REVISED SOVIET TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (ORE 1/1)

Created: 1/6/1947

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

central intelligence group

revised soviet tactics in international affairs

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

REVISED SOVIET TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Indicationshange ln Soviet Tactics

1. The USSR has apparently decided that for the tire being more subtle tactics should be employed in implementing its basic foreign and military policy (see OREated- Recentindicating this decision include:

g. Soviet concessions on the Trieste issue.

b. Soviet acceptance of the principle of free navigation on the Danube.

C- Soviet agreement in principle to international inspection of armaments and to eliminate the veto in the work of theatonic and disarmament cctrmissions.

d_. Indications of substantial reductions in Sovietforces.

of the USSR to render effective support to

of the Security Council to investigatefor disorders on the Greek frontier.

from former extreme position,eto to meaning not an expressioneto.

*

to have Foreign Ministers' Deputies meetbefore the forthcoming Moscow Conference to draw upfor Austria and Germany.

Considerations Conducivehange In Tactics

2. Thereumber of considerations, both international and domestic, which appear to have convinced the Kremlin ofemporary change of course:

include:

considerations in estimated order of Importance

The firm policy of the Western Powers, especially the US-the realizationurther expansion of Soviet control incannot be accomplished by force without risk of war; and the desire to placate the US and the UK in order to encourage aof Western vigilance, to strengthen the hand ofonciliatory policy toward the USSR, and to obtain economic aid from the West for sorely needed rehabilitation.

fe. The benefits to the USSReduction in itsforces. With effective control over Soviet-dominatedo the maxlmuir extent possible at present, the USSR can afford to reduce its present excessive occupation forces especially in view of the Increased mechanization of th? remainingeduction in occupation Torces would have the following benefits:

U) Release of additional manpower sorely needed for the boviet internal economy.

of antagonism throughout the world.

Alleviationajor cause of popular hostility toward the Coammist Parties in occupied areas where localhave been disillusioned and alienated by ruthless boviet reparations policies, the conduct of Soviet troops and the burden of subsisting these troops.

14) asis for attempting to induce further reductions of occupation forces by the Western Powers. The USSR will undoubtedly use any drastic reduction in its occupation forces toampaign of diplomacy and propaganda to secure lurtner reductions in the occupation forces of the Western Powers. Proportionate reductions by all of the Allied Powers would have the net effect of strengthening the Soviet Union's relative position on the Continent. Once the occupation forces of the US and the UK have beer, reduced, there is small chance tnat they could be readily increased again. The USSR, on the other hand, iaosition to move troops into and out of the areas under its control with relative ease and

IISIT-in tt Pinion to conceal theof its troops abroad by infiltrating the* intol" forces, and by settling theamans Ln occupied areaa, ready for iiobilization on snort notice.

ussr's need of support at internationalthe smaller nations outside the soviet bloc which havebeen aligning themselves with anglo-american positionsto arbitrary soviet tactics.

advantages to the ussr of general disarmamentmajor powers. the realizationeneral disarmamentwould resultecided relative advantage to the whereas the western powers derive their militaryextensive navies, strategic air forces and intricatethat of the ussr is still essentially based on mass once reduced, therefore, the war potential of therequire years to restore, while that of the ussr wouldrestored merely by the re-moblllzing of manpower.

4. domestic factors which would have equal weight inemporary change in soviet tactics are:

economic conditions. the condition ofis undoubtedly serious, with critical shortagesvital foods, while certain basic industries are failingthe quotas prescribed by the fourth five-year plan. asthe kremlin may have been forced to revise itsthe proportions of the national economy which could beto military purposes, because the immediate needs ofparticularly the devastated areas, nave exceeded whatreasonable to plan for industry to produce.

morale. there are increasing signs ofeven unrest, among the soviet populace. shortages inand consumer goods have created widespread the vigorous campaign or "ideological cleansing"concern with which the kremlin views the situation.

morale among former occupation troops. the occupation hasarge number of sovieth their first opportunity to view the outside world. the "bourgeois fleshpots" of germany, austria, and the balkans have produceda reluctance to return to the ussr,ubstantialof desertions-' demobilised occupation troops are spreading theiroughout the ussr, which is probablyportant element in current domestic dissatisfaction. the large-scale

the department of state considers this sentence too strong because it implies that these conditions are rather prevalent. . and the war and navy departments, however, consider that theseare indeed prevalent.

occupation hue thusreach in the barriers which guard the Soviet people from foreign ideology and information, and which are so essential to the maintenance of the Kremlin's control.

Probable Future Tactics

5. In view of the foregoing considerations, Soviet leaders must have decidedemporary breathing space for the purpose ofand ideological rehabilitation at home and the consolidation of positions abroad. We believe, however, that the Kremlin has notany of its long-range objectives described in CHEut that these objectives will now be pursued where expedient by methods isore subtle than those of recent months. Such methods will include:

efforts to gain political and economicGermany, Austria, Hungary, Chechoslovakia, and Korea, bycharacteristically Soviet techniques, which would notthe presence of large Soviet military forces. Suchconsist of the "popularr coalition,under which relatively weak Coacounist parties batand gain control of leftist and liberal organizations:by Moscow agents or local Communists, into keypositions, especially police, judicial, military,and educational agencies; the "liquidation" byparties of all native elements which might beoppose the Soviet program; and the stripping orkey industrial plants and the establishment of elaboratesystems, giving the USSR control of vital industry.

of militant Communist activity inareas outside of the present Soviet sphere, aimed atCommunist or Communist-controlled governments by legalmeans in such countries as Prance, Italy,Greece.

fi- Political and economic penetration in the Kiddle East, Far East, and Latin America.

campaigns of propaganda and diplomacyconvince the world of the USSR's peaceful intentions, anddisarmament and pacifism abroad.

intensive long-range program to develop the warof the USSR, concentrating especially on the expansionindustries, on the secret development of new weapons,acquisition of information on secret military developments

in other countries, and on reducing the vulnerability of Soviet industry to attack by atom bombs, rockets, etc.

Promot ion of discord and unrest in the capitalist

specially by seizins any opportunities offered byeconomic crises and unemployment, which tne Sovietspredict for the near future.

Conclusions

6. Recent developments have confirmed previous estimates that -the USSR did not Intend and was notosition to engage inmilitary conquests. Its ultimate action will depend upon future developments in the Soviet Union and in the outside world. Meanwhile, the USSR is seeking to consolidate its positions abroad and to improve its economic and psychological position at home, while encouragingand pacifism ln the rest of the world.

?. Soviet tactics, however, will remain flexible and The Kremlin has never relied exclusively on any single line of action. Rather, its tactics are based on the inter-play of twoconflicting courses, International collaboration and unilateral aggression, and on its ability suddenly to shift from one to the other. This technique seeks to achieve maximum surprise for each new move, and to promote such confusion and uncertainty among the opposition as to prevent the development of any long-range counter-strategy. Thus, in view of the considerations described in the preceding pages, new tactics of compromise and conciliation have been adopted merelyatter of expediency. They will be employed only in those situations where they are deemed to further Soviet foreign and military policy as described in ORB 1.

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