CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST ACCESSION TO POWER IN ITALY BY LEGAL MEANS
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CONSEQUENCES OrJ^^UNW^CCESSION ToToWER IN ITALY
BY LEGAL MEANS
SUMMARY
At the request ot the National Security Council Staff, we estimate herein thc consequences ol Communist accession to power In Italy by legal means.
Even If there had been no resort to force to prevent the Communist-dorninated government from entering office, there wouldtrong possibility of an early attempt to prevent by force the consolidation of its power, lhe Communists, however, would probably win the civil war resulting from any such attempt.
Thc Communists would be particularly anxious to avoidivil war. Their policy would be one of outward conciliation and quiet Inftltration until their control of the armed forces, police, and national administration had been consolidated. By processes made familiar in Eastern Europe, Italy would be eventually transformedotalitarian police state.
ommunisUlominated Italian government must do all In its power, short of political suicide, to maintain commercial relations with the West and toenial of US dollar credits. The Communists would not withdraw Italian participation ln the European Recovery Program, but would resist any US attempt to supervise its execution.trictly economic point of view. Italian participation Is not essential to thc success of the Recovery Program.
Italian Communist capabilities io support Communist action la neighboring countries would noi be appreciable. It is unlikely that thc armed forces of Italy,atellite Stale, could ever be of value for purposes other than the maintenance of internal security. From Italian bases, however, Soviet air and naval forces couldclose thc Slciban Channel and endanger shipping throughout Iho Mediterranean. Fighter escorted bombers could reach North African targets from Algiers to Dema and could cover all of France except Brest and Cherbourg.
The advantages to be derivedonsolidation of Communist control of Italy would be such thai the Kremlin would be likely toeneral policy of detente in order to facilitate that development. If. however, this policy failed to prevent Western Interventionossible Italian civil war. Communist parties in the West would be directed to create the maximum disruption and diversion by strikes, disorders,
Nole: The InformaUoii in thisfebruary, at whleh*Umc It was submitted to the member aijeneles of thc Interdeparlmenlal Advisory Council *or coordination.
Th? report has the concurrence of the Intelligence agencies *or the Departments or state the Array, and the Air Force, the latter two actlnfi only with respect to IU military aspects. '
The omce ot Naval Intelligence does not concur In this paper. Its position Is as rollows* "ONI La not prepared toetailedpredictions derived from tha assumption. Tbe situation presented by such an assumption would be fluid and could eventually taae one ot many paths which at the present tune cannot be clearly charted -
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and sabotage. While supporting the Communist regime, the Kremlin would be careful to permit neither lher the Satellite States to become so definitely committed as to Incur serious risk ofollision and war with the Western rowers.
he fear which Communist control of Italy would arouse In Western European and Mediterranean countries would be more likely to stimulate resistance tothan to induce submission. These nations would call on the United States for greater aid and for military guarantees of their independence and territorial integrity.
CON SEQUENCES OFJCOMMUNIST 'ACCESSION TO POWER IN ITALY
BY LEGAL MEANS
ASSUMPTION
For the purposes of this estimate it is assumedommunist-con trolledhas actually taken office in Italy by legal means.
Within thc foreseeable future the assumed situation could occur onlyesulteople's Bloc victory In thc election scheduled fortonth must pass between that election and thc inaugurationew government. Even If the People's Bloc were to win at theajority of the scats in the Nationalits actual accession to power might be prevented by falsification of thc returns or by force. It is assumed, however,eople's Bloc (Communist-controlled)has actually been installed in office.
DIRECT CONSEQUENCES
3. The Possiuhjty or Crm War.
Even if there had been no resort to force to prevent the installationommunist-dominated government, there wouldtrong possibility of an early attempt to prevent by force the consolidation of its power. Such an attempt would beby lack of cohesion and leadership among militantly anti-Communist elements in Italy and by Communist administrative control of the Armed Forces, Carablnieri, and police. However, an anti-Communist insurrection, if it occurred prior to anpurge of thc Armed Forces and thc Carabinicri, would be favored by the probable piecemeal adherence of such units of those forces as wereosition to do so. Thc Vatican would probably give covert support to the movement, but would not take sides officially against the government until, in the initial disorder, ecclesiastical persons and property had been subjected to mob attack (as in Spain. At the outset the conflict would be between the organized militants of the extreme Right and Left, the mass of the population being dismayed and bewildered. Eventually thc masses could be aroused to pillage and violence by whichever side held the local advantage.
