OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
The Russian-actuated Communist movement gath-
reat deal of momentum in the era immediately
following World War II, slipping stealthily into the political vacuums created by the toppling of theItalian, and Japanese fascist movements. esult of shifts in power after the war, Russia looked upon the United States as the leader of an opposite camp, within Cormunist ideology, democracy was an ultimate target for destruction. hole series of inimical actions engineered from Moscow served totate of opprohension within the American body politic*
day gurus often refer to those years as
the "McCarthy era." onsequence, his political reprehensibility is generally projected withoutexposition of the unallayed anxiety thatat the time in the public mind because of tho aggressive actions of the USSR. To some, theof Senator Joseph McCarthy appeared moreroduct of the existing public trepidation thanause of it as alleged by others.
In6 an important state paper was
prepared by Mr. Clark M. Clifford, an aide toHarry S. Truman, on the subject of US relations with the Soviet Union. Tt supplied the President with every past detail of the wartime relationship with the USSR. More importantly, as it turned out, it charted the postwar prospect with startlingoutlining the shape and thrust of Truman'sprograms, namely: the Greek-Turkish aid legislation or Truman Doctrine; the Marshall Plan; and the North Atlantic Alliance. Clifford'ssummarized the situation as follows:
The gravest problem facing the United States today is that ofrelations with the Soviet Union. The solution of that problem maywhether or not there willhird World War. Soviet leaders appear to be conducting their nationourse of aggrandizementto lead to eventual worldby the USSR. Their goal, and their policies designed to reach it, are in direct conflict with American ideals, and the United States has not yet been able to persuade Stalin and his associates that world peace and prosperity lie not in the direction in which the Soviet Union is moving but in the opposite direction of
international cooperation and friend-ship.
Postwar US foreign policy, shaped by aims toward world peace, awakened only slowly to theof the Russian threat at home and abroad. Atocsin was sounded8 by the exposure of the extent of the Russian espionage that had been conducted in the United States. Featured prominently in all of the media was the indictment of Mr. Alger Hiss of the Department of State. The related confessions of Mr. Whittaker Chambers and Mrs. Elizabeth Bentley were disconcertingof the perfidyartime ally.
Overseas, the organization of the Communist Information 3ureau (Cominform) in7esumption of the process of international revolution which purportedly had been discarded by the dissolution of the Communist International (Comintern) This subversive formation was viewed by the American peopleortent ofRussian intentions.
The Communist efforts to disrupt the political-econorcic system of the Western World werea crescendo France and Italyjve of Communist-inspired strikes. Italy was facing its first national election and the threatommunist victory. Greece was fighting the Communist guerrillas in its northern provinces.
The Communist coup in Czechoslovakiaas followedotal blockade ofand its subsequent relief by American airlift. In China the defeat of the Nationalists by theamies was impending. In the Philippines the Government was under continuing guerrillaby the Communist Kukbalahaps.
US leaders were convinced that the Russian regime and its satellite satrapy were completely untrustworthy and. as later voiced by Premier Niki-ta S. Krushchev, out to "bury" the Americans. There was ample evidence to conclude that Russia aimed at hegemony over the industrial potential of Germany, France, Italy, and all of Europe. It was apparent that the Cominfonr. was preparing to capitalize in
the undeveloped countries on the politicalbrought about by the voluntary and involuntary decolonization of territories previously occupied by the European powers.
With the imminent end of US nuclear monopoly following the explosion of an atomic bomb by the USSRhe US leaders did not know how far Russia might go to attain its objectives. With the Truman Doctrineakeoff point, US nationalcame out in favor of the containment of This, of course, amountedecision to bringolitical confrontation with the Russians.
It was toeaceful confrontation; but should Russia react with hostile moves, it was deemed prudent that the United States should quietly prepare itself for any eventuality2arget date frequently mentioned). Diplomatic and economicwould be the means of outright confrontation. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treatyon the heels of the Greek-Turkish aid provided under the Truman Doctrine; but it was recognized that these measures could have little lasting impact unless the subversive aggression of Communism could be halted.
