cia historical review program release in full
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
SOVIET FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY
ore 1
mis document has fcean approved for release through the hlstop-lcai. review prohtth of the ^enttal intelligence agency.
date Xttb/fl-
ulyno
intelligence group soviet foreign and military policy
summary
the soviet government anticipates an inevitable conflict with theworld. it therefore seeks to increase its relative power by building up its own strength and undermining that of its assumed antagonists.
at the same time the soviet union needs to avoidonflict for an indefinite period. it must therefore avoidtrong reaction by aof major powers.
n any matter deemed essential to its security, soviet policy will prove adamant. 'in other matters it will prove grasping and opportunistic, but flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resistance encountered.
4. the soviet union will insist on exclusive domination of europe east of the general line stettin-trieste.
soviet union will endeavor to extend its predominant influenceall of germany and austria.
in the remainder of europe the soviet union will seek to prevent the formation of regional blocs from which it is excluded and to influence national policy through the political activities of local communists.
the soviet union desires to include greece, turkey, and iran in its security zone through the establishment of "friendly" governments in those countries. local factors are favorable toward its designs, but the danger of provoking groat britain and the united states in combinationeterrent to overt action.
the basic soviet objective in the par east is to prevent the use of china, korea, or japan as bases of attack on the soviet par east by gaining in each of those countries an influence at least equal to that or the united states.
the basic soviet military policy is to maintain armed forces capable of assuring its security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible hostile combination. on the completion of planned deeobiligation these forces will stillco men.
for the time being the soviets will continue to rely primarily on large masses of ground troops. they have been impressed by anglo-american strategic air power, however, and will seek to develop fighter defense and long range bonber forces-.
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ENCLOSURESQVTKT FOREIGN POLICY
THE PASIS QF SOVIET FOREIGN PQIiICY
1. Soviet foreign policy is determined, not by the Interests orof the Russian people, but by the prejudices and calculations of the inner directorate of the Coatounlst Party in the Soviet Union. While the shrewdness, tactical cunning, and long-range forethought of this controlling group should not be minimized, its isolation within the Kremlin, ignorance of the outside world, and Marxist dogmatism have significant Influence on itsto problems in foreign relations.
S>. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy any be world domination.ondition is contemplated as inevitable in Comaunist doctrine, albeitesult of the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism, which Communist effort can only accelerate. Inowever, of such actual circumstances as the marked Indisposition of democratic nations to adopt the Communist faith and the greatly Inferior war potential of the Soviet Union In relation to them, that goal must be regarded by the most sanguine Communist as one remote and largely theoretical. While acknowledging no limit to the eventual power and expansion of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership Is more practicallywith the position of. In the actual circumstances.
3- Por the present and the indefinite future the fundamental thesis of Soviet foreign policy is the related proposition that the peaceful coexistence of Communist and .capitalist states is in the long run impossible. . must be considered Imperiled so long as It remains within an antagonistic "capitalist This concept, absurd In relation to soountry with such wealth of human and material resources and no powerful or aggressive.neighbors, la not subject to rational disproofbecause It is not the result of objective analysis. It is. deeply rootedaunting sense of internal and external insecurity inherited from thepast, is required by compelling internal necessityustification for the burdensome character of the Soviet police state and derives its authority from the doctrine of Harx and Lenin.
4. On the basis of this concept of ultimate inevitable conflict, it is the fundamental policy of the Soviet Union;
build up the power of the Soviet state; to assure itsstability through the isolation of lt= citizens from foreignand through the maintenance of strict police controls: toforces stronger than those of any potential combination ofand to develop as rapidly asowerful andeconomy.
seize every opportunity to expand the area of direct orSoviet control in order to provide additional protection forareas of the Soviet Union.
In this context socialism Us distinguished from communism) Is considered as antagonistic as capitalism.
prevent any combination of foreign powers potentiallythe Soviet Union-by insistence upon Soviet participation, within any international section affecting Soviet interests, bythrough intimidation the formation of regional and by exploiting every opportunity to fomentamong foreign powers.
undermine the unity and strength of particular foreigndiscrediting their leadership, fomenting domestic discord,agitations conduciveeduction of their military andand to the adoption of foreign policies favorable to Sovietand Inciting colonial unrest.