4. The Outcome or Civil War.
In the event of civil war in the circumstances envisaged above, theGovernment could probably retain an effective general control of allof the Rome-Pescara line and of the Adriatic coast from Pescara to Ban,might also hold the Taranto naval base, and Messina, Catania, Stracusa. andin Sicily. Either side might prevail in the initial struggle for the possessionElsewhere in Italian territory thc anti-Communist forces would gain *
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The anti-Communist insurgents would not only fail to overthrow the Communist-dominated government: they could not hold the area under their Initial control without immediate and substantial forfcfgn aid. As the probabilityommunist victory in the civil war became apparent, however) secession movements would develop In Sicily and Sardinia. If the .Communists in the Sicilian cities had meanwhile been subdued, it is possible that the anti-Communists could succeed In holding the two islands.
Developments in the Absence or Civil War.
Having won an electoral victory, the People's Bloc would wish to exploit itsby political means and would be particularly anxious to avoidivil war in which It would have little to gain and much to lose. Ils Communist leadership would seek to be all things to all men: more Catholic than the Vatican, more solicitous of middle-class interests than the bourgeois parties, more jealous of national sovereignty than the neo-Fascists. Palmlro Togliatti has already proved himself adept andin this sort of duplicity. Thc People's Bloc would not take office as agovernment, butoalition of popular parties devoted to democracy, national sovereignty, and peace. The prime minister would probableon-Communist, possibly Pictro Nenni.
Behind the scenes, however, the Communists would exercise effective control. As in the original coalition governments of Eastern Europe, they would demand and receive the ministries of control such as those of the Interior, Justice. Communications, and Defense. There wouldiscreet, but rapid, Communist infiltration of the armed forces, the police, and thc national administration. The time required tothe transition mightatter of months or of years, but the end wouldully developed police state under open and exclusive Communist control.
Control of the Italian Economy.
The Communists, in power, would seek to integrate thc Italian economy with that of the USSR. They could not afford, however, to forego commercial relations with thc West or to alienate dollar credits In excess of those earned by exports.
The economies of Italy and the USSR are in many respects complementary. Italy possesses facilities and skills required to produce goods needed by the USSR and the Satellite States, such as motor transport, electrical equipment, other machinery, and textiles. The USSR and the Satellite States, in turn, arc relatively well supplied with products needed by Italy, such as cereal grains, coal, lumber, cotton, petroleum,and chromium. For the time being, however, the area presently under Soviet control could not deliver as much as half the coal, petroleum, and cotton required to maintain the current level of Italian industrial production. Moreover, Italy would remain almost entirely dependent on the West for essential imports of scrap Iron, steel, and steel products, and for thc tungsten, vanadium, and molybdenum required for fine steel and armaments production. Italy must also depend on the West for fertilizers required to maintain domestic production of foodstuffs.
If Italy were denied imports from the West except such as might be earned by exports from production supported only by available Eastern economic aid, the result would be severe economic hardship Exceptrief interval of reduced rations attributable to administrative lag, emergency provision of foodstuffs from the East would permit the maintenance of Italian rations at the current level. In thc courseear, however, industrial production would decline to about half the current level,onsequent increase In unemploymentradual recovery might occur, but after another year the level of production could be no more thanercent of what it might have been under the European Recovery Program. These consequences would be unacceptable tor Internal political as well as economic reasons.ommunlst-dominatcd Italian government must therefore do all in its power, short of political suicide, toenial of US dollar credits.
Policv.
Communist control of Italian foreign policy would Insure its immediateto the basic objectives of the USSR. For both internal political and economic reasons,ommunist-dominated government would seek to avoid an abrupt severance of existing Italian relations with the West. There would, of course, be immediate professions of friendship with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and other "democratic" states. The advantages of friendly association with the East would be attested by beneficial trade agreements, Yugoslav concession of Trieste to Italy, and Soviet sponsorship of Italy for membership In tho United Nations and for trusteeship over the former Italian colonics in Africa. These benefits, gratifying to the Italian people, would enhance the popularity of the Government and further the consolidation of Communist control. While capitalising its relations with the East, however, the Government would demand of the West the fulfillment of all commitments made lo its predecessors and even more of the same benefits.
European Recovery Program.