To gain ascendency, alternatives to theideology would require the strengthening and building of institutions of independent thought. At the same time, individuals and groups abroadby political aspirations contrary to those of the Communists had few resources to advance their cause. They wouldtrong source of secret support, financial, material and moral. It had to be secret to allay possible charges of foreignmeddling which might defeat the very purpose of the support, Tf covert aid of this sort were not forthcoming from the United States, it appeared that the Cominform might proceed unhampered in itsto envelop the world with Communist ideology.
To this end the United States decided to stem Soviet underground subversive operations and toa clandestine agency for that purpose. This would have toew organization in order not to militate against the clandestine collection ofand counterintelligence already assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by the National Security Act Ony directive of the National Security Council (NSC),
the task of confrontation on the clandestine front was assigned to the Office of Policy Coordinationhen called the Office of Special Projects. OPC was formally established8 and continued operating until2 merger with OSOombined directorate which became the CIA Clandestine Service.
The NSC directive which created OPC8 gaveoose charter to undertake the full range of covert activities incident to the conduct ofpolitical, psychological, and economic warfare together with preventive direct action (paramilitaryll within the policy direction of the Departments of State and Defense. This authorityrevious and much more limited directive whereby the Office of Special Operations (OSO) was to engage in certain secret psychological activities along with its existing commitments for the conduct of espionage and counterespionage. Theook cognizance of "the vicious covertof the USSR" and reflected the high state of arousal existing in US Government circles at that time.
OPC was placed in CIA alongside OSO with an
adjuration by the NSC that it was to operate asof the other offices of CIA as efficiency would permit. The head of OPC, Assistant Director of CIA for Policy Coordinationas to be nominated by the Secretary of State (General George C. Marshall at the time) on the basis that he was to be acceptable to the Director of Central (DCI) and appointed by the NSC. Thewas made in the summer
By collateral accord with State and Defense the DCI, Rear Admiral Roscoe II. Hillenkoetter, agreed that their policies would flow directly throughDesignated Representatives to the head of OPC. When Lieutenant General Walter 3edell SmithHillenkoetter ineonstruction on the NSC directive. Thereafter, State and Defense policies reached OPC only through the DCI, who effectively installed himself in control of its operations.
During the corporate life of OPC, the topof ADPC was held by just two individuals, Hr. Frank G. Wisner3nd Colonel Kilbourne1 -
1. an ofolid background in secret intelligence work,ingular choice toovertfrom scratch; and Johnston with muchexperience was well qualified to organize that establishmentore orderly existence. Wisner was promoted1 to become the Deputy Director for Plans hereby assuming general direction of both OSO and OPC operations; andwas General Smith's choice to succeed him as ADPC.
The scope of the OPC effort and theof its relationships with the highest levels of State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other governmental agencies was a tremendous challenge to these men and their staffs,eavy burden as well. Operational requirementsfrom State, Defense, and JCS taxed OPCfrom the very moment of its establishment. As the US Government increased the pace of peaceful confrontation (the coldPC grew faster andfurther than initially anticipated.
Operational directives issued from the NSC in
capable of executing covert actionorldwide scale- It had goneeriod of rapid expan sion in terms of both people and money.
The secret war provided an lm-meoiate area of confrontation and,onsequence, there was much governmental pressure to "get on with it," Operations grew apace, some successful and some not, as revealeduick look at what happened during theeriod.
In the8PC concentratedon Europe and the West. Itsplaced first in the Western Europeanthen in some of the Middle East-
and South Asia; and in the Far EasternSouth America and sub-Sahara Africa wereIMlillHlililiHHl^
At first most of the OPCand bases had only skeletal staffs. Theirwere limited; but their very oresence was a
cogent factor. Local individuals, groups, andservices quickly came to understand that thereorce abroad in the world around which they could rally and gain support in their own opposition
Highest on the Department of State's list of priorities was the need to deal with the political leadership of the countless thousands of refugees and emigres who had fled to the West from Russia
and the satellite countries. The immediate problem was to deal with them outside of the Iron Curtain. These leaders could not be endorsed to headfor the realities of the situation ultimately demanded recognition of the Communist regimes that had assumed power; but they could be employed in the conduct of PP operations behond the Curtain.
onsequence, the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE) was organized9 with OPC support under the aegis of prominent financiers.
lawyers, industrialists, and savants in order to give the political energy of these foreigngroups some direction. The main activity of
NCFE centered on Radio Free Europe (RFE) withfacilities directed toward the satellites.
project involved the organization of the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples ofwhich established Radio Liberty to broadcast to Russia itself. RFE and Radio Liberty were still operating1 and had figured prominently in the press.
