CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
central intelligence group
IntalUfieneo Gpoupouth0 E. St.lf.W..
Cl.iaS NO.CO. IcVntlfyfcig Syul-ol Dated7 .3
Receipt of materiel froo Central fete!lifjaneel>ovo Is horebj teknonlcdged bys
The extent of fulfillment of the current 8oviet five-Year PJwi for pctroleun cannot be accurately predicted, since it depends not only upon capabilities inherent ln the petroleum Industry Itself but also upon the progress achieved ln other Industries and, more importantly, upon expediencies dictated by Cwiounlat Party strategy. Tl* implementation of Forty strategy Is readily effected through Government control of tconcvilc activities enabling Soviet administrators to revise Industrial priorities to the extent feasirie tohanging situation.
Or ganlxat !onal_Con'-rol.
Since the governmental reorganizationhe exploitation of petroleum resources, formerly under Geographicupervisedentral Commissariat for Petroleum, has been theof two eeparate minlotriea: Petroleum Ministry, South and 6wt, and Petroleum Ministry, East. The former has Jurisdiction over theUkraine and other areas of Western Russia; the latter over the Volga-Urals, Central Asia and the Far East. Pechora tUkhtad refinery) Is reported to be under thc direct control of the Mini-try of Internal Affairs.
Under tl* present organization, control it centralizedh Ministryunctional basis, thus eliminating theractice of vesting the control of exploration, drilling, production and rcflnlig in the Geogiaphlc Combines which in turn required each operating branch lo clear through the head or the Combine before discussing even purely technical problems with an opposite number ln the Central Moscow Cecnla-sanat. These organizational changes are indicativelllJngn-ss to modify existing concepts of Industrial organization If increased orer- tlng efficiency Is likely to result,heolicy to build up oil output in the eastern fields.
. * i
While little Is known regarding Russia's potential store of! ln view of the existence of vast areas favorable to the accumulation of etroleum, it is possible that total reserves are at leest as large as those of any world power. Proven reserves, however, the measure of oil ^
reasonably certain of being produced by current practices withavailable, are much smaller. Estimates of proven reserves vary from BOOraVlg millionillion metric tons. The latter figure, which is theovlet estimates0 of proven world reserves andf like reserves In the United States.
Production (see Enclosure Bl.
The Fourth Plve-Year Plan callsrogressive annual Increase In crude oil output4 million metric tons54 million metric tons If viewedive-year goal beginning6 million metric tonshis rate of increase in production is giroter than that set in any previous Plve-Year Plan. However, if0 crude oil output2 million metric tons is usedeference, the goal appears realizable without undue strain elsewhere in thc Soviet eyeten of economy. This is at once apparent from the table below showing planned percentage Increases In output of selected industries:
Pig Iron Steel Coal
Electric Power Capacity " Metric Tons
Gross Industrial Output ub
The bulk of Russia's petroleum comes from the Caucasus. The Volga-Urals and Central Asia, areas referred to as the Eastern Fields, rank next in importance. Sakhalin, Old Polish Galicia and Ukhta, though minor producing areas by comparison, are important by reason of geographic* location. The extent to which the annual crude oil production Quotas will, be met during the next five years la dependent, in large measure, on the following considerations:
extent to which production at Baku can be revived.
rapidity with which the devastated oil fieldsand West Grozny in the Caucasus can be
.'. c. The measure of success attained In increasing the annual rate of drilling hole from5 figure, whirl, was well underillion meters drilledillion meters Fulfillmentls drilling
program in turn Is predicatedieen conroetclal armingn exploratory drilling per rig perub-atantial increase5 ln the number of working riga;of improved equipment to obtain greater drillingore estersive use of geophysical prospecting; and increased output of drilling machinery, pipe, and auppllee.
d. Repair of'plpellnes and rallroade ln the Caucasus tcoperating capacity: the building of several moderate length pipelines and railroads connecting oil flelda with refineries in the Eastern oil areas; and the replacement, to required capacity, of tankers on the Black and Caspian Seas and barges on the Volga Rlver.
Refining [gee Enclosure CI.
