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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE
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POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE SUMMARY
It Is apparent that the partition ol Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (and an internationalith economic union between the two states, asby the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) onbe Implemented. The Arab reaction to the recommendation has been violent, and thc Arab refusal to cooperate in any way with the five-nation United Nationswill prevent the formation of an Arab state ond the organization of economic union. The Arabs will use force to oppose thc establishmentewish state and to this end are training troop* in Palestine and other Arab states. Moreover, the United Kingdom has stated repeatedly that it will take no part inN decision notto both Jews and Arabs. The British have also declared that when the mandate terminates on IS May. they will not transfer authority to the UN Commission but will merely relinquish that authority, which would then be assumed by the UN. Thus, without Arab and British cooperation, the Commission will be unable to carry out the task assigned to it.
Even among the Jews there Is dissatisfaction over thc partition plan. Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, thc two extremist groups, have refused to accept the plan and continue to claim all of Palestine (and even Ttansjordan) for the Jewish slate. The Jewish Agency, official representative of lhe Jewish community, had hoped toarger portion of Palestine for the new slate but has decided to cooperate with the UN Commission. Recruiting and training for Hagana, the Agency's military arm, have been increased, and the terrorist groups will Join Hagana in the Arab light despite their opposition to partition. Thc Jewish effort, however, will not be sufficient lo enable the UN Commission lo carry out partition as envisaged by the UNGA.
Since the complete partition plan cannot be implemented, the possibleIn Palestine resolve themselves into three main groups:
N attempts to setewish state by
Again, the UN would be balked by lack of Arab and British cooperation. While the UN might attempt lo set up an international police force (which would have to be large and remain in Palestinehe US and UK would have to consider the danger of permitting Soviet and/or Satellite troops to enter Palestine, and the USSR would undoubtedly object to any force not including these troops. It is possible that the SC might consider authorizing unilateral aid to the Jews by the member states of the UN, butourse would be extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would take advantage ol the opportunity to increase its influence in Palestine by
he Information in this reportl IS February IMS. al which lime lhe repot 1iub-milled to the member agenoei of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council for cootdinauon This paper was concurred inIhe Intelligence Agencies or the DeparUncm of Stale. Annv. Navy, and Air Force onebruary. Onebruary CIA disseminated an Advance Copy of tho coordinated report.
supporting thc Jews, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the SC.
action by thc UN.
The UN woulderious loss of prestige if it should wash Its hands of the Palestine issue. Moreover, the Jewish-Arab conflict would increase and spread, and the USSR would be free to send troops Into Palestine as it saw fit.
reconsideration of the whole issue.
Reconsideration of the issue could be Initiated in several ways. The SC might seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the UNOA recommendations and simultaneously arrange an Arab-Jewish truce. The Arabs would welcometep and the Jews would probably have to agree (though reluctantly) since thc entire Jewish position is based on UN action. Jewish violence, however, would undoubtedly continue.
Should the issue be returned to the General Assembly, partition could beabandoned. Subsequent developments cannot be predicted, but it is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable lo the Arabs, who would probably be willing to make some concessions on the basis of the Minority Report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine,
UN Course ol Action.
When the UNGA voted on7 recommending the partition ol Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, the course of action to be followed was clearlyive-man commission with representatives from Denmark.Bolivia. Panama, and the Philippines was to be organized in New York, togetherizable secretariat of adrmnistrative officials and technical experts. After consul tat ions with the mandatory power, the commission and Its secretarial were to proceed to Palestine In the lalter part ofhen ln Palestine, the UN Commission was to take over administrative responsibility from the UK in those areas from which the laltci" would progressively withdraw its troops. This withdrawal and thc termination of the mandate were lo lake place not lalerugust. {Thesubsequently announced that the mandate would terminate not later thanuring this period of transference of authority from the mandatory to the UN Commission, the latter was to cooperate with Ihc Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee in the formation of provisional councils of government of theJewish and Arab stalesoint Economic Board. Thc provisional councils in both stales were to be establishedpril. Administrative authority was to be progressively turned over by the UN Commission to these two bodies, which would become the provisional governments of the two new states whose independence would be established not lalerhe UN Commission would also delimit the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states All these recommendations of the UNGA were to be carried out by the UN Commission with the guidance of thc Security Council.
UK Course of Action.
