THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF POSTPONEMENT OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES QUESTION
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THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF POSTPONEMENT OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES QUESTION
SUMMARY
This study assumes United Nations General Assembly postponement for one yearecision on the disposition of Libya, northern Eritrea, and possibly Somalliand. Postponement of Itself will probably reflect Assembly Inability In agree on either UK trusteeship for Cyrenaica. Italian trusteeship over its former colonies (except perhapsirect UN trusteeship, orof which will probably be aired in the present OA. The resulting deadlock would lead to postponement of the issue until the next Assembly session.
The general effect of postponement will be to promote, during the ensuingelter of propaganda, conflicting claims, and international lobbying, as Italy, the colonial populations, and other Interested slates build up their cases In preparation for9 Assembly. While it is impossible to predict accurately the final UNpostponement will increase the likelihood that either independence (perhaps after an interim UN trusteeship in the case of the Icas-dcvcloped colonies) or acombination of one-power trusteeships will be the final solution.
Postponement is likely to result in increased sentiment favoring independence, particularly for Libya, the most highly developed of the three colonies. The colonial nationalist movements wouldear in which to demonstrate their strength, and native leaders, seizing upon postponement as an Indication of Indecision, would probably utilize the period to strengthen local aspirations for Independence. Many UNas the Arab states, the Asiatic nations, and some Latin Americanwhich are anti-colonial In outlook, would thereby be encouraged to vote forShould strong pressure for independence develop, the Soviet bloc, too. might switch to this policy In order lo curry favor with the anti-colonial powers and block strategic use of the colonics by the US and UK.
Thc current Soviet proposal for direct UN trusteeshipeven-power advisory council might also have substantial appeal to those favoring independence because it avoids placing thc colonies under any one state, provides for their independencepecified period, and permits most of the interested nations some voice in theirMany UN members might findroposal, perhaps modified to bar Soviet participation, more desirable for the less-developed colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. Italy and the Arab states might favor direct UN trusteeship provided they could participate.
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The lobbying by lhe interested powers which would undoubtedly take place during the Interim period would probably tendompromise solution. The US, UK. France, Italy, and the Arab states, sensing that their preferred solutions had little chance of being accepted, might seek some "behind-the-scenes'* agreement aimed toward securing sufficient QA votes to support their minimum aspirations. For example, the three Western Powers might offer their support of Italian claims to Somaliland and Tripolitania In exchange for Italian espousal of UK trusteeship over Cyrenaica and French trusteeship over the Fezzan. The Arab states, fearful that Libyanis unattainable, reportedly would compromise on UK trusteeship over all Libya, butolution wouldost unfavorable reaction in Italy. The Arab votes gained would also be offset by the probable loss of Italian-influenced Latin American votes. In any case, assuming delay and barring unforeseen developments, theanti-colonial sentiment among numerous UK members will make difficult Assembly approval of any one-power trusteeshlps.
For Italy, postponement and any of Its probable aftermaths would mean greatAlthough the Government, in view of its recent loss of Soviet support, now favors postponement on all but Somaliland, the public would be bitter over any further delay. Even should Somaliland be returned, this feeling would be only partly assuAged. Furthermore, should Italian claims to Libya and Eritrea again be advanced, this time before tbc current GA. failure to acquire these areas would convince many Italians that they lack real support from thc Western Powers. If approval of Italian trusteeships appeared unlikely, the Government might shiftirect UN trusteeship, which would provide Italy with atoice In an advisory council, or to some form of multilateral trusteeship with Italy as one of the trustee powers. These solutions would better save Italian face than loss of its former colonics to another power and would enable Italy to protect the Italian settlers who would be at the mercy of native elements under an independent regime.
Should the proposalK trusteeship overdesirable lo the US anddisapproved by the presentould have no belter chance of acceptanceater meeting unless some compromise arrangement to secure the necessary voles were worked out In the Interim, or unless UN members became so fearful of Soviet aggressive Intentions that they would favor direct strengthening of themilitary position.
The probable willingness of thc Cyrenalcan leader. Sayid Idris, to accept treaty relations with the British in case Cyrenaica is made Independent might makean acceptable alternative to UK trusteeshipS-UK point of view. Under such circumstances, independence would at leastesser evilollective trusteeship in which the USSR participated.
THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF POSTPONEMENT
OF THE ITALIAN COLONIES QUESTION
This study assumes UN General Assembly postponement for one yearecision on the disposition of Libya, northern Eritrea, and possibly Somaliland. Although it is by no means certain that the Assembly will agree on postponement, such aseems likely if pressed by the US, UK. and France.
Postponement would, however, probably be precededealed debate, with the presentation of several alternative solutions ranging from Italian trusteeship toSuch debate appears unavoidable, since various interested states willinsist on proposing their favored solutions. Libya, the most important of the three colonies, will be the chief bone of contention. The USSR probably willits recent plan for direct UN trusteeship under lhe Trusteeship Council for all three colonics, while some UN member, such as Argentina, may counter by proposing Italian trusteeships. The Arab states will doubtless urge immediate LibyanThe UK intends torusteeship over Cyrenaica. It seems unlikely that enough votes could be secured to carry any one of these proposals, thus leaving final agreement on postponement, at least on Libya and northern Eritrea, the most probable solution (There appears to be general agreement Ihat some part of Eritrea should go to Ethiopia in compensation for the Italo-Ethioplanince the colonies question will come up late in thc Assembly, the extent of discussion will also be limited by the length of the debate on preceding items.itter and protracted session occur over such issues as Berlin. Palestine, and Korea, the weary delegates would be more favorably disposed toward postponement in order to avoid additional wrangling and to hasten adjournment.
Agreement may well be achieved on Italian trusteeship for Somaliland, the least controversial of the three colonies, at the coming session. Many European and Latin American slates, as well as thc US, UK. and France, favor Italian trusteeship, and even the USSR, which once shared this view, may agree in order toavorable Italian reaction. On thc other hand, some nations might withhold final agreement onto permit bargaining when the other colonics come up for discussion.
The effect of the initial OA debate will be to indicate the various alternativeboth to the native leaders involved and to the UN members with whom the final decision rests. Removal of the Issue from the closed meetings of the Foreign Ministers and their Deputies to thc open forum of the UN will focus world attention on the problem, and the various interested parties will then be able to gauge the relative
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acceptability of each of lhe possible solutions. Postponement at this juncture would allow full latitude for conflicting interests and propaganda claims to come into play as each side sought to use the year's delay lo influence the final UN decision. These efforts would be accentuated If the GA were to send an investigating commission lo the three areas. Thc probable results of this situation upon each of the major factors in the colonies issue are discussed below.
on Soviet Policy.
Postponement would give the USSR an opportunity to propagandize for some speciously reasonable solution like that proposed by Vishinsky in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Previously the USSR had called for thc return lo Italy of all ils formercoloniesN trusteeship. Thc Kremlin, apparently appreciating that this would obtain only negligible long-term results in Italy, subsequently broughtlan for the eventual independence of the colonies following an intermediate direct UN trusteeship with an advisory council In which the USSR would participate. Soviet propagandists will no doubt make political capital of the fact that this idea is similar to one advanced by the UShe new Soviet proposal is obviously designed to block strategic use of the colonies by the US and the UK and to secure USSRin their administration. Moreover, since it specifies Independence for Eritrea and Libyaefinite Interim period, it would have some appeal to those favoring
If It should become apparent that the administrative impracticality ofrusteeship makes GA approval unlikely, the USSR might feel that its objective of denying strategic areas to thc US and UK could best be served if it proposed, or at least supported, independence. Inase, Soviet and Communist propaganda would portray the USSReader for the freedom of an Arab and colonial people,emphasizing that thc US and UK, in blocking independence, were denyingto such people. Thus by again changing its policy, the Soviet Union mightits standing with the Arab world and with colonial peoples in general and. If the US and UK clung to postponement, might provide itself with excellent propaganda material to damage Anglo-American prestige in colonial and former colonial areas.
Reaction to Postponemknt.
Italian public opinion, already bitter over thc colonies issue, will be exacerbated by postponement, particularly if the likelihood of an unfavorable solution is Indicated by the initial GA debate. Return of Somaliland would, however, somewhat assuage Italian bitterness. Had thc USSR not abandoned its support for ItalianN vote lo delay the disposition of Eritrea and Libya would have evoked vigorous pro-
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test from both the Government and the public, with adverse reaction against those who supportedotion. Now, however, Soviet adherence to direct UN trusteeship has caused the Italian Government, in an attempt to forestall an unfavorablelo favor postponement on Libya and Eritrea, though urging the immediate return of Somaliland. The new Soviet plan also eliminates the possibility of Increasedanticipated by the Italian Communistsesult of western opposition to the return of Eritrea and Libya.