The Cominform, following its formation,a number of wide-ranging front organizations (so called because theyacadencluding the World Peace Council; the world Federation of Democratic Youth; the World Federation of Scientific Workers; theUnion of Students; the Women'sDemocratic Federation; the International
Organization of Journalists; and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers,
These international organizations spoke out in favor of peace and solidarity in order to prepare the unwary for subtle indoctrination into theideology. As instruments of psychological warfare, their announced aims were so estimable that it was difficult toeans of defense except in kind. Principally although not exclusively in the west, OPC became active in sponsoring rivalorganizationson-Communist hue, specifically in the cultural, youth and student,omen's, labor, and lawyers1 fields.
Certain labor operations had beenthe Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)OPC came into being. onsequence, OPCconcentrated its efforts within theof the trade union movement with theof the ECA which had certain counterpartfor the purpose-
The US policy of containment was soon tested by Communists when the Republic of Korea was invaded on Up to this point, OPC'sfor preventive direct action or PM activity -or unconventional warfare as it came to be known -had been limited to the plans and preparations for staybehind networks in the eventuture war. Much of this effort was in support of North Atlantic
reat deal about defensive tactics. esult, unconventional warfare in Koreatandoff.
It was quickly apparent that theregimesreat deal about how to deal with their internal security; consequently little resistance by the civilian population could bein the north on which either intelligence or action networks could be constructed by OSO and OPC resoectivelv.
were -naae oecausc officers were bemused by their own creative urges and ventured too far into activity that was overt by nature and not OPC's business. Ill-starred ventures into the production of motion pictures demonstrated this point.
There were many sound decisions and someones; but the margin for error, it is clear, decreased as experience was gained.
When Smith became DCI ine was perplexed, if not dumbfounded, at the wide-ranging responsibilities of OPC. ew months before his appointment the NSC had decided to expand US P? Encouraged by sorae apparent cracks in the Bloc structure, there was even talk of separating the USSR from some of its satellites. OPC had been told to accelerate its activity but no one knew how far it was to go or from whence were to come the means to get
At an early moment. Smith deliberated on the
merger of OPC and OSO but deferred any action for fear that the self-revealing activities of OPC might interfere with OSO's long-range espionage and(CEJ mission- He decided to bridge the duality of their overseas representations bySenior Representatives of his own choosing and reporting to him.
In1 Smith decided to seek furtherfrom the NSC as to the scope and pace of OPC operations. He requested that the NSC initiate areview of covert operations in light of the increase in their magnitude, that such reviewthe responsibilities involved for L'S covert operations, and that if the review should reaffirm CIA's covert operational responsibility, he should be provideday to obtain the necessaryfrom other agencies.
He received half an answer from the NSC. The operational responsibility of CIA for covert activity was reaffirmed. But the review of operations and methods for the provision of their support was placed in the handshe PsychologicalBoard (PSB). Evidently Smith was to have the
satisfaction of answering his own question, for he soon became chairman of the PSB. Separated from the making of strategic policy as it was, the PSB proved torail reed, but it was the beginningrocess whereby mechanics were later established for better relating the conduct of covert operations to US national strategy.
The answer from NSC, unsatisfactory though it was, may have been the turning point in General Smith's considerations of merging OSO andourse urged on him by his deputy, Mr. Allen w. Dulles, and his operational deputy, Wisner. At least he knew that for the foreseeable future he would be privileged Orepending on how he looked atith the responsibility for conducting covertumber of actions began to take place within OSO and OPC and between them, looking toward integration.
By the time of 2 merger, OPC was
facilities at home and abroad and had accumulated against planning contingencies foruge stockpile of ordnance items. It had acquirednumbers of aircraft for support purposes and the Air Force had undertaken to allocate to OPC
support four air wings, again to fulfill planning contingencies.
