COMOB THE ASSISTANT OIBECTOB FORC1A
THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
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THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
SUMMARY
the foreseeable future the USSR will be the only power capable ofthc security of the United States, The Soviet regime, moreover, is essentially and implacably inimical toward the United States.
The power of the USSR to endanger the security of the United States is anot only of Soviet strength, but also of the weakness and instability prevalent in Europe and Asia and of weaknesses in the military posture of the United States. The principal restraint on hostile Soviet action is thc greater potential strength or the United Slates.
Soviet strengths and weaknesses and specific Soviet capabilities to threaten the United States and US security interests overseas are set forth within.
general, the probable basic intentions of the Kremlin for the next decade are:
avoid war with the United Stales, but to exploit to thc utmost,limitation, the coercive power inherent in the preponderance of Sovietin Eurasia, relying on the disinclination of the United States to resort to war.
build up as rapidly as possible the war potential of the Soviet orbit, into equal and surpass, eventually, the war potential of the United States.
wage political, economic, and psychological warfare against theand its allies,iew lo undermining their potential strength andrelative strength of the USSR: In particular, to prevent or retard the recoveryor Western Europe and the stabilization of the situation in the Near EaslEast.
exploit every opportunity presented by the weakness and instabilitystates to expand the area of Soviet domination by political and
Although the Kremlin is unlikely to resort deliberately to war to gain Its ends within the next decade, it would do so if ever it came lo considerourse expedient, particularly if convinced that time was on thc side of the United Stales. In this respect the situation will remain critical pending the successful accomplishment of US efforts to redress the balance of power. Moreover, there is constant danger of war through accident or miscalculation.
In any case, the fundamental hostility of the Soviet Government toward thc United States and its formidable military power require, in common prudence, that the United States be prepared for the eventuality of war with the USSR.
Force has also concurred, but see comments In Enclosure A.issent by lhe Office
of Naval Intelligence, see Enclosure B.
Thc information in Ihis report Is as of
Note; Thc inlelliBcncr organizations of lhe Departments of Stale and Army have concurred in ihis
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THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
Problem.
At thc request of the National Security Council Staff, we estimate herein "existing or foreseeable threats to our national security with particular reference to the USSR, including the probable nature and timing of these threats."
For the foreseeable future the USSR will be the only power capable of threatening the security of the United States. The policy of the USSR, moreover, is essentially inimical to the security of the United States and will continue to be, at least as long as thc existing Soviet regime remains inindefinitely. The problem becomes, then, one of reviewing thc capabilities of the USSR to threaten the security of the United States, directly or indirectly, now or in the foreseeable future.
Strengths and Weaknesses.
Military. The most obvious element of Soviet strength is thc overwhelmingof power that the USSR can bring to bear at every point within logistical reach of Soviet ground forces. At present, however, the USSR lacksair and naval strength to project this preponderance of land power overseas.5 Soviet strategic air power will have been greatly augmented and weapons of mass destruction (atomic, biological, and chemical) will presumably be available. Soviet naval capabilities, however, will then still be largely limited to submarine operations.
Economic. The Soviet economy, still relatively undevelopedas severely damaged by the war. It is presently incapable ofrolonged global war.owever, il will probably be capable of supportingar, although the war industrial capacities of the United States and thc United Kingdom combined would still be preponderantatio of.
Soviet seizure of the industrial capacities of continental Western Europe could greatly enhance the Soviet industrial war potential, but effective conversion ct these capacities lo Soviet use would probably require at least two or three years. If in the meantime the USSR were obliged to engagelobal war to hold these seizures, the total realizable resources under Soviet control would probably prove unequal lo lhe task
Political and Subversive. Important elements of Soviet strength are the absolute power of lhe Kremlin within the Soviet state and lhe Kremlin's apostolic relationship lo international Communism through which it commands the allegiance of the faithful throughout the world even against the claims of their respective national stales.
Thc Kremlin, however, does not enjoy complete freedom of aclion, even within the USSR. With realistic regard for the perpetuation of the regime, it must take into account the present war-weariness of thc Russian people, their resentment of prolonged deprivations, the disillusionment spread by veterans returning from the West, and the respect of the Russian people for the superiority of US technology and
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war materiel.ust reckon with thc potentialities for subversion inherent in any tyrannical regime, particularlyountry of such ethnic complexity as the USSR It must consider that resort to war would involve the risk of creating an alternative national leadership armed with real power. It must anticipate the stresses to which the regime will be subjected by the Inescapable problem of the succession.
Similarly, Soviet control of the Satellite States cannot be rendered perfectly secure, no matter how complete the Kremlin's control over governments maintained by Soviet force. The forces of mdividualisrn and nationalism will continue to exist In those countries; the hostility of their populations toward Communism and toward the USSR can be controlled only so long as active resistance remains hopeless
The same spirit of Individualism and of patriotism militates against Communist penetration of the West. Thc demonstrated subservience of Communist Partiesoreign power has severely curtailed their political influence. Should Western Europe be overrun by Soviet armies, the resulting antagonisms toward the USSR and toward Communism would undo such popular appeal as thc Communists still exercise. As in Eastern Europe, Soviet control would depend on the presence of superior force; passive resistance would be widespread, and active resistance could be expected in any circumstances thateasonable hope of liberation. Military conquest would prove an Inauspicious beginning for thc establishment of long-term political power.
3. US Security Interests Overseas.
Although thc USSR will constantly seek to undermine the economy and polity of the United States, the American continent is relatively Immune to sustained direct attack Inasmuch, however, as US security would be enhanced by the existencetable world situation, or by the availability ot military bases overseas, the weaknesses and instability prevailing in areas accessible to the USSR constitute weaknesses In the US security position. Should these areas fall under Soviet domination, the eventual result would be an agglomeration of hostile power against which it would beto render thc United States secure. Conversely, to restore and develop the normal and potential economic, political, and military strength of these areas would tend to redress the balance of power and ultimately to restrain the aggressive tendencies of the USSR. Thus the United Slates has vital security interests overseas in areas presently vulnerable to Soviet military or subversive aggression.
direct threats to us security
4. Economic
A basic consideration in Soviet policy is thc assumptionevere economic depression in the United States is inevitable and impending. Although Sovietas lo the timing of this event have been disappointed, the basic assumption Is still held.epression would be expecled to curtail US military strength, to undermine US support of resistance to Communism abroad, and lo create political instability in the Unitedshort, to provide new opportunities for Soviet
aggrandizement by means short of war and to facilitate Soviet success in the event of war. There is no reason to suppose that the USSR wouid await passively aof such decisive importance. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that the USSR is actively interested in the development of indecisive, diversionary situations which will cause the United States to over-extend its commitments and exhaust its resources.
The Communist Party in the United States is not numerically formidable, but is rather to be regarded as an elite cadre for the manipulation of mass discontent. Its potentialities in this regard are well Illustrated by the ease with which it hascontrol of the essentially non-Communist following of Henry Wallace. TheParty has been relatively unsuccessful, however. In its efforts to win control of US labor, although its prospects in the CIO were once promising and it still exercises control or predominant influence in important unions. Although Communistcapabilities in the United States are now narrowly limited, the Party would be quite capable of exploiting the labor unrest and mass discontent which would exist in the eventevere depression.
Apart from its political potentialities, the Communist Party in the United States is presently capable of extensive subversion, espionage, and sabotage. In thc event of war its underground elements would prove toangerous fifth column.capabilities in this regard will become more formidable with the progressive development of techniques of biological warfare and with the eventual availability of atomic weapons.
Lacking the requisite air and naval forces, the USSR has no present capability of sustained and decisive direct attack on the continental United Slates. Long-range air attacks on the Puget Sound area and one-way bomber sorties against any important US target are now possible, but not on such scale as to inflict crippling damageoperations would seriously interfere with US sea lines of communication.
5 the USSR will probably be capable of large scale air attacks on most parts of the United States from territory now under Soviet control, using weapons of mass destruction, und of large-scale submarine operations off US coasts, including the launching of short-range guided missiles from submarines. The USSR would then also be capable of airborne operations to seize advanced bases in Alaska and the Norlh Atlantic islands. It Is unlikely, however, that such advanced bases could be held againsl vigorous counterattack. The USSR could not successfullyajor airborne or seaborne invasion of the United States as long as major US air and naval forces remained In being.
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TO US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The existing and potential dangers to Canadian security are essentially similar to those referred to ln the ease of the United States, with the obvious difference that Canada Is more immediately exposed to Soviet air attack.
