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central intelligence agency
the consequences of the partition of palestine
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HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE
SUMMARY
Armed hostilities between Jews and Arabs will breax out if the UN General Assembly accepts the plan lo partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab Slates as recommended by the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).
Inflamed by nationalism and religious fervor. Arabs ln Syria. Lebanon. Iraq. Transjordan. Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as well as Palestine are determined to fight against any force, or combination of forces, which attempts to setewish state In Palestine. While the governments of the Arab states arc not expected to make official declarations of war. they will not attempt to keep their people (especially fanatical tribesmen) from joining the battle; they may even encourage such action and furnish clandestine assistance as well.
In composition, the Arab forces will vary from relatively well controlled quasi-military bands to the loose tribal organization of the nomads. The largest number actively engaged against the Jews at any one time will probably be. The Arabs are good guerrilla fighters, and Ihey will be well supplied with small arms and will also undoubtedly obtain some planes and tanks.
The Zionists, for their part, are determined totate ln Palestine or. in tbe view of extreme elements, all of Palestine and Transjordan as well. Whatever the UN recommends, they will attempt toewish state after the British(now set by the British for. The Jews are expected to be able to mobilizeighters in Palestine, supplementedimited extent byand recruits from abroad. The Jewish armed groups in Palestine are well equipped and well trained in commando tactics. Initially, they will achieve marked success over the Arabs because of superior organization and equipment. As the war of attrition develops, however, the Jewish economy (severely strained by mobilization) will break down; furthermore, the Jews will be unable continuously to protect their extended supply lines and isolated settlements or to plant and cultivate their fields in the face of constant harassing, "hit and run" Arab attacks Without substantial outside aid in terms of manpower and material, they win be able to hold out no longer thanyears.
The US. by supporting partition, has already lost much of its prestige in the Neur East. In the event that partition is imposed on Palestine, the resulting conflict, will seriously disturb the social, economic, and political stability of the Arab world, and US commercial and strategic interests will be dangerously Jeopardized. Whiletribesmen and fanatic Moslems are haphazardly blowing up parts of the oil pipelines and attacking occasional Americans, il is passible that the responsible governments will refuse to sign pipeline conventions, oil concessions, civil airand trade pacts The various projects which are necessary to raise the standard
Hot* Thisha* been coordinated with the tatdHpm organisation* of lhe DepsrtnwnU el Siate. Army. Navy, and Air Forces.
of living cannot be carried through without US assistance and guidance. With the US committed lo partition, such developments will be shelved indefinitely. The poverty, unrest, and hopelessness upon which Communist propaganda thrives will increase throughout thc Arab world, and Soviet agents (some of whom have already beenInto Palestine as Jewish DP's) will scatter into the other Arab states and there attempt to organize so-called "democratic movements" such as the one existing today In Greece.
Jf the UN recommends partition, it will be morally bound to take steps to enforce partition, with the major powers acting as thc Instruments of enforcement. Thepotentialities ofevelopment to US-Arab and US-USSR relations need no emphasis.
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THE CONSEQUENCES OK THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE
7 thc United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) completed its report,ajority o( its members recommended partition as the best solution of the Palestine problem. In spite of violent opposition from the Arab states and the possibility that partition would not receive the necessary two-thirds majority In the UNGA. there Is no doubt that this type of solution of the Palestine problem has been more seriously studied and more generally accepted than any other. It Istherefore, to attempt to determine what the consequences of partition will be.
The General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine has presented to thcartition plan based on the majority report of UNSCOP. Although no final decisions have yet been reached on Implementing and enforcing the eventual UNcertain basic assumptions can be made if the UNGA (now debating the partition scheme) acceptswo-thirds majori'y partition for Palestine, the following situation will result:
sovereign Jewish state,ubstantial part of the area ofbe established.
substantial number of immigrants will be permitted to enter this Jewish state.
Arabs, not only of Palestine but of all the Near East, will stronglybove, and armed hostilities between Jews and Arabs will take place.
in the form of men, arms, and supplies will be afforded both thcthe Arabs from outside Palestine.
United Nations will not Immediately organize an international policekeep the peace in Palestine.
On the basis of these assumptions, three questions must be answered:
a. How will the Arab-Jewish conflict develop, and with what results?
h How will the stability of the Middle East be affected?
c. How will US strategic and commercial Interests be affected?
in order to answer these questions, an examination of the political situationfrom partition and the military developments which may arise from thatfollows.
Consequences
a. Internal Pressures on Arab Nationalist Pressure. .
Arab nationalism Is Die strongest political force in the Arab world. It grewecret societies under Ottoman rule, came out Into the open In the Arab Revolt of World War.I. and has been the major factor in the independence movement In the Arab world ever since. The independence of all the Arab stales in the Near East throws into high relief the continuing mandatory status ot Palestine. Because of the strong ties between the various Arab states, political developments in any one country are of vital concern to Arabs everywhere Palestinian independence is, consequently,
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the major aim cot only of the Palestinian Arabs but also of Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis. Transjordanians, Egyptians, and Saudi Arabians. It would be political suicide for any Arab government to ignore this situation.