This attitude toward the West would be exemplified particularly in the policy of the new Italian Government with respect to the European Recovery Program. Although the Italian Communist Partyember of the Cominform, It is even now permitted topecial variant of thc Cominform line regarding the ERP. It is not opposedubstantial US contribution to Italian economicit feels that Italy is properly entitled to more aid from the United States than lt is scheduled to receive. It is critical of De Gasperi's "subservience" to USowever, and Jealous of any infringement of Italian sovereignty which could be attributed to the Program. Thc Communists In office would not wilhdra^ Italy from participation In the ERP. They would be critical of the'"inadequacy"'of the assistance received {in contrast to the "generosity" of the USSR) and they would resist any US attempt to control the administration of the Program as an Infringement of Italian sovereignty. If US aid to Italy were continued, the Communists would seek lo gain for themselves and thc USSR thc credit for any consequent Improvement in the Italian economic
If further US aid were withheld from Italy, the Communists would seize
the strictly economic point of view, the participation of Italy Is not essential to the success of the European Recovery Program. The elimination of Italy from the Program would permit increased allocations of foodstuffs, fertilizers, chemicals, coal, oil, and scrap iron to other countries.
Am to Neighboring Communists.
Thc abilityommunist-dominated Italian government to support Communist activities in neighboringspecially in France, Spain, and North Africa) would not be appreciable. The passage of couriers and of light supplies and equipment into France would, of course, be facilitated, but no considerable contribution ofand bulk supplies would be possible, both for logistical reasons and because for some time all the resources of the Italian Communist Party would be required toand exploit its position in Italy.
Military Potential of Italyatellite State.
The existing Italian military establishment has no significant capabilities except in relation to internal security. It Is strongly anti-Communist in tradition andThe first concernommunist-dominated government would be tothc insurrectionary capabilities of the armed forcesurge of thcedisposltlon of units, to be followedomplete political reorientation through further purging and relndoctrination. In view of the delicacy of the Internal political situation, thc latter phase of this process would have to be accomplished gradually, In order not to provoke insurrection. Until thc process had been completed the Italian armed forces would betnot only without external military capabilities but also an actual danger to thc internal security of the regime.
Eventually, the political reliability of the armed forces having been assured, an effort would be made lo increase their military effectiveness. The USSR would assist in their reequipment and training, but only lo the extent necessary to create an effective local auxiliary force of limited capabilities. It is doubtful, in any case, whether the Italian armed forces, under Communist control, could ever be of value for purposes other than thc maintenance of internal security. If Mussolini, in twenty years, could not create forces willing to fight with determination for empire in the Mediterranean, it Is unlikely that the Communists could create, from the same material, forces more willing to fight thc Western Powers at thc bidding of thc Kremlin.
MruTARY Catabiltes FROM Italian Bases.
Through Communist control of Jtaly thc USSR would gain potential access lo bases in Italian territory. From such bases Soviet air and naval forces (the latter
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primarily submarines) could endanger shipping throughout the Mediterranean and could effectively close the Stfilian ChanneV lo traffic. From the Catania airfieldin Sicily, Soviet bombers with fighter escort could range as far east as Derna, Crete, and the Aegean; from Cagliari In Sardinia, they could reach westward to Valencia and beyond Algiers. North Africa, between the limits indicate, would be subject to such air attack.
oviet ground offensive westward or northward from North Italy would be hindered by the barrier of the Alps, fighter-escorted bombers from that area could reach most of that part of France beyond range of similar attack from the Soviet Zone in Germany. Only lirest and Cherbourg would be beyond their reach.
EFFECT ON SOVIET STRATEGY AND POLICY
the EventrACxnn, Transition.
The advantages to be derivedonsolidation of Communist control of Italy would be such that the Kremlin would seek to avoid action likely to Jeopardize that prospective development.iew to minimizing the US reaction and theof US suspension of essential economic aid to Italy, the USSR might well take the Initiative to ease the general International tension, assuming an attitude of goodwill and sweet reasonableness without actually yielding on any essential point. This attitude, if it did not deceive US policy makers, would at least render their position more difficult by influencing public opinion and tending to put on them the onus of any continuation of International tension.
In consonance with this policy the Communists would move circumspectly to consolidate their control of Italy, and the Communist parties In other countries would be directed to exercise equal care to avoid provocations and allay antagonisms. For the time being. Communist activity would be directed into legitimate politicaland, even so. would not be pressed too vigorously, except for propagandaof the Italian exampleopular front for peace and democracy.