Although these general policies are premisedonvlction of latr. and inevitable conflict between. and the capitalist world, they al<ostponement of overt conflict for an indefinite period. The doctrine of Harx and Lenin does not forbid, but rather encourages, expedient compromise or collaboration with infidels for the accomplishment of ultimate Communist pui poses. The Soviet (Unlon has followedourse in the past and has need tc do so still, for time is required both to build up its own strength and to weak and divide its assumed antagonists. In such postponement, time Ishe side of the Soviet Union, since natural population growth and projected ece nomlc development should resultradual increase In its relative strength. It Is manifestly In the Soviet interest to avoid an overt test of strength at least until, by this process, the Soviet Union has become more powerful than at possible combination of opponents. No date can be set for the fulfillment of that condition. The Soviet Union must therefore seek toajor open coi flict for an indefinite period.
The basis of Soviet foreign policy isynthesis betweet anticipation of and preparation for an ultimate Inevitable conflict on the one hand and need for the indefinite postponement ofonflict on the other. In any matter conceived to be essential to the present security of the Soviet Union, including the Soviet veto power in international councils, Soviet pollcj, will prove adamant. In other matters Soviet policy will prove grasping, but opportunistic and flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of theencountered, it being conceived *ore important to avoid provoking acombination of major powers than to score an immediate, but limited, gain. But in any case In which the Soviet Union is forced to yield on this account, as in Iran, it may be expected lo persist in pursuit of the same end by subtle) means.
SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EASTERN EUROPE
7. It is apparent that the Soviet Union regards effective control of Europe east of the Baltic and Adriatic Seas and of the general line Stettin-Trieste as essential to its present security. Consequently it will tolerate no rival Influence in that region and will insist on the maintenance there of "friendly-hat is, governments realistically disposed to accept the fact of exclusive Soviet domination. That condition being met,ocs not insistniform pattern of political and economic organization.
but adjusts its policy in accordance with tbe local situation. The immediate Soviet objective Is effective control, although the ultimate objective may well be universal sovletiiatlon.
some cases no Soviet coercion is required to accomplish theend. In Yugoslavia and Albania the Soviet Union finds genuinelygovernments themselves veil able to cope with the localCzechoslovakia also, although the government Is democratic ratherIn pattern, no Interference Is required, since therelated partiesajority and the non-Communist leaders Even In Finland the Soviet Union has been able to displayFinnish leaders having become convincedfriendly" attitudeto the survival of the nation* In these countries the Sovietto insure its continued predominance by the creation of strong bonds of
. economic and military collaboration, but does not have to' resort to coercion other than that implicit in the circumstances.
Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, however, the Soviet Unionand widespread opposition. The "friendly" governments installed inare notoriously unrepresentative, but the Soviet Union Isto maintain them, since no truly representative government couldreliable from the Soviet point of view. In deference toelections may eventually be held and some changes In theof these governments may be permitted; but only after violentpurges, electoral chicanery, and similar measures have insured
the "friendly" character of the resulting regime. Continued political control of the countries in question will be reinforced by measures insuring effective Soviet control of their armed forces and their economies.
elected government of Hungary was both representative andbeut the Soviet Union has apparently remained unconvincedreliability in view of the attitude of the Hungarian people. has been applied to render It unrepresenlativoly subject toin the same degree and manner as are the governments of Poland,Bulgaria. The end is the Basse as that of the policy pursued In those- the secure establishmenteliably "friendly" regime, howevercoupled with Soviet control of the economic life of the country.
SOVIET POLICY IW AUSTRIA AND GERHANY
policy ln Austria is similar to that ln Hungary, subject toof quadripartite occupation. Having accepted an electedand unable to reconstruct It at will, the Soviet Union launilateral deportations and sequestrations in its own tone and bysimilar action ln others, to gain, at least, economic dominationhole and to create, at most,ituation favorable toward aSoviet political influence as well, on the withdrawal of Allied The Soviet Union willinal settlement, however, until itto withdraw its troops from Hungary and Rumania as well as Austria.
he Soviet Union hitherto ha* been content to proceed with theof its position in eastern Germany free of quadripartite How, rejecting both federallzatIon and the separation of the Ruhr and Rhlneland, It appears aa the champion of German unification In opposition to the "lmporallstic" schemes of the Western powers. erman administration strongly centralized In Berlin would be more susceptible than any other to Soviet pressure, and the most convenient means of extending Soviet Influence to the western frontiers of Germany. The Initial Soviet objectiveentralized -anti-Pasclst- republicoalition government of the eastern European type, but actually under strong Communist Influence and bound to the Soviet Union by ties of political and economic dependency.
