chinese communist capabilities for control of all china
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CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR CONTROL OF ALL CHINA
This paper assumes that the intention of the Chinese Communist Party Is to gain absolute control of all China. It Is the purpose of this paper to determine whether the Chinese Communists are capable of so doing.
The Military Phase
The strength and the tactical success of the Chinese Communist Forces have been the chief instruments In the ascent of the Communist Party, and will continue lo be so unlil all organised resistance by the Nationalist Army has been overcome. As the Nationalist Army Is the major obstacle to that ascent, the mission of the Communist Forces wiU be to proceed with the armlhUatlon of the Nationalists* vital strength. The Communist Forces, through extremely able use of available human resources, Ihrough support (derived or extracted) from the populace in Communfst-held areas, andlever use of propaganda, have overcome initial limitations In the materials of war and have reached or exceeded parity with the Nationalists in numbers, weapons, and equipment. The Communists* greatest advantage over their opponent Is found In this expert exploitation of human resources, and their prospect of eventual victory rests upon that ability.
a. The Human Factor.
High morale and excellent leadership, repetitive and finally crediblethemes,ell-developed sense of purpose, have elevated the once materially weak Communist Forces to their present position of superiority In the civil conflict. The morale of the opposing Nationalists Is excessively low, and Is reflected not onlyarked preference for passive tactics but oftenholesale refusal lo fight. Entire armies surrender tn masse, and even those units which choose lo fight often find that tlw defections of neighboring units have rendered their position tactically untenable. As continued resistance appears pointless, and as Communist propaganda emphasizes this, the defenses soon collapse. Further, lhe loss ol such defense centers as Chin-hsien. Mukden, or Tsinan. has the same effect In an over-all strategic sense as do local defectionsactical sense.
Communist propaganda is aimed both at strengthening internal Communist morale and at weakening the morale of National Governmentimple theme, constantlyare better under thein time, and under the properonviction in the minds of the Nationalist officers and men that this is true. The Communists have offered equivalent grades to those who "comehey offer foodure; they reiterate the essential brother-hood of all Chinese and the futility of internecine warfare (especially the futility of continued resistance to the Communisthey point out corruption andwithin lhe Nationalist Forces; in fact there la, in Communist propaganda,for everybody. It is effective, for the will of the Nationalists to resist has been
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so weakened as to make highly Improbable any continued effective resistanceignificant period of time. The Insidious effects of the Communist Fifth Column and the obvious superiority of Communist intelligence, contribute heavily both to themiliury and political successes. Nationalist counter-efforts in each of these fields have been puerile failures.
b. The Material Factor.
It is estimated lhal the strength of the Communist Forces is, the great majority being combat effectives, in addition, theytrategic reserve. They are opposed by slightlyillion Nationalists, the great majority of whom will offer only token resistance before defecting to the Communists. It is unnecessary for the Communists to integrate the growing number of Nationalist renegades into their army inasmuch as present Communist combat forces arelarge to fulfill their mission; If they were to absorb large numbers of defected Nationalist Forces, they would probably dilute their real strength. In addition to their first-line troops, the Communists can, when necessary, call upon the combat services ofrregulars, whose mdectrination, from the Communist viewpoint. Is superior to that of disaffected Nationalists.
The Communists' logistic position Is such that they nowarked advantage over the Nationalist Army. The former, with Japanese, Chinese, and US arms garneredariety of sources, can now outgun the latter at almost any point. As neither combatant can supply itself from current arsenal production, each must remain dependent upon outside supply. The US has supplied, and again Isarms and ammunition to the National Government, while the chief source ol supply for the Communist Forces remains the capture of materiel from theThe USSR allowed the Communists to take over the large stocks of the Japanese Kwantung Army In Manchuria (which materiel Is probably only now runningnd even now may be extending them technical advice, but no concrete evidence exists to support the contention that the USSR Is currently supplying Japanese or Soviet materiel to the Chinese Communists.
The Communists control the great majority of the rural, food-producing areas of North and Northeast China, and are thereby enabled to employ foodeapon in the civil contest Shortages of food, later starvation, in Nationalist-held cities, surrounded and cut off from the normal sources of food, play an Important role In their eventual capitulation. By making effective use of all means of transport available lo them, and by conditioning tactics to their limitations in this regard, the Communists haveelative advantage in combat supply. More recently the railways of Manchuria have lent theew and apparently devastating mobility and striking power. Nationalist transport has. on the contrary, gone from bad lo worse, and is now reduced to short stretches of highway and railway within or leading into the combat areas. These truncated channels are supplemented by walerbornc and aeiiat Uasportation, which are, though Inaclequate, the mostavailable lo the Nationalists.
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The Nationalists possess the only extant navy and air force, and thus enjoy certain limited tactical advantages. The Nationalist Air Force, however, has shown itself to be an ineffective organization in the fields of bombing and fighter support. In addition, shortages of almost all materials required to operate an air force have reduced the Nationalist Air Forcerimary function of transport
c. Strategy ond Probable Future Ttctuis.
