THE KURDISH MINORITY PROBLEM
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
ublicalionnformation and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and ol individuals under thc Jurisdiction of thc recipient's office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Fur.hc dissemination elsewhere in thc department to other offices which require thefor thc performance of oilicial duties may he authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of Slate for Research and Intelligence for the Department of Stale
irector of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army
Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
of Intelligence. USAF. for the Department of the Air Force
' uSoneCU"ly andAEC. for the Atomic Energy Com-
eputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. CIA, for anyor 1
his copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or relumed lo the central Intelligencewith the Office of Collection and Dissemination. ' *
DtSTKWl'TION Office of the President National Security Council National Secuillyard Department of Stale OfTct of flcrretary nf Defense Depailmcnl of the Army Department nf the Navy Deparlnvntof the Air Force
State Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinst'nKChiefsof
Research and Development Board
8
THK KURDISH MINORITY PROBLEM SUMMARY
VI
The almost Ihree million Kurdish tribesmen of Turkey. Iran, Iraq, and Sytlaactor of some importance in any strategic estimate of Near East affairs by itlue of their tradition of armed resistance to the governments over them and the efloits the USSR is making to stimulate and capitalize upon their grievances. Because of the narrow tribal loyalties of trie Kurds and thc rudimentary nature of the Kurdish nationalistnified attempt to set up an independent state over all of the traditional mountain homeland of "Kurdistan" is unlikely Nevertheless, the Kurdish tribes can be expected to continue to break out in sporadic local uprisings, and theactivities ol Soviet agents indicate that these revolts may follow the lines of the Soviet-sponsored "Kurdish Peopleshichrief existence In the Kurdish sector of Iranuch revolts, although unlikely to achieve more than temporary independence for their instigators, are capable of furnishing propaganda foi the USSR before world opinion and of disrupting operations of Iraq's Mosul oilfields, which are In the Kurdish area Moieover. thc delicate balance of the present Near East slate system creates the possibilityurdish revolt, by drawing on security forces and by stimulating other dissident gioups. might lead lo furtherof thc political and economic stability of that region.
Note: The intellicence orions of Ihc Department* of State. Army. Navy, and the Air Force have cencuirrd in Urn report
The Information herein Is as of Ocloher ma.
SECRET
THE KURDISH MINORITY PROBLEM
mountain tribes known as the Kurds are now and will continue toactor ol sonic importance in any strategic estimate of Near East affairs. Possessing aethnic strainanguage of their own. the Kurdsairlypopulation group of roughly three million persons. They form the major element of the populationountainous area embracingquare miles of Turkish. Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrianhis area, although it has nevera definite political entity and therefore cannot be precisely defined, has tradi-ditionally been known asr land of the Kurds"
The Kurds are worthy of scrutiny chiefly because of the potential threat theyto the internal stability of Iran. Iraq, and,esser extent. Syria, and because or the opportunity they present for Soviet subversive activity. In Turkey, where some one and one-half million Kurds, about half of the total, live, they constitute about seven or eight percent of lhe population and form the largest minority group. They alsothe most significant minority In Iran, where they number. and in Iraq, where the Kurdish population totals. Anurds live In northern Syria and in the cities of Damascus and Beirut0 Kurds live in the USSR, and there is an insignificant scattering in Afghanistan.
An ancient people noted for their strong tribal loyalty, thc Kurds are still mainly nomads whoemi-autonomous existence in the mountains of their traditionalhey are belligerently independent, distrust the governments over them, and have stubbornly resisted efforts to disarm them or restrict in any way their relative freedom.
The Kurdsong history of rebellion, although they have never been unitedovernment of their own and even now haveudimentary nationalist movement. In Turkey, out of which an autonomous "Kuidislan" was lo have been carved under the aboitive Treaty ofhc government is achieving successrogram ol assimilation, but it first had lo quell three major Kurdish revolts and even now is careful lo maintain strong security forces in the Kurdish area. In Iran. Kurdish tribal groups, including the poweiful Slukkaks and the Jalalis. waged protracted campaigns against the government duringnd made new attempts to establish iheir independence1G. Iraq has been confionled with repeated insurrections by Sheikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniya and by Batzani tribesmen, most recently under Mulla Mustapha. who was finally farced7 lo dee with his followers through Iran inlo the USSR. Although Syria has not had to cope wiih tribal revolts. Damascus and thc ncaiby Lebanese capital, Beirut, have been centers for Kurdish nationalist
ri>Nini3tcly theof Montana> and Auurnriix C. "Kurdistan."
Appendix A. "Kuidisli Characteristics and Social Conditions"Sec Appendix B. "RelationsPatent Cover mucins."