SOVIET POLICY IK WESTER* EUROPE
a time it appeared that the Communist Party in Prance mightto gain control of that country by democratic political processespolicy was shaped to support that endeavor. The Communists recentreverses, however, appear to have led the Soviet Union to sacrifice
a fading hope of winning Pranceivelier prospect of gaining Germany. The Pronch ComBur.itlatrong political factor nevertheless, saddisproportionate Influence through their control of organized labor. That influence will be used to shape French policy as may be most suitable for Soviet purposes, and to prepare for an eventual renewal of the attempt to gain control of Prance by political means. esort to force la unlikely in view of the danger ofajor international conflict.
In Italy also the Communist Parly Is seeking major Influence, if not control, by political means,esort to force unlikely in present The Party and the Soviet Union have played their cards well to divert Italian resentment at the proposed peace terms from themselves toward the Western Powers.
The Soviet Union misses no opportunity to raise the Spanlnh issueeans of embarrassing and dividing the Western Powers. Any change in Spain might afford It an opportunity for penetration. Even its goading of the West-em Powers into expressions of distaste for Franco appear to have afforded it an opportunity to approach hia.
or the rest, the Soviet Union is concerned to prevent the formationentcrn Bloc, including France and the Low Countries,candinavian Bloc, In accordance with its general policy. As opportunity offers, it will seek to facilitate the growth of Communist influence In Scandinavia and the Low Countries, but not at the sacrifice of more important interests or at the risk of provokingtrong reaction.
T POl.ICY IS THE MIDDLE KAs'r
he Middle Eastempting field for Soviet expansion because of its proximity to the Soviet Union and remoteness from other major powers, the weaknens and instability of indigenous governments (except Turkey, and the
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: many local antagonisms and minority discontents. It ia, moreover, an area of Soviet strategic interest oven greater than that of eastern Europe, in view" of the general shift of Soviet industry away from the European Frontier, but still within range of air attack from the south, and of the vital importance of Baku oil in the Soviet economy. It is in the Middle East, however, that Soviet Interest comes into collision with the established interest of Great Britain and that there is consequently the greatest danger ofajor conflict. Soviet policy In the area must therefore be pursued with due caution and flexibility.
iven the opportunity, the Soviet Union might be expected to seek the following objectives:
least the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, andthe incorporation of that country ln the Soviet spherefriendly" government.
At least the political and military isolation of Turkeyew regime of the Straits more favorable to Sovietat most the Incorporation of that country la the Sovietthe establishment therefriendly" government.
least implementation of the recent settlement withassures theontinued indirect control in Azerbaijanopportunity to .develop any oil resources in northern Iran; atof that country In the Soviet sphere through thetherefriendly" government.
Soviet policy in pursuit of these objectives will be opportunistic, not only In relation to the local situation, but more particularly in relation to the probable reactions of the major powers.
Soviet Interest In the Arab states is still airected rather toward exploiting themeans of undermining the British position in the Kiddle East than as objectives In themselves. Their principal asset, the oil of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, would be economically inaccessible, although its denial to Bntam and the United States in the event of war would be of important consequence. But, by fomenting local demands for the withdrawal of British troops, the Soviet Union can hope to deny effective British support to Turkey and Iran. To this end the Soviet Union will exploit anti-British sentiment among the Arabs, and particularly the vexing Palestine issue.
The Soviet Union has shown no disposition to intrude into theIndian situation, possibly finding it as yet impossible to determine the most advantageous course in that regard. It also shows no presentintentions toward Afghanistan, although the establishmentfriendly-government there wouldogical, albeit low priority, objective.
SOVIET POM-CY IH TUP PAP
bJective in China, Korea, and Japan is to prevent
"eir becoming potential bases of attack on the Soviet Par East. This requires
nith
that. exert with respect to each as influence at leastand preferably greater than) that of any other power. Since ln this reel
Soviet policy encounters that of the United States, It must be pursued wit
due circumspection.
due circumspection
lthough the Soviet Union cannot hope toredominantover the whole of Chine, at leastong time to come. It could accomplish its baalc objective through either the formationoalition government, with the Chinese Communist Partyajor participant, ordivision of the country, with the Chinese Communist Parly ln exclusive control of those areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. . should logically prefer the former solution as at once Involving less dangerollision wit) the United Slatos and greater opportunity for the subsequent expansion of Bovii Influence throughout China through political penetration by the Communist Part-and tho course of its relations with the Chinese Government would seem toirm that preference. owever, would not be willing to sacrlflc. the actual political and military Independence of the Chinese Communists unlest assured of their effective participation in the proposed coalition. If,efforts to establishoalition were to fall and unrestricted clvl" war were to ensue, the Soviet Union would probably support the Chinese Commun- ots in their efforts lo consolidate their effective control over Kanchurl. an. North China.
n Korea the Soviets have shown that they will consent to theof the country only if assuredfriendly- government. In default of unification on such terms, they are content to consolidate their control In th. north and lo bide their time, trusting that an eventual American withdrawal will permit them to extend their predominant influence over the whole country.