Much of the Soviet refining plant la operated at considerably rated capacity due to obsolescence, lax maintenance,and loo few experienced personnel. Nevertheless, theof lhe USSR can process, with capacity to spare, all crude oilto be produced in that country under the Fourth Five-Yeardifficulties as regards the refining of petroleum are qualitativethan Quantitative. Much gasoline and lubricating oil Is of In general, oil products are produced ln accordanceewsatisfactory for common uses but unsulled to many
Transportation (see Enclnnir* D)
Although petroleum transportation facilities were considerably reduced by war damage, temporary reconstruction measures have progressed sufficiently to permit the handling of all crude oil production. Plans for permanent reconstruction of facilities are phased in with scheduled increases In crude output.
Because of primary dependence on rail transport, therefined prcducrn will in all probabilityore ocrloun trans-. problem than gelling the crude to tho refineries. It lef the Investment in rail facilities, concentratedWee tern Russia, was lost during the and that rehabilitation is far complete. Throughout ll* USSR thereeneral lack of rolling eterioration of rail facilities, and frequent loadingcapacity. 1
It ia not feasible to make an estimate of the total oil product^/iV requirements baaed on the needs of principal consumers. Demand would sS
TrcTucd nf It, y for propellents, lubricants and other products of petroleum were met in acecrdance with American conrepts of adequacy. While some deficiencies of high grade lubricants are in rroepect, in KRreral it can be assumed that Soviet administrators will succeed in avo-dlng oil shortages serious enough to interfere with essential industry, agriculture end transportaticn overlcds or greatly Imi-ilr the effectiveness of the armed forces. This will teiolute control, ofight system of priorities, and nee of Inferior products where high grade products are Indicated.
he clrcunBl^cce, it seems ,re useful to ascertain the probable total availability of finished oil products. If the annual ende oil production schedules established for the Fourth Five-Year Plan are met-if combined leasee in refining, in transportation and for evaporation do not exceedercent: end, finally, if Rus-la receives annually fromoillion metric tons of refined oil products from the satellite counties, apparent supplies will approximate:
Million Metric 8 6 5 4
No information is available regarding storage facilities cr oil In stcrege, but because of wartime heavy demand and reduced production, sufficient tint has hardly elapsed to enable.the accumulation of eub-itl-.tial stocks.
Notable contributions to the progress ofechnology particularly in the fields of exploration and production, can ben :he years ahead from the USSR. Tjie turbo syute* of drilling and the geo-chenlcal system of prospecting were both developed in the USSR. Although neither have been exploited tc any conoidcrable extent elsewhere,merican oil experts arc of the opinion that these techniques are not inferior to methods developed for the same purposes now employed in the United States. Based on the record to date, contributions of equalance to the technology of petroleum refining and transportation cannot be anticipated in the near future.
A map, showing the principal oil fields, crude oil transportation routes, and refineries (throughput and cracking capacity) wltUn the USSR, Is attached at the end of this report.
Immense reserves of petroleum are believed to ealst in the USSR. In addition to areas being developed, tested and partially explored, forma-tlons favorable for prospecting under-lle vast eectlons of the country.
Reproduced In the table below Is the latest available official estimate of the petroleum reserves for the USSR:
(hTiTIc^ Metric Tons)
Official Russian EstimateIt '
(including Baku! Georgia
Dagestan and Grozny Krasnodar-Maikop and Crimea
(Uzbek, Tadihlk, Kirglz and Turkmen)
reserves can only be approximated at best-andthem have little meaning unless fullyhepetroleum reserves as follows:
eposits frura which pt.-lioleu.ti can he fitiacted by mans of existing we] Is drilled In producing horizons.
uiveyed and delJ.nlted iceeiwa, ur resetvdafield ready to be tapped by additional welleweed.
B eserves ln horlrons which contain oil as indicated byl existing wells,ot delimited or corpltlely survived.-Also, In Fiodueiii^ fields,rtMCves anyt5mlvs for lever untapped hoc Icons whichoil piodu<;eis ln adja-'tnt fields.
n producing arees this represents reserves in horizons the existence of which is not yet establiahed but la assumedhe basis of the geological structure and location. In areas In which the presence of oil in economic quantities is not yet rstab-Unn-Td, "C" represents les^rves axvuned to be pieacnt In knownin pieces, already partly *urvcjvd favorable utructures.
evives in possible fr.voirble itrucluiep. Hiee and extent of which is nsei^edhe regional gtolcgy.
Pew countries aside from the Soviet IJnl'jn compile [tobable and possible oil reserveB. Such figures are gei/eially octMidrreri.to haw little or no connection with proven Proven reserves,not lutccp-tible of accurate measurement, dcniform conceit cf the probuMe exis.ter.eeccepted byn rost countries).
