Created: 8/22/1946

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ui DIRnCTOa OF : INTELLIGENCE Subject: Intelligence at Pearl Harbor

Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolutioneventy-ninth Con:Tess,oint Congressional Committee on theofrl harbor Attack was established to Investigate the attack, and events and circumstances relating thereto.

Inhe Coreidttee Report was published, together with the additional views of one Congressman and the Minority Heport of two Senators.

3a tudy of the Committee Keuort has been made by the under-sicned from the viewpoint of ascertaining the role, achievements, andof intelligence in connoction with the attack on Pearl Harbor. This intelligence study is attached herewith. Ho atterapt haa been made to examine the Committee Reportillttry or diplomatic standpoint. Rather, this paper la restricted solely to tne problems of Inteilig-xice.

L. Far convenience, thla st>idy of the Coardttee Heport has beon divided into four tabs as followsi TA9 ACollectionesearch and Evaluation TAB CDissemination

tab DDeficiencies, Conclusions and Hecoronendations



D luusiimo


following are among the major conclusions andreached by the Committee:

work requires centralisation ofclear-cut allocation of responsibilities.

armed services should;

Select officers for intelligencewho possess the background and capacity for such work;

Retain these officers on intelligence duty for an extended period of time;

Insure that officers with an aptitude forreceive such assignments and do not have their progress impeded or their promotions affected.

restriction of highly classified information tonumber of officials, while often necessary, should not be carriedpoint of prejudicing the work of an organization,

should be complete integration of Army andagenoies.

should consider legislation fully protectingof classified matter and amending the Comnnmications Act ofaa it handicapa our intelligence agencies with regard to wire tapping.

in the additional views of Congressman Keefc orReport of Senators Brewster and Ferguson materially changesReport insofar as intelligence is concerned. All dates, unlessindicated, are in thel.

WALTERTiKjCn-feac Chief, Legislative Liaison ;iranch

A considerable amount of information regarding Japanese plana, intentions, and capabilities waa oollectod by tbe military and navalservices, bo Ui in Washington and in the field, prior to Pearl Harbor.

The greatest source of intelligence information concerningplans was provided by the interception and decoding of messages from Japan to its diplomatic establishments. These intercepta were known by the coda name Magic, and were providedoint operation of the army and Navy, This operation was characterised by the Congressional Committee as "meriting the highest commendation" because of the "exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness" by the services.

To protect the security of Magic, it was necessary toolicy of extremely limited distribution of the material. Thus it was possible to aroid alerting the Japanese to the fact that their diplomatic codes had been broken. Had the Japanese been aware of this fact, they would have changed their codes, resulting obviously in oomploto loss of Magic until the new codes could be broken.

The greatest volume of Magic traffic, waa of primary interest to the State Department, being diplomatic in nature, although oaftain elements of the information were of interest to the Armed Services. Many of the messages concerned the espionage activities of Japanese consular staffs, particularly regarding the location and movements of American ships and the status of military Installations.

Detailed analysis of the intelligence secured through Lagic is

not required by this paper. However, it is interesting to note that the Magic interceptions included auch messages (now much publicized) as thecode, the "berthing" plan of Pearl Harbor, the "hidden word" code* the "deadline" messages, and the lli-part message ofDecember. In addition, as pointed out in the section of this paper onmessages were intercepted which showed ths destruction by the Japanese of their secret codes and confidential papers.

Vital information was obtained by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet from the daily summaries prepared by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Hawaii which, through traffic analyses, identified, located, and determined the movements of Japanese warships by their call signals and by radio direction-finding techniques. imilar unit was included within the Naval Command in the Philippines. The reports of the latter unit were considered the more reliable, and all Pacific radioenes reports wereto the Philippine Unit for evaluation. Copies of these evaluations were available to Kiamel, as were fortnightly intelligence bulletins from these sources by ONI.

Close liaison was maintained in Hawaii between the services and the FBI. The latter provided considerable information of significance, including (on Decemberhe so-called "Iterihichranscript of an intercepted radio telephone conversationember of the Mori family ln Honolulu and an individual in Japan. Tha transcript indicated that the latter was interested in such military information as daily flights of aeroplanes, searchlights, aod ship locations in Pearl Harbor.

