces of resistance grew steadily. In the summerepresentatives of EAM and other resistance groups, including EDES, visited Cairo, where the government was then established, in an unsuccessful effort to secure representation in the government for the underground forces and to obtain from theromise not to return to Greece until the people had had an opportunity to express their wishes on the matter by plebiscite.
Shortly thereafter, EAM formed inolitical Committee or National Liberation (PEEA) to counteract and dispute the authority of the Governmcnt-ln-Exile. The persistent refusal of the King and his Cabinet tooalition government had led to generaland eventually even to serious mutinies in the Greek armed forces ln the Middle East. Finally the Britlah, who had consistently supported the King and the government, assisted ln the suppression of the mutinies and Installed os Prime Minister the antl-EAM George Papandreou. Papan-dreou set out tooalition as agreed upon ln4 In Lebanon, where representatives of all important resistance groups from inside Greece had met with the Government-in-Exile. Three members of PEEA and two Communists joined the Cabinet. In September, the new government moved from Cairo to Caserta, Italy, and thereormal agreementassurances of collaboration from EAM and EDES, who placedunder the orders of the Commander of the British forces ln Greece. The government entered Athens on
With the aid of thc newly appointed British Commander, the government then tried to reorganize the Greek army, which would Involve
the demobilization of all guerrilla organizations in accordance with the Caserta Agreement. EAH was strongly opposed to this move, being reluctant to give up its power and feeling that the government was trying to make theere royalist tool by purging it of anti-royalist elements. Disagreement became bitter, and early in December the Canmunist and BAH ministers resigned from the Cabinet. ew days later, fighting (for which ELAS had long been preparing) broke out in the streets of Athens, and British troops gave armed support to the established government. On Christmas Day, Prime Minister Churchill went to Athens in an effort to resolve the difficulties. After his return to England, he persuaded King George II to appoint Archbishop Damaskinos as Regent, and the King himself promised not to return to Greecelebiscite on the constitution had been held.
General Plastiras, an anti-royalist, was selected as Premier by the Regent. Heew government, which drew up an agreement with EAM at Varkiza, near Athens, in This agreement provided, among other things, for an end to martial law, an amnesty for political offenders, reorganization of the army, demobilization of ELAS,lebiscite on the monarchy, to be held The plebiscite was to be followed as soon as possible by Parliamentary elections, to which the "great Allied powers" would be requested to send observers.
Although the disarming of ELAS began at once, many members retained their best weapons, and large numbers of them fled to the hills. ew members and many sympathizers, dissatisfied by EAM's refusal to abide by the letter and spirit of tho Varkiza Agreement and angered or disillusioned by ELAS excesses, went over to thecamp. It had become apparent to many Greeks who had supported EAM during the occupation as the best means of combatting the common enemy, that the organization was now concerned solely with its own narrow political interests and that its aim was identical with that of its dominant member group, KKE (the Greek Communist Party): namely, toommunist regime in Greece oriented towards the Soviet Union. From there on, EAM began to lose many of its non-extremist members.
Various cabinet permutations followed during the next few months. Contentions on the proposed Parliamentary elections and thc Plebiscite became so bitter that Regent Damaskinos, after visiting the Greek King in England in the autumnnnounced that the elections would be-held before the plebiscite rather than after, as had been stipulated in the Varkiza Agreement. There was alsodisagreement on the general amnesty demanded by EAM to include the0 prisoners held in detention camps. Under
British guidance, the Regent experimented with several governments. Each, however, was short-lived during this transitional period before the elections, partly because none was willing to modify its owninterests for the sake of effective coalition.
Onhe elections were held. EAM realized that because of continued defections, it could not substantially Influence the vote, and consequently abstained. The royalist right wing,by the Populist Party, won an over-all majorityeats out. The National Political Unionoalition group right
Uberal Partyand center,
ndependents won the remaining 3. The Populist Partyoyalist Coblnet under Constantin Tsaldaris.