American geologists who attendedh International Geological Congress in Moscow7 are repoited to have estimated total Russian proven oil reserves at approximately one billion metric tons, which con-pares very well with the official Russian figure for. Thinwever, exceeds other unofficial estimates by about three to one.' Though many specific clatnw have been nv.de regarding jirospecis forension of old oil fields .discoveries of deeper cil horirons and *xplor.f favoi-ible geological structureso official newf jioven ie-serves are known to have been relcaacd.
Annual Report on the Soviet Oil Industryaeselieff,
illion of metric tona; Annual Report on the Soviet Oil Industryuse-Jli-ff,
illion of metric tons; Petroleun Resources of the1 PAW et alillion
of metric tons..
raOPJCTlON AND EXPLORATION
Although Russian production of petroleum etlll le concentrated largely In theontinuation of pre-war efforts is strenuously being rmrfe to reduce dependence on this area by building up production in the Eastern fields. It was realized thategion as prolific asould not expected indefinitely toigh rate of oil production arid that Inevent of hostilities the Caucasus area rolght be difficult of defense. Koreover, the principal fields in the Volga-Urals area ate nore accessible than Caucasian oil lo the new eastern industrial centers. The eastward trend of petroleum production wea accelerated during the war when tho Caucasus was largely isolated from Western Russia and it-Is heavily accentuated in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Important oil-producing areas are individually discussed In eubscouent paragraphs.
SSR (Thousand MetriVtorisY
Ha lk op-Krasnodar
UkhlaJ Pechora 1
Holotov Central Asia
Turkmen For East (Sakhalin)
Estl- peV-meted ent
but BroA-SSW* U WSB notOf Mrlouely bombed during thoW
durinf tK nit of rn' trials and eouipment to other area*llw06lon- Sucn enforced shutdowns, together with periods.'"
1 ;Pr?UCll0fl int* Wed penwntly thelifeany fields In the BaXu.
Pi** SV*Mlto be undertakenheiiiJ. 'recover end eusteln output el Baku. he laic* 0 figurehow-nd meters byercent.
1 proouctlon" prospect. Likelyoreae throughout
hi*?Sf?LPe?in,Ula arClvely explored and deeper wells are
..i Bl1 over lhe Bftku re*lon to orlzone ae yet little expi oiteo.
. i8niflcrnlaccoxpllBhrent of theClCdmuch oil0 as whs
Allhcu8f> Grozny produced two-thirds as *jehm2 (aboutillion metric tone I, subseouent exhaustion of thewd reduced output to slightlyillion neirlc tensnd not1 was if* declineeated by rinding oil in deeper formations. Althcugn only the Vest Groznyrey lhe Gerrans, since re-occupying th* fieldehe Russians have had to replace many facilities, restore equipment and replenish atorea of nil kinds. Production0 is expected to5 output by almostercent if exploitation of deep horUonu locateddistant from the City of Grozny proceeds an expected.
Before the wfcr, the Kalkop-Krasnodnr region was ccr.ildered one of the most pronlHing oil-developments in the entire Soviet Uniei. Production . vmK,trlc tens1i.Ulcn metric tons3 and further increases appeared certain. Though completely devastated during the Gerran invasion, on extensive program or rehabilitation already under way is counted on to Increase output Trtxihousand metric tons5 loillion netric tons Thiseescneble goal provided men and eauiprent ere rade-avai]able, as proved deposits should be productive Tor many yeare withoul the establislxert of new reserve?.
Production of petroleum In Dagestan and Georgia die not begin until arter lhe war con-enced. Prospects appear favorableubeiant'al output of oil for these regions, particularly Dagestan,argeof peiroleum is not anticipated during tho next few jears. Dageetan output0 ia expected barely to5 andise inis planned ln Georgia, operations in ihai area during the next five years apparently will be primarily exploratory.
a not surprising that Soviet
Planner* haye scheduled no large Increaee In output for the oM PollS fields located mainly in the vicinityrogobych and Borlslev. Production hod declined steadily for years before the war owing to the onerousimposed by the former Polish Government"on foreignanies
heproduction methods practiced by the Polish oil industry. Presumably, Soviet officials feel that theeffort necessary to raise output can be wre advantageously employed In other areas inside the USSR easier of defense.