In addition to the sources of collection listed above, there was the information to be obtained from the aircraft warning radar, which detected incoming Japanese planes on December 7th while they wereiles from Oahu. (The failure to take advantage of this is now history.)

In addition, Washington reoonreended visual and photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands, including troop conecntra-tions in th* Carolines and Marshal Is. This recommendation for collection was not exploited.

, Tho Committee also studied Japanese collection of intelligence, basing its resulting conclusions largely on post-VJ-Day reports ofof knowledgeable Japanese. Tho following nay be listed as among the main sources of Japanese intelligence:

(1J Espionage;

(2) Consular staffaj

(j) Naval attaches of the Japanese Embassy in Washington; Newspapers in the United States; (i) Inerican public radio broadcasts;

Crews and passengers on ships which docked in Hawaii;

General information}

Foreign diplomatic establishments;

Coaaerdal firms;

Signal intelligence;

Submarine reconnaissance in Hawaiian waters.

Early reports, by committees and boards investigating Pearl Harbor prior to tho Congressional Committee, had supported the belief that one of the determining factors In the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was that the Japanese had the benefit of unusually superior intelligence. All early reports indicated the probability of extensive Japanese espionage activity in Hawaii. The Congressional Committee, however, concludedeasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence "had nothing whatever to do" with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor, and furthermore that Japanese espionage in Hawaii was not notably effective in securing the information necessary to support the attack plana. Whllo interrogations in Japan indicate that one of tho factors in the decision to attack Pearl Harbor over tho week-end was the knowledge that the Fleet ordinarily came into the harbor on Friday and remained over the weeK-end, further

interrogations and investigations in Japan reveal that, except for the consul in Honolulu and hi3 staff, espionage agents played no major role in the plans for attack. It was therefore felt by the Committee that the role of espionage in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack has been magnified out of proportion to its significance.

As noted previously, much of the Japanese traffic intercepted by Magic was diplomatic in nature, but many of the intercepted messages concerned espionage activities by Japanese consular staffs, particularly as to the location and movement of American ships and the nature of military and defensive Installations. However, Japanese interrogated since VJ-Day have placed little Importance on intelligence obtained from the consulates. For example, th- Japanese did not include the so-callad "berthing plan" of Pearl Harbor (see "Research and evaluation" section of this report) in listing information used by the attacking force at Pearl Harbor. This plan had been supplied by the consulate at Honolulu.

From newspapers and magazines published in the United States, the Japanese compiled material regarding America's war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, locations and capabilities of aircraft and naval units, military strengths at Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines, and olaewhare.

In connection with items of general information. Admiral Wilkinson, former Chief of ONI, testified that "the Japanese for many years had the reputation of beingseekers for every scrap ofn this connection the Adniral pointed out that the Japanese were also making investigations of naval installations at Seattle* dreaerton. Long Beach, San Diego. Panama, and Manila, as well as evincing an unusual

interest In the presence of our Pacific Fleet and its detailed locationPearl Harbor.

information, in addition, included detailed bits of intelligence regarding the habits, strength, and security of the Fleet in Hawaii, which Uio Intelligence Section of the Japanese Naval General Staff had been amassing for years.

Of great interest ia the fact that the Japanese placed little credence on reports from commercial firms in foreign countries. The Japanese regarded these reports aa not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence tospecial write-up, and were considered on their own merits."

The Japanese employed signal Intelligence to deduce (from signals fromihe number of shipe and small craft of the Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor or out on training. Tho fleet training areas were also determined partially in this manner.

Commander Ono, staff coanunications officer of the Japanese striking force, kept close watch on Hawaiian broadcasts as the task force approached Pearl Harbor. It was fait that it could bo determined froa these broadcasts whether the forces on Oahu had any inkling of the impending attack. Since stations KQU and KG KB were broadcasting normally, Admiral Nagumo felt that American forces were still oblivious of developments. For several days prior to the attack, the Jap force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but by means of radio direction finders they had been able to plot in the plane positions, knew the number of patrol planes in the air at all times and that patrolsin the southwestern sector off Oahu.