UK plans after the partition recommendation were exactly what they had been throughout the UNGA session. The British stated repeatedly that they would refuse to assist inN decision not acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs. They based their stand on the thesis that until the mandate was terminated they were bound by its provisions. On this basis, the UK was determined to retain undivided responsibility for the administration and internal security of Palestine until thewas terminated. Thereafter, lhe UK would retain responsibility in any areas occupied by its military forces until those forces were withdrawn. Finally, thc UK stated unequivocally that it would not transfer administrative authority to the UN Commission but would simply relinquish that authority, which would be Immediately assumed by the UN. The UK would not obstruct the efforts of the UN Commission; nor wouldarticipate in the work of the Commission
Arab Course of Action.
Ihe UNGA recommendation on Palestine put the Arabs on thc defensive, and consequently theli plans were largely undeveloped. Thc very multiplicity of Arab stales
and of tbe groups within those states resultedpate of different proposals. In spite of these differences, however, the Arabs agreedionist state could not be tolerated in the Arab world. To prevent the formation of this state, the following general course ot action was envisaged:
make military preparations, both in Palestine and the Arab states,by military action the formation and functioningewish state.
To refuse to cooperate with thc UN Commission in any way.
To establish an Independent unitary state embracing all of Palestine.
prevent further Jewish immigration until an immigration policyformulated by the unitary state.
Various Arab groups contemplated two additional lines of action. The most responsible and moderate groups considered further action In the UN. while the most extreme and nationalistic groups urged the cancellation of all diplomatic and economic relations with those states that had supported partition. While neither of thesewas generally agreed to, the Arab states sent strong notes of protest to the respective US chiefs of missions.
d. Jewish Course of Action.
The Jewish plan of action after the UNGA recommendation was perfectly clear-cut. While the Jewish Agency, the official representative of the Jewish community, had hoped toarger portion of Palestine, it decided lo cooperate with the UNin the establishment of the proposed Jewish stale. In thc meantime, it planned to build up its internal security forces, train an administrative corps, and propagandize the rest of the world for financial and military assistance against any Arab attempts to prevent the implementation of the UNGA recommendation. The aims, however, of the Revisionists, Including Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, were more extreme: to fight both thc British and the Arabs and to setewish slate in all of Palestine and Trans Jordan.
2. Development or the Situation since the Partition. UN Activity.
From the very beginning, the UN had difficulty in carrying out Its intended course of action In spile of repeated urgent appeals by Secretary General Trygve Lie. thc members of the UN Commission were not appointed by their respective governments until late in December and did not all reach New York for their first meetinganuary. Since then the UN Commission has made little progress, for Its success was predicated on Uie assumption that it would receive the cooperation of the Jews, the Arabs, and thc UK. Of these, only the Jews have fully cooperated The Arabs have flatly refused to have anything to do with thc Commission, and thc UK's cooperation was considerably restricted by its interpretation of its responsibilities as mandatory power. UK refusal to allow the Commission to enter Palestineay {two weeks before the termination of the mandate) will make it Impossible for Uie Commission to establish the provisional Arab and Jewish governments by the required dalepril. The UK refusal to relinquish any administrative authority in Palcs-
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tine until after the termination of Uie mandate has prevented the progressive transfer ot authority to the UN Commission. The Commission has also been compelled tothe deplorable security situation in Palestine and realizes that it cannot attempt to carry out the recommendations of the UNGA without an adequate international police force.
b. UK Activity.
UK activity since the partition vote has been twofold. In Palestine theadministration. Its police, and the UK forces have been attempting to maintain internal security. They have been hampered by two mainvacuation plans have considerably obstructed UK security measures;he UK desire not to antagonize thc Arab states has prevented the Implementation of full-scale security measures to repress Arab-Jewish hostilities. In spite of these reservations. UK forces have been impartial in attempting to curb Arab-Jewish hostilities. Thc major aims seem to have been to prevent general anarchy and full-scaleleast untd the forces themselves have withdrawn.
In the UN. thc UK delegates have taken pains to acquaint the UN Commission with the difficulties of the Palestine situation. They have advised the UN Commission on administrative matters, on the question of the projected Jerusalem Trusteeship, and on the setting up of provisional governments. They have refused, however, to assume joint responsibility with thc Commission for thc establishment of thc new states in Palestine or to permit any development which might be Interpreted as UK support of one side against the other. On this ground, the UK has refused toortebruary to unlimited Jewish Immigration, as recommended by thc UNGA resolution, c. Arab Activity.