A shift In the Communist tactical emphasis has paralleled the growth of its army. At first tentatively, but lately with assurance, the Communists have assaulted large, comparatively wdl-dercndcd cities. Although this hasortion of the Communist Army, which, departing from the traditional Communist concept of guerrilla warfare, is probably capable of taking any Nationalist-held city, thereonsiderable section of Communist units still operating primarily along guerrilla lines. The latter groups will be principally employed In the Initial phases of any new operations. The assault troops will undertake lo reduce Nationahst-held pockets which have been encircled and arc about to fall. Communist strategy will continue to invito Nationalist defections and will probably be highly successful.
At present tbe principal areas of Nationalist resistance are in the Tientsin-Kalgan area of North China, and the Central China area around Hsuchou. Greatly superior Communist forces are moving into position to attack the former region,trong Communist drive in the Hsuchou area is well under way. This drive, which threatens to engulf all Nationalist units in the area andear pathway to lightly defended Nanking, might well prove the coup de grace to organisedby the Nationalist Army. Other areas of Nationalist resistance, at Sian, Kueisui, Taiyuan, and Hankow, are now being reduced or can be reduced later without much difficulty by the Communists. There are no effective Nationalist forces, nor are there any local troops that could successfully resist the Communists, in South.or West China, and it can be assumed that the extension of Communist authority into these areas will Inevitably follow the termination of organised military operations by the Nationalist Array.
The Economic Phase.
The Chinese Communist Party will not be faced with any economic problems which in scope or kind will prevent it from attaining its Immediate military and political goals. As the military program of the Communist Army nears completion, and the Islands of Nationalist resistance are reduced, the pattern of the Communist economy will gradually devdopoose federation of relatively Self-sufficient and economl. cally Independent regionstructure with increased integration and
o. Agricultural Factor.
The food situation, in areas occupied by the Communists, will not be serious Although agricultural prospects are not favorable, the food situation in Communist areas should not be worse than it has been under the Nationalists, insect plagues in
southern Manchuria have reduced the normally large grain surplus from Manchuria, but the outlook for North Ctiina Is good, and production should be close to that of prewar. In North China there will be. asew famine areas, notably in parts of Shansl and the flooded areas of the Hual River and the Hungtze and Weishan Lakes, but this may be partly overcome by moving food from areas of more adequateThe unification of the economic regions of North China may have ansalutary effect on the distribution system which formerly linked the farmers and the numerous small towns dotting the North China plains. The problem ofthe large cities which have come under Communist control, or which will fall to the Communists In the near future, will be offset by possession of through railwhich will permit transportation of food from surplus areas. While theof feeding these additional cities will strain the Communists* food resources, the standard of living in the cities will probably not be reduced under Communist rule.
b. The Industrial Factor.
The Chinese Communists have thus far exploited the resources and Industry of Manchuria onlyimited extent, and further rehabilitation of transportation, mining, and industry In Communist areas will probably prove difiicult. There has been no large-scale resumption ot the heavy iron and steel Industry once built up In this region. With the exceptionew consumer items, such as textiles, the present limited production of small-scale home Industries, augmented by the smuggling ot goods from Nationalist areas, apparently meets the Immediate needs of theeconomy.
North China wouldossible excess of industrial capacity over the Chinese Communists' Immediate requirements If the Communists acquire control of the large textile and other industrial Installations in North China cities; textile shortages in Manchuria could thus be eased.
By capturing Tslnan and Mukden Intact, the Communists have gainedof large Industrial Installations and stocks of raw materials and finished goods This mayrecedent, and, if Tientsin or other large cities fall to thethe industrial Installations, power plants, and railway networks may be taken over by themomparatively undamaged state In attempting to rehabilitate the Industry of newly won areas, the Communists will necessarily be faced with theol replacing worn-out machinery and equipment, but in the immediate future, all of the Communists' industrial needs can bo met even with the plants in theirunder-maintained and obsolete condition. The Communists will not be faced with any large-scale shortages of skilled personnel, for most of the technicians operating Nationalist factories probably can be induced to slay on the Jobommunist regime.
The large arsenal at Mukden has fallen lo the Communist Forces and will add to the Communist military potential. Furthermore, the Communists have acquiredast stock of weapons and equipment in their capture of Nationalist military units that, even without the arsenal, the Communist Forces would have an adequate supply of munitions.
There Is no sTiort^rjt? of QQflfl in Msttchu iovinin^ CApACily bcwj well in excess ofiiemcnla for power plants, railroads, and fuel. When the Kalian mines (north of Tientsin) fall Into Communist hands, there willurplus of coal over and above Communist domestic requirement* In North China.
The transportation system ln North China and Manchuria, al though under-maintained and In most cases seriously deteriorated, will be of great benefit to the Communist* in their consolidation of the areas of North and Northeast China. Through rail routes are already in operation, and several more seem about to be. In addition, the capture of the North China ports might give theumber of small vessels, totalingons, which would provide adequate shipping for coastal requirements.
e. Possible Future Trends.