Mfasures in Sutpowt or Italy.
While following thc general policy indicated above, the USSR would probably adopt the following specific measures In support of the Communist-dominated Government of Italy:
a. Economic support of selected Italian industries within the limits of Soviet capabilities (See
upport of revision of the Italian Peace Treaty on terms advantageous lo thc new government, with particular referenceivision of the Free Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia,,giving Trieste to Italy. US and Britishto this solution would manifestly be resistance to expulsion from their own "impcrialisl" stronghold in Trieste
c. Support for the admittance of Italy to membership in the United Nations The United Stales and United Kingdom, having hitherto supported the admittance of
Italy, could not reverse their position without exposing hostility toward ,
d More insistent advocacy ot Italian trusteeship over the former Italian colonics in Africa. The Western Powers could not oppose this solution without exposing both their hostility toward Italian "'democracy" and their own "Imperialist" ambitions. Acquiescence, however, wouldoviet lodgment in Africa.
14. In the Event or Civil Wab.
If Communist accession to power in Italy shouldivil war (seehc Kremlin would seek to support the Communists to the maximum ex'.entwith avoidanceeneral war, and at the same time would seek to prevent Western support of the anti-Communists by meansonintervention formulato that or the Western Powers with respect to the Spanish Civil War. If that tactic succeeded, the USSR might stilleneral policy of detenteconsolidationommunist victory in Italy. If it did not, the Kremlin would call on Western Communists to prevent or curtail Western intervention in Italy by exertion of their utmost capabilities for disruption through strikes, disorders, and sabotage, but avoiding armed insurrection. In any case, the Kremlin would be careful in Italy (as in Greece) not to permit either the USSR or its Satellites to become so definitely committed as to incur serious risk of direct collision and war with the Western Power*.
reactions elsewhere
eneral.
Thc assumed Communist accession to power in Italy would be significant not only as the first actual extension of Communist (Soviet) territorial control (except in China) since the conclusion of World War II. but also as the first instance In history of aaccession to power by popular suffrage and legal procedure. So unprecedented and portentous an event mustrofound psychological effect in thosethreatened by Soviet or Communist aggression and still striving to retain their freedom.
Moreover, whereas In Eastern Europe Communism had overrun lands long inbetween the East and West, in Italy Communism would have taken possession of the most ancient seat of Western Culture. In particular, devout Catholicswould be gravely concerned regarding thc safety of the Holy See.
Communist control of Italy would bring the power of Russia to the shores of thc Mediterranean for the first lime in history, .and that at the point best suited forof that Sea. The strategic implications of that development would be appreciated in all Mediterranean countries and in Great Britain.
The fear of Communism and of Soviet aggression wldch these considerations would arouse would be more likely to stimulate resistance than to induce submission.confidence in their own powers of resistance, however, the nations of Western Europe
S^RET
and the Mediterranean would call upon Lhe United States for greater aid and forguarantees of their indcpenderfce and territorial Integrity.
IC The United Kingdom.
The British Government wouldommunist accession to power in Italy with grave concern, as threatening both the strategic position of the Western Powers in the Mediterranean and the political stability of Western Europe. The British would wish to join with the United Stalesrompt and vigorous program of combined counteraction. They would urge greater US economic support and military guarantees for Western European and Mediterranean countries. The British would also initiate staff consultations with the older Dominions, and would probably secure their support, British demobilization would be suspended and British naval and air units Inediterranean would be reinforced- The developmenttrategic position ln Africa would be expedited. The adoption of these measures would Increase British dependence on the economic and financial support of the United States.
ranc*.
Thc accessionommunist-dominated government to power in Italy would revive in France an acute sense of Communist menace and so would favor the fortunes of Dc Gaulle. His political appeal requires also,ronounced lack ofin the existing regime. If. at the time, the French public lacked confidence in the eventual success of the Schuman Government's economic program and In its ability to cope with the new situation, the Government might fall, in which case De Gaulle would come to power. If. on the other hand, thereeasonable prospect ofimprovement and the Government's action to control Communist exploitation of thc new situation were prompt and vigorous, it would probably retain sufficient public confildence to withstand the shockommunist advance to the French frontier.