1
SECRET
Thc USSR hastrong interest in slii ring up lhe Kurds ever since lhe latterl World War II It was the moving force behind theived "Kurdish People's Republic" set up in Iran alongside lhe "Azerbaijan People's Republic" in IMS andimilar "republic" in Iiaq which died in the bluepnnt stage Soviet agents are curicnlly active in Kurdish Iran, in noithein Iraq, and in Beirut, where lhe Soviet Legation servesontact point wilh Kurdish nationalists andase for agents in thc tribal areas. Mulla Mustaplia is still In the USSR, though he is reportedly not altogether satisfied with his treatment there, he might be used looray into Iran and Iraq, orseful tool in lhe creation of another puppet Kurdish government
There is no real prospectettlement of Kurdish grievances. Theof the parent states are doing very little at present to improve thc conditions which are the subject of Kurdishnd although they may be impelled to promise thc Kurds reforms, there is no indication that they will actually carry them out The various groups claiming lo represent Kurdish nationalist aspirations willcontinue their appeals lo the UN and other international bodies, but it is difficult to foresee how any such organization could materially help the Kurds. Thus, threats of Kurdish rebellions are constantly present, while Kurdish complaintshronic theme for Soviet piopagandists and agitators.
Thc Kurdish question, as manipulated by Soviet agitation.isruptive force which will continue to threaten, sporadically, the delicate balance of the present Near East stateuccessful large-scale Kurdish rebellion Is not likely to lake place; union of the tribes on an unprecedented scale would be necessary before any Kurdish uprising could achieve genuinely serious propoitions, and there is al present no reason lo expect any marked lessening of ihe traditional disunity of the tribes Nevertheless, except In Turkey, local uprisings may be expected to recur periodically, possibly decked out in the trappings of nationalism along the lines of the "KurdishRepublic" in Iran. Such revolts, although unlikely to last moreear or two at most, are al least capable of furnishing propaganda material for the USSR before world opinion and, of course, the UN; In the case of the Iiaqi Kurds, an uprising might result in disruption of operations in the Mosul oilfields. Moreover, the tenuous Internal security of such states as Iraq and Iran makes it possibleurdish revolt, by drawing off security forces and stimulating other dissident gioups, might lead to fuithcr disruption of lhe political and economic stability ol thc Near and Middle East.
Further details arc set forth in thc following attached appendices:
AppendixChiiicteristics and Social Conditions Appendixwith Parent Governments Appendix(with map) AppendixBackground
2
APPENDIX A
KURDISH CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS
E. Individual Characteristics, Language, and Religion.
For centuries the Kurds have lived apart Irom other population groups,their own social organization and customs: Intei marriage with non-Kurds has been negligible since the Middle Ages.esult ol this social and racial segregation, the Kurds have distinctive personal characteristics and trails. Physically, they arc taller than neighboring peoples, and theyeputation throughout the Near East (or exceptional strength and stamina. Particularly In westernhe Kurds arc longheaded, and many ot them have fair hair and blue eyes, in contrast to most of their neighbors. Individual Kurds give an initial impression of being stolid, taciturn, and even stupid; the men usually appear politically naive. These appearances,are deceptive and can probably be attubuled lo the loneliness and tnliequent participation in social affairs which marks the Kurdish herdsman's life. When foiced to compete in less Isolated environments, Kurds have demonstrated great shrewdness, even when they lacked formal education. Individual Kurds who have been assimilated Into surrounding cultures have often achieved great success despite the disadvantage Of cominginorityin so doing they have usually lost touch with their kinsmen. Two notable exceptions are Jelal Paban of Syria and Amanullah Ardalan of Iran, each of whom has held several cabinet posts in his country. The tenacity with which the Kurds have persistently resisted assimilation into moresurrounding populations is In itself an Indication of their moral stamina.
The Kurds continue toanguage of their own. although many of them,in Turkey and Iran, are now also conversant with the chief language or the country In which they usually reside. Kurdish, an Indo-Buiopean tongue which bears some resemblance to Persian, can be broken down into several principal dialects,actual classification is difficult because of the many variations in th* sub-dialects. Despite these differences, however. Kurds using different dialects are usually able to understand one another.
Kurdish is almostpoken, everyday language which has no literature exceptew songs and poems passed down by word of mouth from generation to generation There is no Kurdish alphabet, and when the language is written. Arabic (or, less alien. Roman) characters are employed. The Kurdsroup are almost completelynd although some slait has been made in educating the Kurds, the instruction is almost invariably conducted in another language. The use of Kurd-
For eaample. in Turkey, where considerable pcof resi In education has been made, (he1heof Mirdinercent Illiteracy forercent for females over the populationhole. Including rvon-Kuids Although these Rgi irs are high enough,ignificant Ihat Turkey provides noor some other ^lovmtci viiriln Turkishhich piobably had even poorer education facilities than Watttti
3
in schools is prohibited in Turkey and Iran, while difficulties arising in part from thc absence of any Kurdish alphabet have been thc basis of constant Kurdishin Syria. Lebanon, andesser extent) in Iraq.