After sifting the information available on Japanese collection of

intelligence material prior to Pearl Harbor, tile Committee concluded that there were certain weaknesses in Japanese intelligence. This statement is supported by the fact that the Japanese estimates as to our air strength in Hawaii, cade late in the fallil, were thoroughly erroneous, and the margin of error was such as to make it impossible to credit them with superior intelligence. The Committee also felt that tho Japanese did not have accurate intelligence as to our real naval weakness in the Pacific.

The Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack reached theonclusion that "the attack onHarbor surprised the defending Army and Navy establishments."

General Marshall testified that the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was the major consideration of the Army. The secondary consideration was the protection of the Hawaiian lalanda. The question then arises as to whether intelligence performed its role in this mission.

The Committee felt that the military and naval commands in Hawaii were "properly chargeable with possessing highly significant information and Intelligence In the days before Pearl It also felt that this was true in Washington, where much information, particularly Magic, was available to the heads of the intelligence sections of both of the services, as well as to the State Department. There also appeared to be the closest cooperation at the Secretarial level between Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox.

It is the purpose of this section of this report to note briefly the major items of information available to intelligence officers of the Army and Navy for research and evaluation prior to Pearl Harbor, and the estimates resulting therefrom.

A letter from Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations,


eelurprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harborossibility, and we arenoediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay."

Ineneral Uartin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force,

and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Base Defense Air Force, pre-

oint estimate foreseeing possible sudden hostile action in the Hawaiian ar-a. This estimate included as possibilities^ an air attack on the fleet, the arrival of Japan-a- submarinesast raiding force, with no prior warning to the defenders from American intelligence services. Thus it is evidentossible surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was in the minds of its defendera at an early date.

There was, of course, available for research andass of material obtained by Magic. As set forth in the section of this paper on Dissemination, the War Department did not disseminate Magic material to its commander in Hawaii. The Army did not feel its codes to be sufficiently secure for this purpose, though certain elements of information were ofature as to be of value to the field commanders, and though from tine to time the Navy did forward this material to tha Pacific Fleet in the form of estimates or paraphrases. While the Committee felt that the decision not to supply field commanders with all of the Magiceasonable one, thewas also expressed that this material, insofar as it was pertinent, should have reached the field commanders in the form of operational estimates.

The Committee felt that the Japanese message of Novembertranslatedeforring to critical relations between the United States and Japan, and requesting that the "ships in harbor" berthing report be made irregularly, but at leasteek, and directing that extra care be taken to maintain its secrecy, should have raised the question as to whether or not this was highly important intelligence to the Pacific Fleet. While the Comittee deems that tho so-called "berthing plan" at Pearl Harbor and related dispatches could not be concluded toomb plot, it felt thatarticular interest in the Pacific Fleet base was indicated, this

goncs should have been appreciated and disseminated to the commanding officers in Hawaii together with other available intelligence to assist thee In caking ar. estimate of the situation. It is in tor* sting to note that no high ranking officers in Washington attached tho significance to this intelligence which hindsight now makes apparent that it must have possessed.

One of the unfortunate circumstances in connection with Magic was the fact that several significant messages were not translated prior to the attack. One of these contained for the firat time an inquiry from Tokyo regarding certain defenses of the Fleet In Pearl Harbor. Tho limitations of personnel and facilities both in Washington and tho field, including the problem of transmission to Washington, was noted in the course of the testimony.

The Committee held that -

"the officers in the intelligence divisions of the War and Navy Departmentsarticular responsibility with

respect to the Magicwas the duty of

these officers to evaluate and disseminate the Magic in the form ofhis responsibility they failed 'towith that high degree of skill and imagination which this intelligence warranted."

Tha testimony of Secretary Stlmson bore out this view.

Information was available through Maglo regarding Japaneseto its consulates to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential documents. (See section of this report on Dissemination.) The ovorwhslmlng weight of the testimony by Army and Navy experts is to the effect that the destruction of codes and confidential documents under the circumstances prevailing in1 meant war. The Committee took the position that Washington adequately discharged its responsibility in transmitting thla information to Hawaii. The Committee points out that -

"with the failure, however, of Admiral Kimmel to read into this intelligence what it is agreed should have been self-evident to hie, it it believed that in the future the intelligence as well as the departmental appraisal and estimate thereof should be supplied field commanders."

ecember, the FBI delivered to Army and Havy intelligence officers atranscript of an intercepted radioerson named tlori in Honolulu and an individual in Japan. Tho transcript Indicated that the latter wae interested in daily flights of airplanes, particularly large planes from Honolulu, where the searchlights were bein^ used, and the number of ships present at Pearl Harbor. Reference waa made in the conversation to numerous flowers, which was presumed toode. The Navy determined that this Information should be studied further by Japanese linguists. Admiral Kimmel was not informed and did not see the transcript until after the attack. The eveningecember it was brought to tho attention of General Short andy an, who indicatedpecial agent of the FBI was alarmed by what he considered the military implications of the conversation in respect to Pearl Harbor, Both General Short andndicated that the assistant waa perhapsintelligence conscious" and that the message was nothing about which to become excited. The Committee felt that the ttori call pointed directly at Hawaii.

The fortnightly Intelligence summary dated Decembereceived by Kimmel from ONI, stated that it believed the major Japanese capital ship strength was its homo waters, together with the greatest portion of the Japanese carriers. On Decemberimmel's dally summary indicated that the Japanese service radio call si^ne had changed at midnight, one month aftor the previous change, whereas the former Japanese practice had

been to change their call signs every six months. andum from the Fleet Intelligence Officer on the disposition of the Japanese naval force, togetheronversation between hansel and this Officer, stressed the point that thore was no reliable information on Japanese carrierndonsisting of four carriers. No information on carriers was availableecember. Admiral Klmmel received this intelligence, but accepted the estimate that they were probably in home waters. The Committee found that,

"recognising all of the vagaries of radio intelligence analysis, however, it was still not in keeping with hia responsibility as Commander in Chief of the Fleet for Admiral Klmmel to ignore the sinister implications of the information supplied through the Radio Intelligence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant information relating to when and,egree, where the Japanese would possibly attack."

In addition to this material, operational intelligence wason the day of the attack ltsslf. This included the reports of sighting and subsequent attackapanese submarine In close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese raiding forceiles from Oahu on the morning of December 7th.

"Despite the foregoing, the estimate was made and persisted in that Hawaii was safe from an air attack,the very assumptions made by the Army and Navy Commanders are implicit with the contemplation of an attack from without. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Klmmel assumed, on tha other hand, that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes."

From the above, it is apparent that there was at leaat some

cognizance in Washington and Hawaii of the possibilityaid on Pearl

Harbor. Much of the material available pointed to hostile action on the

part of the Japanese, but in the mass of information available, many of the witnessesery small percentage pointed to Pearl Harbor as the point of attack. Granted that this point was so, and that those itnns of information which might have produced an estimate of attack on Pearl Harbor loom much larger by hindsight than thoy did at the time, the Committee felt that Admiral Kinrael and ueneral Short were supplied enough information toorrect estimate of the situation. That they failed to do. That there may have been other information which could have been supplied them, failed to modify the Committee's conclusion in this respect.

Bissau: nat io:;

During the period precedir^ Pearl Harbor, there appears to haveailure of proper dlsssnination of intelligence* This failure in dissemination lay not only between tiie Washington headquarters of the Army and Navy and their field Commands, but also between the services themselves in Hawaii.

Admiral Kimmel's concern in connection with internal Navalof secret material was set forthetter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, inn which he stated:

o not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility /as between ONI andt is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility ao that there will be no misunderstanding?"

In response. Admiral Stark advised that ONI was fully aware of its responsibilities to keep the Commander in Chief of the Pacifio Fleetinformed on matters concerning foreign nations and their activities. In addition, in, instructions were given various naval observers to include the ^ommander-in- Chief of the Pacific Fleet as an informationfor all pertinent dispatches, and to furnish one copy of all intelligence reports directly to him.

The Army did not forward the substance of any intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of its feeling that the Army codes were generally not as secure as those of the Kavy. As evidence of this, General Stiles, 7Jart tho ti=ie of Pearl Harbor, testified that he was under the improssion that the Navy would promptly disseminate such intelligence to General Short'3 headquarters.