In strength levels OPC had overtaken and passed OSO. In the course of its growth, OPC had found it necessary to undergo several major reorganizations.2 the leaders of CIA were of the opinion that OPC had grownointeriod ofof its resources was in order. On the eve of
eview .board of senior OPC officers wasby General Smith to reduce OPC's monetary commitments by as much as one-third. It quicklyknown as "the murder board." Although many projects were earmarked for termination, theirwas found toomplicated andpainful procedure. Further sorting out, itwould have to take place2 within the framework of the merged service.
In concluding this introduction to the history of OPC's tough encounter with the Soviets in the covert action (CA) field, it would be exciting to say chat OPC emerged as the winner, but the most one can say is that the contestsee-saw" affair. The Soviets were ready at the end of World War II with an aggressive game plan and had taken an early lead.ew organization, was faced with trying toatch-up game from the very start. No one can say how and when the contest endedr if it
has everut the Soviet Union no longer had the field completely to itself.
II. Enabling Directives and Related Actions
At the end of World War II, CA operationsout by OSS and other agencies during the period of hostilities had cometandstill with little indication as to when, how, or if they might beshort of another war.
The secret intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activity of OSS had passed into the trusteeship of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) Its uncertain future was partially resolved when President Truman on6 directed the coordination of intelligence activities,the formation of the Central Intelligence Group V
directive contained certain phrases
that were ultimately to have significance inwith the future conduct of covert operations.
The DCI was directed to perform thoseservices which could be accomplished centrally with more efficacy as might be determined by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The DCI
was also to "perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting national security as the President or the National Intelligencemight direct. Although it was not clear that this clause envisioned the future conduct of covert activities, the same language was repeated in the National Security Acthich among its other provisions established the NSC and under it CIA to succeed CIC. Whatever the original intent, the NSC was to interpret these words as sufficientto place the conduct of covert activities in CIA in tandem with OSO which was the office within the new CIA structure already conducting espionage.
and counterespionage on foreign soil.
As US leaders in the postwar era came tothe need to repulse the underground attack by the USSR, countermeasures received theof an interagency committee consisting of State Department and the Military Services which emerged as the State, Army, Navy, Air ForceCommittee (SANACC).- Based on its deliberations
State, War, Navy Coordinating Comittee (SWNCC)
formedas renamed SANACCnd was terminated on
e decision to engage in covert psychological action was secretly formalized on7 by the NSC through the issuance of. (SeeB.) This directive placed responsibility for covert operations on the DCI, directing him "toand conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities."
The DCI, Hillenkoetter, who served7as not altogether convinced as to the advisability of conducting covertoperations in combination with secretoperations. Itesponsibility,that he was ill-prepared to accept, as he was then deeply involved in organizational problemsto the establishment of CIA. Nevertheless, Hillenkoetter, shaped by military tradition,to his superiors in the NSC.
B. OPC's Basic Directive
The Department of State apparently felt that it did not have enough influence over the burgeoningof the Special Procedures Grouphe CIA operating component which Hillenkoetter had
established within OSO in response totate, moreover, lookedaundiced eye on the planning activities then taking place within the JCS
with respect to secret psychological and political warfare. Regarding itself as the prime source of policy in these matters. State was ready to jump at almost any chance toheck-rein on the JCS, even to the acceptance of some joint vehicle for the conduct of covert activities. At the sameore encompassing program of covertwas growing at Cabinet level. of all of these factors led to the issuancear-reaching directive on IBet forth inhich established within CIA the new Office of Special Projects (OS?) "to plan and conduct covert operations." (See
This was the basic directive leading to8 of OPC, an innocuous title replacing OSP included in the initial wording of It stated that the OPC chief was to
was called the Special Procedures Branch. It wasSpecial Procedures Group on
report directly to the DCI, but to the maximumconsistent with efficiency, OPC was to operate independently of other CIA components- Policyas to covert operations was to flow from the senior levelsState and Defense, and the JCS was to be consulted on the planning for covertin wartime. However, on the question of the responsibilities for the conduct of covertin wartime (as opposed to planninghe document left considerable room for argument.
