CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO GREECE
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CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO OREECE THE PROBLEM
L By direction ot the National Security Council, wc estimate herein theof the following courses of US action with respect to Greece:
Course A: to coniinue and strengthen thc present program of US assistance by all feasible means short of the employment of US military power.
Course B: to continue and strengthen the present program of US assistance inwith one or more of the following uses of US military power:
Dispatchoken armed force to Greece.
Employment in Greece of all presently available US armed forces to assist in preventing Communist domination of Greece.
Strengthening and disposing US armed forces outside of Greece as would be deemed most effective.
Partial mobilization in the United States as an indication of deUnnina-tion to resist Communist expansion.
DISCUSSION
iscussion of the probable Soviet reaction to the courses of US action under consideration ls in Enclosuref the probable consequences in Greece, in Enclosurend of the probable reaction elsewhere in Europe and the Near East, In Enclosure
CONCLUSIONS
3ould have no appreciable eflect on current Soviet policy toward either Greece or thc United States. It wouldeneficial effect in Greece, but would be unlikely to prove decisive,
ould have no effect substantially different from the effects of Course A
ight alarm the USSR initially, but not after It had becomethat the US force In Greece was limited in strength and mission. Thc USSR would not accept risk of war for the sake of Greece. Only this course gives definite
NOTE: Trie InformaUon In thiss ofl whichlhe report wasU> Hie intelligence organizations ol thc Departments of State. Army, Navy, and Air Force for concurrence or substantial dissent
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of Suit. Navy, and All Force hawIn the report
The Intelligence Division, Department of thc Army, "docs not agree with the gcnrral tone of extreme pessimism found In the paper with regard to the success of lhe United states aid program (pp.ar.. par.,he apparent lack of wul on the part of the Grck Army toiliiary dedilon (p.nd par. I) and lhe statement lhat political Interference with the Greek Armyikely to continue or lhat such Interference is habitual (p.he Intelligence Division. Department of lhe Army. esUmales that lhe situation In regard to these factors Is not such as to leadonclusion that employment of United States tacticalould be required to achieve succeaa."
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OP CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION WTTH RESPECT TO GREECE THE PROBLEM
direction o( thc National Security Council, we estimate herein theof the following courses of US action with respect to Greece:
Course A; to continue and strengthen thc present program of US assistance by all feasible means short of the employment of US military power.
Course B: to continue and strengthen the present program of US assistance Inwith one or more of the following uses of US militaryispatchoken armed force to Greece.
Employment in Greece of all presently available US armed forces to assist in preventing Communist domination of Greece.
Strengthening and disposing US armed forces outside of Greece as would be deemed most effective.
Partial mobilization in the United States as an indication ofto resist Communist expansion.
DISCUSSION
of the probable Soviet reaction to the courses of US actionis in Enclosuref the probable consequences in Greece, inand of the probable reaction elsewhere in Europe and the Near East, In
CONCLUSIONS
ould have no appreciable effect on current Soviet policy toward either Greece or the United States. It wouldeneficial effect in Greece, but would be unlikely to prove decisive,
ould have no effect substantially different from the effects of Course A.
ight alarm the USSR initially, but not after it had becomethat the US force in Greece was limited in strength and mission. The USSR would not accept risk of war for the sake of Greece. Only this course gives definite
NOTE: Thc information in thiss olt which lime the report wasto the Intelligence organizations ot the Departments of State, Army. Navy, and Air Force for concurrence or substanUal dissent
The InteUigence organizations of Ihc Departments of Slate. Navy, and Air Force haveIn the report.
The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, "does not agree with the general tone of extreme pessimism found in the paper with regard to the success of the United States aid program (pp.ar.. par..he apparent lack of will on the part of the Greek Army toilitary decision (p. a. end par.nd the statement that political Interference with the Greek Army command is likely to continue or that such Interference Is habitual (p.he Intelligence Division. Department of Uie Army, estimates that lhe situation In regard to these factors Ls not such as to leadonclusion that employment of United States tactical units would be required to achieve success
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of the pacification of Greece, which is essential to that country's economic recovery and political stability.
ouldess decisive effect on the situation in Greece than would,ore favorable effect than would Courses,. Friendly states in Europe and the Near East would prefer It to. It might cause the Kremlin to reconsider its current general policy. (See below.)
ould have no direct effect on the local situation in Greece, but wouldenerally reassuring and stabilizing effect throughout free Europe and the Near East. It would probably cause the Krcrnlin to reconsider Its current general policy, the basic choices before it being (a) to continue that policy substantially(b) toeneral peace settlement, or (c) toreventive war. The Kremlin would resort to war only if convincedS attack on the USSR was in prospect and inevitable.
