POSSIBLE PROGRAM OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY

Created: 4/2/1948

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DocS^fiftteT

ft

HO CHANGE in Class.

CBAHGKD TO: CIA DDApr 77 8

Possible progress ol* Future Soviet Movee In Romany

1. Reference lato tbe Heaorandusi to the President ofroe the Director,nd to the Memorandum* to the Director, CTA fron the Aaalatent Director, ORB ofubjecti probable Soviet Raeotlone In Berlin to Waatarn European Talks, (ooplae attached),

8. ihe following dlecuealoneesIble pre great that might be reeorted to by the USSR la oemnny in en effort to force the eeatern poeere fron Berlin and eventually fron waa tern Germany. Until recently tola review of possible Sovietna waa eonaldored purely epeculatlTa end the program one that would be attempted only after the USSR had concluded that Soviet interference with the Allied efforts in eeatern Oerenny could not be effected by legal International moans or through local Cononunlet subversion*

3. the recent Soviet walkout fron the Allied Control Council, end Soviet effort* to bleak transportation to and fron Berlin indicate that tale program may already be under way, end that while riek of war may be involved, the plan possibly can be effected without military violence.

Xt la believed, therefore, that recent neatern roeer action may have caused the Befit to decide thatt

a* hep* no longer naasfiia for legally sharinginterfering with the production of weeternwhich the eneceee of tha European reoovary

b. the Soviet Zone auet b* placed under permanent controldemocratic" and "loyal" oorman groupf

e. theongreea should be the instrument for the formation ofrovisional oeraan Oovernmontj

d. In order to prevent Allied Interference with the formation of this Government, tha Allied Control coimoil should be ebollabed, or permanently boycotted, and the Beatern Powers forced out of Berlin}

mm

SECRET

tha new Germanthould bo Bivon,ropitious tins- diplomatlo recognition as tha official admlnlatretion for all oeraanyf

th* sovlot Amy should raw* in a* th* "pro tea tor* of tho no* Raich ponding eroationo* German Amy, aeoordlngutoal aaaletenoe paotf and

f

visaaraany should bo pre* sad by all bio methods. Including terrorlam, threats, and propaganda, to "rejoin" the Reich by making the Weetem Poeer occupation prohibitive In coat end effort through organised non-cooperation and sabotage*

THEODORE BABBITT

Attachments| Discujslon

Mono. of7 Homo, of8

Coordinated with Eastern Europe Branch

dEMIM

piacppflicq

with the oonoluslon of tho London tripartite talks and tha daoleioa to consider Waa tern Germany in the EHP planning, tha Kremlin eay hare da elded that little hope remains for the USSR to block or control US/UK Zona production. Three events, the aeetlng of tbe Soviet-sponsored Peoples* Congress, the abrupt departure of tha Soviet delegation fron the Allied Control council meeting onerch and the subsequent Soviet efforts to Impede both freight and passenger traffic between Berlin and the West indicate that at loaat the first ateps in the outline of possible Soviet action may no longer be entirely In the realm of pure speculation*

8* It has been believed by ORB that the USSR night encourage the Peoples* Congress to organise itselfnational" admlnlatretion for all Germany ande facto Government for the Eastern Zone while simultaneously obtaining de Jure authority over ell the oountry. The peoples' Congress port lally confirmed thla opinion whenn waned onerch, advocated the early establishmentovernment to replace the Allied controlnd evidenced its pretensions to speak for the German people*

3* it haa been believed also that In preparation for the newhe USSR would attempt to discredit tbe acc. While the abrupt torminatIon of the Control council meeting ofarch haa not yet been extendedermanent Soviet boycott of the council, Soviet offlelale have charged that the Western powers, by unilateral motion, have already made the work of the Oounoil worthless*

4* The preeenoe or the weatern powere in Berlin adde to the difficulty ofoviet puppet government In Has tarn Germany, beoauee of the "opposition" that operates from the sanctuary of the weeternsection* ef th* city. The USSR would consequently desire toestern power evacuation of Berlin as expeditiously aa possible. The Soviet attempt to block transport threatens to render the Allied position in Berlin untenable*

6* Should the peoples* congress. In fact, setgovernment* of the Sovietnd lay claim to "represent" all of aeraany, the Soviet Military Administration might accord it local recognition as the established German admlnlatretion and give propaganda credenoe to its pretensions to govern mil of the Zones. The USSR and lta satellites might be expected to enter Into provisional political and eoononlo agreements dlreotly with Eastern Germany, laying

SECRET

recognitionob.