America.
Communist capabilities in Latin America are limited essentially to subversion, espionage, and sabotage, In which respects they are considerable. Political control is not regarded as an immediate Communist objective in that area. In any case.political influence Is presently declining, and Communist accession to political power Is unlikely to occur anywhere during the next decade. Except for possibleoperations and the eventual possibility of long-range one-way air attack from Alaska, the North Atlantic islands, or West Africa, Latin America is out of reach of direct military attack
threats to us security interests in western europe
Economic recovery Is essential to the restoration of Western European political stability, internal security, and capability of self-defenserimary objective of Soviet policy is to frustrate the European recovery program. The meanspolitical, andvaried with the circumstances. The purpose remains constant.
Despite political reverses suffered during the past year. Communist strength and political capabilities remain considerable, especially in France and Italy. There Is no present prospect of Communist accession to power by political means in any Western European country. This development, however, was In large part the effect of hope engendered by Indications that decisive US support of Western European recovery and independence might be expected. Should this hope turn to despair. Communistcapabilities would correspondingly increase.
The Communist Parlies of Western Europe, especially those of France and Italy, retain significant capabilities for subversion, espionage, and sabotage Communist control of French and Italian labor, though curtailed, is still considerable.in Western Europe the hard core of Communist militants wouldangerous fifth column In the event of war.
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Thc Soviet armed forces areapability. In present circumstances, of overrunning In about Iwo months all of Western Europe except southern Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and the British Isles, despite logistical difficulties. The occupation of Italy (including Sicily) could be completed In about four months, that of the Iberian Peninsula In about six. Meanwhile Great Britain could be subjected to severe air and missile bombardment Shipping in the western approaches and the Mediterranean would also be subject to air and submarine attack.
Despite efforts to restore thc defensive strength of Western Europe, the present prospect is that, in the absence of decisive US Intervention, these Soviet capabilities will still existlthough the rale of Soviet advance might be slower.8 the scale of possible air and missile attack on Great Britain and of air and submarine blockade will have been greatly increased, weapons of mass destruction (atomic, biological, and chemical) will presumably be available,apability of airborne invasion of Great Britain and the North Atlantic Islands will exist
threats to us security interests in the near east
ano Subversive.
The strategic importance of the Near East to both the USSR and the Westernits proximity to the USSR and remoteness from other Powers, the weakness andof indigenous governments, the many bitter local antagonisms and widespread mass discontent render the area extremely liable to Soviet political and subversive penetration The existing situation with respect to Palestine affords the USSR afavorable opportunity lo establish its political influence in thc region byoff Israel and the Arab Stales against each other and against the Western Powers and to promote its subversive purposes by exploiting the passions which have been aroused. These opportunities will probably continue lo exist throughout (he next decade.
15 Military.
In present circumstances the USSR could overrun lhe Near East to Jerusalem. Bahrein, and Bandar Abbas in aboul three months, to Cairo in about six, concurrently with the operations envisaged In Western Europe. The obstacles lo be overcome would be primarily logistical. The USSR would also be capable of harrassing air bases in Pakistan by air attack, if need be
Except as modified by US counteraction, these capabilities will presumably still exist8
threats to us security interests in the ear east
18. Political and Subversive
The situation in the Fat East is increasingly propitious for the accomplishment of Soviet purposes by political and subversive means. The newly established government
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South Korea could not long survive the withdrawal or US support. Chinese war-weariness and the progressive disintegration ol the authority of the Nationalmay well lead eventuallyettlement of the Chinese civil war on termsto the expansion of Soviet Influence and control. In Southeast Asia, Soviet championship of local nationalisms serves to gain native adherence and to prolong and intensify colonial conflicts which both deprive the West of needed strategic materials and actrain on Western energies and resources. The vulnerability of East Asia to Soviet penetration may be expected to continue during the next decade.
17. MnjTARY.
In the event of war, Soviet operations In the Far East would necessarily beto those In Europe and the Near East. Nevertheless Soviet forces, with the support of native adherents, could occupy such continental areas as Sinkiang, Manchuria, North and Central China, and South Korea.5 increased Soviet air power would also permit the invasion of Alaska and of Japan.
CONCLUSION'S
Soviet Intentions.