Despite their obstinate retention of their own language and social customs, the Kurds were not able to withstand the advance of Islam. Almost all of them are Sunniis. members of that division of Islam which regards thc Hadithas well as the Koranource of truethey thus form part of the religious majority in the Islamic worldhole and Ln all the countries (except predominantly Shiite Iran) which contain large Kurdish populations. Their religious faith, however, is not deep. Allhough they engage In such normal Moslem practices as the use of talismans to ward off evil spirits, thc employment of mullas (or laylo perform marriage and funeral ceremonies, and the memorization by role of long passages from the Koran, many of their religious usages actually pie-dale their conversion lo Islam. They are unlikely to join any cause primarily on religious grounds.
Life.
The economic pattern of Kurdish life has scarcely changed during the enlire period of recorded history. Some of the tribes have settled downrimitive exploitation of the soil in one locality. Most of them are. however, like their ancestors, nomadic herdsmen who migrate back and forth with their sheep and goals from the highpasturages lo lhe more sheltered mountain valleys used in the winter, living in tents and carrying all of their accumulated paraphernalia on their camels, donkeys, and horses and on their own backs. Except as they arc able, from time to time, to obtain such items as salt, utensils, weapons, and bits of clothing from others, the nomadsall of their material needs themselves. They often supplement their lood supply by planting small vegetable or cereal crops to be harvested before the next migration, and they occasionally plunder settled communities while on lhe march. Whatever the success of such raids, however, the life of thc nomadic Kurdsard one which yields barely enough for subsistence From birth to dealh lhe Kurdish herdsman isfaced with disease, filth, wet. and cold, and his native costume is only too often nothing moreew rags swathed around his body in traditional fashion.
The settled Kurds live in similarly strained economic circumstances, although they depend less on livestock and more on cultivation than do their nomadic kinsmen. They are able to obtain salt, utensils, clothing, and other articles through the sale of brush or charcoal, tobacco, rugs, honey, nuts, and garden products The yield of thc land lo its cultivators is limited, however, by the poor soil and almost chronic drought which usually prevail and by lhe fad that the land is usually owned by an absentee landlord who takes much of the crop yield himself.
Importance of the Tribe.
The tribe, usually ruledingle leader with lhe advice of the tribal elders, is lhe basic unit of Kurdish economic and social life The nomadic Kurds move as tribal units in their semi-annual treks between summer and winter encampments, leaving
4
RET
mall number of individuals designated to tend or guard the land The set-tied Kurds, although more exposed to outside influence and more likely lo move away Into non-KurdUh areas than are their nomadic kinsmen, remain subject to tubalthe influence of lhe community is stiong. and. In addition, the Kurdish peasant usually has an agha. or notable, of the tribe as his landlord.
The Kurds me individually subject to the laws of the countries in which Ihey reside. In piactice. however, the maintenance of order, like thc making of social and economic decisions, is normally carried on by the tribal community, on the basis of unwritten iribal law Because of the remoteness of the Kurdish tribal areas, law-enforcement machinery is often unavailable, andertain extent lhe civilthemselves recognize tribal jurisdiction and tubal law as binding. Even when this Is not the case, the Kurds view the civil courtsisttusl that is often justified.esult, the Kurds tend to mete out justice and settle disputes themselves, through the medium of primitive open courts in which the tribal elders act as Judges. Disputes-between sub tubes are handled thiough negotiations between the tribal leaders or through aibitration.
Strong tribal loyalties arc carefully nurtured, Individuality is discouraged in Kurdish youth from an early age as being detrimental Ui the well-being of the tribal community Thc adult Kurd identifies hirmelf almost exclusively with the Inbe In which he engages in the struggle for existence, he hashallow comprehension of being, forurk or Iranian oreven of having any loyalty to the Kurdish peoplehole. Because of this independent, self-sufficient attitude,between Kurdishover the use of grazing lands orhcep-stealuiglikely to remain unsettled,asis for lingering hatred.
4. Military CAPAaiuriES.
Like most nomadiche Kurdstrong martial tradition. The Kurdish boy begins loagger before he reaches his teens and becomes an adept rifleman during his adolescence The rifle is the adult Kurd's most prized possession; it is not only useful in hunting, sheep-stealing, and the protection of tribalbut also servesymbol of manhood, independence, and Iribal prestige.
Kurdish belligerency is most evident among the purely nomadic tubes Again and again they have resisted attempts to restrain their raiding habits or otherwise exercise gieater control over them, and despite pei iodic attempts by the civil authority to disarm then they have mysteriously almost always been able lo acquire new weapons Although their armament is limited lo individual weapons (and sometimes machinehese liibesmen are effective guerrilla fighters in their own mountain aieas and have frequently defeated more heavily equipped government forces by virtue of their superior knowledge of the terrain and their ability to scatter and disappear when con-fionted with superior forces. Outside of their mountains, the Kurds are handicapped by the bmits which narrow tribal loyalties place on the size of the forces they can muster
SEC
and by the stealer effectiveness villi which tne heavier weapons of governmentalfoices can be employed against Ihem Even if they are temporarily quelled,tliey can flee to their own mountain fastnesses (perhaps crossing international boundaries lo hall the pinsuil) and can remain there, quid but unsubdued, until the ncxl opportunityoray arises.