A not Able failure existed in the diss rein ation of intelligence between the Amy and liavy eoDnands in Hawaii. For example, the Army radar unit, which first picked up the incoming Japanese plaiea, plotted thea buck out to the north following the attack. let this information, which would have made an effective search for the task force possible, was not employed by either service. Admiral Kimmel stated he did not receive tho information for tm days.

A chart showing the position of the Japanese carriors waa takenapanese plane by the Armyecember. It was not shown to the Navy until the afternoon.

Admiral Kissel stated that he did not supply General Short with information he had received froa Washington concerning Japanese orders to destroy codes, ciphers and confidential documents, adding that,id not consider that of any vital importanceeceived General Short, on the other hand, complaining that he was not provided with this intelligence by the Navy, indicated that it was 'the one thing that would have affected me more than any othernd that if any of these dispatches concerning the destruction of the codes had been furnished him by the Navy, he would have goneore serious alert. The opinion of virtually all witnesses holds that the code burning intelligence waa the moat significant information received betweenovemberecember regarding the imminence of war.

Thetto re the Committee shows that although Kimmel received significant information on four different occasionsecember concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments, and that although he knew that the

Kavy Department had also ordered the destruction of its codes in our outlying possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short. It is the Committee's conclusion that Kimmel'3 failure to supply Short with this IntelHrencQ was "inexcusable"."

Despiteersonal failure (to informhe testimony reveals that onecember General Short's assistantlearned from Navy sources that Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, Iondon, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere, were destroying their codes and papers. Further testimony shows that theeceived similar information regarding Honolulu from the FBI. There is also evidence that this was communicated to General Short, although the Uinority Report considers it an open question and the evidence not decisive.

In making the finding set forth above, the Committee points out that the information on code destruction which Short received was not supplied him directly by the War Department,

Both Kimmel and Short have testified that they were wrongfully deprived of intelligence available to Washington through Magic, which would have completely altered their estimate of the situation and Tould have resultedroper alert and appropriate dispositions had they received it. In particular, there were four messages, or groups of messages, received through Magic which night have been particularly significant in Hawaii. The Committee is of the opinion that this intelligence should have been supplied Kirxncl and Short (together with other available information and intelligence) to assist them in making their estimate of the situation.

However, the Conraittee further finds that, between them, both Commanders had considerable vital, intelligencsossible attack on Hawaii. They had, inter alia:

Correspondenceaahini-ton and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack;

Tbe warning dispatches fron Washington;

The code destruction intelligence;

intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carrlera;

The "Mori" call. (See "Research anc ^valuation" section);

The report of sighting and subsequent attackapanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor (early on

7 December )j

detection of the Japanese planesileson the morningecember.

' noting the erroneous assumptions which General Short snd admiral Klmmel made regarding each other's activities in Hawaii, and the estimates and actions which they took based on the intelligence available to them there, the Committee believes it problematical aa to what steps Klmmel and Short would have taken had they received all of the intelligence which they contend was withheld from them. esult of thla, the Committee finds that "the ultimate and direct responsibility for failure to engage the Japanese on the morningecember with the weapons at their disposal rests essentially and properly with the Army and Navy Commands in

However, it is the Committee's additional conclusion that the officers in the Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departmentsarticular responsibility with respect to the Magichat it was their duty to evaluate and disseminate Magic ln the form of estimates. This responsibility, the Committee feels, these officers "failed to discharge with that high degree of skill and Imagination which this intelligence warranted." The Committee further stated:

"that ths completely ineffective liaison between the Army and the Kavy in Hawaiiine whgn the fullestof intelligence was absolutely imperative, dictates that military and naval intelligence, particularly, must bi? consolidated."

they were entitled to believe he would attach the properto this intelligence. let the conniander in chief of the Pacific Fleet testified that he did not interpret these diapatches to mean that Japan contemplated immediate war on

the Unitedsimple fact is that the dispatches

were not properly interpreted. Had the Navy Department not taken for granted that Klmmel would be alerted by than buthave given hia the benefit of its interpretation, there could now be no argument as to what the state of alertness should have been based on such dispatches. With Pearl Harborad experience, crucial intelligence should in the future be supplied commanders accompanied by the best estimate of its significance.- )

Any doubt as to whether outposts_should bo givenshould alwaya ba resolved in favor of supplying the information.