. econd Baku"). The Fourth Pive-Year Plan calls for five limes as much drilling in the Eastern fields0 as took placend the-bulk of this effort Is to be concentrated in the Volga-Urals area which includes the important oil-producing regions of Bashkiria and Kuibyshev-Volga. Priorost of Bashkiria's production centered at the fields around IsMmbal. Exhaustion of these fields, together with Soviet inability to locate new reserves during the war years,eavy decline in output only partly arrested by the discovery of oil in the deep rocae of thc Devonian Age. This fall in prediction ate wore than effset by developments at Tuimazy wJere output hassubstantially High initial production and lo- rate of decline characterizes the wells which tap Devonian, foivationa in this region.
The Kuibyshev-Volga region which includes ell of the oiluctlon in the Kuibyshev Oblnst, as well as that of the Bugun-slan field in Chkalov Oblast, was the most favored of Soviet oil developments during the war. Production was greatly expended and operations here received top priority in men and eouipment at the time the Caucasus was isolated and output in the Bashkiria region failed to reach expected levels. Like other oil-bearing regions in the Middle Volga, Kuibyshev-Volga is decent upon oil from deep Devonian rocks to sustain its high rate of production. Typical of these new fields are those at Zhlgull hills in there. Rend, said to con-pare favorably with the best fields at Keikop and Grozny.
The status of oil operations in Holotov Oblasi is net clear. Production effort there Is being shifted from the field around Krasnok&mek to SeverokamsK. Thisogical development, as the Devonian formations at Scverokamsk are nore prolific than the shallow deposits at Kremokonsk Intensive exploitation of the region is scheduled to increase outputercent5
Pechora <Ukhta). Operations at the ukhta fieldu in Pechora near the Arctic Circle are believed to be under the Ministry of Internal Affelrs ao penal labor is largely employed. It Is reportedarge modern efinery capable of processing nany times0 planned outputhousand netric tons was erectedermitting thehat actual production might be higher than that scheduled in the Fourth Five-Yeer Plan. Although seemingly isolated, the Ukhta fields arey rail.
Central Asia. Loosely grouped ae the Central Asia area are the widely scattered oil develcpments of Uzbek, Including the very minorof Klrglz and Tadzhlk, of Turkmen and Kazakh. Uzbek oil comeoentirely fron the southern part of the Porgana Valley, mootly In the vicinity of Palvantooh and Andizhan, though exploration le planned of areas favorable to prospecting ln the northern part of the Valley. Production ln Kazakh is concentrated ln the Emba District. Prospering, so faraimed at extending the field northward,ng done along thc plje-llne to Orsk and extending aa far as the Southern Urals. The Nebil Dog field near Kresncvodsk Is the source of all petroleum produced ln Turkmen. Oil-bearing areas ore believed .to extend from the Belktonski Mountains to the Iranian border and from the Caspian Sea to Kopet Dagh. The output of all three regions increased substantially during the war when it waslo employ many men and much eoulpment normally at work ln the Caucasus, and future prospects are said to be favorable. It la cucstlonuble if planned output for the next five years will be met, since the reoulred drilling rlga end men could probably be used elsewhere to produce oilaccessible to the principal centers of consumption.
Far East. Commercial development of petroleum ln the Soviet far East is confined lo Sakhalin where,roduction was shared with the Japanese. Il is reported that production in Northern Sakhalin, comingarrow belt along the East Coast roughly between tie Okta and Noglik Pavers,housand toillion metric tonsnd that Russian control of the entire island will probably enable5 output to be doubled This latter increase in production Is In part predicated upon exploitation of new horizons not yet fully developed. Efforts will undoubtedly be made to exploit fully this,region, where every ton of oil produced avoids the long rail haul on the Trars-Siberlan line or procurement from foreign sources.
Synt he tic, Liquid
The Russians are familiar with the basic processes for cmI liquefaction; they nave developed further than anyone else the production of gas by burning coal in nines; for years ihey hove made limited use of producer gas and similar propelloni3 for automobiles, tractors,nd It is reported that sapropellle coals in several places ln Siberia,iurnl petroleum is unavailable, are being processed for liouid fuels.