. e"trcmely critical of American ad. ini strati on I,
Japan, which has afforded them no opportunity to establish the degree of influ-ence they desire. Regardless of the prevailing influence, theyir.
to ace Japan politically and militarily impotent. The greater Japan's politic, dUorganitaUon, th. greater would be their opportunity to eatablish an equaleventually predominant influence there-
SOVIET PQLICT El.SKVHKRg
set forth national states, gonlsms between states,
OUCy l" follow th*lin
n paragraph 3, seeking to underminei ty and strength of na
to foment colonial unrest, to stir up diversionary antagonisms be
the Chines. Communi.t. are
Ulllll on of ed from territorial control and Ihe Uvemy' la consequence of which they exhibit unusual Ltkiil.-
"
jnr
and to disrupt any system of International cooperation from which. la excluded. Activity along these lines is constant, though often Its importance to the Soviet Union derives not from any prospect of dire gain, but from its effect in enhancing the relative power of. by diminishing that of potential anlagonlsts-
ecause of their position in world affairs, the United States and Great Britain will be the primary targets of such Soviet activities. Into domestic agitations, the effort will be made to distract .and weaken th by attacks upon their interests in areas of special concern to them. In Latin America, in particular, Soviet and Communist influence will be exerted to the utmost to destroy the Influence of "the United States and to create antagonisms disruptive to the Pan American system.
enclosure *b" soviet military policy
soviet military policy derives from that preoccupation with security which is the basis of soviet foreign policy. (see enclosurend on the premise that the peaceful coexistence of communist andstates is in the long run impossible, and that. is inperll'so long as it remainscapitalistt is tt policy of the soviet union to maintain armed forces capable of assuring its security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible combination ol foreign powers. the result is an army by far the largest in the world (excep< the chinese).
even the populous soviet union, however, cannot afford an unlimited diversion of manpower from productive civil pursuits, especially in view of manpower requirements for reconstruction and for the new five year plan. it has had toemobilization program whichompromise between the supposed requirements of security and those of the economy. by september the strength of the armed forces will have been reduceden." further reduction is unlikely.
the probable geographical distribution of the total strength indicat* willn occupiedn the far east,he remainder of. the composition willtift) in the ground forces and rearift) in the airn the naval forces,ift) in the mvd (political securityhe post-war reorganization includes unification of commandingle minis' of the armed forces having jurisdiction over all forces except the mvt> troops, which remain under the ministry of internal affairs.
in addition to its own forces, the soviet union is assisting andin the recpnst>tution of the armed forces of its satellites i" suet manner as to insure its effective control of them. while in this itsrimarily political, such forces supplement its own as locally useful auxillii ics.
soviet experience during the war was limited almost exclusively to t) employment of large masses of ground troops spearheaded by mobile tank-artill. infantry teams. air power was employed chiefly for close ground support. na< operations were inalgnifleant. the soviets had only limited experience in an-phibious operations, almost none in airborne operations, and none with carrle: based air operations.
it appears that for the time being the soviet union will continue to rely primarily on large masses of ground troops, but with emphasis on increas. mechanisation and further development of the tank-artillery-moblle infantry spearhead- the ground support capabilities of the air forces will be naintaii
* as compared3
At the same time, the Soviets may be expected to give increased attention to the strategic employment of air power, in view of demonstrated Anglo-America capabilities In that regard, and to develop both fighter defense and long range bomber forces.
7. Although there have been indications that the eventual developmentigh seas fleet (or fleets)oviet intention, its early accomplish meat is prohibited by inexperience, lack of shipbuilding capacity, and the higher priority of other undertakings. Even were these hindrances overcome, geography handicaps the Soviet Unionaval power, since naval forces on Its several coasts would be Incapable of mutual support. It la, however, within the capabilities of the Soviot Union to develop considerable submarift light surface, and short-range amphibious forces.
he Industrial development, which competes with the armed forces fc manpower. Is. of course, intended to enhance the overall Soviet war potently Beyond that. Intensive effort will be devoted to the development of special weapons, with particular reference to guided missiles and the atomic bomb. Some reports suggest that the Sovleta may already have an atomic bomb of sot or at least the capability toarge atomic expjosion. In anyaximum effort will bo made toractical bomb In quantity at th* earliest portolblo date.
Original document.
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