The external channels of OPC guidance andderiving from this directive had resulted from the fact that State and Defense were bothto provide certain policy signals withoutplaying in the secret political andwarfare game. CIA was again specified as the agency within which the instrument for thesewas to be housed. Both the Hooverworking committee on National Securityunder the chairmanship of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt and NSC's Survey Group reviewing theintelligence structure, comprising Messrs. Dulles, Mathias F. Correa, and William H. Jackson,
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which were active during the months thatas in formulation/ voiced the opinion that allactivities to whatever end should bein concert- Since CIA was already carrying out secret espionage and CE operations/ bothconcluded that it should conduct covertalso. Their advice was followed.
There is ample evidence among theof the time to indicate thatrivalry in relation to the conduct of thecold war was rampant and had its impactmethod whereby policy guidance to OPC wasby thewas on notice thathave to walk the fence between its twoand Defense,elicate balance.
The established cover story of OPC was based on the presumption that its existence would soon be known, or at least suspected, as its operations
unfolded. Its presence within the CIA structure might then be imputed. It appearedable be formulated in such fashion as to substitute vagueness for any strenuous effort at total secrecy that might not long be sustained. That was the thinking behind the choice of the name: Office of Policy Coordination. Itswere covered under the following legend:
OPC was established to coordinate the activities of CIA with national security policy as adopted by those agencies of government responsible or the formation of such policy. ^0
It was felt that in this role,ortiddleman, OPC might legitimately and logicallyboth the intelligence and planning aspects of various covert activities. In explaining the OPC role to personsegitimate interest, nowas to be made of action programs; only its planning, intelligence coordinating, and defensive aspects were to be stressed. To the greatest extent possible, contacts were to be arranged throughcutouts, with no reference whatsoever to OPC.
The "covert operations" to be handled by OPC were defined by2 as all activities (except
as noted) which were to be conducted or sponsored by the US Government against hostile foreign states or groups, or in support of friendly foreign states or groups. They were to be so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them would not be evident to unauthorized persons. If uncovered the US Government was to be able to disclaimany responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations were to include any covert activitiesto; propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage; antisabotage,and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugeegroups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the Free World. Such operations were not to include anned conflict by recognized military forces, and excluded espionage, CE, and cover and deception for military operations.
The exception noted in the preceding paragraph referredtatement inf thewhich stated:
In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orderswill be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unlessdirected by the President.
This language was foredoomed to be the cause of much contention between OPC and the JCS as to theirroles in wartime in regard to the conduct of covert activity.
Oneeting to clarify theof2 was attended by: DCIColonel Ivan D. Yeaton, and Mr. Robert Blum, representing the Secretary of Defense; Mr. George P. Kennan, chief of State's Policy Planning Staff; Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary, NSC; and Wisner, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for Occupied Areas who was about to take over8 as CIA's Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (ADPC). It is reasonable to conclude that before taking that office Wisner was asking for an agreed interpretation of the parameters of the task
he was about to undertake. emorandum ofand understanding was agreed to and initialed by those present. (See Within the context of the understanding reached, OPC was to be given considerable latitude to operate independently of the CIA machinery of command and administration, with the proviso, however, that the OCI was to be "kept informed in regard to all important projects and decisions." "Important* was not delineated and as it turned out, the determination was largely left up to the head of the new instrumentality for covert activities. It was clear, moreover, thatadvice was to flow to the ADPC directly, not through the DCI Wisner was installed as ADPC
The relationship of OPC to CIA during the period when Admiral Hillenkoetter was DCI is described by Dr. Edward P. Lilly, an historical observer, in the following terms:
OPC was in CIA administratively andtrict reading ofhe Director of CIA would have control
over its policy and operations. When it commenced to operate,because of the personalitiesbecause OPC receivedand guidance directly from the Secretaries of State and Defense, and because of the special sensitivity of its operations, thereeneral agreement among the officials involved that OPC shouldeparate andentity within CIA. even went so far that OPC'srequests were handled by CIA as requestseparate agency. OPC, on its part, was reluctant to tell the intelligence side of CIA about itseven though the DCI had been given the responsibility of policyand of appealing to NSC if policy disagreements arose. Thedeveloped, however, that thepolicy representatives only consulted with OPC, and the DCI was initially left out of covert planning. This procedure initially gaveelatively greater freedom of action, but removed the single responsible authority who could decide if acovert operation was in accord with American policy. 8/
D. Financing OPC
Early9 legislation highly important to the conduct of covert activities was enacted. the National Security Act7 had given statutory recognition to CIA, it did not include enabling legislation authorizing the DCI to acquire
or administer CIA funds in his own
continued to depend upon allocations from theSecretaries and tenuous understandings with Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO), and certain other Government agencies as to the purposes for which available funds could legally and properly be expended. Onublict Congress, was approved "to provide for theof the Central Intelligence Agency,pursuant to, National Security Act of7 and for other purposes." Thisprovided specifically that:
. . he sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to theof Government funds; and for objectsonfidential, extraordinary.