Though encouraged somewhat by the probable return of Somaliland, publicwill nevertheless run high over further prolongation of the dispute andoss of areas whose acquisition predated the fascism for which Italy is being penalized. Apparently the Italians are more or less resigned to the possible loss of Cyrenaica. but aspirations regarding Trlpolitania have been kept at fever pilch. If ultimate trusteeship over even Trlpolitania should be denied Italy, public bitterness will be acule. Italians would be less bitter, however, over US trusteeship for Libya than over that of any other power and might, indeed, believe that their own security would be strengthened by thc presence of US forces in the Mediterranean.
Italian policy during the interim period will be to seek, by all possible means, toN vole favorable Lo its interests. This lobbying will be most effective among the Latin American states, many of which, because of their large Italianand sympathy toward another Latin country, already favor Italian claims. Since the Government recognizes that thc return of all three colonies Is unlikely, It may seek some compromise arrangement with the Western Powers under which they would support Italian claims lo Somaliland and Trlpolitania in return for Italian support of British and French trusteeships over Cyrenaica and the Fezzan respectively. On the other hand, Italy is reportedly seeking Arab state support for an Italianover Libya in returnuarantee to grant It independence after one year.
Italian public opinion would be very unfavorable toward UK trusteeship for all Libya. To avoid any such plan, the Government mightirect UN trusteeship for Libya and Eritrea in which Italy wouldoice, orultiple trusteeship by Italy and other interested states. At the very minimum, were Libyan independence likely, Italy would seek protection for Italian settlors, assurances ofuarantee of economic development privileges. Either of the latter courses would belter ameliorate Italian public opinion than loss of Eritrea or Libya to other powers and would better enable Italy to save face.
Italians consider Italy disarmed by the Peace Treaty in the face of two powerful and unpredictable forces, bolh of which will put stralegic interests before Italy'swhether In the disposition of the colonies or in the prosecutionuropean war. Since controversy over the colonial issue has led some members of the Government to question lhe desirability of any political or military alliances wilh the Western Powers,
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Soviet support of Italian trusteeship would have been extremely embarrassing to the present Italian Government In Its efforts to cooperate with the Westime when such cooperation is Important to the successful implementation of the ERP andnited Western Europe. The Soviet switch to direct UN trusteeship hasthe Government's dilemma Even so.arkedly unfavorable UN decision on the Italian colonies to appear to be in the offing, the belief that advantage could be gained from strict neutrality In thc face of increased pressures from East and West would gain pound among the Italian people.
3. Reaction- in tiik Colonuss.
One likely effect of postponement will be to increase local sentiment forin Libya andesser degree In Somaliland, particularly should thc inhabitants sec from the Initial OA debates the possibilityavorable vote forolution. Postponement for one year would allow time for this sentiment to expand atid for other interested parties, like the Arab states, to propagandize in Its favor. If the UN were to call for plebiscites, the local inhabitants would probably favor independence, except In Eritrea where the demand for union with Ethiopia might overbalance such sentiment. Should immediate independence seem unattainable, some native groups might see merit In the latest Soviet proposal since it specifies eventual Independence.
Postponement might lead to some disturbances in Eritrea and possibly InThe extent of the disturbances in Eritrea, where Ihc pro-Ethiopian Unionist Party is strongly organized and active, would depend upon Ethiopian saUsraclion with the portion of Erilrea lt received. Should thc UN debate indicate possible return of these areas to Italy, serious disturbances might occur in all ihree colonies becauseall thc populations are anti-Italian.
In Eritrea, the Unionist Party, composed mostly of Coptic Christians, favors union with Ethiopia. Although the present GA will probably transfer at least the Danakil coast to Ethiopia, thc Unionists will agitate for transfer of allinimum, the inland plateau region. Their activities in this respect will be largely determined by the degree of direct Incitement from Addis Ababa. Thc Moslem League favors Eritrean independence or. If this la not immediately possible, UK liustceship. Lesser groups either favor UN trusteeship If independence is not possible or ask directly for Italian or UK trusteeship The Foreign Ministers' Investigating Commission found strong anti-Ethiopian sentiment among the Moslem, pro-Italian Danakil tribesmen in thc South, around Assab, but they are not very articulate politically
Should the GA postpone the disposition of Italian Somaliland. rather lhan voting to return thc colony to Italy, the effect on the native population would not be great. Difficulty with lhe strongly anti-Italian Somali Youth League, however, may be antici-
patrd in either case. Thc League, thc most articulate local group, is seeking anSomalia involving the union of all the East African Somali tribes, or. barringour-power UN trusteeship with independence after ten years.