The signing of the Arab League Pact InSictory for the Arab nationalists in that it hastened the day when they could form their own bloc In relation to the other great powers of the world.
The Arab nationalist movement in Palestine has been as active as in any other Arab country. The uprisings96 demonstrated thc strength of thistamp commemorating the signing of the Arab League Pactr. appeared in Egyptluster ol flags of country members, one of whichhite flag Inscribedalestine has been represented at meetings of the Arab League, first by independent individuals and then by the representatives of thc new Arab Higher Committee, formedt the conference of the Politicalof thc Arab League in7 it is significant that the Mufti, as Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee,eading role. Although the Arab Higherand the Arab League have differed as to the advisability of testifying before UNSCOP, the members of the League are in complete accord over the injustice ofto the Palestinian Arabs.
Thc ultimate aim of Arab nationalism Is to preserve and enrich the Arab heritage, while the political aims are the independence of all Arab lands and the establishment of some degree of unity among them. The nationalists regard Palestine as the chief stumbling block to the achievement of their political aims. Despite thc fact that Arabs and Jews have lived peaceably side by side, determination to make Palestine an independent Arab country is strong in all of the Arab states, from the more educated and ambitious classes down to the poorest and most politically naive peasants. Arab national fervor is so explosive andorce that Arabofficials who recognize the political implications involved inNwill nevertheless have to oppose any decision for partition or run the risk of losing office.
(2) Religious Pressure.
The Arab governments are probably as greatly influenced by religious pressures as they arc by nationalist pressures. The Arabs arc capableeligious fanaticism which when coupled with political aspirations is an extremely powerful force. Whether or not the Arab governments are capable of guiding this force is difficult to judge. It is very possible that certain religious organizations will take the initiative in organizing Arab resistance in Palestine.
The Ikhwan al Muslimin (Moslemith headquarters in Egypt, is an organization of young Moslems founded for the purpose of orienting Arab society in accordance with Islamic ideologies. Branches of the Ikhwan have been formed In Syria and Lebanon, and one of the most active branches is in Palestine. The Ikhwan regards Westernizationangerous threat to Islam and would oppose any political encroachment of Zionism on Palestine with religious fanaticism.r Holy War, be declared, the Ikhwan would be the spearhead of anyhe Grand Mufti, as head of the Moslem Supreme Council, can count on thc unanimous
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supportembers of the Dchwan. who are assured of entrance Into Paradise if they die on the field of battle.
(3) Tribal Pressure.
The tribes of the Arab countriesowerful element ln the political and military pattern of the Middle East. The triberoup of related families under the leadershipheikh) which may be joinedonfederacy with other tribesaramount sheikh. The economic basis of tribal life Is pastoral nomadism involving periodic migrations to seek pasturage for camels, sheep, and horses. The nomad (Beduln) population of Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia has been estimated.
The conditions of Beduin life haveardy type of fighting man, not only imbuedarlike tradition (combining religious fanaticism with an enthusiastic devotion to looting, plundering, and raiding) but also trained ln the use of small arms and the methods of desert warfare.
Large stipends have been paid annually to the tribes of the Near East by whatever power wished to have their support, whether that power was British, French, or the local Arab government. Since the Arab governments now pay the stipends, they could rely on the tribes within their regions. The tribes would doubtless Join the crusade, not only for reasons of Arab patriotism but also for plunder, the assurance of additional stipends, and the thrill of battle. The Syrian Defense Minister statedctober that as the Arabs marched into Palestine they "would be buttressedoot-seeking Beduln described as 'mine fodder1."
The dramatic meetingurdish and Arab tribal sheikhs at Hllla in Iraq in Octoberesolutionoly War to defend Palestine. Although Prime Minister Saleh Jabr took the Initiative in organizing this meeting, it is significant that the Arab and Kurdish leaders (many of whom are hostile to each other) consented to meet and to agTceommon program.
b. Probable Attitudes of Arab) ewish State.
The Arabs violently oppose the establishmentewish slate in Palestine because they believe that Palestine is an integral part of the Arab world. In addition, they fcur that the Jews will consolidate their position through unlimited immigration and that they will attempt to expand until theyhreat to the newly won independence of each of the other Arab countries They believe that not only politically but also culturally the Jewish state threatens the continuedof the Islamlc-Anib civilization. For these reasons, the Arab governments will not consider any compromise, and they categorically reject any scheme which would setewish state in Palestine. The meetings of the Political Committee of the Arab League In Ubanon crystallized this feeling of unanimity.ote, which represents the views of all the Arab states, the Committee stated. "The Arabthemselves, shall not be able to restrain the feelings of their nationals revolting against the oppression falling on them, nor shall they stand with folded armsanger threatening all lhe Arab countries, but rather will they be compelled to take every decisive action which will guarantee resistance to the aggression and the restora-
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tfon ofn addition, leaders in all the Arab slates have stated theirto resist.
the UN.