ELATIONS WITH PARENT GOVERNMENTS
1. Introduction.
The Kurdshole have almost always been subject to the rule of outsideIn thc seventeenth century Persia and the Ottoman Empire between them absorbed all ofhus wiping out the last of the small, temporarilyKurdish "stales" which had grown up there In the early nineteenth century, when Turkey was preoccupied with the revolt of Egypt, the Kurdish tribes rebelled under Russian encouragement, and for almost two decades they succeeded iniheir independencearge area centering on Mosul. Theseprincipalities were suppressedowever, and whenenturyonfederation of Kurdish tribes known as the Mill! threatened Turkish sovereignty over Iheu- tribal lands, the Turks succeeded In suppressing it by showering Its leader. Ibrahim Pasha, with rank and privilege In World War I. despite some defections to the Russian side, large numbers ol Kurds (from Iran as well as Turkey) fought as members of the Ottoman Army.
The collapse of thc Ottoman Empne at lhe end of Worldncouraged many Kurds to agitate (or independence, and In thc Treaty of) lhe victorious Allies included provisions for an autonomous "Kurdistan" as part o( their plan tothe "sick man of Europe" almost out ofmplementation of lhe Treaty of Sevres, however, was prevented by the rise of Turkish nationalism under Mustafa Kemal (Ataluikl and Turkeys armed resistance lo lhe dismemberment of Anatolia. In the Treaty ofhich formally terminated Turkey's successfulcampaign, thc idea of Kurdish autonomy was dropped. Parts of the Kuidish homeland pissed to the jurisdiction of lhe newly created mandates of Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Syria. More than half remained under Turkey and Iran.
The subsequent history of the Kurds must be healed country by country. The Kurds have continued lo think and act as membersarticular tribe rather than as "Turks" ornd their revolts have sometimes been carried on acrossboundaries Nevertheless, the problem of controlling them or trying tothem hasifferent one in each of the countries concerned.
f th* liraly called for preparations lor iht establishment ol Kurdish autonomy "lot the district* predominanUy Kurdish, situated east of lhe Euphrates, to the south of thefrontierArmenia which is to be determined later, and to the north of the Turco-Syrlan-Mesopotamian rrontlrr" Article Cf of thc treaty provided ihat the Kuids ol the Vilayet (Province! Of Mosul, which was allocatrd lo the Mandate of Mesopotamia, would be pei milted to Join the new state of Kmdistan provided thatonstialed lo ihc Leajjue ol Nationsajority of the population wanted and was capable of self-government.
SEO^ET
2. Relations with Turkey.
After Turkey's exchange of populations with Greece during thehe Kurds constituted tbe laigcst non-Turkish group in thc republic. The Kurdish sheikhs and aghas, realizing that their ranks, titles, wealth, and feudal privileges wereby Mustafa Kcmal's new regime, led repeated revolts. Moicecade passed before they were pacified.
The first major uprising did not take placefter the Ankarahad abolished the Caliphate, and It drew upon religious feeling as well as thenationalism" which hod been disappointed by thc Treaty of Lausanne. Ledurdish religious notable. Sheikh Said,5 rebellion called for the proclamationew Sullan-Caliph and the re-establishment of the Shariah. or Koranic law, which the Turkish Republic had replaced with Western civil codes. Thc Kurdish candidate for the Sullanateiince of thc deposed imperial house ofon of Sultan Abf.ul Hamit II. who had for his own purposes treated the Kuuls well.
This rebellion, which look place in southern and eastern Turkey, was firmlyby Mustafa Kcmal. and Sheikh Said and other leaders were executed- Soon thereafter,econd uprising, led by Ihsan Nuii and supported by Kurds in lian and Syria, took place in the Agh Dag (Mount Ararat) region. Its ostensiblewas to protest against thc abolition of the fez and the wearing ot "Christian" hats in Turkey. After allowing the "fez revolt" to drag out for almost three years, Turkey finally stifled itampaign of great rulhlessness. Ihsan Nuii himself managed to escape into lian with many of his followers, however, and other Kurds who hadiversionary attack from Syria were able to get back across the border.
The last major Kurdish revolt against Turkey look place7 in Tunccli. aof the Dcrsim legion. This time thc Turkish Government lost no lime in crushing the rebellion. Sayit Riza. the Alouite religious leader who had instigated the revolt, was hanged alongumber of his followers, and the governments victory was followed by enactment of the famous "Tunceliinch piovided rigid militaryover Kurdish-inhabited territory.
7 the Turkish Government hasti ict watch over the Kurdish areas and, while doing SO, has worked assiduously to assimilate thc Kurds. Turkish policy is based on the concept that "there is no Kurdish problem, and there are non official usage, the Kurds are "mountain Turks" who theoretically possess all.theght*:ational. Theol Kuidish is prohibited, and primary schools are being set up in which Kurdish children arc taught to speak Turkish. Roads and raihoads have been constructed in the Kuidish aieas. not only to facilitate administration and military control, but in an honest effort to raise the Kurdish standard of living; Lhe major railroad construction currently in piogress in Turkey isine which will eventually run through the heart of Turkishrom Elazig eastward lo Qutur in lian, by way of Mus and Lake Van Kurds who resist assimilation have been transported to the western, non-Kurdish pi evinces andewime, in widely scattered villages. At lhe
8
same time. Tui ks itom western Anatolia, and more particularly immigrant Moslem Turks, arc encouiaged lo settle in "Kurdish" territory.