"Admiral Stark hesitated about sending the 'one o'clock' intelligence to the Pacific outposts for the reason that he regarded them as adequately alerted and ha did not want to confuse them, aa has been seen, ha was properly entitled to believe that naval establishments were adequately alert, but the fact is thatas nottate of This one exception ia proof of the principle that any question as to whether information should be supplied tho field should always be resolved in favor of transmitting)

"8. The coordination and proper evaluation ofin times of stress mast ba insured by continuity of service and centralisation of responsibility in competent officials.

" 'On occasion witnesses have oohoed the sentiment that tha Pearl Harbor debacle was made possible, not by theerrors or poor Judgment of any individual or individuals but rather by reason of the imperfection and deficiencies of the ay steal whereby Army and Navy intelligence was coordinated and evaluated. Only partial credence, however, can bethis conclusion Inasmuch as no amount of coordination and no system could be effeoted to compensate for lack ofand Imagination. Nevertheless, there ia substantial basis,eview of tho Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through continuity of service andof responsibility In those charged with handling And the asslgnmont of an offloor having an aptitude for such work over an oxtondad period of time should nothia progress nor affect his promotions.

profeasional character of Intelligence work doea notto have been properly appreciated in either tha War or Navy Departments. It seems to hare been regarded as just another tour of duty, aa reflected by limitations imposed on the period ofto such work, among other things. The committee hasthe distinct Impression that thereendency, whether realised or not, to relegate intelligenceole of secondary importance.

"Aa an Integrated picture, the Pearl Harbor Investigations graphically portray the imperative necessity, in the War and Naryor selection of men for intelligence work who possess tho background, capacity, and penchant for suchor maintaining than in the work over an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the rami float! ons and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir ofin evaluating data received;or the centralisation Of responsibility for handling Intelligence to avoid all of tho pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly)

There la no substitute for Imagination andon the part of supervisory ami" officials.

"As refloated by an examination of the situation in Hawaii, thereailure to employ the necessary Imagination with respect to the intelligence which was at hand.

"Washington, like Hawaii, possessed unusually significant and vital ino dc* . Had greater imaginationpsonorness of tbo significance of Intelligence existed, concentrating and applying it to particular situations, it la proper to suggest that someone ahould have concluded that Pearl Harborikely point of Japanese attack.

"The committee feels that the failure to demonstrate theimagination with rtapeet to the intelligence which waain Hawaii and in Washington ia traceable, at least in part, to the failure to aooord to Intelligence work tho important and significant role which It)

estruction of highly confidential informationumber of officials, while often necessary, ahould not bo car^ riod to the point of pie jadJolng the work of the organisation.

"The magic intelligence was preeadnently importantnecessity for keeping it confidential cannot be overemphasised. However, so closely hold and top secret was thla intelligence that it appears the faot ths Japanese codes had boon broken wasas of more importance than the information obtained from decod-

ed traffic. Tha result of this rather specious was to leave large numbers of policy-making and enforcement officials in Washington completely oblivious of the most pertinentconcerning Japan.

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, was charged with combating espionage, sabotage, and un-American activities within the United States. Onl, Tokyo dispatched toetailed outline as to the type of espionage Information desired from thla country. The FBI was never informed of this vital Information necessary to the success of Its work, despite the fact that the oloeest liaison was supposed to exist among thw FBI, Navaland Military Intelligence.

Hayes a. Kroner, who was ln charge of thebranch, has testified that ha at no tame wasto avail himself of the Magic. And this daha foot that to effectively perform his work he should have known of this intelligence and one of his subordinate a, Colonel Brat-ton, was 'loaned* to General Miles to distribute magic materials to authorized recipients.

as previously indicated, it la appreciated that pre-misccous distribution of highly confidential material Isit nevertheless should be aade available to all those whose responsibility cannot adequately and intelligently be' discharged without knowledge of such confidential data. It would seen that through sufficient paraphrase of the original material the source of tha information could have been adequately protected. Certainly as great confidence could be placed in rankingof various departments and bureaus of the Government as in the numerous technicians, cryptographers, translators, and clerks required for the Interception and processing of the)