In the absence of civil war in Italy, the French Communists would presumablyto restrict themselves to political action, in consonance with over-all(see. In the event of civil war in Italy, however, theybe directed to exert their utmost capabilities for disruption throughand sabotage. This policy would be Intended to prevent Westernin Italy by neutralizing France and diverting the United Kingdom and theeven at the sacrifice of the French Communist Party. The Frenchcould eventually suppress the French Communists, but meanwhile thewould have won the Italian civil war and the economy of France would have
ustria and Western Germany.
Communist accession lo power in Italy might convince thc Austrian Government that It was expedient to reach an understanding wilh thc USSR It would not have that effect on the political leaders of Western Germany. If the Vatican appeared lo be
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endangered by the turn ol events in Italy, there would probablytrong anti-Cominunist reaction among the Catholic populations of Austria and Western Germany. If communications through Italy^o* Austria were/interrupted the resultant increased strain on thc German transportation system would have serious economic effects.
The accessionommunist-dominated government to power in Italy would revive Spanish memories of the Civil War and would cause Spaniards of all shades of political opinion (except the few genuine Communists) to rally against the Communist menace. The only practical rallying point would be Franco, whose position would be greatly strengthened by this tendency. Franco would exploit the threat to Western strategic interests in the Mediterranean to seek an escape from political Isolation into
close political, economic, and military relations with the Western Powers.
North Africa.
Any marked change in thc Mediterranean area wouldisturbing effect on thc unstable situation in French North Africa. Communist accession to power In Italy would facilitate, in some degree, Communist infiltration of the Italian population In Tunisia. Thc European population of North Africa is generally anti-Communist,while the North African nationalists are Interested in exploiting the divisions and distractions of Europe for their own, not Communist, purposes.
The idea of an Italian trusteeship might appeal to thc Italian population of Tripolitania. but the ideaommunist regime would not. The Arab majority would resist by force of arms thc relmposltion of an Italian regime of whatever politicalThc British military occupation would remain secure.
and Other Arab States.
Communist accession to power in Italy and consequent Soviet penetration Into the Mediterranean would alarm the Arab governments. Normally, in fear of the USSR, they would turn to the United States for support. If. however, the United States were continuing to support the partition of Palestine, an Arab rapprochement with the USSR might well occur. The Arabs would have no Illusions thai any Soviet support which they might receive in their own conflict with the West would be disinterested. They might hope, however, that the USSR's need for Arab support in its conflict with the West would be such that the USSR would desist from efforts to undermine the existing order in the Arab States so as to facilitate their realignment. This eventuality isnot only by Arab extremists, but even by responsible elements. The existing Arab Governments, however, would be unlikely to followourse unless compelled to do so by overwhelming popular reaction.
Although not generally receptive to Communism, the long-established Italianin the Arab Stales would serve as channels of Italian Communist infiltration.
Most of0 Italians in the Arab States arc concentrated in Egypt where they constitute the second largestolony. They are fairly well Integrated Into Egyptian national life, and are generally conservative and anti-Ck>rnmunlst. Moreto Communist agitation would betalian ex-prisoners employed ln the Dhahran oilfield in Saudi Arabia.
rkecb.
Communist accession to power in Italy wouldisheartening effect on the Greek people, already discouraged by the endless struggle with the Communist-led guerrillas. There would be no large-scale defections lo the Communist cause, however, since the division between Communists and anti-Communists has already been sharply drawn by civil war. The old bitterness against the Italian people (which all but died out after the Italian surrender) would revive. It is just possible that there mightwithpirit of Greek patriotism like thathich might lead to greater political solidarity In the face of national peril and to more effective collaboraton with US officials ln Greece. The sense of greater danger would certainly lead to demands for Increased US support and possibly for US military Intervention.
DISTRIBUTION
The President Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to Commander In Chief
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of lhe Army
Secretary of tbo KaTy
Secretory ot tbe Air Force
Executive Secretary. National Security Council
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations. General Staff. US Army
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations.
Director of Plans and Opera lions. US Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Research and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence. General Staff. US Army
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelllsence, US Air Force
Secretary. Joint Chiefs of BtaS
Secretary. Joint Intelligence Group
Secretary. State-Army-Navy-Air Force OoordlnaUnE Committee
Executive secretary. Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Cblef. Acquisition and Distribution. OICD. Department ot State
Original document.
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