The Arab governments are embittered by the UNSCOP majority report, which they feel was not arrived at impartially. Speeches made before Zionist groups by the Guatemalan member of UNSCOP, following the return of the committee, have convinced the Arabs that certain members of UNSCOP had made up their minds on the question before the committee undertook its task.
However, the Arab governments are reluctant to break with the UN. At the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League In Cairo following the formation of UNSCOP, the Arab states were not willing to follow the lead of the Arab Higher Committee in boycotting the hearings Thc Arab governments supported the Mufti in refusing to give testimony within the frontiers of Palestine, but they alltestimony to UNSCOP subsequently in Beirut.
The Arab governments realize the debt they owe lo the UN. The raising of the question of the evacuation of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon in the UN ledpeedy and satisfactory settlement among the French, British, and Levant States. Egypt has had an opportunity to air its views on thc evacuation of British troops from Egypt and its claims to the Sudan. The UN hasedium for the immediate recognition and participation in world affairs of the young Arab states. Although the Arab states are adamant in their determination to make Palestine an Arab state, they will probablyomplete rupture with the UN should partition be Imposed.
the US and UK.
Since the Balfour Declaration thc British have been the target of Arab political feeling in Palestine. The recommendation for thc partition of Palestine as contained In the Peel Report7 resulted in serious anti-British demonstrations by the Arabs. After thc dissolution of the first Arab Higher Committeehc arrest of Arab political leaders, and the escape of the Mufti and others across the border, the Arabs were convinced that Britain was crushing all hopes of Arab political Independence In Palestine. Although the Arabs welcomed the White Paperhey haveto criticize the British for permitting Jewish immigrationimited scale and for refusing to disarm the Jewish underground.esult, however, of the UK's announced decision to terminate thc mandate and to withdraw both Its troops and administration from Palestine and its refusal to implement by force any settlement not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, British prestige in the Arab world has definitely improved.
US prestige, on the other hand, has steadily decreased with each new indication that the US supports the Zionists. The good will enjoyed by the US at the time of the Roosevell-lbn Saud Conference and following US backing of Lebanese and Syrian claims for independence was short livedesult of President Truman'sof Jewish immigration to Palestine and the Anglo-American Committee report. After the publication of the Anglo-American Committee report, Arab popular feeling expressed itself in the bombing of the US Legation at Beirut and in the attempt to burn
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the USIS office in that city. The Arab governments' official attitudes were made known at the Biudan Conference, in which the US bore the brunt of the attacks. British-sponsored newspapers in the Levant States placed the responsibility for the Anglo-American Committee's findings on the US, Indicating that the UK members of the Committee could only follow the recommendations of the US members. Gradually, within the last two years, the blame for the Palestine situation bas passed from the UK to the US.
Because of long-stnnding cultural ties between the US and the Arab world, the friendly role that the US played In the achievement of Syrian and Lebanese independence, the partial dependence of certain Arab states on oil royalties from US companies, and the promise of Increased royalties In the future, the Arab states would like to maintain friendly relations with the US. The Arab governments realize that without US financial aid and technical assistance, they will be unable to carry through the extensive projects that are needed if the standard of living Is to be raised above its present subsistence level. Little of this development will be possible, however. If the USewish slate in Palestine.
c. Probable Actions ot Arab Governments.
Palestine.
In the event of the partition of Palestine, it Is unlikely that the Arab governments will openly proclaim war against the Jews. Pressure from the Arab people for an open declaration of war will be strong, but the governments doubtless realize thattep In defianceecision passed by the UN would seriously Jeopardize the Arab position in the UN. However, It Is probable that large numbers of Arabs from the surrounding countries will Join the Arabs residing within Palestine for the war against Zionism. These Arabs will be loosely organized under national leaders and tribal sheikhs. Volunteers will leave the armies, and ammunition and military equipment will find their way from the Arab armies to the resistance movement. The Arab governments, though not officially endorsing such action, will doubtless allow it to continue
Jews in Arab Lands.
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Before the enunciation of the Balfour Declarationhe Jews in the Near East fared as well as other minority groups throughout the world.owever. Ihey have had lo bear the brunt of Arab anUigonlsin to lhe development of political Zionism in Palestine In the event of partition, lhe lives of the million Jews throughout the Arab world (including Palestine) will be Imperiled. The lower element in the population would look'forward to attacks on Jewish quarters because of the excellent opportunity forillustrated at the time or the Baghdad revolt1 when the Jewish quarter wasepresentative of the Jewish Agency has stated that in the event of partitionews in the Arab stales outside Palestine may have to be sacrificed In the interest of the Jewish communityhole.
