V mm,
NO CH'EtfS in Class.. D ECLASSIFIED lass. CHANGED TO: TS ;5 jP
DDAprBaronw
anthi DSARy.
Date: Isfl'lT? -By*
SEHODANPQM FOB TBS Dl HECTOR, CIA*
ASSISTANT DIHBCTOT. ORE
3OBJECT! PROBABLE SOVIET RnaCTXQSS IS BERLIH TO WB8TKRH aOTOPKAH DTTIOS TALKS
Attention la invitedaaaoraadua for tha preaUdent froa tba Director ordatedopy of ehloh la attached* Delay In the fomatlcneparate Be*tem German Govorranent end in Soviet attenpta tothe Westm* yeyi from. Berlin hoe probably boon caused lo large neaaure by the ftoa attitudedYlciala in Berlin* while no further report* have been received Indicating that the OSaa deelded to force th* Veatern power* froa Berlin* th* recantPrance, Benelux dleottaelone In London concerning the formtloneat German State to b* Includedee torn European Valor. Invite ffone fona of Soviet roeponae etremger than th* laare protests received ee> fay.
soviet reopens*bo tSnod to felloe evert allied UiulmMmUtlen of the London dec la lone, end willef too enneoneeawmt of plane* ettahleeleelte* for en Hmaternmene% claiming to repreeont
in. the moat urgent danger* arei from the eweeanaB in Berlin ef young,ggravation ef th* situation by euoh
en Boat-vastny tandenoy taeerde ear hyeterla or laak of firmness and patience on Use part of VS official* in Berlin*
of eooh plane eould be eeamwilan to *os* the
TH2QD0RS BABBITT
AMlatant Director Reports and Betlnete*
Attach:
Memo.7
Okui
MEMORANDUM FOR THB PRBSID5KT
.SECRET
7
Tha breakdown of the CPU In London may cause- tha USSR torogram of Intensified obstructionism and caloulatod Insult In an effort to foroe tha us and the Othar Western powers to withdraw from Berlinmail Allied Control Authority group. The Implementation ofrogram couldituation of great tension which might lead to armed clashes between Soviet personnel and that of the other oooupylng powers.
The failure of the CFM to reach agreement on any question and thesubsequent Indefinite adjournment will reault in an accelerated consolidation of eastern Oenaany. The USSR will at tempt to Incorporate thoroughly the economic "Tfrf?lta Zon# Soviet economy and to orient tha poUtteal ayateai etiU more eloaely to the Soviett* ltlM wU1 onoounter difficulties In aeoompllahing both obiectlvea beoauae of the preseno* of U8 officials and troops ia Berlin*
The presence there of this personnel hindersand forcible oommunisatlon of all easternto sustain non-Caaaunlat opposition, endthe US dome not Intend to abandon or partition Berlin, of oouree, oould hardly aerve aa thaatate, should the TOSH eventually
establish one. ao long as the western Powers maintain troops in the city. The Kremlin ie aware of this situation.
The Kremlin is aware, also, that the presentoccupation of Berlin furnishes the US with an excellent listening postase of operations for intalll-
notlvitiem In the Eastern Zone aa well aa providing political refugees from soviet areasonvenient haven, Masters of propaganda themselves, tha Soviet authorities are highly sensitive to the great propaganda value of the continued presence of US and tha other Western power foroes and tha guarantees they provide of relative polltleal freedom for th* residents of the olty.
R, consequently, cannot expeot tha OS and tha other Weatern Powers to evacuate the city voluntarily* The USSR* therefore, will probably use every means short of armed force to oompel those powers to leave the oity.
These devloea may Include additional obstruction to transport and travel to and within the oity,f services euoh aa electric supply, reduction of that part of the food supply which comes from the Soviet zone, flagrant violations of Sacaandatura agreements', instigation of unrest among Germans Is the OS sector, disregard of the elected nunlolpaleliberately intensified campaign of insult or personal injury toersonnel* and terror last ion of their German employees.
_i t .
The degree of danger inherent Inampaign will depend on the aocuracy with which Soviet authorities gauge OS determination to remain and the atate of discipline of OS officials and troops. Overly enthusiastic resort to insults or personal violence by Soviet troops or Communists could well createtreet fights, brawls, and other public disturbances which* in turn* might well lead to high-level repercuaalons of the gravest character. 'Only the greatest determination and taet on both sides coulderious incident from deteriorating beyond control of the Berlin authorities* Evan if Soviet estimates of limits to OS patlanoe are accurate* the situation could and probably would be aggravated by theof German malcontents* who for one reason or another, seek to bring about an open Bast-west oonfliot.
The Kremlin will probably defer lte maximum effort to force Western power evacuation of Berlin until it has fully calculated the risks and considered tha problem In the light of Soviet strategy elsewhere* nevertheless* in view of probable irresponsible action by local Soviet officials, the day-to-day developments in the immediate future will teat the firmness,nd discipline of all OS personnel in Berlin.
R. H. HILLESXOETTKR Rear Admiral, OSK Director of Central intelligence
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: