SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAP

Created: 10/31/1946

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT

AND PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

.'l

October No

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR THE DEVEIiOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

erein Is presented an estimate of Soviet capabilities in the development and production, during the next ten years, of certain weapons and equipment, as follows:

The atomic

Guided

Heavy

ny report of this nature is at best educated guesswork. An estimate of capabilities ten years hence obviously cannot be based on evidence, but onlyrojection from known facts in the light of past experience and reasonable conjecture. The estimates herein are derived from the current estimate of existing Soviet scientific and industrial capabilities, taking Into account the past performance of Soviet and of Soviet-controlled German scientists and technicians, our own past experience, and estimates of our own capabilities for future development and production.

In view of the Soviet Union's relatively low Industrial potential, of the evident necessity to devote much of her effort to restoring and developing her transportation system and heavy industry in general, and of her limited technological advancement, particularly with respect to precision instruments and electronic controls, it seems reasonable to assume that during the next ten years she could not carry out advanced development and quantity production simultaneously in all of the fields underThe selection of those fields inaximum effort was to be made would be governed by political or politico-military considerations. The commonsupported by many Indications, Is that every other Soviet program has been subordinated to the development of an atomict is not clear that the Soviet authorities have yetirm determination of other priorities. In any case, it must be understood that the estimates which followaximum effort In each case, that such an effort is not possible in every cose, and that in some cases actualwill fall short of the maximum capability indicated, in accordance with theassigned.

The atomic bomb. Our real information relating to this subject is meager It is probable that the capability of. to develop weapons based on atomic energy will be limited to the possible development of an atomic bomb to the stage of production at some time0n thisuantity of such bombs could be produced and stockpiled

Quided Mistilca.

a. Ground to ground.. is not believed to be capable of carrying out advanced development and quantity production of radically new weapons of this type within the next ten years. However, by making full use of German faculties under Soviet control,. is capable of attaininguantity productionissiles with increased ranges and some improvement

in accuracy. The possibility that thend associated missiles may be developed to an effective range0 miles within the next ten years is considered remote.*

urface to air.s considered capable of putting into0 anU*alrcraftsthe German Wasserfal! or SmetterUng

c. Air to surface. The CSS.It Is considered capable of developing to the production stageissile of similar type to the Germanossibly equippedroximity or influenceighter or bomber borne missiles with rocket assisted Impact power can be expected in quantity within the next ten years.

bombers.s capable of developing and producing bybomber with the approximate characteristics ofnd of achievinger month1 the Soviets will be capable of maintainingaircraft of such type supportedtored reserve of equal strength.of new types of destructive agents may reduce the importance ofcapacity and make range and speed the primary factors in design.

aircraft. Within the next five yearss capable ofand producing an effective defense force of jet interceptors of subsonicaircraft will be almost entirely Jet propelled, but it is consideredsupersonic speeds will be developed in this period.

"olds thatentirely possible that qoanUUesmil- rocketill be available lo the Russian* in

ould emphasize the view Uiat by the VSSSt. will also have stockpiled quanuttes of mlasUes similar to the German Ttembcii Torpedo/ equippedroximity orfuse, which will have lelhal capabilities ai-altul aea-borne forces"

Radar. Within ten years the Soviets will have the construction and operational capabilities in the radar field which existed In the United Stateshey will exploit the use of radar In establishing Integrated systems of warning networks.

t is believed thatill concentrate on building the German type XXI boat, since in feasibility of both construction and further development this type offers the prospect of most immediate returns. Using German facilities,hould be capable of constructing upf these craftproduction would be virtually unlimited except by priorities.. is capable of developinguided missile launching device for use on these sub-miuines.

Original document.

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