Although the main political issue in Greece is tho Communist-ertreme rightist conflict, it is apparent from these election results that there are various shades of opinion within the limits of the chiefUf: o Jhe nuraerous sToups, parties, and associations inside and outside Parliament, some can boast considerable support: others are merelyparties' headed by ambitious politicians who have managed toew followers. Among most of the parties there is general agreenent on such large objectives as the restoration of the national economy (which they agree, can be achieved only with foreign financial aid) and the fulfillment of territorial ambitions, which includeEpirus (now part oftrategic strip on the Bulgarian border, and the Dodecanese Islands. Such agreement, however, does not extend to the ways and means of accomplishing them, and the many fac-Uons see* unwilling to compromise their differences and work together for the common good.
anA Dao e superfluous to list all the political parties, groupings, and associations existing in Greece at any given moment. Many of them grow like mushrooms and die as quickly. ashington report earlier this year spoke of the number of Greek parties in existence "ao of Mon-aay .) The parties or organizations, however, fall more or less Into five main groups:
The extreme right, consisting of conservative and royalist parties. Their chief aim la to perserve the Greek constitutional monarchy, patterned after the British, but there istrong tendency within this group to returnotalitarian, Me tax1st regime. Prime MinisterPopulist Party belongs to the extreme right.
The moderate right, consisting ofepublican outlook. Although their avowedIs to re-establish the Republic, they acquiesced in the people's verdictonarchy, as expressed in6
3. The center, composed of liberals and progressives. They conceded the royalist victory decided by the plebiscite, but will continue to work for re-establishment of the Repub-
The moderate left, which has seceded from EAM. This group, which is small, cooperated with the extreme left infrom the elections and refuses to recognize theof the plebiscite.
The extreme left, consisting of the several parties which make up EAM and dominated by KKE (Greek Communistt^ims to makeommunist state oriented towards the
When the plebiscite was heldcpten*er, there were nofor political reasons,f the voters favored theof the monarchy. This large majority does not mean that the Greeks had forgiven King George for past misdeeds; it was, rather, due to the desperate conviction that his return to the throne wouldore of resistance to the extreme leftists, whose purpose of achieving full control of Greece had become more and more manifest ever since Var-kiza. 6 the alleged menace of Communism had brought about agovernment ln Greece. Now, ten years later almost to the day. the people of Greece, most of whom assuredly did not want him, voted for the return of their King.
Economic. Greece emerged from the war and occupation with her national economy severely disrupted. Crop production, upon which this primarily agricultural country heavily depends, was far below minimum needs. Industrial equipment had been ruined or lost, and the continued lack of such equipment iseturn to normal production. Transportation wasarticularly bad slate; roads were, andto be, in an appalling state of disrepair; rail communications and rolling stock were damaged and destroyed; most of the merchant fleet had been sunk; and harbor facilities, especially at the chief ports of Piraeus and Salonika, were largely destroyed.
To complicate the conditions caused by these difficulties, the Greek government has been unable to prevent Inflation and lhe flight of capital abroad; nor is itosition to recapture private investments abroad.
The Greek people, furthermore, are suffering from malnutrition and disease; almostillion, according to some estimates, died of starvation during the occupation. And worst of all, perhaps, political factionalism of thc most bluer kind was still rampani on the day ofand grew worse.
These difficulties have united to cause the virtualof Greece's foreign trade. Nor can it revive without more stable political conditions and greater financial aid from abroad to rebuild the industrial machine, help feed and clothe the people, andconfidence in Greek currency.
UNRRA has contributed heavily toward the generalof Greece. The greater part of an allotmenthiefly of US origin, had already been applied by the end The US hasurplus Property Credit, together with an Export-Import Bank loan, and the Federal Reserve Bank has extended short-term loans secured by Greece's gold holdings with the Bank. The US Maritime Commission hasreditor the purchase of ships to replace Greece's lost tonnage. The British have extended credits, and the Turks have given and sold small shipments of food. Collection of war reparations would also help to expedite
Additional measures which would contribute to the economicof Greece include the following:
1. Stimulation of export trade.
ncreased domestic production of essential commodities.
Foreign loans, carefully circumscribed by the lenders in order to prevent uneconomic use by thc Greeks, andof foreign capital.
Reduction of non-productive government expenditures, which would make funds available for reconstruction.
Control and effective utilization of foreign exchange acquired by the national economy.
reforms in administration and taxation.
0. Planned conservation of national resources.
9. Restoration of communications facilities, including roads, rail lines, and harbors. Rolling stock and thefleet must also be restored.