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ENCLOSURE "A"
SOVIET REACTION
Thc consequences of the various courses of US action under considerationprimarily on the Soviet reaction thereto. The Kremlin would Interpretof each In terms of the global situation, not merely ln relation to thcIn Greece. Appreciation of the probable consequences, therefore,review of thc basic policy ot thc USSR and consideration of the relativeof Greece in Soviet
Soviet Policy.
Thc Soviet Governmentossible war of survival with the capitalist world. It therefore seeks to Increase its relative strength by building up Its own war potential and improving its strategic position while undermining the strength and position of its presumed antagonists. In particular. It seeks to gain control over West-era Europe, or at least to prevent hostile development of that areaotential base of attack on thc USSR. For the present, however, the potential (as distinguished from Immediately available) strength of the Soviet Union and Its satellites is so markedly inferior to that of the United States that, in its efforts to improve its strategic position, the USSR must take care to avoid provokingarlike reaction on the part of the United Slates. Consequently, although the USSR would resist wllha real or supposed threat to the security of its existing strategic position in Eastern Europe, it will be flexible and opportunistic In its efforts to extend thc area under its control, taking care to avoid any commitment which might bring It or its satellites Into direct and inescapable physical conflict with the United States
So far this policy has produced satisfactory results. The Soviet Union has made significant progress in lhe development of ils war potential and has consolidated ils position In lhe Satellite SLates. It has prospects of expanding further the area under its control by means short of general war No power or possible combination of powers could mount an effective military attack on the USSR without intensive preparationsonsiderable period of time
3. Contingent Alternative Policies.
Pending thc developmentoviet war potential decisively superior to that of thc United States, there appear to be only two possible contingencies in view of which there mightadical revision of Soviet policy as set forth above.
If the Kremlin were to conclude that, despite its efforts, the situation in Western Europe was definitely becoming stabilized on the basis of the European Recovery Program and the Western Union, it would have occasion to reconsider its policy. There is no reason to suppose that the Kremlin already considersevelopmentIn the contingency envisaged, the basic choices before it would be: (a) lo continue to adhere to Its current general policy; (b) to accept the stabilization of
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Western Europe, abandon (for the time being) an expansionist policy there,eneral European settlement, concentrate on the internal development of the area under firm Soviet control, and await with confidence the "inevitable" occurrenceew "revolutionaryr, (c) to take advantage of its still existing, butdiminishing, capability to overrun Western Europereventive war. The Kremlin would be predisposed in favor of the first or second alternative. The third, presumablylobal war with the United States, would be acceptable only if the Kremlin were also convinced that the United States and Western Europe would inevitably attack the USSR once thc recovery of Western Europe had been accomplished.
Expansion of the existing US military establishmentignificant increase in US military strength In Europe and/or the Mediterranean would also cause aof Soviet policy, the broad alternatives before the Kremlin being the same as those presented above. Again, the Kremlin would probably prefer toeneral settlement if il could believe that thereby war could be avoided. It would resort to preventive war only if convincedS attack on the USSR was actually in prospect and inevitable.
It must be taken into account, in this connection, that Kremlin appreciation of US capabilities and intentions may be distorted by ideological preconceptions andInteUigence.
4. The Relative Importance of Greece to the USSR.
The only vital Soviet interest in Greeceonsequence of the vulnerability of vital targets in the Soviet Union to long-range air attack from the Near East. On this flank thc USSR lacks the defense in depth which it has gained on the west by its advance from the Pripct Marshes into the heart of0he Ideal desirability ofimilar defensive zone on the south (and of gaining other advantages) by extending Soviet control over Greece, Turkey, Iran, and thc Arab States is obvious. At the very least the Kremlin Is likely to regard it as vital to prevent the establishment hi Greece of an "imperialist" slronghold capable of resisting Spviet atiack andof use inear Eastern base or operations against lhe USSR in the event of war.
Effective Communist (Soviet) control of Greece would avert this danger andthe further extension of Soviet control in the Near East. Soviet domination of the Aegean would by itself prevent hostile naval intrusion into the Black Sea,of who controlled the Straits. It would, moreover, extend on the west the existing double envelopment of Turkey, permitting the exertion of such pressure as might eventually neutralize that country or bring it under Soviet control. From Greek bases Soviet aircraft and submarines could endanger shipping throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and Soviet aircraft could also threaten land targets in Tripoli, Cirenaica. Egypt, and the Levant. In addition to these capabilities. Communistto power in Greece, in defiance of the "Trumanould have profound psychological and poliUcal consequences advantageous to the USSR, in Western Europe and Uie Middle East as well as in thc Eastern Mediterranean. Thus the USSR has much to gain by pressing Communist revolutionary operations in Greeceuccess-
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(ul conclusion, unci much lo lose by permitting the Communists to be detested by US intervention.
Thc countervailing considerations, from thc Soviet point of view axe: (a) the necessity to avoid provoking an undesired war; (b) the greater value ot Western Europeossible prize; and (c) the greater urgency ot the situation with respect to Western Europe. In all probability the Near and Middle East will remain indefinitely unstable and vulnerable to Soviet penetration, but the postwar opportunity in Western Europe must be realized before It Is lost through the stabilization of that area.In bringing Western Europe under Soviet domination wouldore immediate and decisive eflect on the global situation than would the extension of Soviet control in any other sector of Eurasia. If the USSR were willing to accept the risk of war over Oreece, It would sooner incur that risk to gain Western Europe.
In sum, thc USSR would be extremely sensitive to a. hostile build-up In Greece or anywhere else on its exposed southern flank, bul would not take counteractionrisk ot war unless convinced that the operationeal threat to the security of thc USSR itself or to Its control of the Satellite States. The USSR's own operations in Greece arc essentially the exploitation of an especially favorable opportunityecondary front
5. Exploitation or Opportunity ii* Greece.
The special opportunity which the USSR is exploiting in Greece resulted from (a) thc postwar exhaustion and disorganization of that naturally poor and politicallycountry; (b) its accessibility from neighboring states under Soviet control; (c> the existence, ready-made,ommunist-led guerrilla movement, developed during thc Axis occupation; and (d) the existenceational government vulnerable to attack as "monarcho-Fascist" With covert Soviet and Satellite support, thehave grown In strength, despite all efforts to pacify or suppress them, and. by keeping thc countryurmoil, have prevented Ils economic rehabilitation andstabilization. But for such assistance as the Greek Government has received from the United Kingdom and thc United Stales, the Communists might well have already seized control of the country orajor portion of It
Soviet support of the Greek insurgents has consisted of (a) psychological warfare against the Greek Government and against British and US "interference" In Greece; <b> unified direction and control of operations in Greek and Satellite territory by qualified international Communists; (c) provision of secure bases in Satellite territory; and (d) Satellite provision of supplies and equipment in increasing quantity. Alien personnel, however, have not yet appeared in Greece in appreciable numbers.
Further increase in the provision of supplies and equipment to the insurgents is to be expected, including the passible provision of aircraft, tanks, and additionalForeign volunteers may also appear, particularly as required to man technical equipment With careful regard for US reaction, however, the USSR and the Satellite States will avoid any open and inescapable commitment in Greece. No Soviet orforces, as such, will enter the country, nor arc the USSR and the Satellite States likely to grant formal recognition lo Ihc Communist government, at least not untilcontrol of Greece is apparently assured.
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The Kremlin has no public commitment with respect to Greece comparable to the "Trumanespite popular identification of the guerrillas as agents of Soviet policy, the USSR retains complete freedom of action.
A.
If the United States were to extend and "strengthen" thc present program ofto Greece, without employing US military power, there would be no change In Soviet policy toward either Greece or the United States. The USSR would rely upon its own Increased aid to the guerrillas to balance any problematical increase in the effectiveness of the Greek Army and upon continued guerrilla activity to frustrate US efforts to achieve economic recovery and political stability. Soviet propaganda would intensify its exploitation of the theme of US "interference" in Greek Internal affairs.
.
If, in addition to extending and strengthening the present aid program for Greece, thc United States should alsooken armed force to that country, there would still be no immediate change in Soviet policy. The USSR would be keenly alert to determine whether the token force was the advance guardarger bodyit might pauseew estimate of the situationwhen the token force was recognized as such thc USSR would continue its present operations withompensatory Increase In material aid for the guerrillas. Soviet propaganda would redouble ils attacks on US "imperialism" in Greece: thc USSR might raise the issue in the United Nations. Provocative incidents would be arranged in order to induce US soldiers to kill innocent Greeks, for propaganda purposes. The guerrillas, however, would probably avoid the US force in their military operations.
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If "all presently available US armed forces" were set in motion toward Greece thc USSR might well become unduly, but genuinely, alarmed. Soviet intelligence would be concerned to discover the expedition's ultimate strength and mission, and would receive exaggerated and alarmist reports on those subjects. By way of precaution Soviet and Satellite forces might be puttate of readiness for war. The USSR would not precipitate hostilities, however; Soviet diplomacy would first explore the possibilityeaceful solution. When it became apparent that the US force in Greece was limited in strength and mission the USSR would be reassured. It would then be content to maintain the existing ratio of Soviet to US strength in Europe, knowing that if war did come eventually it could quickly overwhelm the US force in Greece.
While not opposing Soviet force to US force in Greece, the USSR would exploit to the utmost the propaganda value of US military intervention there. Its condemnation of US "reactionary and war-mongering imperialism" might well include an indictment of the United States before the United Nations.
Soviet concern to avoid direct Soviet or Satellite involvement in Greece, as well as the eflecl of US miliiary operations, would tend to curtail the amount of material aid actually received by the guerrillas. After offering such resistance as they could, most
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of them would find sanctuary In Satellite territory, where they would be received as political refugees. Every effort consistent with avoidance of war would be made,to maintain an effective underground resistance in Greece,iew to retarding stabilization andenewal of guerrilla activity if and when thc US forces withdrew.
The USSR would soon appreciate that the commitment of "all available US forces" In Greece had precluded prompt US military intervention elsewhere. It might then, in keeping with its current policyntensify its subversive operations in countries of greater importance than Greece (e, g, Italy or Iran)iew toa fait accompli before US forces could be extricated from Greece to prevent it, or before additional US forces could be made available for that purpose.
If, however,ere supported by. the Kremlin might well take occasion to reconsider its current policy. The critical consideration in this case would be the Soviet reaction to, discussed in
.
The adoption of this course would have no direct bearing on the Greek situation unless the contemplated deployment of US forces occurred in the EasternThe initial Soviet reactionS build-up there would be as to the initial phase of. The USSR wouldhreat on its relatively exposed southern flank and would take corresponding precautions. When it became apparent, however, that the US forces in the Eastern Mediterranean were limited in strength and even more limited in mission than the force contemplated under, the Kremlin would recognize that they constituted no Immediate threat to Soviet security.
ontinued adherence to current Soviet policy, the augmented US forces in thc Mediterranean, equally available for military intervention in Italy. Greece, or Turkey, would serveestraint on Soviet or Communist operations against any of those countries. At thc same time their presence in the vicinity would impose less restraint on Communist operations within Greece than would. The USSR would remain free to give sufficient support to the guerrillas to prevenLof the situation in Greece.
However, contemplation of US developmenttrategic position in readiness out of reach of direct Soviet ground attack, yet suitablease for eventual US air attack on the USSR, might well cause the Kremlin to reconsider Its current policy and to weigh the alternatives of appeasement or preventive warhis reaction would be probable ifere adopted in conjunction with.
.
The USSR would be concerned with the global implications of partial mobilization in the United States, without particular reference to the situation in Greece. Such mobilization would probably cause the Kremlin lo reconsider its current general policy and to weigh the alternatives ol appeasement or preventive warofr ofn conjunction withould intensify Soviet anxiety and would tend to weight the scales in favor of preventive war. It must be stressed, however, that thc Kremlin would choose war at this time only if convinced that appeasement was futile, that eventual US attack was inevitable, and that lhc USSR must strike first in self defense.
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ENCLOSURE
CONSEQUENCES IN GREECE
1. General Considerations.
Thc effective pacification of Greece is prerequisite to the economic rehabilitation and political stabilization of that country.reponderance of numerical strength in the orderohe Greek Army has failed to subdue the guerrillas, whose relative capabilities have steadily increased. This failure is attributable only In part to the elusive tactics hitherto employed by the guerrillas and to thc foreign aid which they have received. Also involved are the adverse effect of political Intrigue on Army efficiency and morale and thc Army's apparent lack of will toilitary decision.
Political interference in Greek Army command is habitual, the consequence of the bitter factionalism characteristic of Greek politics and of the relationship in Greek experience between control of the Army and political survival. The tendency is likely to continue, even in circumstances of extreme national peril, thc stake being political control of Greece if and when the situation has been stabilized.
An increasingly important morale factoratalistic sense that the conflict in Greece Is essentially one between the USSR and the United States thc outcome of which cannot be decided by Greek effort. From this point of view it would appear that
vigorous action against the guerrillas would probably result only in increased Soviet support of them, Intensifying the fighting without hopeavorable decision.
The mood of depression prevailing in Greece and stifling military, political, and economic initiative can be broken onlyonviction that the United States Is firmly resolved to bring the struggle in that countryavorable and early conclusion.that the United States would never permit the Communists to come to power is not enough What is needed is conviction that thc United States Is determined to break the existing deadlock
2. Coin.se A.
Continuation of direct US assistance to Greece beyond8 is essential to prevent the collapse of the existing regime and eventual Communist control of thcstrengthening" of the assistance program, in the sense of increasedwould have beneficial effect, but would not itself produce decisive results. Increased economic and financial aid can result in effective suppression of the guerrillas, economic rehabilitation, and poliiical stability only if the United States is able loa decisive influence upon Greek poliUcal acUon. internal administration, andoperations without antagonizing the Greeks and forfeiting their cooperation. To accomplisheat wouldare combination of force and tact, an adequate and skillful public relations program, and perfect timing. To rely exclusively upon the successful management of auch an intervention would be to incur considerable risk of the operation's backfiring.
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Thc crux of the problem with respect tos whether the Greek Army,from political interference, increased in numerical strength, and well supplied,
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equipped, and "advised" (I. e. directed) could succeed in suppressing the guerrillas without thc employment ot US military force. In the best case the Army might succeed in doing so. but that result is problematical. Considerable US interference in Greek politics would be required lo protect the Army from Greek political Interference; US political interference could be as demoralizing as Greek, or more so. Sovietwould be alert to exploit actual instances of US interference to document its presently somewhat abstract case against US "imperialism" in Greece. The USSR would presumably Increase its aid to the "Democratico that the relativeof the Greek Army might not be decisively Increased. Even in the best case. It Is improbableilitary decision could be won. although the guerrilla situation might possibly be brought under more effective control. The most probable result wouldontinuation of the existing stalemate In the worst case, there might be an adverse reaction to US interference resultingisintegration of Greekto Communism.
In short, adoption ofould probably result in some improvement in thc Greek situation, but would be unlikely toecisive effect
.
The arrivaloken US armed force in Greece wouldomentarilypsychological effect, but this tendency would be reversed when it became apparent that the token force did notecisive military intervention. Ultimately the presenceS force would have no greater influence on thc situation than that of the existing British token force. It would afford some assurance that the United States would not permit the Communists to gain complete control of the country, but no hope of an end to the existing situation.
.
The employment of "all available" US armed foices In Greece wuuld affordhope of an early pacification of the country and of consequent economic recovery and political stabilization This renewed hope would itself contribute greatly to the accomplishment ol those objectives. Curtailment of Satellitenclosurearagraph II) would so reduce guerrilla capabilities as probably 'o permit effectiveof the Communist Insurrection, although Communist underground resistance would continue and minor banditti might still hold out in the mountains Greecebeen effectively pacified. Its economic rehabilitation might be accomplished. Thc US forces could not be withdrawn, however, without exposing Greeceenewal ofguerrilla uclivity.
.