In Libya, postponement would give an impetus Lo present extensive nationalistic tendencies. Native opinion in both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania favors independence and local leaders will undoubtedly seize all opportunities to press their advantage. Any Indication of Italy's possible return would lead to prompt and bitter local reactions. Including anti-Italian riots In Cyrenaica. thc Scnussi tribes -comprising ninety-five percent of thcsupport any decision made by their leader Sayld Idrla. While Idns himself prefers an independent Emirate with UK advisers, he will doubtlessemporary UK trusteeship Should this appear unattainable,the Emir would certainly seek Immediate independence. He would not favor any direct UN trusteeship in which Italy and the USSR participated.
TTlpolitanian sentiment for independence has also been growing, and furtherfor its development would be affordedear's postponement. The National Council for the Liberation of Libya, led by Beshir Saadawi and reflecting the viewsubstantial majority of the people,nited Libya. While it would accept the personal leadership of Sayid Idris. it is unwilling to support an hereditary dynasty as the Senussi insist. The Arab League supports Saadawi's proposal. Trlpolitanlan Arabs will be no more anxious than thc Cyrenaicansirect UN trusteeship and will propagandizenited independent Libya.
4. Reaction in Neighboring Stater.
Although the Arab League, embroiled in Palestine, has been unable to devote much attention to the Italian colonics problem, its component states strongly favor Independence for both Eritreanited Libya Consequently if they see ina blow to theseoud vocalfiery speeches, bitter press comment, and Leagueinevitably follow. Actualmight occur in Egypt, since Cairo has been the center of agitation for Libyan independence and Egypt is more Interested in neighboring Libya than are the other Arab states Following hard on thc heels of the Palestineenial of celt-determination to the Libyans would strengthen antagonism toward western "imperialism."
There have been indications, however, that, fearful of an adverse UN agreement on Libya, the Arab states arc slowly shifting In favorK trusteeship for the entire colony. Although preferring immediate independence, Ihey apparently might accept UK truteeshlp as the only practical alternative which would eventually lead toand yet forestall some unfavorable settlement such as division ol the territory
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and Italian return lo Trlpolitania. The most immediately Interested state, Egypt, now reportedly favors postponement to avoid some such solution. The Arabs also might seek to trade their support for Italian trusteeship for Somaliland and northern Eritrea for Italian-influenced support on independence for Libya.
Aside from issuing strongly worded resolutions condemning the denial ofindependence to Libya and perhaps attempting to incite the North Africanto demonstrations of violence, it Is not anticipated that further action will be undertaken by thc League itself. Increasing dissensions within thc League andwith thc Palestine problem make it rather improbable that the stateswould feelosition to take positive steps lo further the cause of Libyan independence. Should thc Palestine dispute die down, however, thc Arab slates would turn their attention increasingly toward Libya and wouldearsto lobby for independence or for some compromise which would eventually assure this goal.
Ethiopian bitterness may be anticipated if postponement is approved for thc whole of Eritrea. Ultimate cession of at least the southern areas seems assured,If unsatisfied by the UN decision, the Ethiopian Government will doubtlessormal protest, accompanied by reiteration of previous claims, while simultaneously directing the "spontaneous" demonstrations of Eritrean Unionists.
5. Effects on US-UK Strategic Requirements.
The UK seeks trusteeship over Cyrenaica for buildingajor base to replace former installations ln Egypt and Palestine. While present GA approval of British trusteeship is by no meansear's postponement might further reduce the chances for this desired solution by allowing sentiment for independencenited Libya to increase. The UK will, of course, utilize the period lo mend its fences locally and lo seek wide UN support, but its efforts will be made more difficult by aof nationalist sentiment. Postponement will also increase Lhe financial burden on the UK, since it will, in that case, continue to administer the colonies. Moreover, uncertainly over the eventual disposition of Cyrenaica will make the British, even if not restrained by the restrictive provisions of the Hague Conventions, hesitate to build up bases in this area
Direct US strategic interests in thc former Italian colonies include the Mullaha airfield in Tripoli and the radio facilities at Asmara,made available by the UK. Postponement would temporarily extend British control, thus assuringavailability of these facilities. Should delay increase the possibility ofor direct UN trusteeship, however, il would militate against long-termof these strategic interests. British loss of Cyrenaica would also lessen the pos-
stuilily of US use of thc bases there. UK treaty arrangements with an independent Cyrenaica or Libya along the lines of those with Transjordan might, however, provide comparable facilities.