(3) Against the US and UK.
The Btudan Conference6ourse of procedure* to be followed by the Arab states in the event that the recommendations of theCommittee should be implemented. Following the publication of the UNSCOP report and the speech of Secretary Marshall before UNGA, the Arab League Political Committee met and decided in general terms to apply the Bludan recommendations if partition were voted by the UN. However, In the discussions on the manner In which these recommendations should be applied, there was considerable disagreement in the Political Committee. Some of the Arab governments refused toreak in diplomatic relations with the Western powers, and others refused to cancel oilNevertheless, there is complete unanimity among the Arab states as regards aim. They are all unalterably opposed to the establishmentewish state ln Palestine Whether or not they now agree on retaliatory measures against the US is beside the point; In time US interests will be seriously affected, if not by the decisions of the Arab governments, certainly by the instability and hostility which wilt Inevitably be aroused in the Arab world.
The bombing of the American Consulate General in Jerusalem onctober is evidence of the Arab resentment against US support of the majority plan. This action was reported to have been taken by the newly formed Arab terrorist group which calls Itself "thehatever the official position of the Arab governments may be, attacks on US property. Installations, and personnel by Irresponsible groups or individuals can be expected.
d. Aims of Jewish State.
In spite of increasing tension and hostilities between various factions in the Jewish community, It can be expected that all Jewish groups in Palestine will Join forces against the Arabs in defense of the newly formed Jewish state. The chief aims of the Jewish government will be organization of defense and Increased immigration.
Ambitions.
In the long run no Zionists in Palestine will be satisfied with the territorial arrangements of the partition settlement. Even the more conservative Zionists will hope to obtain the whole ol the Nejeb, Western Galilee, the chy of Jerusalem, and eventually all of Palestine. The extremists demand not only all of Palestine but Transjordan as well. They have slated that Ihey will refuse to recognize the validity of any Jewish government which will settle for anything less, and will probablyaggressive action lo achieve their ends.
of Foreign Aid.
The Zionists will continue totrong propaganda campaign in the US and in Europe. The "Injustice" of the proposed Jewish boundaries will be exag-
The "secret" precede decided on is reported lo include the following provisions:
to give the US and UK or their local communiUes any new concessions, economic
Noi to support US and UK special interests in any educational insUtution.
Tomoral boycott" searnst the US and UK.
A. To consider cancellation of any concession in the Arab world. S. Totrong case of the Arab cause before the UN.
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gerated, and the demand (or more territory wlU be made as Jewish Immigration floods the Jewish sector. In the chaos which will follow the implementation of partition, atrocities will undoubtedly be committed by Arab fanatics; such actions will be given wide publicity and will even be exaggerated by Jewish propaganda The Arabs will be accused of aggression, whatever the actual circumstances may be. This propaganda campaign will doubtless continue to influence the US public, and the US Government may, consequently, be forced Into actions which will further complicate and embitter its relations with thc entire Arab world.
e. Attitude of Vie USSR.
The USSR's aims in Palestineo end the British mandate and bring about the removal ol British troops from theo keep thc situation unsettled;o take an active part in "maintaining order" in the country. Thc USSR has been highly successful in carrying out the first twoany effort on its part. The accomplishment of thc third aim would give thease in the heart of the Near East from which to disseminate propaganda, carry on subversive activities, and attempt to organize "democratic movements" in thc Arab states.
By firsti-national state in Palestine, the USSR has made atesture toward the Arabs. By supporting partition, the USSR has set itself up as the champion of minorities and has posedower attempting to find the "just solution" for Palestine. The USSR could now logically claim that Kurdistan should be set upurdish state and that Kars Province of Turkey should be Joined to Soviet Armenia.
Meanwhile, thc USSR has been actively but secretly assisting the Jews. In addition to reports that thc USSR is assisting Jewish underground agents in Europe, large ships filled with illegal immigrants have been leaving thc Rumanian port of Constanza. The British have watched with suspicion Soviet "lumber ships" leaving the Black Sea for Palestine which, the British claim, are carrying arms below decks to both the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.
In the event of Arab-Jewish hostilities, the USSR wiil continue to support thc Jews and will probably also attempt covertly to aid the Arabs.
/. Effect on US Economic Interests in Hear Oil.
If partition Is to be implemented in Palestine, it appears unlikely that the Arab governments will initially cancel existing oil concessions. Such action would have the combined effect of alienating the US and cutting off future oil royalties. Theof cancellation of oil contracts was discussed at the meeting of the Arab League Political Committee in Aley, Lebanon, inhe Saudi Arabian delegate, stating that the oil companies were privalc corporations and did not represent the US Government, opposed the Iraqi delegate's stand that the contracts should be cancelled.
