CONTINUING SATELLITE AID TO THE GREEK GUERRILLAS (ORE 67-48)

Created: 10/8/1948

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

COPTOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

CONTINUING SATELLITE AID TO THE GREEK GUERRILLAS

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL

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mission

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CONTINUING SATELLITE AID TO THE GREEK GUERRILLAS

SUMMARY

In view of recent reports Indicating thatid to the Greekla continuing. It appears that the Soviet intention of ultimately bringing Oreece under Communist domination still obtains. For the following reasons the Kremlin may be expected to continue to supply and use the guerrillas as one instrument of policy in pursuit of this objective:

a. The guerrillas arc more immediately available than any political weapon of comparable effectiveness in Greece.

he guerrillas are militarily effective.

c. The guerrillas are useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against thc US.

uerrilla operations are cheap, requiringarge number of men nor large expenditures in heavy equipment.

Despite continued Soviet-satellite aid, thc guerrillas cannot nowilitary domination of Greece. Hit-and-run tactics, however, will still be feasible so long as supplies reach the guerrillas. Such activity, evenrogressively reduced scale, will continue seriously to hamper Greek rehabilitation and economic recovery.any relaxation of vigilance on the part of the Greeks and their Western supporters would provide the satellites with an opportunity for re-equipplng and reinforcing thc guerrillas to such an extent as to render them capable of seizing the Initiative once again.

ln this paper, the term satellite refers only lo Albania. Yugoslavia. and Bulgaria. Note: Thc informaUon is as oreptember IM8.

TOe intelligence organlzaUons of the Departments or Stale. Army. Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in Uils roport.

T

SB/ret

CONTINUING SATELLITE AID TO THE GREEK

Thc failure of the Greek guerrillas to launch expected large-scale Attacks8 gave riseelief that the Soviet bloc was severely curtailing itsMarkos. It was believed that the Kremlin (hence also Albania. Yugoslavia,was unwilling to risk further world censure by furnishing aid to thein the amount necessary to enable them to disrupt the Greek nationbring about an early overthrow of the regime, and that Markos wouldallowed "to wither on thehis belief was strengthened by the failure ofCommunist-dominated country officially to recognize the Markosfailure of rumored international brigades to participate in the fighting, andof peace feelers from thc Markos camp, especially during the

In view, however, of recent field reports which indicate that Soviet-satellite aid to the guerrillas In the form of both refuge and materiel is continuing, it appears that the Soviet intention of ultimately bringing Greece under Communist domination still obtains. The questions consequentlyill the Kremlin, in the face of such factors as US-UK support of the Athens government. UN censure of satellite aid to thc guerrillas, and the slow defeat of the Markos forces, continue to use the guerrillas as one instrument of-policy in pursuit of thisf so,tfe-tm^cftect' of continuing guerrilla activity in Greece?

I. With respect to the first question, it appears for the following reasons that the Kremlin will continue lo supply and use the guerrillas:

guerrillas are more immediately available than any political weaponeffectiveness in Greece. The Communist Party members inisappointment lo the military leaders; their morale is reported asthat of the guerrillas, and their organization has been severely disrupted bymeasures. The Communist Party is outlawed in Greece. Even were It loupon tennination of the guerrilla war, popular anti-Communistcontinue so strong as to make overt Communist participation in Greeceimpossible, although eventually the guerrillas themselves (adequatelymight prove to be an effective bargaining weapon in forcing the Greekto accede to Communist participation in politics. Meanwhile, thecontinues to provide an excuse for violent Soviet political attacks on the

guerrillas are militarily effective. For the better part of three yearsseriously disrupted the economic, political, and social life of thc country.of guerrilla operations to the Greek Government has been staggering not onlyof military expenditures but also in the non-productivityi refugees,of lines of communication and transport equipment, and the burningAlthough the continued success of the Greek Army will enable theto reduce the size or thc army, return the refugees to their homes, and supply

greater security to thc population, thc guerrillas must be all but completely eliminated before their cost to the government will become negligible.

guerrillas arc useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against theactivity can assure the Kremlinontinued drain of US dollars formilitary expenditures, as well as for rehabilitation,

operations are cheap, requiringarge number o( menexpenditures in heavy equipment So far thc guerrillas have subsisted largelycollected on forage raids and have been armed,onsiderable extenteffort, with British equipment obtained during World War IT or withand Italian equipment; there is no reason to believe that the guerrillasto be supplied and armed in much the same manner.

There Is no evidence that the Kremlin feels that, because of thc strong US interest in Greece and current US assistance lo the Greeks in the form of money, materiel, and advisers, it would be wise to defer further guerrilla action until US interest had waned. It is probable, moreover, that any such consideration would be outweighed byrolonged period of inactivity could well destroy guerrilla enthusiasm for thc struggle and Irreparably damage thc present guerrilla organization It also seems unlikely that the Soviets would he deterred from supporting the guerrillas by any fear nf UN action to teal Greece's northern borders. The USSR has been able to block any decisive UN action and probably feels confident that, as in the case ofno UN member (especially the US) would be willing to send troops to Greece

It is true that Tito's defection raises practical difficulties in the matter of aiding the guerrillas. Of the three northern neighbors, Yugoslavia had been the principal source of supply and probably of military advice for the guerrillas. Currently,border guards are still passively cooperating with the rebels, and the "free" Greek radio continues to operate from Yugoslav soli. It is possible, however, that Yugoslavia will cease giving active aid to Marfcoshe Tito-Cominform split isYugoslavia preoccupied with its own affairs and probably has not encouraged any desire to assist the Kremlin ln its foreign-policy aims,t might be convenient eventually loeconciliation with the Athens government, thereby eliminating an enemy on the south and keeping the door to the western world open. Tito still has an active interest In Oreek Macedonia,umber of guerrillas are probably ready to serve those interests, but they will undoubtedly be restrainedore propitious time. Nevertheless, even with the defection of Yugoslavia, the Kremlin can still supply the guerrillas through Albania and Bulgaria at only slightly Increased effort and expense.

ith respect to the second question, It Is apparent that lhe guerrillas, despiteSoviet-satellite aid, cannot nowilitary domination of Greececapabilities are slowly being reduced under steady pressure from the army;movements are being somewhat restricted, their supply problems (especially in areas distant from the Albanian and Bulgarian borders) are Increasing, and the local defenses of the government-held villages are improving Hit-and-run tactics,will still be feasible so long as supplies reach the guerrillas. Such activity, even on

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a progressively reduced scale, will continue seriously to hamper Greek rehabilitation and economic recovery. Moreover, any relaxation of vigilance on the part of the Greeks and their Western supporters would provide thc satellites with an opportunity for re-equipping and reinforcing the guerrillas to such an extent as to render them capable of seizing thc initiative once again.

Original document.

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