Arab reaction lo the UNGA partition plan was prompt and violent. Strikes and demonstrations led lo scattered riots within Palestine, and Arab League action was instituted by the Arab states. The sporadic violence Ln Palestine had developed by thc middle of January into more highly organized hostilities. By the beginning ofdisciplined Arab bands were operating In different parts of the country, and the Arab Higher Committee claimed to be directing their activities. The nature of Arab activities indicated that until the British withdrawal Arab objectives were limitedvoiding, if possible, hostilities with the Britishurchasing andessential supplies such as food, weapons, ammunition, andisrupting Jewish commerce, transportation, and communications without launching full-scaleecruiting volunteer forces, within and without Palestine, and training them in guerrillaettingnified militarystablishing contact with Arab League channels of assistance. The entire emphasis has been on preparation for the British withdrawal, and the Arab leaders have apparently attempted to hold back their surging followers.
eries of meetings at Sofar. Aley. and Cairo. Arab Leaguedespite differences of opinion, eventuallyrogram of action. The program, which in scvuiul particulars merely approved activities already under way,
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immediately implemented and providedhe partisan movement Inbe supported with funds, arms, androops of the Arab states be stationed on the frontier of Palestineorder watch;hese armies not be sent into Palestine until after the British withdrawal. Funds were immediately raised in all the Arab states. Volunteers from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan foregathered at Qatana in Syria for training; and by the middle of Februaryere known to have slipped, uniformed and armed, into Palestine. Syrian, Egyptian, and Trans-Jordan troops had been moved to the Palestine border; and Iraqi contingents were reported to be moving into Transjordan. Determined efforts were made to obtain arms and ammunition. Syriaontract with Skoda,irst delivery is known to have been made.
While the Arab chain of command has not been announced, thc forces will be commanded by former Syrian and Iraqi army officers and experienced guerrilla leaders.
d. Jewish Activity.
Having won the initial victory In the acceptance by the UNGA of the partition plan, the Jews concentrated (with some exceptions) on preparing for the new state. In the face of violent Arab opposition, the Jewish Agency immediatelyo strengthen the internal defense forces of the prospective Jewisho organize and train an administrative corps;o cooperate with the UN In Implementing thc UNGA decision. Recruiting and training for Hagana were increased; and. In spite of the fact that the mandatory refused to recognize its legality, it attempted to protect the Jewish community from Arab attacks and also actedocal police force. In time, Haganaolicy of "active" defense and carried out terrorist raids against the Arabs similar in tactics to those of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang against thc UK forces. These two extremist groups continued their war against the British; and although they agreed to fight the Arabs together with Hagana, they refused to accept the partition recommendation and continued to claim all of Palestine (and even Transjordan) for thc Jewish state.
3. Possible Developments.
a. General Considerations.
Partition as envisaged by the UNGA involves not only the creation of two states (and an international zone) but also economic union between the states.lan cannot be implemented without Arab cooperation, and it is inconceivable that the Arabs will abandon their present violent opposition to partition. To the masses, the fight has becomeeligious tenet; to thc governing classes, it hasoliUcal creed which they dare not forsake. The Arabs can never be forced to acquiescecstem-sponsorcd movement which they believe is threatening the twentieth century renascence of their Indigenous civilization. With implementation of the complete partition plan hopeless, the possible developments in PalcsUne resolve themselves into three mainN attempts to setewish slate byo action by the UN;N reconsideration of the whole issue.
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b. UN Attempts to Setewish State.
British Assistance.
An attempt might be made to persuade the UK to alter Its currentpolicy and to permit the formationewish militia, lo agree to the "progressive transfer" of authority, to allow the UN Commission to come to Palestine earlieray, to openport and hinterland" for Jewish immigration, and to suppress Arab guerrilla activities. However, in view of the UK's serious economic difficulties. Its disinclination to antagonize the Arab world, and Its consistently "neutral" policy sine: It turned the whole problem over to the UN last year, the British cannot be expected to change their stand between nowugust.ewish state can be established only in the event that thc UN Commission isolice force sufficiently strong to withstand Arab aggression or that the Jews inare provided with enough military support from outside to overcome Arab opposition.
Powers Police Force.
An International police force established by the Security Council may be of various types. Obviously, the most effective force would be one composed of units from the armed forces of the five great powers. Thc USSR can be expected to welcome an opportunity to send its troops to Palestine; France, also, would probably be pleased to set foot once again in the Near East; China, for reasons of prestige, would want to be represented on an International police force but could scarcely afford to spare any troops from the civil war in China. The UK will almost certainly refuse lo contribute. US troops, according to President Truman, will not be sent to Palestine. The dispatchorce composed only of contingents from the USSR. France, and possibly China would present the UK and lhe US wilh the alternatives ot exercising the veto or of opening Palestine to Soviet infiltration.
Powers Police Force.