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However, all oil installations and oil pipelines in the Near East would be endangered. Desert pipelines are vulnerable Lo attack by small Arab bands, which could cut the lines and disappear before they could be arrested. Thc Arab governments probably would not support such irresponsible action, but they would not be able
slop It. Operalions outside thc actual oil centers, such as Kirkuk and Ohahron, would be greatly hampered, and the oil companies would be forced to restrict production.
Although existing oil contracts will probably not be cancelled. It Isthat the Arab governments will refuse to enter Into any new oil contracts with the US. The Syrian Government, for example, has already postponed ratification of the pipeline agreement with the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company. Whatever theirdesires may be, pressure from the people as well as from the Arab Leaguehole may prevent them from entering into any new Commerce.
In the event of partition US trade and commercial relations with the Arab world will be seriously affected. The establishment of an Arab boycott, even though only partially effective, would actrake on the slowly but steadilycommercial relations between the US and the Arab states.oycott would also servear to American participation in projects for the improvement of living standards, increased production, and expanded irrigation programs, many of which would otherwise include the employment of considerable American materials andskills. Even more important, perhaps, would be the general instability in the area. Such Instability could be expected to reduce the size of US investments in the area as well as the returns from present or contemplated investments, thereby impairing the dollar-earning capacity of the area and Its ability to purchase from the US
It Is unlikely that existing air agreements will be cancelled, but theol new ones may well be delayed throughout the area. Other countries will be quick to take advantage of the inevitable deterioration of relations between thc US and the Arab states.
3. Military Conskqukncks. a. The Arab Forces.
The bulk of the Arab forces fighting the Zionists will be semitralned guerrilla groups and loosely organized tribesmen There are three main sources from which the Arabs can raise men to fight In Palestine: fl) Arab quasi-militaryled by ex-army officers, which will form the core of theoldiers volunteering from the official armies of the Arab states to participate in action against the Jews;ribesmen, who will probably be the largest source
It Is estimated that thc largest number of Arabs actively engaged against the Zionists at any one time will be, including Palestine Arabs, volunteers, Beduin, and quasi-military organizations from the other Arab stales. The armed strength ot the Arabs In Palestine itself Is estimatedost of whom are members of such quast-mililary organizations as the Fu'.uwwa, the Najjadn. thc Arab Youth Organization, and thc Ikhwan (Moslem Brotherhood) Moreover, thewill send contingents from its Egyptian and Syrian branches, which0espectively.
The largest Arab group of potential fighting men is the tribesmen (Beduin| of whom0 are in the area Immediately adjacent to Palestine.
They urc expected lo come to the aid of the Palestinian Arabs as soon as hostilities break out. and additional men may be expected lo swell tlie total Arab force as time goes on. Their service will probably be sporadic; but other tribesmen will replace any who drop out of the righting so that the total Arab strength will undoubtedly be maintained.
The ground forces of the Arab League states (Egypt. Iraq. Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, Syria. Transjordan, and Yemen) totalen. Including gendarmes, security troops, and police forces. Besides these ground forces. Egyptmall navy, and several of the states have Infant air forces and commercial planes. Although the Arab armies are not expected lo be officially committed to the fighting, they will supply leadership to the fighters These armies may also be asked by the new Arab slate to enter Arab Palestine to maintain order.
The Arab governments may be expected covertly lo furnish arms and ammunition as well as trained military leadership to the guerrillas. Even before World War II, the Arab states had adequate supplies of weapons suitable for guerrilla fighting These have been supplemented with arms taken from both Axis and Anglo-American dumps following the campaigns in the Near East and North Africa, and with purchase of materiel and equipment from US and UK surplus stocks. Negotiations for the purchase of Czech arms have been reported. The Arabs will, for the most part, rely on small arms rather than the elaborate materiel of modern warfare, though Ihey may lie expected to make use of armored trucks and tractors for attacking Jewish settlements. It is also probable that some light tanksew planes which can be used for strafing and bombing will find their way into Arab hands.
Supply constitutes no serious problem for the Arabs Each fighter will carry his own equipment and will be supplied with funds for buying food fromvillagers. The tribesmen, in particular, are hardy and well accustomed to bare subsislence rations and Hie in the open. Since they will be moving toward Palestine through Arab territory, they will have no difficulty gaining access to the water holes.
The chief incentive to many of the leaders of this struggle will becoupled with nationalist aspirations and religious fervor. The leaders, in turn, will appeal to the newly awakened nationalismtrong incentive to many Arabs, particularly the better educated townsmen. Volunteers deserting from the armies of the Arab slates probably will not incur the disfavor of their governments, and many will even receive secret encouragement from them. The proclamationihad will also be employed to secure volunteers althoughroclamation is not expected toass uprising. The current drought in the northeastern Arabian desert will make the Inbeimen restless, and the promise of loot from Jewish settlements will be attractive to many.