S it.

^'Jnf of* JSMur^SSnanyb.

o oX

?

of

ilEHGKABDUH FOR THB PPBSUXHrT

of tho CPU In London may causa tho

o undertake aprogre* of

other Was tarn Powers to withdraw fron Berlin lOl roS^anta-gWfJfWJJlUad Control

eran couldtuation great teneion which night lead to armed clashes between Soviet personnel end that of the other occupying iower*.

Tho failure of tho ova to reach agr* option end tha CW* snbcaquent indefinitlad

ergon of Its Zone into tho Soviet econony dnd to PdUtloal system etUl nore closely to the Soviet

oounterlee S

d^datlcn^aliSmtha OTSR will attempt to Incorporate thoroughly tha

*hardly serve eg th* capital

SraSB eventually ^

of propagandaJ^

p*aP*nd*wo* of us end the other eastern Power forces end th*

Uv* political frsedoa for th*

in'oaara maintain*troop* to th* oity. The Kremlinaara of thise3amV;

.sOta is aware, alee, that th* present ouadri-

f operate rS lnteHd-sane* oefelvitie* in the Eastern zone aa well aa providing

fl0fflafc-"lthocnvenlartbnTen,th. soviet suthoriti^ar^

-

SfcLHtl

cannot oxpeot tha ua and

fh* USER, therefore, wlU probably uaa every mean* ahoiVor aimed force to compel theae pWi to IsavVtheaty.

Theae devlcee nay inoluda additional obfltruetlon to tranaport and travel to and within the city, -failure" ofeueh aa eleotrlo aupply, reduction of that Vart of th. food eupply which ooaioa frcn the Soviet Zone, flaflrnAt vlolationa of Konmandatura egwementa, lxatlfiatlon ofmong oermm in tne tn aector,

municipal government,deliberately ESnaifled oJarpaiBn of

B tmlmWB^

- Tht degree) Of danger Inherent larft-ralffPdepend on th* eoouracy with which Soviet aat^StUjet.rnin.tion to remain and the atate of^IJoiplln. of US official, and troop*, overly enthnalaatlo reeort to lnault* jr perccnal violence by Soviet troop! or coaetunilt.

^

are aoourato, the aituatlcm could and probably would be

nntnSrouenorher, eeek to bring about an open Knai-wo.t

Kremlin will probably defer

of Soviet atrategy elsewhere.iew ofprcbabU Ira^poSlble^ the

y development* in th* immediate future .IUh. nrmneaa, patlenee, nd dl.dpUne ef all US peraonnal la

He Be TaiXENKDETTWR

Rear admiral, CSV Director of Central Intelligence

SECRET

LX

8

KEMQRAKDUB FOR THB DIRECTOR, CXA

A88XSTAVT DIRECTOR, ORB

SUBJECT I PROBABLE SOVIET HSACTIOTS IB DBRLXB TO TTESTREK BUROPBAB UKIOH TALKS

Attention la Invitedaaajrandua for the president fron too Director of Old* dotedopy of which le attached, Delay In the fornetloneparate Baa tern oeraan Government and In Soviet atteapte to force tba eastern powers fron Berlin haa probably been caused In large measure by tba flra attitude of US officials in Berlin, While no further reports have been received Indicating that the USSR had decided to force th* western Powers fron Berlin, th* recent US, UK,enelux discussions in London oanoernlng the fornetlonest Oenaan State to be Inoludodestern European Union invite sons form of Soviet response stronger than th* acre proono fur.

Sovietill be timed to follow overt allieditatlon of tha London decisions, and willof the announcement ofuchlebiscite, for an Eastern Zona "all Qersaallaiming to represent th* whole Oerean people. f such plan* would b* fallowed by an intensified soviet eaauslgii to oust tha Western rowers fron Berlin. The aoet urgent dangersaria lag froa th* presence in Berlin of young, undisciplinedggravation of the situation by suohloon tents a* want an Bast-westny tendency towards war hysteria or lack of fineness and patience on th* part effflolele In Berlin*

THEODORE BABBITT Assistant Director Reports end Estimates

Attachi

Memo.7

Original document.

---

---