A basic advantage which the Communist* possess derives from the fact that the economic situation under the Nationalists in North and Central China has sodeteriorated that any change for the better, no matter how slight, will afford the Communist* great psychological beneBts. By re-establishing normal relationships between the major cities of North China and Manchuria and their surroundingthe wartime barriers to trade and communication will be eliminated, and the Communists' opportunity (or consoUdaUng their gains in this part of China will be Immeasurably advanced.
The Political Phase.
In the period during which the Communist political effort will be parallel to. and dependent upon, the military effort, the Chinese Communist Party will simultaneously: (a) consolidate its control over areas which It already occupies, (b) prepare toareas which will presently be under its control, and (c) continue lo erectommunist-dominated government for all of China.
a. Contotidot Ion of Control
Within China, the Communist Party has derived Its principal popularfrom the peasant masses, andesser extent from Industrial workers and urbanhe Communist Parly has skillfully exploited three major and genuine grievances: peasant misery, affronts to national sovereignty, and the coriuption and ineptitude of the National Government. By carrying out,arger scale than has the National Government, such basic agrarian reforms as redistribution of land and reduction of rent and taxes, the Communist Party apparently has demonstrated, to the majority of the populace in Communist-controlled areas, it* practical superiority to the National Government The promise of the CCP to defend China against foreign aggression has In some quarters been received with favor, despite the Chineseffinity with the USSR. The character ol the National Goveiovernment which not only has not solved but has lefuied even lo attack the basic economic and political problems of China, has of courseajor asset lo the Communists. The peasant masses have never supported the Nations) Government
and do not now resist the advances of the Communists. The latter are, furthermore, attracting increaalngly Urge numbers of urban workingmen. businessmen, intellectuals, and officials.
The various areas of China occupied by the Communists have In the past been administered Ihrough the Central Executive Committee of the ChineseParty; this body does not. however, fully perform the functionsentraland unconsolidated areas are apparently permitted to exercise some degree of administrative autonomy. About three months ago the Communist PartyNorth China People'sormalising the previous unification of two northern border region governments This North China government may beumber of other "People'so be formally establishedIn China as rapidly as the Communist Parly consolidates Its control. It ispossible that these various regional governments will be administered by agovernment, but public proclamation ofovernment would not beto the Communist plan forcoalition" with olher dissident groups and various elements of the present National Government. In the meantime. It Is probable that the various regional governments will be permitted to pursue policies best adapted to the particular area.
b. Prcparationi for Control.
At present the Communists areolicy of moderation both in the areas which they control and toward the areas which ihey are preparing to control. Before Communist Forcesesieged city, the Communist Party promises to cooperate with businessmen, landlords, and Nationalist troops, and appeals lo the people of the city to maintain order, preseive the governmental apparatus, and remain on the ]ob; the Communist Party promises that It will be lenient with all elements which "cooperate" with It Those tactics appear to indicate that the Communists, because they lack trained personnel, must rely in part upon Nationalist urban administrations, but in any case this practice enables the Communists to control any given city rapidly and to administer it efficiently. Political officers accompany Communist troops into the city; the military administration is replacedivil body as soon as practicable The maintenance of order and the restoration of the municipal government andcan be presented by lhe Communistsavorable contrast lo lhe disorder and confusion which preceded Its entry and which exist in many Nationalist-occupied cities not yet threatened by the Communists The Communists even claim that they will protect the interests of private Industry so long as such industrieshe Communists lack experience and personnel for the operation of large industries, and they are apparently willing, temporarily, to accept assistance from any quarter Thus the above claim certainly encourages propertied elements in their hope of survival in healthommunist government. It Is highly probable, however, that the Communist will assume complete control of all enterprises when they are prepared to do so
The Communist Parly also isoderate policy toward rural areas. The practice of outright expropriation of land, liquidation of landlords, and te. loi.za-
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bCC" 0mCia"yby Ih, Communist extremist." Agrarian reform, especially ua areas occuoied hv
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c. Government for All China.
resenuiivcs of the KMTRC. the Democratic UaRue and
National Government. It is ouitehat^hT^
non-Communist as titular (wad of tho to have a
former's positive achievements Ln China, has been extremely effective. In thatmall proportion of Chinese realize fully the Implicationsov let-orientedgovernment The Communist Party shared with theommonommon political organization, common strategies and techniques, and, atommon goal. The Chinese Communist Party has never publicly deviated from the Soviet Parly line, has never publicly criticized any Soviet action or representative, and has never publicly given any indication whatsoever that it could be oriented away from the USSR and toward the United Slates. It Is certain that the ChineseParty has been and is an instrument of Soviet policy While il is not certain that the Communist Party is or will be an absolutely reliable instrument, there appears to be no chancepilt within the Chinese Communist Party or between the USSR and the Chinese Communists, until at least such timeommunist-domlnaled
Original document.
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