(fi) Organisation.
The Arab forces are expected to vary from relatively well-controlled quasi-military bands to the loose tribal organization of the Beduln, led by their sheikhs. Singleness of purpose will be the main unifying force Extensive guerrilla warfare in Palestine will give great power to opportunistic, aggressive, extreme nationalist leaders.
who (In some instances) may even take over the governments of their countries. It has recently been reportednified command for all Arab guerrilla forces has been established.
of Action.
Arab action will be directed not only against the Jews but also against any police force attempting to maintain order in Palestine. Guerrilla action is not anticipated until the final UN decision Is made known. The manner and timing ol the British withdrawal will be an important factor In the fighting, which Is expected to increase steadily in intensity alter the British withdrawal, eventually taking the form of an undeclared war of attrition against the Jews.
The Arabood guerrilla fighter while relatively lew Jewish soldiers have had experience in guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, the terrain of Palestine Is well suited to the Arab's traditional method of fighting. The quasi-military groups,of ex-army men and townspeople, will specialize in direct assaults on Zionist colonies, demolition of bridges and railroads, and other sabotage. The tribesmen will engage in activities not requiring technical training or extensive coordination such as attacks on Isolated villages, assassination, continual sniping to prevent cultivation of the fields, and attacks on transportation, communications, and supply lines.harassing attacks can be expected in time to wear the Zionist economy to the breaking point.
The Arab intelligence system has always been quick and accurate. Thc traditional "grapevine" can be supplemented by telecommunications and some aerial reconnaissance. Positions In the highlands will provide good observation posts. Also, since nearly hall the population of the Jewish state proposed by UNSCOP will be Arab, the Arabs willeady-made "Fifth Column" In enemy territory.
of Support.
The bulk of support for the Arab cause will come from the member states of the Arab League. Responsibility lor financial support for the Arab cause will devolve primarily upon Egypt, andesser extent upon the states receiving oil royalties,Saudi Arabia. Support in the form of arms and men will come from all the Arab countries, but its extent will be conditioned by availability of transportation,from such countries as Yemen and the more distant parts of Saudi Arabia. Aid from other Moslem areas, such as Pakistan and North Africa, is expected to be limited in quantity and to consist chiefly of money and moral support Although thc USSR has advocated the adoption of the majority report of UNSCOP with certain modificaUons. the Soviets will probably give covert aid to the Arabs as well as to the Jews in an effort to create chaos in the Near East. The Arabs will, of course, appeal to world opinion, but more lor non-interference or for diplomatic support lhan for armed assistance.
b. The Jewish Forces.
(1) Character and Composition.
Although it has been estimated that Jewish and Arab forces will be almost equal numerically, the Arabs will have large numbers of replacements while
thc Jews will have no reinforcements unless they can facilitate additional emigration from Europe or obtain volunteers from the United States. The Jews will be well equipped, but it is doubtful whether the amount of ammunition they have on hand will be sufficientong campaign.
The Jewish forces in Palestine ore composed of threeagana, thc Zionistrgun Zvaihe Stern Gang. The three groups difler in their tactics and in the degree of ruthlessness employed in their operations, Hagana being the most sensitive to world opinion 1ZL and thc Stern Gang are illegal terrorist groups engaging in sabotage and assassination.
Hagana Is sponsored by the Jewish Agency. The original and largest group, it is left of center in political sympathy. Because of its defensive work, Its restraint, ond lis non-extremist Intentions. Hagana Is supportedajority of the Jewish community of Palestine and by most Zionists. It has become primarily an instrument for the advancement of Zionism and wouldeady-made armyewish state In Palestine.
It is estimated that in thc event of hostilities Hagana could mobilizeen and women with some combat or supply experience At present Hagana is believed to have00 members organized Into territorial commandsentral headquarters and consisting of three branches: (I) the statiche field army;hc Palmach or storm trooper unit. Thc static force consists of settlers and townspeople based at Jewish settlementsort of home guard. The Held army consists of0 troops trained in mobile operations. The Palmach is composed ofermanently mobilized troops trained in commando tactics and supplied with their own transportation. Itmaller group known as Paly am or Palind of coast guard trained especially to assist illegal immigrants arriving by ship.
Social and economic pressure has. in effect, made iL compulsory for all able-bodied Jewish men and women in Palestine to serve one year in some armed organizationear's term of enlistment is prerequisite to enrollment in Hebrew University. Hagana is well financedemilegal tax imposed upon the settlements by the Jewish Agency, by subscriptions, and by contributions from Jews In other The organization also has European branches.
It has been estimated that enough modem weapons are available to arm upembers of Hagana. There arc also sufficient automatic weapons for each squad of Palmach, as well as some mortars Hugana has been procuring armseriod of years, many from the residue of the campaigns in the Near East and others smuggled In from abroad.