or emergency nature, suchto be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director andufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.
This would appear to have given the DCI the authority to set up an organizational system toclandestine activities in any way he saw fit, subject only to the rule of prudence and good sense. However, since established patterns of governmental procedure appeared to present the minimum risk to future interpellation. Admiral Hillenkoetter and his advisers chose not to pioneer.
E. Revision in the Understanding on Implementing
General Smith replaced Admiral Hillenkoetter as DCI He was the appointee of President Truman and had direct access to thewhen required. Smith, differing from hisheld uncompromising views with respect to the authorities and responsibilities of command. He determined that OPC would be an integral part of CIA responsive to his policy guidance.
Three years later,eneral Smith was to describe his views on2 to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committeeearing on his nomination to the post of Under Secretary of State
The Office of Policyas set up under rathercircumstances.
It was createdesult of the recognition that something had to be done in the way of the cold war, and it was createdime when, as you know, Secretary Johnson was Secretary of Defense, and Secretary Acheson, Secretary of State.*
Anything that was created at that time in that field inevitably had toort of compromise, and that was what thia OPC thing was. It wasby an order of the NationalCouncil,hought wasarticularly sound orderead it.
It put in the Central Intelligence Agency this entity which was actually in but not of the agency. It took its direction largelyolicy group of officers of the Defense and State Departments. Admiral Hillenkoetter felt he did not have very much control over it.
was somewhat hazy in his chronology.
These positions were held respectively by James V. Forrestal and General George C. Marshall when OPC was created Johnson wason9 and Acheson
On the other hand, it was the place where the money was spent, and all the rest of the agency wasof it.
Smith was advised by senior members of the CIA
staff to seek modification or amendment to2 to eliminate the provisions which served to act in derogation of the DCI's full authority andfor covert operations and to clarify its most controversial provision which pertained to wartime planning and covert operations in military theaters; Smith was not prepared to move in this fashion. At the same time, he found it impossible toituation wherein the authority of the DCI toresources was being hamstrung by the fact that the Departments of State and Defense were directing OPC policy without his prior approval.
Smith felt secure enough in his position to conclude that he could bring OPC under hishange in existing procedures withoutup2 to modification. Accordingly, he instructed wisner, OPC chief, to advise State,and the JCS that8 memorandum was no longer applicable or effective in the light of altered circumstances (apparently altered in the
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sense that he was on the scene).
Wiener's compliance with this instruction was reported to the DCZ on (SeeE.) Kisner advised the representatives of State, Defense, and the JCS that General Smith saw nonecessityevision of2 in order to accomplish the full integration of OPC as an element of CIA under the authority and command of the DCI. Wisner explained that the advice and policy guidance from State, Defense, and the JCS would not thereafter be regarded by Smith as placing any or all of them in the position of giving orders or instructions to OPC. Such guidance thereafter would be considered asto CIA as an organization and not merely to OPC.
Smith then proceeded to take direct control of OPC, and OSO as well, by means of an internalwhich arrogated the principal supporting functionseputy director for administrationdirectly to the DCI. Thus, by takingof resources (money and manpower)hannel reporting directly to him. General Smith in effect took control of operations themselves.
of Paragraph 4, NSC2
0 controversy between OPC and the JCS over the interpretation offggravated by the ambiguity surrounding command relationships in Korea and the Far East, had become so egregious that Smith was persuaded tohis previous decision and to seek aof the directive. The interpretation of the paragraph was, according to wisner, "the subject of more divergent views and conflicting constructions than any other portion of the paper." From thepoint ofears later, the divergentmay seem somewhat recondite;ense of reality is restored when it is recognized that the interpretations were being made by dedicatedwho believed that the United States was living in imminent peril of World War III.