THE CERENT SITUATION
. , , Poetical confusion and strife (complicatedepleted economy are major factors making form Greece today and are, therefore, largely responsible forfusrrllla activities especially prevalent in the northernthe country. (See attached^
IMmost numerous and
inBxtreme left. Control andof these extremist guerrilla band. Is exercised principally bT two
till^.inSrf by rT*kHO? (the Slav Na-
tsmx^Tn^S i leflUlssociated to some ex-
more or less Independently,
thougn aided by the organizations named because they, too, are fighting
TrChlBt wrnp-inl. mereo InaSists, Intimidated peasants, and fugitives from Justice, whose purposes are not political and who are raiding and looting simplyeans of keeping al ve or because of dissatisfaction with conditions in general .KeZr-TrliSirU?uIar ffrom being confined to one type of in-ToTTf oetical opinion
ily decided lo Join, one leader or another.
orii^tyT!are very efficient forfight ng; they descend from the mountains, from which it isto evict them, to raid, pillage, and destroy, and return to their
ofW- field :eftderfl hsW th. Sower
also rightist bands In existence, their chief activities consisting of
reprisals for murder, theft, and destruction wrought by thVfsrSEi,Uwlnj. The^overnnent
onsiderable amount of evidence that many of the
insurgents have been trained, indoctrinated, armed, and equipped at various camps beyond the Greek borders. Infiltration into Greece of -rg*nte lu teliwd to have begun as far bock as "ost
ulJkee 'ln Vo^^'na,of Belgrade) by Nicholas Zachariades, the Greek Communist lead-r
and at Kandr tea and other point, in Bulgaria. The majority, if notgoy^jyMM trainedamps, however, orlginallT
- ll -
The insurgentsariety of arms, including Sten guns, mortars, mines, machine guns, rifles, and grenades. Some of these items have been stolen from Greek stores; others are part of the stock provided the Greeks by the British during the war. Italian, German, and Soviet arms, probably left over from the war, have also been There Is some evidence, too, that UNRRA supplies, including food, clothing, and transport vehicles, have been used to assist the insurgents while they are outside Greece.
Apparently the immediate objective of the rebels is to cut off Macedonia from the rest of Greece. To this end, they haveon driving government forces (army and gendarmerie) and rightist bands southine from Mt. Grammos on the Albanian border to Mt. Olympus near the Aegean Sea. (See map.) These operations haveeasure of success, but most of the key areas andfacilities north of the line remain under government control,the Salonika district, where British troops are stationed.
A recent recrudescence of guerrilla warfare in themay have been staged by leftists to create the impression abroad that the fighting ln Oreece is not confined to border areas and Iburely internal character rather than foreign-inspired. Meanwhile, non-fighting political sympathizers are doing their utmost, through propaganda in the press and elsewhere, to weaken the government.
SOVIET POLICIES AND POSSIBLE GREEK gaJNTaWEASUHES
Under Soviet direction, Greece's northern neighbors--Yugo-slavia, Bulgaria,rive which presumably has for its ultimate objective the establishmentommunist Greece. Short of this supreme goal, there are less drastic objectives which are Important because they admit of more immediate achievement: heappear determined lo prevent the expansion of Greece throughrevisions at the expense of Albania and Bulgaria. So far they have been successful, since the Council of Foreign Ministers has not recognized Greek claims for boundary changes. n the hopereek government less unsympathetic to the USSR, the Soviets will seek to weaken and discredit the present rightist, royalistby promoting Insurgent activities in Greece. Accomplishment of this end would constitute an important step towardB the ultimateresent guerrilla activities and propaganda indicate that thehope to create an Independent Macedonia, which may eventually become part of the Yugoslav Federation, and possibly to add Greek Thrace to Bulgaria. If successful, the USSR would obtain control of Aegean ports, thusominant position in the Aegean Sea and outflanking the Dardanelles.
In line with their usual policy, the Soviets my also belo use Greek instability and the presence of Comnunist elements ln Greece as bargaining power to obtain desirable concessions elsewhere in the world at future international conferences.
Should Greece eventuallyoraounist slate: he Soviets would be able to consolidate and extend the gains ln the Aegean which control of Macedonia and Thrace would giveheirof the Balkans would behey would achieve aposition in thc eastern Mediterranean, thereby outflanking Turkey, threatening the Suez Canal, and endangering the polities of the Near Bast
The Soviets, however, will not ln the immediate future pursue these objectives to the point ofejor conflict. They will concentrate on Intensifying the present dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece. To accomplish this purpose, they will provide clandestine aid to Greek leftists through their satellites, disseminate propaganda to discredit the government, continue to oppose the retention of British troops In Greece, and exert psychological pressure by retaining troops along the northern borders, iSore of these tactics nay be prejudiced and temporarily abandoned during the Security Council's investlgaiion ln th"
The extent lo which the Greeks can counter these tacticson the degree of general Internal stability they can achieve. Although leftist elements, and through them the Soviets, appear to be responsible for much of the chaos prevalent today, great responsibility also attaches to the refusal of Populist leaders toroaderhonestly implement an effective political amnesty, introduce administrative reforms necessary for an efficient program of econostle recovery, andess Intolerant attitude generally. Thewas chosen by the Greek people (although fear and disillusionment may have prompted many of them to vote as they did): the extreme rightictory in the elections, and the plebiscite committedonstitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, legitimategroups (whose leaders are also to be blamed for theirto compromise their differences with the Tsaldarls government in favor of unityritical period) are sufficiently strong tothe government seriously and even to Jeopardize its efficiencyorking organization. The uncompromising attitude of the Tsaldarls Cabinet and the factf the seats in Parliament are not held by the extreme right, serve lo Justify the demands of the oppositionroader government. Unless the government liberalizes its generaland heeds these requests, some political moderates whoarge section of the population may become so disillusioned asto succumb to the persistent Soviot propaganda emanating from abroad and given prominence in certain sections of the free Greek press, and to
w the lead of the extreme leftists. By instituting suitableMlthin its own ranks, however, the government could winsupport from these moderates and thus reduce the potentialities of the extreme leftists andreat extent nullify the effect of Soviet propaganda.