These policies have proved so successful that the government in6 fell justified in repealing the "Tuncelihe most dtaslic of its measures for restraining the Kurds. Many Kuids who had been moved weslwaid aic now permitted lo return lo their homeland. For moreecade no new uprisings have taken place, and the Tuikish Kurds, already somewhat more prosperous than their brethren incountries, have proved far less susceptible to anti-government or nationalistic propaganda from abioad. The adherence of the Kurds in Turkeyevitalized Kurdish nationalist movement is far from assured The process oforeover, will probably be accelerated as the construction of Turkish schools and the government's measures for economic development continue. In paiticular, theof pet "ileum deposiis at Raman Dag. along the uppci icaches of the Tigris River, could conceivably leadew era of prosperity Tor Turkish "Kurdistan."
3. Relations with Iran.
The Kurds of Iran have repeatedly attempted to shake off the central government's authority. In the confusion which permeated the Middle East al lhe close of World War I. two Kinds of the Shikkak tribe, Ismael Agha (belter known by his nickname of Similko or Simko) and Ammar Khan, succeeded inide stretch ofIran for four years before their deleal by an Iranian Army forcenother rebellious Kurdish leader, Jafar Sultan, was able to maintain some measure of independence
Reza Shah's dictatorial government succeeded in controlling the Kurds during the remainder of the period between the two World Wais. by virtue of the strong military posts it set up throughout the Kuidish area, but the collapse of Reza Shah's authority inhen Soviet and British troops simultaneously occupied Iran, was followedew flaieup of the Kuidish tribes. This revolt proved short-lived,thc tribes and sub-tribes concernedack ol colies!veness, and lhe USSR, apparently unpiepaicd tourdish slate, used its military control over most of thc Kurdish area to icstore order.
A new opportunity for Kurdish autonomist aspirations arose inhen the USSR undedook active steps at least partially to dismember Iran before its occupation troops left. Sovipt preparations for establishmentuppet stale in Azerbaijan" were paralleled in thc Kurdish area to the immediateurdish Democratic Parly was organizedrominent and wealthy Kind oi Mehabad. Qaziwhile Ammar Khan, hero ofevolt and probably the most influential Kurdish tribal leader in Iran, was induced to lend the suppoit ol his Shikkak tribesmen. Earlyollowing proclamation Of the new regime in Azerbaijan. Qaziannounced the establishmentKurdish People'sith its capital at Mehabad The Qazt was president of thend Haji Babaehabad mulla, headed thc National Assembly eople's Army was
* Thc alternate spelling "Azei baldzhon" is used on the ached map
SMREV
formed under Soviet auspices with ther consent of Begradch, Jafall. Hcrki. and other Km dish tribes, and Radio Mehabaduidisli newspaper were established under Soviet guidance to back the new state.
The Mehabad. Kurdish slate, wiiich was probably intended to be the nucleusreaterastedew months Rivaliy with the "People's Republic of Azerbaijan"ajoi cause or friction The Mehabad Government's claims toovei al) Iranian tentlory west of Saqqiz. from the Soviet border south to Miyan-duab, conflicted in taigc measure with the claims of thc Azerbaijan Government, and the Mehabad Kurds were irritated by the special favor with which the Soviet Army and Soviet agents treated the Azeibai)an regime Of Increasingly greater Importance,was Kurdish disillusionment over Soviet methods and unfulfilled promises and the impression made by US tumncss against thexpansionism Ammar Khan soon became openly hostile to both the USSR and the Democratic Paity leadership, and Qazi Mohammed lost Influence rapidly as other tribal chieftains joined the Shlkkak opposition Prime Minister Qavam hastened the disintegration of the Kurdish slate by piomlsing the Kurds favoiable treatment if they cooperated with his efforts to re-establish the central government's authority. Inlter the Soviet Army had withdrawn, Iranian forces inarched into both Azerbaijan andnd the two lebel governments collapsed. While the Azerbaijan leader, Pishevari, escaped into the USSR, Qazi Mohammed "tuRendered nnd, with his brother and his cousin, was later executed.
The government's victory was mancd, however, by thc presence in Iran orraqi Kurdish leader. Mulla Mustapha. and his Barzam tribesmen The Barxanis. who had fled into Iran ineized an arsenal at Mehabad abandoned by Qazi Mohammed and refused either to relinquish the armsondition to being settled on Iranian Government territory o: to return to Iraq, wheie Mulla Mu-itanhather leaders had been condemned to death The Bai/anis. who were aided by Herki Kurds and Assyrians under Zero Beg. were finally driven back into Iraq by Iranian troops supported by loyalist Kurdish tribesmen, bul the doughty Mulla Mustapha thereupon leciossed the frontier with several hundred followers and succeeded In working his way noith lo the USSR, where he icmains under Soviet protection.