A second possibility wouldorce made up of contingents from the medium powers, but hero again the UK and the US would have lo consider thc danger of permitting Soviet Satellite troops to enter Palestine. The USSR would probably veto the formation of any force that did not include Satellite representatives. Even if the great powers could agreeorce composed of contingents from thc medium powers, it is unlikelyufficient number of nations would be willing to contribute adequate forces
The formation of an international police force will depend, in the last analysis, notere decision of the Security Council but on the willingness of nations to contribute toorce. It is extremely unlikely that any nation would do so solely to maintain the prestige of the UN. In the present state of internaUonal security, probably no nation will send ils troops to fight the Arabs in Palestine for the purpose ofewish state unless its national interests arc threatened by thc failure of partition or unless it can hope to enlarge Its sphere of influence. Thc USSR is the only nation that would gain from sending troops into Palestine. Since
thc UK and the US have strong strategic reasons (or refusing to allow Soviet or Soviet-controlled troops to enter Palestine, it Is highly Improbable that an international police force will ever be formed.
ssistaTice to the Jews.
The only alternative method, therefore, is (or military aid to be sent to the Jews in such quantities that they will be able to suppress all Arab opposition, both internal and external, and set up and maintain an independent state. Such aid might take the formolunteer "international" force, or the Security Council couldrecommend to the other member nations of the UN that the Arab states be boycotted as deliberatelyecision of the SC and that the Jewish state be supported with shipments of funds, arms, and ammunition. The UN Commission might be retainediaison body between the Security Council and the new Jewish state. It could not delineate the frontiers recommended by the UNGA nor could It have any contacts with the Arabs, orpecial administration in Jerusalem. Thus the entire purpose of the UNGA partition resolution would be distorted from the creation of two independent states in Palestine to the organization and defense of oneJewish state.
By sponsoring the formation of an "international" volunteer force, or by relinquishing the initiative and authorizing unilateral action by member states of the UN, the Security Council wouldourse of action extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would be quick to take advantage of openings related to an SC decision to support the Jews, and thereby extend Soviet strategic influence Into Palestine and thc Near East, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the Security Council.
o. No Action by the UN.
If the UN were unable to agree on any action whatsoever, the consequences would be disastrous and appreciably decrease the prestige of the UN. Thc Jews and Arabs in Palestine would be completely free to solicit aid from and make alliances with individual nations. It would be practically impossible to localize the conflict; any nation with vital interests in the Arab world would inevitably be embroiled. Since thc struggling Jews and Arabs would accept aid from whatever quarter offered, it is difficult to Imagine how, under such circumstances, the USSR could be prevented from sending troops into Palestine.
c. Reconsideration by the General Considerations.
Since the failure of partition is already evident, and in view of the dangers attendant on the establishmentewish slate, it appears that the only course open to the UN is to reconsider the whole issue. For the UN to admit error and to undertake reconsideration wouldomentous step necessitating considerable moral courage, but such procedure would be quite bi line with thc general practice of tribunals in permitting reargument where doubt is entertained as to thc correctness of the original decision. To comprehend thc overriding necessity fortep, two factors must
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behat Arab opposition automatically invalidates the UNGA partition recommendations, whose basic assumption is Arab-Jewishhat evenewish state could be established and defended by force of arms. It would have to defend itself continuously not only against Its hostile neighbors but againstrabs within its own borders until such time as Arab nationalism no longer existed;hat full recourse to all Judicial procedures before action is taken would help to establish world confidence in the fairness and justice of thc UN as an instrument for world peace.
Council Action.
Reconsideration by the UN of the Palestine issue could be Initialed in several ways. The Security Council, after falling to agree on measures to implement partition, may ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legality o( the UNGA recommendations. At thc same time, it mightruce between the Arabs and Jews and designate cither the present Palestine Commission or some newly formed Security Council agent to arrange and supervise the truce Since this step wouldompletely new development, and one long urged by the Arabs, the Arabs would almost certainly agree toruce. Since the entire Jewish position is based on UN action, the Jews would have no alternative but to agree although Jewish violence would probably continue The Security Council might, on the other hand, refer the question to the Little Assembly or take no action. Thc proposalN Conciliation Hoard, if carried through, would furnish an opportunity forwithout damage to UN prestige.
Assembly Action.
Should the Security Council fall to agree on any action whatsoever, the UN Commission, even if it agrees to go lo Palestine to help the Jews set up their state, would probably report lo the Secretary General that the UNGA recommendations could be implemented toimited extent. The Secretary General could then refer the issue to the Little Assembly or evenpecial session of the General Assembly to reconsider the whole question. (The Little Assembly itself has thc authority topecial session of the Generalnce the issue had been returned to thc General Assembly, partition could be considered abandoned. It Is impossible to predict what new developments would take place, but It Is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable to the Arabs, who would probably be willing to make some concessions on the basis of the UNSCOP Minority Report.
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