The probable basic intentions of the Kremlin for the next decade are:
o. To avoid war with the United Slates, but to exploit to the utmost, within that limitation, the coercive power inherent in the preponderance of Soviet military strength in Eurasia, relying on the disinclination of thc United Stales lo resort to war.
build up as rapidly as possible the war potential of the Soviet orbit,effort to equal and surpass, eventually, the war potential of the United States.
wage political, economic, and psychological warfare against theand its allies,iew to undermining their potential strength andthe relative strength ol the USSR: in particular, lo prevent or retardand coalition of Western Europe and the stabilization of the situationNear East and Far East.
exploit every opportunity presented by lhe weakness and instabilitystates to expand the area of Soviet domination by political andmeans.
Possibility of War.
Within the next decade the Kremlin is unlikely to rcsoil deliberately to war lo gain its ends, In view of:
existing Soviet political, economic, and psychological unreadinessprotracted war.
prospective increase in Soviet military and economic capabilitiesthe next decade.
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Inability, even then, to count upon crippling the United SUtesfirst blow, and consequent fear of US retaliation and of the greater US warpotential.
possibilities of expansion through political andand the ideological and personal preference of Soviet leaders for
The relative unsullabillty of military conquesteans for theof ultimate Soviet objectives in Europe and America.
he actual risks to thc regime itself ln the prosecution ofuccessful war. In the demoralization of forces brought in contact with Western civilization and the aggrandizement of military leaders.
The Kremlin, however, might resort to preventive war if convinced that war on US initiative was actually inevitable and that meanwhile time was on the side of thc United States. There is no reason to suppose that the Kremlin presently holds this view, but the situation in this respect will remain critical pending the successfulof US efforts to redress thc balance of power between the USSR and the West Moreover, considering thc bellicose and coercive tactics habitually employed by the USSR, the possibility that war may occur by accident or miscalculation cannot be excluded.
In any case, the fundamental hostility of the Soviet Government toward the United States and its formidable military power require, in common prudence, that the United States be prepared for the eventuality of war with the USSR.
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OMMENT BY THE DIRECTOR OP INTELLIGENCE. USAF
The attempt Io arrive at likely or unlikely Soviet Intentions during the period now facing us requires resolution of so many variables and imponderables as to renderorecast unsound, even dangerous. This applies notwithstanding desires or pressures to divine those Intentions. It is likely that the Kremlin has only the one basic intention of gaining its clear-cut objective of world domination by any and all means available. It Is also likely that the Kremlin has not yetecision as to whether It Is expedient now or at any determined future time to extend thc diplomatic warto armed conflict in order to gain Its basic objective.
Tho final conclusion of the study effectively points out the threats to US security Incident lo the imminent possibility of the present diplomatic war deteriorating Into armed conflict through accident or miscalculation. Nevertheless, the earlier conclusionlthough the Kremlin is unlikely to resort deliberately to war to gain iti ends within the next decade, It would do so If it came to considerourse expedient, particularly if convinced that lime was on the side ol the United" (under-lininj; supplied)reater assurance as to the threat of deliberate militarythan the slender evidence warrants. At any lime during thc next decade, changes in world power distribution, such as. material changes for the better or worse In the practical capabilities, desires and reactions of the Western Powers, or those resulting from Soviet acquisition of thc atomic bomb will require profound re-evaluations by both Soviet and United Slates planners. Current estimates indicate that the USSR may obtain atomic bombs0
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ISSENT OP THE OFFICE OP NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Thc Office of Naval Intelligence dissents with the indicated portions of subject paper and submits itst-
(a)under heading "Political andchange to read: "An important element of Soviet strength is that absolute power within the Soviet states rests ln thc Kremlin. In addition, thc Kremlin demands allegiance from governments of satellite states and from Communist parties throughout the world. However, recent evidences of defection indicate that Soviet control of international communism is not always accepted, especially when this control conflicts with nationalistic sentiment."
(b> Page "Br last sentence ofEconomic)change to read:It is reasonable to suppose that the USSR actively socks lo disrupt US domestic and foreign economic programs."
B TO RECIPIENTS OF CIA ESTIMATE
to tho Security of tho United States" published8 (Top Secret)
Please make the following correction on pagenclosure B
Pafagrapjija)
Atte? word "Page"hird paragraph" andectionirst sentence"
Paragraph (b)
Afte* word "Page"nd.
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