Thc effectiveness and timing of Hagana's diversionary attacks designed to aid illegal immigration are proof that it possesses an excellent intelligence system and that itigh standard of security. "The Voice oflandestine radio, is one of its chief mediums for disseminating propaganda.
The Irgun Zvai Leumi is estimated totrength ofs organizedegional basis similar to that of Hagana but is cellular in character. It employs sabotage and terrorism as the "only effective" means of atlaining Its ultimate objective of an independent state in Palestine and Transjordan.
izl ls rightist in political sympathy. it has foreign branches andits palestinian membership with illegalpparently being more interested in securing new recruits with military abilities than inome for less fortunate "displaced" jews izl members are well armed and trained in sabotage, particularly in the use of explosives. it has been reported, but not confirmed, that izl and thc stern gang have sufficient armor plate foro coo tractors into improvised light tanks and for converting an unestimatcd number of automobiles into armored cars. izl is believed to cooperate closely with uie stern gang, and the two organisations are known to have conducted operations jointly. the infrequency of tactical errors in izl's operations indicates that the organization has an excellentsystem with very tight security. it has its own clandestine radio station known as the "voice of fighting zton."
the stern gang consists ofxtreme fanatics. they do not hesitate to assassinate government officials and police officers or lo obtain funds by acts of violence against jews as well as others. like izl. ihey are well supplied with small arms, and the security of the group is excellent as its organization is limited to cells of three.
the founders of the stern gang were formerly members of izl.when izl restrained its activities against the british during the early days of world war u. the most extreme section of its membershipore terroristic body called ffi (fighters for the freedom of israel) but more commonly known as the stern gang. the political connections of the organization are paradoxical and appear to be the result ol opportunism born of necessity. recent reports confirm thc fact that the stem gang has connections with the ussr, which is furnlsliing it with money. thc organization has stated that iturn towards soviet russia necessary because of the present world situation. it explains that the ussr and the stern gang both desire the creationstrong and independent palestine" which woulda rampart against british "imperialist designs" but would "not be hostile" to the soviet union.
(2) CourseAction.
in the face of an arab attack, the three jewish armed groups will be forced to unite. members of izl and the stem gang will probably be assimilated into hagana, which is already established along military lines and could readily absorb the other two groups into its commando units. initially, the jews will gain marked success over the arabs because of superior organization and equipment, but the jews will be unable to stand up under the long war of attrition which will develop.
the jewish sectionsalestine partitioned in accordance with the unscop majority report will be vulnerable to attack by thc arabs. the northeast sector is entirely surrounded by arabs: palestinian on the south and west. lebanese and syrian on the north, and transjordanian on the east the central jewish sector is flanked on the east by the central arab sector, while the southern jewish sector is surrounded by palestinian arabs on the west and north, transjordanian on the east, and egyptian on the south the arab sectors contain the strategic highlands of galilee and those surrounding the proposed international zone of jerusalem
Two major difficulties facing the Jews will be the large numbers of Arabs within Jewish territory (in the northeast Jewish sector, for Instance, there are0 Arabs as opposed0 Jews) and the extreme vulnerability of outlying Jewish settlements and supply routes to Arab attack. The Jews will be forced toarge proportion of their forces in static defense of Isolated villages and colonics, or organize many mobile units in key locations so that settlements under attack can be aided quickly. Furthermore, many units will have to be used to convoy supplyThe establishment of strong defensive positions, within which normal economic life can be maintained, and the protection of transportation routes will be the main strategy of the Jewish forces. The Zionist colonies are estimated lo have sufficient stores of foodonth's supply Owing to the fact that many agricultural laborers will be engaged in combat and thai Arab attacks will prevent cultivation of the fields, the Jews will have difficulty in producing food. Moreover, mobilizationong period of time will so strain the manpower of the Jewish community that its economy will collapse unless large numbers of immigrants and substantial material assistance are supplied from abroad
The Jews may be expected to employ small-scale, commando-typeo()crations against Arab concentrations if they are able to locate them, or attempts may be made to pursue retreating Arab raiders. Large-scale Jcwiih efforts toterritory adjoining the contemplated Jewish stale are unlikely because such actions would necessitate over-extending the already vulnerable supply lines and would entail the risk of combined rear, frontal, and flanking atlacks by Arabs.
Itistinct strategic advantage lo the Jews that the important port of Haifa and the smaller port of Tel Aviv are included in the Jewish sectors, since any assistance to the Jews in the event of open conflict will come from the westIt Is expected, however, that all cities will be centers of heavy fighting.
c. European Support for Jewish Forces.
There is already Inell organized system for transporting Jewish UP'a from Eastern Europe southward, particularly through the Balkans, to Palestine In the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict, this system would be employed to furnishto the Jewish forces in Palestine.