6. Effect of Postponkmkht on9 UN Vote.
Although it is impossible to predict, on thc basis of the developments outlined above, how3 General Assembly will vole on the Italian colonies question,generalizations can be made. These predictions must be purely tentative,because the positions of most states are as yet unclear and may furthermore be subject to change under pressure.
The three basic alternatives before thc Assembly willirect UN trusteeship, perhapsulti-slate advisory council;eries of one-power trusteeshipsourth possibility for Eritrea would be outright cession to Ethiopia, if not previously doneerhaps with cession ot the western Moslem area lo theet another possibility wouldultiple trusteeship, suchK-French-flalian-KRyptlan trusteeship for Libya, but lhe odministrativeofondominium would greatly limit lis chances of UN acceptance. It is by no means certain that any one of these solutions would be approved for ail three colonies. Some combination of them appears more bkcly.
Insofar as postponement leads to an increase in local sentiment for Independence, particularly in Libya, il is likely to influence the UN vole of the anti-colonial bloc. Immcdiale Independence would probably bo strongly favored only for tinsrelatively thc most advanced. It would most likely be supported by the six Arab states, seven other Asiatic nations, some Latin Ameriear. members like Guatemala. Mexico, and Ecuador, and possibly also by Liberia The sue Slav votes might also be switched lo independence, thus bringing the lota! to some twenty-three. These states can block any other solution if they cling to Independence Many of them, however, should Ihey see the impossibility of securing majority approval, would probobly swing to some other solution, particularly if pressed by the US and UK. The anil-colonial bloc might urge plebiscites In the colonies, which would have wide UN appeal and would probably lead to independence, at least for Libya On the otherhe UN sent out an Investigating commission, itshl tend lo emphasise theof lhe Foreign Ministers1 Commission that none of the colonies is adequatelyfor self-government and hence might recommend thai some interim trusteeship Is desirable
Substantial UN sentiment might develop, particularly among the anU-colonial bloc, for some form of direct UN trusteeship if independenre seemed unattainableolution would probably appear more suitable for Eritiea and Somaliland, which
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arc less ripe for self-government. While little more than the six Slav voles would be forthcoming for the present Soviet-sponsored proi>osal per se, if it were modified lo exclude Soviet participation in any advisory council and to include other interested stales such as Egypt, it might appeal lo many nations which dislike the idea of one-power trusteeships and which feel the interests of the local inhabitants would be better protected by the UN.
If. during postponement, thc US. UK. France, and Italy could reach someagreement on the division of the colonies, it mightood chance for securing lhe necessary Iwo-lhlrds majority. The Western Powers and Italy could probably swing the bulk of the Latin bloc, while the Western European states, four of the British dominions. Ethiopia, Greece, Turkey, mid possibly Liberia would likely extend their support. This would bring the toUil vote lo thirty-six. almost enoughajority Firm opposition from the Slav bloc, the Arab states, the seven anti-colonial Asiatic nations, and one or two others could block any such solution. The US and UK, however, might be able to sway the voles of some of these stales, such as China, Iran, Afghanistan, or therovision for independenceefinite, specified trusteeship period might partially allay the misgivings of ihese nations and would probably be sought by them.
On Ihe other hand, should the Western Powers reach an agreement with the Arab stales to back UK trusteeship for all Libya with automatic independence after aperiod (reportedly favored by the Arabhey could probablyubstantial UN vote for this solution. The Arab bloc, most Western European states,! minions. Ethiopia, Greece, Turkey, and poss oly IJberia,. Iran. Afghanistan, and China might be prevailed upon to give their support. Unless the majority of the ami-colonial Middle and Far Eastern states followed the Arab lead In supporting this solution, however, Lhe addition of lhe Arab bice vote, per se, might be offset bv loss of those Latin American stales favoring Italy's claims to the area.
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