Major clashes between Kurds and government forces have been lacking since the dramatic escape of the Barzanis. but the Kurds remain restive under Iranian rule. Allhough lhe loyalist Kurdish leaders were feted and bemedulled in Tehran following the fail ol the Mchabad regime, the Iranian Government has shown no real interest in dealing with Kuidish grievances. Kurdish leaders feel that they are inadequalely represented in the Iranian Majlis in comparison with non-Kurdish tubal groups such as the Bakhtiaris, the Qashqums, and thc Turcomans, and the Kurdseeptor the corrupt and lethargic provincial and military officials with whom they must deal. The appointment7 of Marshal Shahbakhti. an old enemy of the Kurds, as military governor of Azerbaijan only increased Kuidish dissatisfaction over the governments failure to improve conditions in Azeibaijan The continuing threatoviet attack has also contributed to Kurdi.sh apprehension regaidlng thc future,
SE
particulaily in view of government attempts Io disawn ihe lubes and Kuidish lack of confidence in the Iranian Aimy's ability lo resisl foreign aggicsiion
Neveitheless. despite the existence of some active disaffection among lhe Kuids. notably in the Jalalt and Herki tribes, lhe Kurds have recently tended to fall in with the Iranian Aimy's progiam for harnessing tribal support ae,aintt Sovietumber of Kuidish leaders lost what confidence they had in lhe USSResult of tbe "Peoples Republic" fiasco, and although iheie is much evidence ol Soviet subveisive work in lhe Kuidish area, at present many Kinds aie likely toofTei resistance to any pro-Soviet tendencies among the moie disaffected tribesmen.
4. Relations with Iraq
The Kurdi have fared somewhat belter in It sq than in other countries They are lepicsented in both thc Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and usually have some icpiesentation in the cabinet. Iraq's constitution authotucs lhe use of the Kuidish language in the schools. Nevertheless, the laige Kuidish population of northern Iraq feels restricted by Its minority status and has repeatedly resisted govei nment controls.
Kurdish uprisings have centered about three leading personalities: Sheikh Mah-mud of Sulnimanlya and two brothers of the Barzani tribe. Sheikh Ahmad and Mulla Muslapha Sheikh Mnhmud enjoyed considerable independence from Worldntil the Mosul boundary dispute between Tuikey and Butish-conliolled Iraq was settled by lhe Treaty ol Ankarand he laterumber ol campaigns against government foices. In which he returned lo his chief base of Sulaimaniya several times after having been driven oul by government foices More recently.eattempted to take advantage of the confusion resulting from the German-supported Rashid Ali al-Gallant coup against the govei nment
The Arsl of the major Barzani revolts took placehen Sheikhannouncing his conversion to Christianity, succeeded inumberKuidish tribes as well as regular Iraqi tioops before he was defeated byattack and foiced to Ore into Turkey Leadership of Barzani dissidents haslo his inepiessiblc brother. Mulla Muslapha Mulla Muslapha waged acampaigns against the governments forces3 tohen heto flee with thousands of his Unm into Iian As noted abovewas driven temporarily back into haq. after he had refused lo acceptnative trims offered him by the Iranian Govei nment. but then managed tothrough Iran into thc USSR Although some of his followers haveiI n| y havet' ,ijot
clashes between the Iraqi Army and the Kurds have taken place5 and, when the Palestine War broke outraq was willing to risk shipping its Kuidish areas of their normal garrisons in order to support lhe mote urgent Aiab needs
l the time of Uie Iranian "Kurdish Peoples Republic."Iiaqi Kurdish factionsurdish People's Party, with Mulla Mustaphas blessing, for the puipose of sellingederal Kurdish Slate within Iraq The paity soonhowever, apparently without doin^ any thing beyond setting up its piospectus.
5. Relations with Syria and Lebanon.
The Kurdselatively small minority In Syria and Lcttar.cn Kuidish communities of long standing aie located In the Kurd Dagh area of northwestern Syria, bul tbe largest concentration is in the Jaziiah section of northeastern Syria,onsiderable number of Kurdish immigrants settled after the collapse of ihe Ottoman Empne. Small but politically active Kurdish communities exist in Damascus and Beirut
The Kurds, along with other minorities, are accorded equal rights and privileges with the majority groups in Syria and Lebanon They have parliamentaryand generally concede that they have received fair treatment in such matters as road-building, construction of schools, and administiation of justice Nevertheless, many of them feel that their integrityroup Is In jeopaidy. This feeling is most noticeable in Beirut and Damascus, which have become centers of Kurdish nationalist propaganda, and among thc non-native Immigrant Kuids, who have retained tfceir traditional hatred of alien domination The immigrant gioup has provided most of thc leaders of the Syrian and Lebanese Kurds, notably the Badr Khan family, Dr. Ahmad Nazif. and Hassan Hajo Agha.