The Fourth Five-Year Plan calls for an annuel eulputetric lens of synthetic liquid fuelseeting this goal would seem to depend largely on the extent to which the Russians ore able to move equipment from plants like Leuna In Germany to the USSR and make use of German technicians lo operate them. It is doubtful if slMlari of reoulred capacity cculd be produced during the next five yaars in tne USSR, or sufficient know-how acouired for its efficient operation.
refining capacity in the USSR was lees hdvi-.sely affected
during the war than production of crude oil- Thc Germans rt-suited to littlebombing of Russian industrial targets, and several refineries, particularly those in the Black Sea area, were disunited beforeccupation and set up elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Acquisition ofproduction was tho principal objective of the dennin drive Into tlie Caucasus.
Refining capacity in the USSR now appears substantially in excess of crude production and is likely to continue so for several ye-irs. Crude throughput capacity, cracking capacity and rated aviation gasoline <ataclty are shown in the table below:
^lhpjp^PETRpLEIM REKlNEtflES (Thousands of Metric'TunsT"
Cauca9ua and Southern Ukraine
Koscow-Volga-Urals Astrakhan Bu guruslan Chkalov Gorki
hroughput - Cracking
SHALE OIL PLANTS iThoueande of Metric Tons!
_Jhrou^put_ CWcfctng QennJ ine
'continued on page
otal gftAKP TOTAL
The capacities shown in the table etove are based ln part on trans latlons of German Intelligence reports which are often difficult to evaluate. These figures may be too high, as they substantially exceed other estimates. For instance Kresrodar, though repotted being lefcuilt, was said to Itnve been destroyed by the CetTonn, and Grozny Tuapse may have suffered some damage while the existence of certain plants such as Chinlon, Kin and Aim Ate Is based prlmrly on Gcnran sources.* The aggregatef rated :rude throughput capacity ln the USSR is lees significant titan the Qualifying factors: output and quality of refined products.
Although flexibility of modern refining,ack of precise data on the characteristics of crude oil processed fron refinery to refinery, and unavailability of information as to the output of various refinedmake it impractical too-parison of the relative efficiency of Russian and American petroleum refinery operations, some usefulcan be made. 0 thlity-eight units of Arvrlcan petroleum refining plant, including units for topping, thermal tracking, processing of lubricating oil, polymerization end hvdrogenntlon, went to the USSR. Three complete modern refineries, an aviationlant and two desalting and dehydrating units were furnished to the USSR under lend-lease. Even so, much of the Soviet petroleum refining plant ismaintenance Is lax and operating personnel below supervis.-ry grade is poorly trained and insufficient in nuater; gasoline is often of inferior quality and lubricating oils are generally produced in too few grades to meet many of tho specialized requirements of industry and transportation. It is doubtful if the aggregate output of petroleum refineries exceedsercent of rated capacity ind may be even less.
Petroleum produced ln the Caucasus Is generally accessible lo refinery by pipeline and water transport. Though some uic lo mnde of the rellways to move crude oil, so far as petroleum Is cncented they are used primarily to carry refined products lo ports on the Block and Caspian Seas and to lha rail center al Roetov-cn-Dcn. Caspian Sea tankers connect with Astrakhan, which provides access lo the interior by rail and river; Black Sea tankers unload oil at various ports in the Crimea and Ukraine for rail trans-shipment north and west; end Roatov-on-Don, as yet not fullyfrom the ravages of wae> normally connects with all sections of the USSR by rail.
Elsewhere in the USSR, except the Par East where Sakhalin oil reaches refinery by river end pipeline, railways are etlll relied on'e substantial quantities of crude oil. Short pipelinessome oil fields in the Volga-Urale area wlih refineries, nnd longer lines such ee that between Tulmozyfa are under construction or projected. Thesehowever, still reed to be supplemented by tall facilities. The Ourev-Orsk pipeline carries Emba oil to Orsk for refining and short lines in otter parts of Central. Asia connect scoa-of the widely scattered fields with refineries. Much of thie petroleum, however, rencheo refinery by rail.
In contrast with cruJe oil, lie bulk of which moves by pipeline and water transport, moat refined products reach Russian consumers by roll. There are noteworthy excoptlons: ipeline rrom Grozny to Tmdoveya delivers kerosene to thc Donbaes; tankers unload refined oils at many cities along the coasts of lhe Slack and Caspian seas: and oil barges on the Volga, andees extent on other inland waterways, carry finished products to many ports of the USSR.