Jewish immigrants from Poland, the Soviet Zone of Ocrmany, Hungary, and the Balkans arc gathered together in Austria, Italy, and Germany for transportation to Palestine. It has been estimated thatews cross into Austria every month. In Italy. Hagana is reportedlyecret immigration service for the0 Jewish refugees registered there. Both the Rumanian and Bulgarianare helping Jews reach Black Sea ports in order lo board ships which attempt to run the blockade into Palestine.
There has been some evidence that European agents of IZL and the Stern Gang have been trained and are assisted by the USSR. The Jews will doubtlessto solicit aid from the USSR, but in the eventewish-Arab war. It is unlikely that either side would receive overt material aid from the USSR or its satellites, with the
predominantly Arab pott ol Jaffa, although allocated lo the Ainb slate by UNSCOF, is cut off from the Arab hinterland and thus will not Ix- immediately useful toArab force* in ihcof *ar
exception of Czechoslovakia. Prance and Belgium, as well as Czechoslovakia, are thought to be likely sources of arms and ammunition for the Jewish forces. There have been unconfirmed reports of smuggling from France, Belgium, and Luxembourg for Jewish terrorist groups ln Palestine. The Czechs are reported willing to sell arms to the Arabs; they would also be willing to supply arms to the Jews if the transaction were financially advantageous. No estimate can be made of the amount and types of weapons which would be supplied.
d. Support Obtainable in the VS.
No information Is available upon which to base an estimate of the specificof volunteers or the amount of funds and supplies to be made available to Jewish armed forces from US sources.
The Zionist movement is very strong In the US, but every organization claiming to represent all American Jewry does not in fact do so, and many Zionist organizations, while supporting the objectivesational Home for Jews, do not advocate an Independent Jewish nation in Palestine. The American Jewish Conference, the Jewish Congress, the New Zionist Organization, and the American Leagueree Palestine arc among the leading groups interested In the political aspects of Zionism which may be expected to support Jewish forces. The principal non-Jewish bodies espousing the Zionist cause are the American Palestine Committee, headed by Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, the Christian Council on Palestine, and the Political Actionfor Palestine. Inc. The last-named organization has recentlyor purely military supplies. Because it is illegal to supply arms from the US to Jewish groups in Palestine, figures arc difficult to obtain, although part of most Zionist funds collected Is probably allotted to the purchase of military supplies.
While no authentic figures are available, It is estimated that support of Jewish armed forces by US private organizations will be on the order of, or somewhat greater than, similar support by US citizens of Government forces in the Spanish Civil War.
4. Conclusions.
If the UNGA accepts partition as the best solution of the Palestine problem, it is almost certain that armed hostilities will result in Palestine; that the social, economic, and political stability of the Arab world will be seriously disturbed; and that USand strategic interests in the Near East will be dangerously Jeopardized. Although the UNGA Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine is now consideringommission responsible to lhe Security Council lo oversee the implementation ofit is unlikely that any sizable international police force will initially be available to the Commission. It Is highly probable, therefore, that Jewish and Arab forces will clash over the attempt of lhe Jews toewish stale.
Into this struggle between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the people of the Arab states will inevitably be drawn. Although most of the Arab governments will belo act In opposilionNGA decision and against the wishes of the major powers, nationalist, religious, and tribal pressures will compel them lo supportthe Palestine Arabs. Inevitably the extremists, the chauvinists, will increase their influence at the expense of those statesmen In the Arab world who believe that the development of their countries depends on the maintenance of close ties with the
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US and lhe UK. While irresponsible tribesmen and fanatic Moslems are haphazardly blowing up parts of the pipelines and attacking occasional Americans, it is possible that the responsible governments will refuse to sign pipeline conventions, oil concessions, civil air agreements, and trade pacts Thc various projects which are necessary to raise the standard of living cannot be carried through without US assistance andWith the US committed to partition, such developments will be shelvedThc poverty, unrest, and hopelessness upon which Communist propaganda thrives will increase throughout the Arab world, and Soviet agents (already being smuggled Into Palestine as Jewish DP's) will scatter Into the other Arab states and there attempt to organize so-called "democratic movements" such as the one existing today in Greece.
In the meantime, thc war In Palestine, barring International armed intervention, will Increase In intensity. The Jewish forces will initially have the advantage.as the Arabs gradually coordinate their war effort, thc Jews will be forced tofrom isolated positions, and having been drawnar of attrition, will gradually be defeated. Unless they are able to obtain significant outside aid in terms of manpower and materiel, the Jews will be able to hold out no longer than two years.
The UN. having recommended partition, would have to consider the serious threat to the peace resulting from the recommendation. It would. In effect, be compelled to take steps to enforce partition, with the major powers acting as the instruments of enforcement. Thc dangerous potentialities ofevelopment to US-Arab and US-USSR relations need no emphasis.
Original document.
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