Following conversations with Smith, Wisner on0emorandum confirming the need for and reasonsefinitive andinterpretation of the troublesome para-
pointed out that the basic dif-
lay in the fact that nowhere in2 did it
specifically provide that OPC was to be "responsi-
for the conduct of covert operations inelated problems involved were: first, the specific participation of OPC planners in both peacetime and wartime preparation of plans for wartime covertand second, the delineation of the manner in which covert operations would be set up andin military theaters.^
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as suspended on0 by the NSC at the suggestion of General Smithupplementary draft directive tentatively designated as3 could beewording of the controversial long with certain other changes .tfl The JCS found3 unacceptable and at the1 NSC meeting it was withdrawnewording of paragraph
4 proposed by General Smith was approved, as:
In time of war, or when thedirects, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the JCS. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of theTheater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the
and Pace of OPC Operations (NSC 6B) ;
S and the Psychological Strategy Board2 remained in force with this revision until1 when it was supplemented by further NSC action with regard to the "scope and pace of covert operations" through publicationocument identified as
In0 US policymakers had determinedore rapid buildup in the basic potential for waging cold wai should be undertaken by all relevant branches of government. Thus, the formulationold-war policy and appraisal of the assetsto wage it was undertaken by the NSC,in the issuance in0 of
a nonnilitary counter-
against the USSR and for recapture ofinitiative in the .following terras:
In regard. andoffensive operations short of war, including intensive overtencouragement to andof exiled groups andenergetic prosecution ofcovert operations within the Soviet orbit, and vigorousof favorable opportunities as they. Korea . .were to get underway.)
A State representative on0umber of top OPC officials by citing theNSCrovisions applying to the planning and operations of OPC as follows:"
At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is essential to encourage the Kremlin's attention, keep it off balance and force an increasedof Soviet resources in In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war technique used against the Soviet Union.
underlining was made by the State repre-
sentative, Robert P. Joyce.
Tasks relating to the OPC mission were described as:
Development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate thedesign in other ways.
Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political andwarfareiew to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite
In the course of its considerations, NSC called for budgetary estimatesix-yearfor the period0 The assumptions conveyed to OPC in0 in connection with the formulation of these projections were briefly that the UShad decided toajor effort in the field of covert operations; that there would be no overt hostilities during the period under consideration; and that, if the measures espoused by NSCerehooting war might be avoided. preparationshooting war (overtwere to be made and the4 was
regarded as crucial. tsaaaF
It was readily apparent that the pacethe cold war envisioned by the policymakers calledore rapid expansion of resources than OPC had theretofore been able to undertake. emorandum
written in1 commented on the fact that such broad and comprehensive undertakings asby NSCould only be accomplished by the establishmentorldwide structure for covert operationsuch grander scale than OPC hadcontemplated. It wouldask similar in concept, magnitude, and complexity to theof widely deployed military forces together with the logistical support required to conductcomplex, and delicate operationside variety of overseas locations.m
These considerations had led Smith to seek
clarification from the NSC. aperntitled "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations" sometimes known as the "Magnitudeeon the extent of the resources which would be needed to accomplish the mission apparentlyunder NSCnd concludedrogram of
such magnitude required further review by the NSC. He recommended: (a) that NSC shouldomprehensive review of the covert operationsin view of the magnitude issue; (b) that this review shouldestatement orof the several responsibilities andinvolved in US covert operations; (c) that if the review should resulteaffirmation of CIA's covert operational responsibility, then CIA should be provided the necessary support from otheragencies to insure the successful discharge of the responsibility, with certain specific assurances as to policy and planning relationships andof the needed quantities of personnel andsupport; and (d) that guidance for covert operations of concern to more than one department should be coordinated and issued to CIA (and to other participating agences) by the newly createdStrategy Board (PSB).
PSB had been constituted1 by Presidential Directive. It was to be responsible
for the formulation and promulgation of over-all national psychological objectives, policies, andand for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort. There was reason to doubt, however, that the PSB would be able to muster the authority required for the proper discharge of its responsibilities.