The strengthening of US forces in tbe Eastern Mediterranean, but ouuide of Greece, would still leave to thc Greek Army the critical task ni suppressing the guerrillas. As Inecisive results could not be regarded as assured. The Greeks would be encouraged by the presence of stronger US forces in thc vicinity, but only to the extent that they supposed effective direct support to be at hand Thc USSR would not be prevented from continuing Its covert support of thc guerrillas. In the
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end the (allure ofo eventuate inight result in morethan encouragement in Greece.
6. .
Partial mobilization in the United States would have little direct bearing on the actual situation in Greece. Such comfort as thc Greeks might derive from an increase in US capabilities in general would be counteracted by apprehensioneneral war in which Greece would surely be overrun by Soviet forces. In short, this Course would have no appreciable net effect in Greece except as It affected the general policy of the USSK (Enclosure.
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ENCLOSURE "C
REACTIONS EI.SEWHERE IN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST
All the free nations of Europe and the Near East are extremely apprehensive of further Soviet aggression, Internal or external. All are keenly aware of their ownweakness and the immediate presence of overwhelming Soviet power. They realize that the only restraint on the USSR Is fear of the potential strength of the United States. All are eager for evidenceeal and firm determination on the part of the United States to support their continued independence by miliiary as well as economic means. If need be. The assurance of security which only thc United States could afford them is indispensable to international stability and economic recovery. But all fear that the United States may precipitate an armed conflict with the USSR for which neither thc United States nor they were prepared and in the course of which they would surely be overrun. This apprehension tempers their desireorceful demonstration of US determination. All would welcome, however,ubstantial increase in actual US military powerorward movement of US forcestrategic position hi which there could be no dangerollision with Soviet forces but from which they could render Immediate support.
A.
Increased US economic and financial aid to Greece might arouse in other countries some Jealous anxiety lest greater appropriations for Greece meant less for themselves. Other states dependent on US aid would watch closely the Implementation of thc US program in Greece for indications of the extent lo which compromise of nationalwould be concomitant with acceptance of extraordinary assistance All would be in some degree susceptible to Soviet propaganda on that point, but such propaganda could have important effect only if US Interference in Greece resultedonspicuous forfeiture of Greek confidence, good will, and cooperation.
.
Except as it might be momentarily mistaken for the beginning of, the dispatchS token force to Greece would have little eflect in other countries.
Tlic employment in Greece of "all presently available US forces" would arousefear of imminent armed conflict between the United Stales and lhe USSR. This apprehension would be relieved when war did not ensue, and as the situation in Greece was stabilized it would be succeeded by new confidence in the effectiveness of US support. Except in Turkey, however, there would be continuing concern regarding thein Greece of "ail available" US forces.
.
A US strategic build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean (without lhe commitment of US forces in Greece) wouldenerally reassuring and stabilizing effect in Europe
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and thc Near East, particularly so in Italy and Turkey. II, however, the forcibleof Palestine were still contemplated, the Arab States, which would normally have welcomed the development, would necessarily regard It with misgiving. In the nascent "Western Union" there might be some regret at the commitment elsewhere of forces otherwise available for direct support, except as it was understood that from thc Eastern Mediterranean they could render more effective support than they could directly. Of the three courses Involving employment of US forces overseas, this course would bepreferred, except In Oreece
6.
A partial mobilization in thc United States would be welcomed by all states disposed to resist Soviet aggression, as actually indispensable. In present circumstances, to assure that degree of security essential to International stability and economic recovery.
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DISTRIBUTION
Tbe PTUldail Secretary ot SUtc-
Chief Ot Staff to Commander In Chief
Secretary of Del*on
Secretary of tho Army
Secretary of ine Navy
Secretary ot tha Air Foroa
EaeeutlTO Secretary, National Security Council
CiuLirraan. National Security Reaouicei Board
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chier of Naval Opera Uona
Cblef of Staff, US Air Force
Director of Plana and Operations, General Staff, us Army
Deputy Chief of Naval Operatlona (Operation*)
Director of Plana and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Research, and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence,. US Army
Chief ot Naval Intelllgeac*
Director of Intelligence, US Air Force
Secretary. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary. Jotat Intelligence. Group
Secretary. BUte-Anny-Navy-Alr Force Coordinating Committee
Executive Secretary. miliary Liaison Committee to the Atomic Kaergy CoramUfloa Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission Chief. Acquisition and Distribution.epailment of Stat*
Original document.
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