An official who neglects to familiarise himself inwith hia organisation should forfait ail reaponaiblllty.

dmirals Starkboth have testified they

i thought' tbe commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet wasthe Magic intelligence. leteriod ofonths, with relations between the United States and Japan mounting In tenseness andrisis, neither of these rankingdeterminedact whether the fleet was receiving this )

ersonal or official jealousy will wreck any

"This principle is the result of the general impressionby the Committee concerning the relationship between the


Army and tha Navy as wall as concerning certain intraorganlxa-tlonal situations vhich existed. The relationship,and coordination between the War Flans Division and theof Naval Intelligence aero wholly unsatisfactory. The War Plana Division, particularly, appears to have had an oversealous disposition to preserve and enhance its


Superiors must at all times keep their subordinatesinformed and, conversely, subordinates ahould' keep their superiors :Lnforaao>

Washington, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Navaland Captain McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of that Division, wore not adequately and currently informed as to the nature of tho dispatches being sent to our outposts emanating froa the War Plans Division. Subordinate officials In both War and Davy Departments failed to appreciate the importance and necessity of getting to both General Marshall and Admiral Stark the firstarts of the Japanese lu-part memorandum Immediately on tbo evening of December 6. Colonel French did not inform the Chief of Staff that ba had boon unable to raise ths Army radio in Hawaii on the morning of December 7.

."In Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel failed to Insure that Admiralwho was responsible for Navy patrol pianos, knew of the war warning of Admiral Newton, aa previouslyout, was permitted to leave Pearl Harborask force completely oblivions of any of tbo warning messages. General Short, construing the caution to diaeealnate the information in the warning of Hovoabero 'mlcdaua essential officers'oo-narrow manner, failed to inform the essential and necessary officers of bis command of tbe acuta situation in order that the proper alertness might pervade the Hawaiian)

The administrative organisation of any eatablfohmant must be oeiigDcd to locate failures and to eaaeas responsibility.

"Tho committee has been very much concerned about the fact that there waa no way in which it could be determined definitely that any individualarticular message among tbo Magic It does not appear that any recordea wasfor Initialing tho aesaagoo or otherwise fixing Tho syetem existing left subordinate officers charged with tho duty of disseminating tbe Magic at tbe complete mercy of superior officers with respect to any question as toarticular message had been dollsered to or seen by thorn,)

The specific conclusions and recommendations of tha Pearl Harbor Congressional Committeepect to Intelligence are of such int-reft that they are quoted verbatim from the report herewith.

The followins ar" Concisionsnect to responsibilities so far as they effect intelligence.

"3, Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed

"(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to alert properly the Army and Kavy establishments In Hawaii, particularly in the light of the warnings andail able to them during the period Novembero)

To effect liaisonasis designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant)

"(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to.

he Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments failedt

"(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted messasos from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 2u,nd Novemberthe Harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) aid touestion aa to their algaiflcance. Since theyarticular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base, this Intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for theiralong with other information available to them, in making their estimate of the situation."

To be properly on the qui vive to receive theo'clock' Intercept and to recognise in the message the fact that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur somewhereecember 7. If properly appreciated, this intelli-

"gence should haveispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it." )

The following specific RecoTv r. ia ti ons are made In the Committee port with respect to intelligence!

"That thereomplete integration of Army and Navy Intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent; that uponnified intelligence, officers bofor intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received. The assignment of an officer having an aptitude for such work should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions, efficient intelligence services are Just aa essential in time of peace as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded the important role which it deserves." )

"That effective steps be token to insure that statutory or other restrictions do not operate to the benefit of an enemy or other forces inimical to the Nation's security and to the handicap of our own Intelligence agencies. With this in mind, the Congress should give serious study to, among other things, the Communications actL; to suspension in proper Instances of tbo atatute of limitations during war (it was impossible during the war to prosecute violations relating to the "Magic" without giving the aecret to theo legislation designed to prevent unauthorized sketchingand mapping of military and naval reservations in peacetime; and to legislation fully protecting the security of classified matter." )

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