The Soviets are constantly protesting against the presence of British occupation forces in Greece. The present government,how British troopB ln4eftist minority from seising the government by force, relies loo heavily on the continued presence of the British, feeling that in the event of another such attack, British troops will come to its defense. has not seen any urgent necessity for compromising with other political groups and extending Cabinet positions to them.
Early evacuation of the British troops, however, would produce intensified strife and instability in Greece. The mere presence of the troops, particularly in strategic Salonika, actseterrent to more direct interference by the satellites and also keeps the leftistfrom gaining control of the northern part of the country.ritish Military Mission is supervising the reorganisation of the Greek army Into small, self-contained commando units designed to quell guerrilla disorders within the country. As part of this program, the Mission is continuing to supply modern arcs and equipment; it is also increasing the size of the army0nd has made plans for an even greater expansion.
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Two foreign missions are assembling in Greece to investigate certain aspects of its difficulties. The US Economic Mission, headed by Paulormer chief of the Office of Priceill study Greek reconstruction needsiew to determining the extent to which they can be met by the Greeks themselves and the aaount of foreign economic aid necessary for rehabilitation. The Security Council's Investigating Commission will examine the Greek government's allegation that Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria have interfered in Greece's internal affairs.
Although Greece cannot achieve political or economicwithout foreign aid, the success of any program of recovery depends In large part upon the Greek government itself. The Porter Economic Mission willetailed plan for putting the country's economyounder basis, and it may also Indicate that Greece needs further financial help. Such assistance, however, cannot be efficiently applied
toward! notional recoveryovernment which is under constantnot only by the extreme left but also by more moderate groups constitutionally represented in Parliament.
Investigation by the Security Council Coraaission, to commence in Athene at the end of January, will be hampered by winter conditions as well as the difficulty of digging out evidence which will have been hidden before the Commission's arrival. It may turn up enough evidence to indict such an agency as the Balkan organization SCF (Slav national Liberation Front) for having fomented internal Greek strife. Theis remote, however, that the evidence will be sufficient tothe Soviet satellite governments beyond charging that they acquiesced ln border violations and took no active steps to prevent them.
Regardless of the Commission's findings and recomoendaUona, internecine strife in the border areas should decrease and ttie country should be comparatively tranquil during the course of the investigation.eriod of relative quiet would provide an opportunity for Greek Parliamentary groups to begin settling their politicalrogram of economic recovery could then be developed, aivJ militarycould be speeded up for pacification of the country. It is unlikely, however, that the Tsaldarls Cabinet, except under strongby the Western Powers, will take full advantage of the opportunity and open Its ranks to representatives of other groups, thus abandoning Its narrow, legalistic thesis that the Populist group alone has beenandate to govern. The formationovernment of national unity (excluding the extreme left, which Is not represented inwouldreat step toward stability. Complete unity cannot be expected, perhaps,overnment much broader then the present one is attainable. Unlesstep is taken, civil strife will probably be intensified, and Greece will be unable to achieve the stability noc-easary to thwart the tactics and aims of the USSR.
COMMENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
The Intelligence Division of the War Department concurs in substantial measure with the subject report but notes aemphasis which, it is believed, nay be seriously misleading. The general tone of the paper, despite isolated statements in the contrary sense, attributes to the Leftists, and particularly the Leftisttrength and national character which they lack. Concurrently, the paper places in question the representative character and competence of the Rightist parties or leaders lo an extent which does not correspond to known facts, particularly the results of the recent elections.