7 some difficulty nay be experienced in isolited instances in getting petroleum to refineries, but serious bottlenecks ore not likely to develop. Railroads and pipelines ln tbe Northern Caucasua ore reported to have been repaired sufficiently to handle currentof crude oil in that area, while the capacity of tankers on the Caspian and Block Seas and barges on the Volga River le believed to befor the present carriage of petroleum, further replacement of both land and water rvsans of oil transportation ln the vicinity of the Caucaaue iliiikeep step with planned output of petroleum. Elsewhere In the USSR, important crude oil carriers were not directly effected by German military action.
On the other hand, because of* the predominant reliance on rail tra;*port, distribution of refined products will be eerloualy hampered for years to come throughout the USSR and ot times may be conpletely tied up ln some areas of Western Russia. In this port of the UCSR, hundreds of miles
to ono eetlmate,0 annual requirements for refine, petroleum producta willillion metric tone. Another eource tc^em mayillion metric lone each year. Even the lower of these figures la eubetantlally larger than the planned production5 million metric tone
, almoet certain to exceed available auppllee both lauvllre enough2 rolctri Producta to go around If exleting andSoviet Industrial, transportation, agricultural and militaryare "tinted In terms of American experience as to grade and quantity, -nere Is the additional conelderatlon that in manyreater quantity of refined producte nuet be used because of their inferior quality, harder use to which vehicles and mchlnery are subjected, and longer time operated before replacement.
.* u Depending upon the Soviet estimate or Ruaela'a positionwestern powers and Internal considerations, heavy industry,the armed forces nay be expected to share top priority forthe nea/ future. The remainder win go to transportation, consumer goods production end miscellaneous services withthat concessions will be made from time to time to the *and dissatisfaction among the civil popula-
In general, it can be assumed that Soviet administrators will avoid 0shortages serious enough to interfere with Indispensable induatry,end transportation over prolonged perlode or to Impair greatly the
f the An?y'lraccomplished
through complete control of distribution, absolute enforcement of priorities, utilization of substantial quantities of finlehed products which would be considered unacceptable for use in the united States, and considerable use or producer gas vehicles and other applicative of substitute fuels.
t that' lnsufricient refined oil productsJf "ot to say that shortages in certain
?L to have eufflclent
csnta. tolls facilities ror the production of aviation gasoline are consld-red adequate if operated
potential of these plsnte. However, since the Russians are fullyhey doubtless -HI LLdTS^SS10 Mlm on either
aJUtlmreduce demand for hlph grade
Under thotto cs-
eert*ln th* probable totel ovailabilltyfinished "oil'producle. If lhe annual crude oil production tchedulei esleblUhed for ibe./ourlh/its-Year Planml; if cotsblnod lotsee in refining, in transportation. evaporation do not exceedercent; and,V receives annually fromoillion metric tons of refiwd oll'preducie
entelllto countriob, opparent supplies will amount, lo epprotUwtely: . jjejfjfjpY
1W7 isiQ m
Kllllon Hetrlc Tone 0 8 6 5 4
From the foregoing dlacueelon, It it opparent that the USSRbe (kpected lo have an exportable surplus of petroleumthle does not preclude oilabroad fromSR,or Hungary; the USSR may well release ptlrolovn products tooblalnexclienge or cterwdltles considered more essential notwithstandingdoi->obtlc demand within lhe Soviet Union.
Ko information Is available referdlng itorage facilities or e'l In etore it. It Ts believed that, because of neavy demtnd and reduced production during, sufficient time has not elapsed to enablexlai Ion ofstocks.
hv rolew in the USSR probably has open retarded
culteAfrican oil field workers, and inode-
feophysicai prospecting is not yet widespread S
.(ant.otations, the Russians have mode Bub-stantial contributions lo the advancement of petroleum enslneerine far m
PTiled* ln tne United States extensive changes in practices and eaulpment now
conaidered efficient and satisfactory. Tneess concert-re employing the turbo eyslen to an l" lithan rotary drilling
eneitiea. prospecting, first developed in Russia.erhaps mere versa!ithe geopnysical methods widely employed in tne Unitedhe United States for the reason iral
Am!riciin or other foreign oil men>ears to *vl" tne Russians regarding petroleum
LSSRthe erection of United States refining p
and generally stay until guaranteed performnce i. obtained, it iB believed
f- ; ircumstances, itoubtful if Soviet proeresa In
llcularly noteworthy for some years to