The principal Kurdish grievance is that the Syrian system of administeringalthough sonvewhat less strict than that of the French mandate, continues to be based primarily on religious rather than ethnic distinctions. This groups the Kurds with the Sunni Arabs instead of givingpecial status. The more politically conscious Kurds are equally concerned, however, by the basic tendency of Syrian minority policy toward ultimately eliminating the minority concept entirely In favor of an nil-inclusive secular nationalism Convinced that they cannot halt this piocess of assimilation without outside assistance, these Kurds have tended to regard theof an independent "Kurdistan" as their only salvation The area to be included intate is variously defined In all cases, however. It included portions of Turkey, Iiaq. and lian as well as Syria, and thc supposition is madenified Kurdish movement fo> independence must exist in all four countries
G Kurdish Nationalism and the USSR
Efforts toenuine Kurdish nationalism, as distinct from thcof outside authority fell by the tribes, have been made evei since lhe middle of the nineteenth century. The Kurdish nationalist movement, however, has remained small and disunited and has been dominatedelatively limited number ofand agitators.
Beginninghen Sheikh Ol>eidullahs clandestine Kurdish League was lorined to piomote an independent Kurdish slate west of Luke Urmia, the scciet society hasharacteristic vehicle for Kurdish asnirations Thc Ottoman Government soon suppressed the League through the simple expedient ol banishing the Sheikh, however, and theumerous successors have never succeeded in growingbecause of internal dissension as well as governmental efforts lo suppress them.
12
iE^^KT
SECRET
Little is known of the three most prominent Kuidish seciet societies of recent years; the Khoybun Society, which hasyiia andesser extent) Turkey since thes. the Komalla Kurd (formally the "Jiana'-or Young Kurdin Iraq and lian, which5 was reported as proSoviet. and the llewa Kurd in Iraq. The Khoybun. which had been set up to agitate foi an independenteased dunng Woi Id War II its active cooperation with its Aimenian counterpart The Hewa Kuid oigamxntion appears to betudent agitation gioup which lias no plans for diiecl action.
In addition to the conspiratorialarge number of more or less open organizations have sprung up. particularly in Syria and Lebanon, to agitate for Kurdish independence Such organizations have been active in presenting petitions and demands foi Kuidish independence to international bodies ever since the Sevies deliberation*any such petitions were presented to lhe Allied powers and lo lhe UK during and immediately after World War II
Some disjointed efforts have also been made to establish Kurdish-languageand magazines in an effort touidish literature and spreadpropaganda Thc Badi Khan family of Syria, foi example, haseriodical calledwhich was published by Midhal Beg Badi Khan successively in Caiio. Geneva, and london before being Liken over by his nephew. Suraya Beg Such publications, which must necessarity be printed in Arabic o. Roman character because of the absenceurdish alphabet have had an obviously limited appral in view of thc illiteracy of the great mass of Kurds.
Allhough Kurdish nationalists have shown, through their many appeals tobodies, thai they feel outside support to be neressaiy. ihe USSR alone has taken an active interest in the Kurds, and then only after Ion? ncjlect0 Kurds in lhe USSR, like other minorities, were pei milted lotheir own schools and publications and to form separate units in the Soviet Aimy. but for many >ears the USSR has notKuids. as it did ils Armenians,uicated gioups outside
its boi ders,
Sovicl efforts to win Kuidish support began during Wot Id War II and show cveiy Indication of continuing In Iran, despite thc failure of the Soviet-supported 'Kuidish People'she USSR has continued its agitation the recent opening of Soviet consulatesaiyeh. near Lake Uimia. and al Maku in thcind area, was obviously connected with such activity. Anoihei centei of Soviet activity is the Soviet Legation in Remit, which has maintained contact with Kurdish nationalists in lhe Lrvani and has sent out agents to the Kurdishem Recent leports have emphasized Soviet efforts among the Kinds of northern Iraq Meanwhile, the USSR continues to harbot Mulla Muslaphas icmaunng Baraaru Kurds who are presumably being kepi in readinessiliaps with Soviet suppoit. into Iran and Iraq, orucleus (or lhe formationew puppet Kuid.ih state Theie is goodhow evei. thai Kinds who have been givenhe USSR are not content with Iheii shabby treatment there, and disillusionment iingeis among Kuids in Iran over thc Souet failure to fulfil promises0
KURDISTAN"
The nameeaning "country of thes used toarge area of southeastern Turkey, northwest Iran, northern Iraq, and northern Syria, in which the Kurds form thc preponderant clement in the population. The termebulous one. The boundaries of "Kurdistan" cannot be defined closely on historical grounds because the area has neverefinite political entity. Preciseof the ethnic limits of "Kurdistan" is made difficult by the nomadic habils of many Kurdish tribes and by the overlapping of Kurdish and non Kurdish population groups In many arras Although the great majority of the Kurdish people live within "Kurdiiving the term some ethnic meaning, numerous individuals, groups, and coloniesKurds live outside its boundaries.
