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CUBAN POLITICAL TRENDS
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CUBAN POUTICAL TRENDS SUMMARY
The Cuban presidential elections scheduled8 can have an adverse eflect on US security interests because (a) they will influence the attitude of the Cuban Government toward fundamental US strategic interests, possibly with resultsto those produced by the rejection of the Panama base-sites agreement by the government of that country, and (b) they will determine the degree of favor or disfavor with which the future Cuban Government will regard basic US policies and objectives to be presented and implemented at future international conferences. Neither the Communists nor the proponents of extreme nationalism (Cubanidad) are likely to achieve,esult of the elections,ajority of votesignificant numerical increase in popular strength Political events in Cuba, however, make it apparent that both pre- and post-election cabals among the various contending groups and parties can permit the Communists and/or the Cubanidad nationalists toisproportionate and pervasive influence over Cuban affairs The influence of the former would be exercised In the familiar directions; the ideologies and programs of thc latter would at once be translated into official governmeni campaigns against US "economicand into noisy apprehension regarding the US concept of hemisphere defense and military cooperation. Strength of major groups, and posslbUilies from Communist or Cubanidad combinations, arc analyzed In thc body of this estimate
Note; The information in this report Is as of IS
The intelligence organisation* of litt Departments of th* Kavy. and the Au Forceraj in the report: the Intelligence Diililm Debarment ol the Army, had no comment; the di&scni of the Intelligence Organization. Department ot state, is published herewith as Enclosure
CUBAN POLITICAL TRENDS
Political evt-nls in Cuba, like those tn other countries situated within the area of unquestioned US predominancethe Caribbean and the northern part of South Americausually do not assume thc white or black, pro-US or anti-US cotoralion which is possible In countries remote from the area ol US predominance or even on the margin of that area. It is, for example, almost inconceivable that one ol the Caribbean countries should make an open anti-US alliance with an unfriendly power Theimportant for US security is not whetherountry willonstant friendeclared enemyneither of which is likely to occurbut whetherwill run relatively smoothly or be sabotagederies of acts or group ofeach relatively unimportant inase in point is Panama's rejection of the base-sites agreement, certainly not to be attributed solely to thc personal views ofnd Harmodio Anas, or to Panamanian resentment of long-continued military restrictions, or lo the approaching elections thaiationalistic positionould bc-successful candidate, or. least oE all. to any deep-seated hostUlty to the US and desire to shlvk defense responsibilities On the contrary. It was theboth individually and in combinationof these and other factorsormally friendly majority lhat produced at ieasi temporarily damaging effect on US security Interests Similarly, in Cuba the degree with which the US will encounter either willing cooperation or stubborn recalcitrance In any given situation will be frequently determined by the influence which the numerically small anti-US groups are able to exercise through alliance with other, intrinsically more important forces. For this reason, the Cuban elections must be examinediew to discovering the Individual group and parly strengths, and thc likelihood of inter parly alignments andf ihe impact of the anil-US forces hi Cuban national policy is to be appreciated.
1. ist
Communist strength in Cuba is reflected in two organizations closely connected with one another: the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC recently divided into Communist and non-Communist factions) and the Popular Socialist Parlyhich is the Communist party of Cuba, a. Confederation of Cuban Workers.
Communist control of the CTC had lis origins in thc history of Cuban organized labor The first truly national federation of tabor unions in Cuba was the National Confederation of Cuban WorkersrganizedS. which had. as one of its principal organizers. Julio Antonio Mella. secretary of the Communist Parly. President Machado rigidly repressed the CNOC. martyrized Mella by having him assassinated, andival Cuban Federation of Labor with AFL affiliations. The AFL was considered anti-negro in Cuba and this fact gave additional support to the CNOC. which managed to operate illicitly
Social upheaval that accompanied lhe downfall of Machado permitted the CNOC, under Communist domination, lo emet gc from underground with enhanced pres-
tigc and power, and its influence persisted5 when Batista, the real power in Cuba, dissolved it and Jailed many of its leaders.owever, Batista renounced his anti-Communist, anti-labor stand and permitted the formationew laborthe CTC, under the leadership of the negro Communist, Lazaro Peria. This organization included many original CNOC leaders.
plit had developed between Batista and the Autenticos, led by Grau, within the initial anti-Machado forces. Both sought support from the newly created CTC. The Communists in the CTCatista alliance. The Autcn-ticos sought to oust the Communists from the CTC for, once rid of Communist pro-Batista leaders, the CTC would then consent to cooperation with the Autenticos.
Competition tor control continued after Grau became Presidentlthough the anti-Communist, pvo-Autentico faction was weakened by the Communist Party's participation in thc Grau governing coalition. This persistedhen Grauplit in the Confederation of Cuban Workers between Communist and non-Communist members. Each elected national committees. Thecommittee was then recognized as the solo CTC committee. leaving thegroup without legal standing. Grau subsequently broke with the Communist Party, causing it to leave thc government coalition. Today anti-Communist union membership is greater than that of the rival Communist unions. The future growth and prestige of the anti-Communist unions will be greatly affected by the degree of popular support accorded the AuUnttco Parly in8 elections.
h. Popular Socialist Party.
Legalizedolitical party9 under Batista, the Cuban Communist Party (the Popular Socialist Party) was accorded cabinet representationto Grau's election it retained influence byolitical alliance with the Autenticos, thus escaping the consequences of having supported thc losing Presidential candidate.
In the registration for the forthcominglections, PSP. the smallest of any of the six Cuban national parties. In the election itself thc PSP can be expected to pollotes The importance of its vole, however, will not be derived from the number cast but for whom they are cast and the relative strength of the party of the winning Presidential candidate in thc next Cubanommunist candidate running alone will have no chance of election. The PSP is thus now strivingargainon-Communist candidate by which the Communists may obtain postelection influence in exchange for support of the non-Communist candidate at the polls. The degree of adherenceon-Communist President to any such pre-election bargain with the Communists will depend upon the need for the Communist congressional vote in ordei toorking majority.
2. Non-COMMUMST STnEKGTH.
Non-Communist strength in Cuba is derivedubstantial majority ofnaffiliated registered voters in combination with the adherents ot the five non-Communist political parties whose registered strengthas follows:
Cuban Revolutionary Party
Cuban People's
a. Cuban Revolutionary Patty.
The Cuban Revolutionary Party (AutenticosI emerged from the struggle against Machado3oosely knit force that included not only students who had spearheaded the revolution but also workers opposed to Machado After the original primary period of reaction against thc Machado dictatorship its politicalcrystallizedomplex of aspirations referred to as Cubantdad, still the strongest and most durable influence in Cuban political life Cwtxinidad may bias ultranatlonalism (especially in economicreater opportunities for the peasants and workers, and improvement in thc economic and political status of thc masses in combination with advocacy of equal rights for negroes
Although President Grau San Martin has beenymbol of Aufen'ico strength and policy, failure tochematic arrangement of party policy has permitted sharp divergencies to develop within AuUntico ranks This has beenby Grau's personal predilection for remote and philosophical attitudes. Party discipline, consequently, has been unable to cope with the original anarchist-terroristic elements within the party which, by now, have damaged the party's prestige and authority with bombs, assassinations, and organized extortion
A party coterie, known as the BAOA. has evolved from the alliance of Pauline (Grau's sister-in-law who lives in the palace wither son, her favorite, and her cousin by marriage, and has developedeal political force that now seeksto capture for one of its adherents thc Autentwo nomination for the Presidency.
An open deserter from Autentico ranks has been Senator Eddy Chlbas, who led his following out of the party7ew party, thc Cuban People's Party,
Regardless of defections and divergencies, however, the Autenticos. as the party In power and as the heir of the traditions of the anti-Machado revolution, remain the largest single party in Cuba. Its Presidential candidate supported by the Republican Party cannot be defeated at thc polls exceptnited effort of oil ma|or opposition partiesarge proportion of the independent voters, b. Liberal Party
The Liberal Parly, the oldest and second largest party In Cuba, has neverfrom former Machado associations. Furthermore, its traditional, conservative, and retrospective outlook, lis lackopular program, and inability to attract young people hasrogressive loss of adherents despite excellent precinct andorganization Only by participationuccessful coalition against the Autenticos can it hope to derive power from theune elections, c Republican Party.
The Republican Partyonservative, non revolutionary parly thatfrom the Democratic Party4 lo support Grau's candidacy. The Republl-
cans resented Batlsia's continued Influence and the coalition with the Communist Party that he had perfected. But the postelection Autentico agreement with thcand the unheeded contention of the Republican leader. Alonso Pujol, that thc Aufenficos shouldepublican candidate8 in reward4 support, has driven the Republicans to serious conversations with the Liberals and Democratsiew to forming an anti-Aufe'nfico alliance. The final outcome of such conversations will partially depend on whom the Autenticos nominate. Meanwhile, Autenticos' choiceandidate will possibly be influenced by the realization that the existing Autentico-Republican alliance is essential if the opposition parties unite.
Parti/.
The Democratic Party Is intimately identified with its principalyoung, and vigorous Raul Menocal, ex-mayor of Havana. Menocal actively champions united opposition to the Autenticos. Although already the Democratic nominee for President, he has stated his willingness to step aside in order totrong anti-Aiiferiflco coalition.
People's Party.
The Cuban People's Partyecent product of the alliance of the former ABC Party and the followers of Eddy Chibas, has alreadyplit that threatens its future.
The ABC Parly originally Included many middle- and upper-class young men of ability and talent who organizedellular pattern against the Machado despotism. Although very effeclivc as revolutionaries and publicists, the ABC failed lo develop electoral strength and won cabinet representation only by successive opportune political alliances. Rather than face gradual but inevitable disappearanceolitical party, ABC joined with the colorful radio commentator and senator, Eddyide disparity in basic views. For while the ABC today is comprised largely of experienced political opportunists, Chibas continues lo broadcast his doctrine that no pad should be made with the "evil" opposition parties and that devotion to the "orthodox" principles of3 revolution constitutes the proper function of lhe new party. Observance of these principles, according to Chibas, would abolish graft, black markets, monopolies, and exploitation by foreigners. To Chibas. thc Communistserversion; to thc ABC theylcc of voles capable of possible political utility. Thc intellectual gulf is too great to permit real cohesion. Schism appears imminent, in which some former followers of Chibas and lhe ABC will probably promote an anli-Autentico coalition and Chibas will endeavor to hold his partisans togethermall independent party or drill back to the Autenticosavorable Juncture. /. Unaffiliated Voters.
The unaffiliated voters are an Invisible party of morealf million who did not indicate preferences in the registration and whoossible deciding element in the forthcoming elections. The vole of this group, uncommitted as yet. will probably be divided among the existing parties in proportion to the effectiveness of the election-time appeals of respective candidates and their political alignments
3. Factors Affecting Elections.
Factors now aflcclingune elections are: (a) the Autenticos' choice of a
candidate; (bl the possibility ol an anti Autentico coalition; (c) adheience ot theto their present Autentico alliance, (d) position ol the Communists in political realignments: (c) possibility of an Attlcntuo split with one of the two factions lining up with the Communists; and (f> trend of the unaffiliated vote.
Principal present contenders for the Autentico nomination are: Suarez Fernandez. Prio Socarras, and Jose de Sanossible compromise candidate, known to be favored by President Crau. Suarez Fernandez' nomination might insure Communist support. Prio. the leader of Orau's anti-Communist campaign within the Crc. could not gain this support On the other hand, his anti-Communist record wouldistinct appeal to Chibas. Jose de San Martin, is not openly identified as either pio or anti-Communist, although the BAGA, whose support he would need for nomination, is anil-Communist If Suarez Fernandez were nominated, and elected wilh Communist support, the principal unfavorable effect on US interests would be the re-establishf Communist strength within the Cuban Government If either of the other two candidates succeeds in being elected, without Communist support, the possible increase in "Cubanicfad" nationalism might be haimlul to US interests.
The Liberals. Democrats. Republicans, and opportunists in the People's Party have discussed an antl-Aufenirco coalition but there is Republican reluctance to Joiningoalition and the other three gioups remsin unconvinced that Republican adherence is indispensable to victory.
The Republicans, who recall the disaster of the antUAulentico coalition in the last Havana mayoralty election, will be reluctant again to Joinoalition unless assured of victory; the more so since they would have nothing to gain save additional patronage and spoils, rather than power. In the case of success in the elections by an anli-Aufenfica coalition formedumber of parties, not including the Communist, actual operations of the resulting government would depend an the personnel Inposts and the extent of cooperation obtained from the different parties The outstanding possibility as the coalition's candidate is Nunei Portuondo. of thc Liberal Party, an old-line political lesdcr whose election would not be detrimental to US interests Republican adherence to the coalition would appear to be necessary to success.
Because an alliance with the Communists would now hurl any existing single party more than it would help, the Communist* are likely to remain isolated There is atossibility, however, that the Autenticos, unable to agreeingle candidate of their own, will split into two opposing factions, one of which will ally itself with lhe Communists Bul if the Autenticos remain united, thc isolation of the Communists should continue unless il becomes clear eithernited sntl-Aufenfico coalition, or to tls opponents, Ihai Communist votes could decide the election. Even then, loss of the 'inafiiliated voles might outweigh the gain
Prediction of the trend of the unaffiliated vote Is al present impossible. Were it to be distributed proportionately among individual parties or coalitions, it will have no significant effect. But since few Cubans remain indifferent to politics, sudden and unexpected events of the moment could have an immediate effect on the unaffiliated vote and makeetermining factor.
ENCLOSURE"A"
DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE
It is believed that the somewhat alarming tone of the summary is not Justified by the main text of the report nor by the known facts of the Cuban situation.
Although there is developing nationalismrowing spirit or independence in Cuba which is tending in the long run to make it more difficult for the United States to deal with Cuba with regard to the interests of the United States in that country, there appears to be little if anything in the present political situation which Indicates that the election of8 will be critical as far as US security interests are It does not rccm likely that thc victorious party or coalition will be any less cooperative than the present administration. The Communists have been eliminated in the past year from thc coalition supporting the present administration, and although It is possible that thc Communists might be includedoalition in the forthcoming election, they are unlikely to have more influence than they have had until recently in the Grau Administration In any case. It appears that the strength of the Communists in Cuba is declining slightly rather than increasing. It seems unlikely that theAutenticos will be. If elected, substantially more nationalistic than they have been for the past four years.
Of course any electionoreign country in which thc United States has such important interests as it has in Cuba will affect in some manner the relations between the countries If the more conservative, anti administration forces should bein the June election, it is altogether possible that the United States would find it easier to obtain concessions or negotiate agreements wiih the Cuban Government
Summation of the facts does not appear lohat United .Stairs security interests arc in Jeopardy in the coming election.
Original document.
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