5 was issued onto General Smith's "Magnitude Paper" and calling for an intensification of covert operations. (See It "reaffirmed" theand authority of the DCI for the conduct of covert operations under2 subject to theof the PSB. 5 established the general order of emphasis for covert operations: (a) to place maximum strain on the Soviet power structure; (b) to strengthen the orientation of the free world toward the United States; and (c) to develop undergroundand facilitate covert and guerrillain strategic areas.
The role of the PSB was defined as follows: (a) to determine the desirability and feasibility of covert operational programs and of individual major
projects; (b) to establish the scope, pace, andof covert operations and the allocation ofamong them; and (c) to coordinate action to ensure the adequate provision of personnel, funds, and logistical and other support to the DCI for the carrying out of approved operations. hat the development of undergroundand the conduct of covert and guerrillashould wherever practicable provide bases on which the military might expand military operations in time of war within active theaters of operations. The directive called for the advice andof the JCS in the formulation of PM operations during the period of the cold war.
As it applied to OPC, the purpose of5 was to provide through the PSB an authoritativeof the covert activity being conducted and to furnish policy guidance as to the future extent of such activity. It is evident that the PSB fell short of this purpose. As the "Jacksonas later to find, the creation of the PSB was based
isconception that psychological warfarecould exist apart from the total national-
2 was the basic national directivewhich OPC was constituted and covert activities begun. 5 was intended to refine the earlier directive by providing the method whereby OPC could receive guidance as to the scope and pace of those activities. It fell short in this respect but did reconfirm the fact that responsibility of CIA for covert activities was to continue.
In addition to these basic directives, thereteady stream of NSC policy guidances with respect to specific areas of the world or toproblems. Sometimes CIA was called upon by name for covert action but generally CIA's role was more indirect through its provision of covert support to articulated courses of action assigned to State and
2 was, inreaty between State and Defense to define how US covert activities were to be conducted. Whether itound idea to place the instrument for conducting thosein CIA was thought to be beside the point. The executive arm of the Government was convinced that immediate action had to be taken to forestall "the vicious covert activities of the USSR."CIAthe only vehicle immediately available for undertaking such countermeasures without instituting action by Congress which would certainly make forand might in the long run prove to be
Like most treaties2 contained certain seeds of discord, such as:
requirements placed on OPCand Defense were widely disparate. the'conduct of political andwarfare; the other, plans andfor paramilitary operations. of interests immediately posedin priorites to OPC- Tt did notthe personal or physical resourcesboth demands.
Hillenkoetter acceding, thepermitted the uncanalizedpolicy direction from State andOPC. With this shortcutting ofthe relationship betweenand wisner became an uneasy one emorandum dated ctoberCounsel Lawrence R. Houstonto theumber of debatableand interpretations derivingaper. j| I Houston arguedwere no means under the existing lawthe Director could divest himself of,separated from, his personal responsibility
for the expenditure of unvouchered funds. Houstonurther clarification by NSC to the end that the DCI should have full administrative control of OPC personnel and supplies, final authority over theof its funds, and the right to initiate or veto its projects. In the alternative, if control and responsibility were to remainof CIA, then it should be made clear that the Director's responsibility was specifically limited to that of affording housekeepingonly. There was no clarification of2 until General Smith handled the matter to his own satisfaction by taking over fullof OPC.
c. Hillenkoetter made an accuratein arguing that the proviso permitting OPC to operate independently of other CIAwould lead to continued argument and bickering over financial management. That in fact turned out to be the case.
ti. Until the controversialas changed by mutual consent, the original wording led to endless negotiations andbetween CIA and the JCS on issues of "cold war" versus "hot war" responsibilities and prerogatives.
operations pertaining towarfare were to be conducted by the guidance Of the departmentsresponsible for the planning ofwarfare" but where suchfinally rested never came to light.
as an adequate documentcovert operations under way. Ason and operations multiplied,became clear that some determinationto be made as to the extent andthe resources to be devoted to the An attempt to remedy thisthe provisions of5 fellthe mark. In fact, the creation ofto supply high policy inhole historical episode inOriginal document.