The geographical distribution of Kurds, bothnd without what is generally regarded ass listed below by country. No reliable basis exists forthe numerical strength of the Kurdish population, and the figures used Ui this study,. must be accepted with great reserve.
The Turkish policy of breaking up agglomerations of Kurds and settling them In groups of very small numbers in western Anatolia, despite recent reversals of that policy, has decreased the total number of Kurds in Turkishhc great majority of theurds in Turkey (out5 populationtill live in southeastern Turkey, south and eastine drawn from the USSR border through Kars. Erzurum. Erzincan. Malatya,nd Gazianlep to the border of Syria.
3. Iran.
The majority of Kurds in Iran live in the aiea adjacent lo the borders of Iraq and Tuikcy. across which seasonal nomadic migration normally takes place Territorial overlapping of Kurds with the largely Turki-speaking population of Iranian Azerbaijan and also with Lur tribes makes definition of Iranian "Kurdistan" difficult. Generally speaking, however, the Kurdish area may be taken to include all territory wuhlnu'egins at thcMountollows the west and south shores of Lake Urmia, roughly encircles Mlyanduab and Kangavar. including Kermanshah and Sinneh, and meets the Iraq border south of Khanaquin Kurds are also found living among other peoples In an area stretching southward from this tentative line toward the Persian Gulf, and Kurds arc found elsewhere in Iran, particularly In the northeast In the absence of reliable
s
population statistics for Iran, thc number of Iranian Kurds Is roughly estimated to be somewhat more. outotal population of upwards
"Kurdistan" in Iraq may be generally described as comprising the territory east of the Tigris River and northine running westward from the vicinity of Mandali to thc Tigris River just south of the point where the Little Zab River Joins it Subject to seasonal migrations in and out of Iraq by the nomad tribes, the Kurds In Iraq are estimated to number lessut of an7 total population.
and Lebanon.
Thc Kurds in Syria live chiefly along the northern border .and particularly inarge province in thc northeast bordering Turkey and Iraq. There are also Kurds in Damascus andairly recent estimate gives the number of Kurds in the two countries as. outotal populationSyria)Lebanon). Allew Lhousand of these Kurds live in Syria.
Kurdish Communities.
Most of the Kurds living outside the four chief parent states arc in the USSR, chiefly in the Armenian and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics.0 Kurds are on Soviet soil, although available estimates are even less consistent and reliable than those for the other parent states.
An insignificant number of Kurds live in Alghanistan.
SECRET
SEBRET
ISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Kurds constitute one of the oldest peoples now existing in the Near East. They arc referred lo. by such names as Gull and Kurlle. in inscriptions which dale back several thousand years. Early Greek historians and geographers, including Strabo and Xenophon. mentioned people who appear to have been the Kurds and In some instances described Ihem as living within the borders of what Is now considered "Kurdistanhc name "Kurd" has been used by Arab writers ever since the ninth century.
Despite their ancient lineage, little is known aboul lhe history of the Kurds before the Arab conquests of the ninth century. At that time Kurds fought with Iranians against the Arab advance, and Kurdish conscripts, although sometimes rebellious, are recorded as having fought In the Arab armies.umber of tribal chieftains set up small, independent Kurdish states around such centers as Khurramabad in Iran. Ruwandlz and Sulalinaniya in Iraq, and Diyarbaklr and Utfa in Turkey. The most famous of these warrior kings was Salah althe "Saladln" who so enthusiastically and successfully organised Islamic resistance lo the ChristianAt the height of his power.,Salah-al-Din ruled nol only northeastern Iraq, where lhe Ayyub dynasty of which heember originated, but Syria and Egypt as well.
Except for Salah-al-Din. however, the Kurdish chieftains ruled over very restricted territories, and the few dynasties which attained local independence were unable to maintain it. "Kurdistan"attleground in thc centuries of strife between Persia and the expanding empire of the Ottoman Turks, and by the end of lhe seventeenth century the last ol the Kurdish princes had succumbed to one or the other of the two antagonists. The Kurds thereafterubject people whose local revolts were unsuccessful in long restoring even partial Kuidish political independence.
The Kurds haveemarkably high degree of ethnic purity. In Assyrian Umes their territories In the vicinity of Lake Van and Lake Urmia were subjected to successive invasions from almost every direction, but the in accessibility of theirfastnesses enabled Ihem to avoid close contact with the conquciors' hordes. Later the Medes, whose conquests extended over and far beyonday have made some contribution to the Kurdish ethnic strain, and during the succeedingsome admixture of Caucasian, Armenoid, Iranian, and finally Arab blood probably took place, especially along the periphery ofn more recent limes,during lhe centuries of Ottoman suzerainty over the great majority of thc Kurds, intermarriage between Kurds and other groups was probably negligible, and the Kurds of present day Turkey show little evidence of any Turkish ancestry. Even under Turkey's present republican regime, which strongly favors assimilation ofixed marriages arc most uncommon.
SECRET
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: